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g6stract 
In this dissertation I claim that Michel Foucault is a pro-enlightenment 
philosopher. I argue that his critical history of thought cultivates a state of being 
autonomous in thought and action which is indicative of a kantian notion of 
maturity. In addition, I contend that, because he follows a nietzschean path to 
enlightenment, Foucault’s elaboration of freedom proceeds from his critique of who 
we are, which includes a rejection of humanism’s experiential limits. At the same 
time, and perhaps most importantly, I also suggest that Foucault articulates a post- 
humanist conception of finitude and being. 
To begin with, I show that on humanism’s path to edghtenment, which is 
established by Rousseau, Kant and Hegel and currently advocated by Rawls and 
Taylor, a philosophy of the autonomous subject who desires self-actualisation 
through recogrution precedes the epistemologcal and political critiques which 
generate humanism’s objective, normative and subjective axes of experience. On 
the basis of Foucault’s archzological, genealogical and, when they operate together, 
critical historical critiques of these conditions of possibility for autonomy and 
recogrution, I maintain that humanism fails to teach us how to think or act freely- 
that is, as critical thought that delivers enhghtenment-and that humanism’s 
knowledge of the world and its justice in politics necessitate the confined exclusion 
of those who are different and the submission of subjectivity of those who are 
nor mal. 
In response to the immaturity that is at the heart of humanism, I illustrate that 
Foucault deploys archzology, genealogy and critical history to excavate his post- 
humanist, enlightenment alternatives of sauoir, pouvoir and etluco-morality. After 
he relocates an explanation of cause and effect in the human sciences from sazioir to 
the relations between snuoir and pouvoir, I explicate how Foucault reconceives, 
firstly, the way pouaoir is exercised by productive mechanisms, which discipline the 
body and regulate the citizen, and, secondly, the nature of pouvoir, which he 
characterises as governmentality, or one’s action upon the actions of others. He 
then retlunks freedom as the 77is-ir-vis of pou-t,air/savoir, and I demonstrate how 
critical history reveals that, prior to the hermeneutic relation to self wluch is at the 
centre of humanism’s conception of moral identity, etlucal subjectivity in antiquity 
is formed through an ascetic, agonistic freedom that is based on a practical relation 
to self. Foucault uses this as a blueprint for the present, in which an ethico-political 
state of being autonomous in thought and action is constituted over against our 
limits of poui.,oir/ smoir. 
I thus claim that Foucault’s portrayal as an anti-enlightenment philosopher, 
who proffers nothing but anormative critique and amoral freedom, represents the 
perspective of those for whom to be anti-humanism is akin to being anti- 
enlightenment. These criticisms are exposed as misguided by the thesis that I verify 
in tlus dissertation, which is that critical history qua critique, thence an ontology, 
namely, Foucault’s critical ontology, brings about maturity and endorses an 
ehghtenment that is both contra- and post-humanism. 
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Preface 
Shortly before he died in 1984 at the age of fifty-seven, Paul-Michel Foucault wrote 
of the ”irony in those efforts one makes to alter one’s way of looking at things ... 
[and] to change the boundaries of what one knows”.1 After thirty-five years of 
philosophical labour, during which he always sought (to) s’kgarer un peu (to stray a 
little afield from Foucault wondered if in the end it had enabled him to 
thmk differently. Perhaps, he reflected, 
[my efforts] made it possible to go back through what I was already thinking, to 
think it differently, and to see what I had done from a new vantage point and in 
a clearer light. Sure of having traveled [sic] far, one finds that one is looking 
down on oneself from above. The journey rejuvenates things, and ages the 
relationship with 0ne~eI.f.~ 
In my case, I first began to orient myself in philosophy-at least if it is ”still 
what it was in times past, i.e., an ’ascesis’, rrske’sis, an exercise of oneself in the 
activity of thought”4 - through the liberal and communitarian debate, which 
dominated the under- and post-graduate curricula at Southampton and British 
Columbia. These studies culminated in a masters dissertation, in which I argued 
that feminism lies in a state of purgatory between the ambiguous status of the 
subject in post-modern philosophy and the foundational, masculine subject in 
modern philosophy. I concluded that, because of these problematic notions of the 
subject, feminism is unable to produce the critique necessary to transform 
patriarchy and realise freedom for its constituency of women. 
With this in mind, I enrolled for a doctoral degree at Edinburgh to examine 
the potential for critique and freedom without the compass of the subject to guide 
them. Yet it soon became apparent that how one defines critique is a political 
matter in its own right, whilst how one conceptualises freedom is as important as 
the politics that implements it. As a consequence, I have researched these 
’ Foucault, The Use ofPleusure, p. 11. Michel Foucault was a professor at the Colltgc de F r ~ n c c  in Paris 
from 1970 until h s  death from an AIDS related illness. He held a chair there in what he designated as 
the History of Systenzs of Thought. 
Foucault, ”Usage des plaisirs et techniques de soi”, p. 545. 
Foucault, The Use ofPleasure, p. 11. 
Foucault, The Use ofPleasure, p. 9. 
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philosophical themes through the writings of some archetypal modern, 
enlightenment philosophers, from Immanual Kant and Georg Hegel to John Rawls, 
Charles Taylor and Jiirgen Habermas, and one of their supposed post-modern, anti- 
enlightenment antagonists, Foucault. Ultimately, though, I have altered my way of 
loolung at things through the latter’s dits et h i t s :  literally, the things said and 
7uvitten by Foucault. Albeit some distance from where I started, what I present here 
in the shape of a doctoral dissertation is me looking down on myself en route to 
assuage my ignorance via the exercise of myself in the activity of thought. 
ix 
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FoucauLi ’s CriticaCXistory of  Thought 
The core thesis in this dissertation is that Foucault’s self-designated histoire critique 
de la pens&,’ his critical history of thought, epitomises how to practice critical 
thought. On this understanding, I refute the standard reception of Foucault as an 
anti-enlightenment philosopher. Instead, I claim that he is pro-enlightenment and 
anti-humanism. In particular, I argue that while Foucault’s critical history (of 
thought) is skeptical about humanism’s abhty to realise Kant’s motto of 
enlightenment - ”Sapere nude!, Be wise, dare to know!”2 - his critical hstory is 
successful in its endeavour to mamfest enhghtenment. It does so through critique 
that cultivates maturity, which is a state of being autonomous in thought and action 
that results from both resolution and ”courage to use your own understanding’? 
Before I articulate how Foucault honours critical thought, which is the legacy 
of the intellectual revolution that blossomed in Europe in the eighteenth century, it 
is helpful for the terms of the investigation to touch on the principal objections that 
are made against him. As I spell out shortly, Foucault’s critics suggest that he is 
more of a foe than a friend of enlightenment, and especially a foe of critical 
thought’s twin pillars of how to thmk critically and act freely. This hostility is 
fuelled by humanism’s belief that, as the sole path to enlightenment, anyone who is 
anti-humanism must also be anti-enlightenment. Subsequent to this, I define 
Foucault’s critical history, which as I shall demonstrate in the conclusion to the 
dissertation represents a modern attitude - he portrays it as ”a permanent critique 
of our historical era’’4 - which elucidates the experience that mediates who we are. 
’ Foucault, ”Foucault”, pp. 631-632. 
This is an amalgamation of Reiss’ (“Dare to be wise!”) and Becks (“Dare to know!”) translation of 
“Sapere aude!”. Cf., respectively, Kant, “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 192, 
f. 2.; Kant, ”What is Enlightenment?”, p. 286, f. 1. 
Kant, ”An Answer to the Question: ’What is Edghtenment?”’, p. 54. 
Foucault, ”’What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 42. 
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Further, it is only after critique reveals these experiential limits, both humanism’s, 
which perpetuate immaturity, and the foucauldian alternatives of suvoir,5 pouvoir,6 
and ethico-morality,7 that Foucault elaborates ethical subjectivity. He conceives of it 
as an ascetic practice of agonistic freedom, or an zesthetics of existence, which is a 
resolute and courageous mode of being that promises a state of being autonomous 
in thought and action. As such, I claim that his critical history qua critique, thence 
ontology, namely, Foucault’s critical ontology, endorses enlightenment and realises 
maturity in the present. 
1.i. Foucault as Friend or Foe 
It is fruitful to commence with Habermas’ criteria of what is required if one wants 
to be recognised as a trustee of the critical thought that is at the heart of 
enlightenment. Firstly, one must subscribe to Kant’s philosophcal understanding 
of the present as the time of critique and the age of maturity; and, secondly, one 
should imitate Hegel’s desire to find within the post-1789 epoch of modernity 
concrete evidence that lends existential re-assurance to the claims of critical 
thought? Typically, re-assurance is rendered through epistemological and political 
critique, which a propos of a theorisation of the subject’s true being give certainty to 
thought and action in terms of objective knowledge and normative justice. As 
Habermas apprehends the obligation of post-kantian, hegelian critical thought, 
modernity can ”no longer borrow [from other epochs] the criteria by which it takes 
its orientation . . . : it has to create its normativity out 0fit~eyl.9 
Obviously, the conceptual elements of critical thought’s twin axes of 
objectivity and normativity, whch Kant establishes and Hegel redefines, need not 
determine how one practices it. Rawls, for example, eventually jettisons his kantian 
I use savoir in contrabtinction to connaissance, both of which translate as knowledge. Ian Haclung 
calls the former depth knowledge, and David Macey describes connaissance as scientdic knowledge, 
whilst Foucault hunself suggests that ” p l y  connaissance I mean the relation of the subject to the object 
and the formal rules that govern it. Savoir refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular 
period for h s  or that type of object to be given to connaissance and for tlus or that enunciation to be 
formulated”. Savoir is then the background wluch frames the connaissance that is necessary for 
historical experience. Hacking, “The Archaeology of Foucault”, p. 30; Macey, The Lives ofMichel 
FoucauZt, p. 234; Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 15, f. 2. 
ever use the word ’power’ and if I do . . . it is . . . a short cut to the expression I always use: the 
relationslups of power”. Foucault, “The etluc of the care for the self”, p. 11. 
As I shall elaborate in chapter 6, I speak of etluco-morality to reflect the fact that Foucault’s 
conception of ethics as a mode of subjectivation is an aspect of, and inseparable from, morality. 
Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse ofModemity, p. 16. 
Habermas, The PhilosophicaI Discourse ofModemity, p. 7. 
I employ pouvoir to distinguish Foucault’s idea of the relations of power, as he writes that ”I hardly 
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heritage of a metaphysical conception of the subject for a democratically derived, 
social contract based notion of political liberalism, which is supported by the 
rational and reasonable citizen. For his part, the hegelian inspired Taylor counters 
atomistic and methodological individualism with a politics of recognition, which in 
its assumption of the self-interpreting, expressivist subject is as indebted to Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau as it is to Martin Heidegger and Johann Herder. 
Nonetheless, the fundamental assumption from Kant through Hegel to Rawls 
and Taylor, who command attention in the dissertation because they establish and 
are current custodians of enlightenment critical thought, is that the philosopher 
renders an account of the truth of the subject’s being through knowledge. It in turn 
morally jusbfies critique in as much as knowledge is presumed to be independent 
of power. Their philosophies of what Jean-Luc Nancy defines as the philosophical 
subject translate into the concepts of autonomy, recogrution, political liberty and 
political liberation, respectively.10 Kant and Rawls assume that liberty is by human 
right an a priori possession of the subject, and as such it is definitive of maturity, 
whereas Hegel and Taylor hypothesise that the subject has an existential desire to 
engage in a process of liberation, which concludes in maturity.” Indeed, once the 
manoeuvres of reason c u h a t e  in disenchantment at the close of the eighteenth 
century, the subject is introduced to resolve ruhihsm via h s  autonomy and 
recognition, which emphasise ”the intention ... [and] the purpose for the sake of 
which one has acted or lived”.** For Kant and Hegel, epistemological critique orders 
the world of things into objective experience, which is shouldered by the subject’s 
moral identities of autonomy and recogrution, and for Rawls and Taylor political 
critique regulates the power of the juridical state on the basis of the normative 
experience that is required for the moral identities of political liberty and political 
liberation. In short, what underpins Kant’s and Hegel’s approach to knowledge, 
and Rawls’ and Taylor’s account of power, is a theory of the subject. Whence the 
raison d’itue of the philosopher, too, who at Zygmunt Bauman’s analytical level of 
intellectual praxis is either a legislator that upholds autonomy, or an interpreter 
‘O According to Nancy, tlie phlosophcal subject’s identity is defined by self-consciousness, wluch 
relates to difference in three ways: it opposes difference, because difference signals the exteriority of 
being-outside-the-self; it assumes, and resorbs w i b n  itself qua self-consciousness, tlie difference that 
constitutes the subject; and it makes difference, insofar as self-consciousness relates itself to itself as 
different from all other identity and non-identity. ”Being the very movement proper to self- 
consciousness”, Nancy says, ”identity - or the Self that identifies itself - therefore makes difference 
itself, difference proper: and this property designates or denotes itself as ’man’”. Nancy, TIze Birth to 
Presence, pp. 9-10. 
l2 Nietzsche, The Will to Pouw, 5 666, p. 351. 
Rajchan, Michel Foucault, p. 7. 
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who meets the desire for recognition.13 
The philosophcal subject who grounds epistemological and political critique, 
which aims to re-assure modernity of itself as the age of maturity, encapsulates 
humanism and its path to enlightenment. From it, reason gives those in modernity 
a heightened consciousness of the autonomous subject's authentic being, as well as 
of the concrete recogrution it requires to be self-actualised? Essentially, as 
Rousseau first recogruses and even Rawls grants, political liberty and political 
liberation belong together.15 In fact, rather than an account of what freedom is in 
itself, it might be said that autonomy and recognition are conceptual statements 
about security from others, hence political liberty, or community with others, which 
is realised through political liberation. Notwithstanding, and with a generalisation 
that is a necessary analytical aid, it is possible to describe the critical thought of 
Kant, Hegel, Rawls and Taylor as humanist because it articulates truth based 
critique to re-assure modernity of its right to autonomy and desire for recogmtion. 
As Jean-Paul Sartre writes, at the centre of humanism is the autonomous legislator, 
man, for whom "it is not by turning back upon himself, but always by seeking, 
beyond himself, an aim which is one of liberation or of some particular realisation, 
that man can realise hmself as truly 
From the perspective of this path to enhghtenment, the friends of the faith in 
humanism find their foe in Foucault. They argue that he promotes anormative 
critique and proffers nothing but amoral freedom. In respect of the former, he 
locates truth within relations of pouvoir/snaoir. This stems from hs influence by 
Friedrich Nietzsche, for whom truth is always already a will to power.I7 
Consequently, for critics like Habermas Foucault disguises his enlightenment 
values in pseudo-judgements,'* and for Peter Dews his pre-critical investigations 
simply valorise mar p a l  experien~e.1~ Taylor, for example, believes that "half- 
baked, neo-Nietzschean theories . . . [dleriving frequently from Foucault . . . claim 
that all judgements of worth are based on standards that are ultimately imposed by 
'3 Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters, pp. 3-5. 
l 4  Owen, Maturity and Modernity, pp. 2-3. 
'' Autonomy ensures "that all men are equally protected against the abuse of power and [die 
recognition that they are] equally entitled to insist that power shall be used . . . for the general 
advantage". Tawney, Equality, p. 158. 
'' Sartre, Existenlialzsm and Humanism, pp. 55-56. 
" Merquior, Foucault, p. 108. 
l8  Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Moderni ty, p. 282. 
l9 Dews, Logics ofDisintegrution, p. 169. 
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... structures of power”.20 Or, where I see an ethical subject who practices an 
agonistic freedom over against pouvoirl savoir, Lois McNay perceives Foucault’s 
replication of ”the fundamental dynamic of the philosophy of the subject[,] which 
posits an active self acting on an objectdied world and interacting with other 
subjects who are defined as ... narcissistic extensions of the primary subject”.*’ To 
all intents and purposes, Foucault reneges on enhghtenment critique and freedom, 
which for J-G. Merquior confirms the bankruptcy of gauchiste foucauldianism, 
especially the lamentable efforts of its pnvvenu protagonist from Poitiers to practice 
critical thought.u ”Professors at the College de France or other academic 
Olympuses”, Merquior writes, who regard ”themselves as maverick bohemians at 
war with bureaucracy and Les p i s [ , ]  are a permanent possibility among French 
intellectualdom, a bourgeois stratum dying to pass for an intelligentsia” .B 
Most tellingly, Habermas puzzles over the compatibility between Foucault’s 
enlightenment tendencies, which come to the fore just before his death, and his 
earlier anti-h~rnanism.~~ Eventually, though, Habermas manages to piece together 
his foucauldian puzzle from several of Foucault’s lectures and articles, most 
notably the essay, ”’What is Enlightenment?”’, which Habermas views as an 
attempted rapproclwnent with humanist critical Foucault, the foe of 
enlightenment with his anti-humanism, becomes Foucault the friend once he 
discards lus anti-enlightenment nietzscheanism and embraces Habermas’ post- 
kantian, enhghtenment critical theory.26 After the hostdity to the objectivity and 
normativity of humanism in the 1960s and 1970s, which for Foucault’s detractors 
above translate as anormative critique and amoral freedom, Habermas sees in 
Foucault’s 1980s references to Kant a move away from archaeology and genealogy 
and his return to h~manisrn.2~ For travellers along its path to enlightenment, this 
ualte-face is necessitated by the backward-looking critique of Foucault’s critical 
history,28 whch in combination with critical ontology’s ascetic aesthetics of 
’O Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition”, p. 70. 
21 McNay, Foucault, p. 153. 
Merquior, Foucault, p. 107. 
23 h4erquior, Foucault, p. 83. 
” Habermas, ”Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present”, p. 106. 
” Foucault explores Kant’s original essay, “Eeant-rmrtung der Frage: Was ist Aufkllirung?”, in lectures to 
the Socic‘tc‘ Franpise de Plzilosoplzie in 1978 and at the College de France on the 5 January 1983. See 
Foucault, “Qu’est-ce que les Lumieres?”; Foucault, “‘What is Enlightenment?”’; Foucault, 
”Introduction par Michel Foucault”. 
26 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modern2 ty, pp. 4-5. 
’’ Habermas, “Taking A m  at the Heart of the Present”, p. 108. 
28 Dews, Logics ofDisintegration, p. 199. 
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existence that divulges his ”longing for an undefiled, immaculate and stable 
pre~ent”,2~ means that Foucault’s critical thought is a waste-land intellectually.30 
Now, as I would like to argue that Foucault’s critical hstory and ontology 
affirm the enlightenment’s philosophical legacy of critical thought, his reception as 
a philosopher who is antithetical to critique and indifferent to freedom must be 
addressed. I therefore intend to demonstrate that Foucault’s critics misrepresent his 
critical hstory due to their confusion about his target of critique, which is not the 
enlightenment doctrine of critical thought itself but its monopolisation by the 
French tradition of humanism that is indebted to Kant’s transcendental subject and 
Hegel’s transcendental dialectic. Furthermore, if the best form of defence is attack, I 
want to suggest that Foucault’s critics’ conceptions of objective and normative 
experience, which they deploy to make epistemolopco-political critique, procures 
maturity for some to the detriment of others. Humanism is unsuccessful on its own 
terms of the procurement, via reason, of the universal socio-political conditions 
which are necessary for autonomy and recogrution. Contrary to the belief of the 
kantian and rawlsian legislator, or the hegelian and taylorian interpreter, 
enlightenment ”is neither a world era to which one belongs, . . . nor the dawning of 
an accomplishment, . . . [but] an Ausgang, an ’exit’, a ’way O U ~ ” ’ . ~ ~  Thus, rather than 
a phdosophy of the subject that precedes and guides critique, what is first required 
is a critical history of humanism that bars the way-and of the savoir, pou-c~oir and 
ethico-morality which paves the path - to enlightenment, which then pve shape to 
an ontology. As John Rajchman suggests, Foucault does not start with an ideal of 
freedom ”as a standard of critique, but with an analysis of the historical forms of 
the constitution of the subject”.32 For these reasons, I argue in this dissertation that 
critique sans the subject, which gives birth to a mature mode of being, permeates 
Foucault’s critical thought throughout his career. 
So how can this friend of enlightenment, whose anti-humanism is central to 
the realisation of maturity, be portrayed as a foe of enhghtenment? Llke most 
important thinkers since Kant, Foucault’s critical thought is a chdd of the 
Konigberger’s call to take up pens around the history of reason. In France, this is 
realised from nineteenth century positivism to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’ s 
phenomenology and Sartre’s existentialism as a history of science, which from the 
1930s is countered by an epistemological history that is advocated by figures such 
29 Habermas, ”Modernity: An incomplete project“, p. 14. 
30 Taylor, “Introduction”, pp. 10-11. 
31 Foucault, “’What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 34. 
32 Rajchman, Michel Foucault, p. 85. 
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as Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem. By way of contrast, the history of 
reason in Germany is written from Karl Marx and Max Weber to Habermas as a 
history of social rati~nality.~~ Along this (Franco-German) humanist path to 
enlightenment, Kant’s plea for a history of reason is met by a history of science that 
thrives on the progress of transcendental reason, and a critical theory that 
reconciles reason to its moments of social diremption. 
However, because Foucault’s archzology aligns him with the French 
epistemological historians, he opposes humanism’s history of reason and seeks to 
rescue Kant from it.3 Also, once Foucault locates h s  archzology of snvoir w i t h  a 
genealogy of pouvoir he joins a nietzschean path to enlightenment, where he 
investigates the ”philosophical intensity and . . . the current philosophical effects . . . 
[of Nietzsche’s] texts” .35 On h s  basis, Foucault’s critique confronts the ambivalence 
w i t h  modernity of humanism’s history of the scienbficity of social rationality. As 
Paul Veyne writes, Foucault’s philosophical aim is ”to show that every gesture, 
without exception, ... always fails to fulfil the universalism of a reason and always 
leaves emptiness outside, even if the gesture is one of inclusion and integration”.36 
The task of critique is to make the will to truth - re-articulated by Foucault as a will 
to know-that is at the heart of humanism conscious of itself as a problem. In so 
doing, critique that is the prior condition of possibility for maturity facilitates an 
ongoing process of self-overcoming, which leads to an ethical subjectivity that is 
not so much a- as extra-rnora1.3’ 
On the humanist and nietzschean paths to enlightenment, critique entails 
”the pursuit of iizaturify through reflection on iirodernity, where this reflection is 
articulated via a historical reconstruction of our being in the However, 
for humanists critique takes its cue from an a priori philosophy of the subject’s 
being qua autonomy and recognition, whde nietzscheans make sense of how man is 
constantly becoming in his ethical subjectivity a posteriori to a critique of the 
33 Foucault, ”La vie: l’experience et la science”, pp. 764-769; Foucault, ”Critical Theory! Intellectual 
History”, p. 27. 
34 For Foucault, Kant specifies the phdosophical understanding of enlightenment that gives rise to the 
demand for critical thought, and he- rather than Hegel-advocates critique to find existential re- 
assurance in the present, too. Foucault, ”The Art of Telling the Truth”, pp. 88-89 and p. 95. 
35 Foucault, ”Critical Theory/Intellectual fistory”, p. 33. 
36 Veyne, ”The Final Foucault and HIS Etfucs”, p. 5. 
37 Owen, Maturity and Modernity, p. 3. 
38 Owen, Maturity and Modernity, p. 1. For David Owen, this is a post-kantian definition of critique, 
which as Habermas claims above springs from Hegel‘s differentiation of the age of Aufkliirung into the 
manifestation of Geist in modernity. Although Owen speaks of Habermas’ hegelian, rather than what I 
call the humanist, trajectory of post-kantian critique, Owen similarly opposes it but in terms of a path 
to maturity that is forged by Nietzsche, Max Weber and Foucault. 
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finitude that moderates who we are. This divergence over how to do critical 
thought is best illustrated by the stark contrast between Rousseau, who as a 
founder of humanism claims that "[mlan is born free; and everywhere he is in 
and Foucault, for whom "man does not begin with liberty, but with limits 
and insuperable horizons".40 Whereas on the humanist path to enlightenment the 
epistemologico-political critique of the legislator and interpreter unchains man to 
produce freedom, on the nietzschean path freedom is the effect of a critical 
historical critique of the finitude that defines man's limits. 
There is no question of Foucault's return to critical thought in the 1980s. 
Instead, thanks to a skepticism vis-a-vis the sovereign subject of transcendental and 
dialectical reason:' he has always practiced it, albeit in a way - subjectless critique 
followed by an ontology - which seems to elude the comprehension of his critics.42 
Foucault's philosophical difference, which from the very beginning has 
incorporated analyses of Kant's43 and Hegel'+ approach to the post-cartesian 
paradox of man as knower and known:j as well as an appreciation of philosophy's 
task to re-assure via a diagnosis of the events which determine the present,46 is 
misrecogrused as anti-enlightenment. After h s  academic visits to America in the 
1 9 7 0 ~ ~  when Foucault first realises the widespread incomprehension of h s  
nietzschean path, he attempts to dissipate misunderstandings through dialogue 
with his Anglo-American and German peers.47 Unfortunately, though, this is taken 
as a renunciation of his supposed 1960s and 1970s relativism and subjectivism. 
Together with hs ethico-moral writings on freedom in the 1980s, these apparent 
signs of repentance fuel the notion that, after the misadventures of critical history 
along a nietzschean path to enlightenment, Foucault eventually returns to 
humanism's path with his critical ontology. 
There are also political explanations of Foucault's misrepresentation as a foe 
39 Rousseau, "The Social Contract", p. 181. 
40 "[L'lhonznze ne cornnzence pas auec la liberLe, mais iluec la Iznzite et la lignc de I'infranchissable". Foucault, 
"La folie, l'absence d'ceuvre", p. 415. 
41 Marti, "Michel Foucault - ein moderner Aufklarer?", p. 1352. 
42 On how philosophical traditions - for example, Britain's absence of a tradition of the role of the 
philosopher, its sense of modernity as a problematic fact rather than project, or its disconnection of 
philosophy froin history -foster cross-purposes between Foucault and his critics, see Gordon, 
"Foucault in Britain". 
43 Foucault, "Espace, savoir et pouvoir", pp. 278-279. 
44 Foucault, "Folie, litterature, societe", pp. 124125. 
45 Foucault, "La vie: l'experience et la science", p. 775. 
46 Foucault, "Qui etes-vous?", p. 620; Foucault, "La scene de la philosophe", p. 594. 
47 Gordon, "Question, ethos, event", pp. 19-20. 
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of enhghtenment. He argues that, like Habermas,48 €us critical thought is influenced 
by the classic censure of the history of reason by Adorno and Horkheimer,49 who 
chart how an excessively rationalised society blights critique and masks maturity.9 
Their prognosis is that critique must address the destructive aspects of 
enlightenment. These are persorufied by the experience of national socialism in 
Germany,51 which prompted the Frankfurt School’s exile to London and New York 
in the 1940s after the hostility of their political and philosophical reception in 
Paris.52 Perhaps this is why, in a post-fascist society ill at ease with itself, Habermas 
attempts to confound the destructive aspects of enhghtenment through Marx, who 
he rehabilitates during the 1950s, and an Anglo-American philosophy of language 
that sets “standards of rigour which continental philosophy could no longer 
satisfy”.53 Further, it is well nigh impossible to be an anti-humanist in post-war 
Germany because of who the expert critic of humanism is, the politically 
unambiguous Heidegger? 
In France, however, the destructive aspects of enlightenment refer to 
Stalinism, which is filtered through the Parti Coinmuniste Francaise (PCF), and the 
relatively serene experience of socialism’s shortcomings closer to home. Foucault’s 
critical history is a political response to marxism and a critique of French 
humanism’s philosophically destructive aspects of enlightenment, or Sartre’s 
existentialism and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. And, for better or for worse, 
Foucault‘s archzology of humanism’s epistemology is indebted to a suitably de- 
Nazified Heidegger, who ”stepped on stage after the War, like a phoenix from the 
ashes’’.S5 Unlike Habermas, though, Foucault does not throw out the baby with the 
bath water, as he points out the tenuous analytical relation between a phlosophical 
conception and the concrete politics of someone who appeals to it, while even the 
48 Foucault, ”Entretien avec Michel Foucault (1978)”, pp. 72-73. The differences in perspective, 
theoretical tradition and conceptual language, which make a comparison between Habermas and 
Foucault problematic, are discussed by Isenberg, ”Die kritischen Bemerkungen von Jurgen Habermas 
zu Michel Foucault”, pp. 1397-1398. 
49 This is not to reduce Habermas to Adorno and Horkheimer, against whose mimetic unreason 
Habermas reconstructs the concept of communicative reason. Habermas, ”Political Experience and the 
Renewal of Marxist Theory”, p. 93. 
5” Adorno and Horkheimer, 77ze Dialectic of Enliglzfenmcnt, pp. 83-86. 
51 Adorno and Horkheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. xiii. 
52 Foucault, ”Structuralisine et poststructuralisme”, p. 439. 
53 Habermas, “Ideologies and Society in the Post-War World”, p. 45. 
54 Habermas, ”A  Phlosophico-Political Profile”, p. 155. 
55 Habermas, “A Philosophico-Political Profile”, p. 156. 
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best theories cannot guard against disastrous political choices? In any case, 
Foucault’s anti-humanism is on behalf of enhghtenment rather than Der Fiihrer. 
He - Foucault - is especially critical of French marxian, existential and 
phenomenological humanism’s dialectical reason, which a propos of man knows no 
limits to its remit,57 as well as of humanism’s progressive narrative of history that is 
based on the continuite de la conscience.58 As Sartre idealises this philosophy of the 
subject which grounds humanism’s anthropocentric dialectical history, 
[slince man is ... self-surpassing, and can grasp objects only in relation to his 
self-surpassing, he is himself the heart and centre of his transcendence. There is 
no other universe except ... the universe of human subjectivity. This relation of 
transcendence as constitutive of man . . . with subjectivity . . . we call existential 
humanism.59 
However, from Foucault’s point of view of critical hstory, which problematises 
man as the objective and normative condition of possibllity for epistemological and 
political critique, 
[hlumanism invented a whole series of subjected sovereignties: . . . 
consciousness (sovereign in a context of judgement, but subjected to the 
necessities of truth), . . . [and] basic freedom (sovereign within, but accepting the 
demands of an outside world and ’aligned with destiny’). ... The theory of the 
subject (in the double sense of the word) is at the heart of humanism[,]and ... 
the armature of our civilization ... exists as a definition of individuality as 
subjected sovereignty.60 
For Foucault, humanist critical thought operates on the basis of objective and 
normative statements which depend on true notions of man’s subjectivity as the 
critical principle of differentiation - hence, Christian, marxian, existential, national 
socialist and stalinist varieties of Enlightenment, by way of contrast, 
requires the philosopher to have a reflective relation to the present. He keeps an eye 
on the link between the status of truth, whch grounds critique, and freedom as it is 
played out in political, economic, social, institutional and cultural events and 
56 Foucault, ”Politics and Etlucs”, p. 374. For a discussion of Heidegger’s relation to national socialism, 
see Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation 71iith Modernity, ch. 3. 
57 Foucault, ”Entretien avec Michel Foucault (1971)”, pp. 164-165. 
58 Foucault, ”La situation de Cuvier”, p. 65. 
59 Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, p. 55. 
(” Foucault, “Revolutionary Action”, pp. 221-222. 
be rejected, but that the humanistic thematic is in itself too supple, too diverse, too inconsistent to 
serve as an axis for reflection”. Foucault, ”’What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 44. 
From this, we must not conclude that everything that has ever been associated with humanism is to 61 ” 
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processes. Foucault then refuses to be a part of the blackmail of enlightenment, 
whch supporters of its humanist path hold him to ransom with: either one 
befriends it and remains withrn its history of reason, or one is a foe of 
enhghtenment whose critical history embraces an irrationalism along Nietzsche’s 
path.b2 After all, to analyse the ambivalence of reason is not to argue that the 
eighteenth century bourgeois philosoplle is responsible for the gulag.63 Nor, for that 
matter, does it imply a historical relation between enlightenment and 
tota1itarianism.M Rather, it is to say that humanism’s desire to see the glass half-full 
must be tempered by the vision of the skeptic, whose alternative half-empty glass is 
equally true and necessary if the optimist is to be held accountable for the 
ambivalence of hls reason. Irrespective of hs critics’ dogmatism-one is for or 
against, a friend or foe, of enlightenment- Foucault practices critique on 
humanism, as well as savoir, pouvoir and ethico-morality, in the name of an analysis 
of finitude, of who we are, and a subsequent ontology that is apposite to these 
limits. From h s  nietzschean path, Foucault is not so much a foe of enlightenment as 
of its monopolisation by humanism, which ”can be opposed by a principle of 
critique and a permanent creation of ourselves in our autonomy: that is, a principle 
that is at the heart of the hstorical consciousness that the Enlightenment has of 
itseF.65 In t h~s  light, Foucault is clearly a friend of enhghtenment, and a foe of its 
hijack by humanism. 
l.ii. L’Histoire Critique de la Pensee 
In the preceding section, I have argued that there is no contradiction in Foucault’s 
pro-enlightenment that is anti-humanism. The editors of his academic bad press, 
who purport that his anormative critique and amoral freedom result in professional 
disengagement, merely fail to comprehend alternatives to their humanist path to 
enlightenment. They are unable to acknowledge that, as an eizgage‘ philosopher 
whose critique and ontology are oriented by ”[wlhat are we? as Aufiliirer, as part of 
the Enlightenment?”,hb Foucault affirm critical thought along a nietzschean path. 
Indeed, his critique of humanist experience reveals that pouuoir/ snvoir defines our 
finitude, our background practice,67 whilst his analyses of sauoir, pouvoir and ethico- 
62 Foucault, ”’What is Enlightenment?”’, pp. 42-44. 
63 Foucault, ”La poussiere et le nuage”, p. 16. 
(* Foucault, ”Postface”, p. 36. 
65 Foucault, ”’What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 44. 
“ Foucault, ”The Subject and Power”, p. 216. 
67 Dreyfus, ”Heideggerian Themes in Foucault: Session 11”. 
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morality implore an ethical subject whose ascetic practice of agonistic freedom 
resists these insuperable horizons. Because freedom for Foucault is the vis-a-vis of 
pouvoir(/savoir)-”since freedom must exist for power to be exerted, ... [it] is 
exercised only over free subjects, ... [and] without the possibility of recalcitrance, 
power would be equivalent to a physical determination”68 -I look here at 
Foucault’s critical hstory that precedes and ushers in his conception of maturity. 
In a short summary of his work for the Dictionnaire des plzilosoplzes in 1983, 
Foucault writes that if he is a member of any philosophical tradition it is the 
“tradition critique qui est celle de Kanf”.69 Although the synopsis is signatured 
Maurice Florence the author is unquestionably Foucault,7° who in keeping with the 
tradition of these brief intellectual biographies writes in the third person about 
Foucault’s ”entreprise Histoire critique de la p e n ~ k e ” . ~ ~  As opposed to  IS critics, I 
argue in h s  dissertation that Foucault can be taken at his word, for any journey in 
critical thought not only ages the relationship with oneself but it affords a clearer 
light in whch to look at one’s work. Moreover, with the candid self-criticisms 
evident throughout hs intellectual travels, which are part and parcel of the French 
tradition of engagement that thrives on public interviews and debates, newspaper 
articles, petitions, or the clarification of one’s work at the public defence of a 
thesis72 I believe that Foucault’s reflections are sincere, especially the claim that h s  
critical history of thought upholds the tradition of kantian critical thought. But at 
the outset, what my reading of Foucault raises is the difficult question of how to 
understand his work and whose interpretations I draw on to lend me a hand. 
To explain the diverse readings of Foucault, it is useful to recall his well- 
known riposte in 1969 to those who sought to label him a structuralist: ”Do not ask 
me who I am and do not ask me to remain the Some frfteen years after this 
irreducibility of omm to author position, Foucault acknowledges that to change 
how one thmks is a game with oneself which, because it is constitutive of who one 
is, should not to be kept from one’s readers.74 It is this oscillation between a desire 
for anonymity, which is mistakenly understood by humanists as a flight from 
critical thought, and the centrality in his life of the transformation of himself by 
Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, p. 221. 
69 Foucault, “Foucault”, p. 631. 
70 Gordon, ”Man of action in a world of thought”, p. 10 
71 Foucault, ”Foucault”, p. 631. 
72 For example, Jacques Derrida retraces the first twenty years of his philosophical venture in his thesis 
defence for the doctorat i s  leftrcs. See Derrida, ”The time of a thesis”. 
73 Foucault, The Archeaology ofKnoudedge, p. 18. 
74 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p. 8. 
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thought, such that he wears h i s  mind on his sleeve, which accounts for the often 
diametrically opposed interpretations of F ~ u c a u l t . ~ ~  James Mdler, for example, cites 
Nietzsche’s aphorism, become who you are, to justify his controversial reading of 
Foucault’s philosophy as a mirror of his ~ersonal i ty .~~ At the same time, Macey 
alludes to a nietzschean maxim- scorn all the learned dust of biography- to re- 
iterate Foucault’s hostility to any association of the author to his euvye. Macey 
hereby claims that, because of his many lives, Foucault’s critical thought is separate 
from hs personalities.n And, sandwiched between Miller and Macey, Didier Eribon 
suggests that Foucault is a chdd of his times whose critical thought reflects and 
directs French philosophy between the 1950s and 1 9 8 0 ~ . ~ *  As far as the dissertation 
is concerned, it is not vital to have a sense of who Foucault is as a private 
individual, though I do draw on all three biographers for personal, professional 
and political contextualisations of h s  critical thought. 
Besides these biographical expositions, there are intellectual interpretations of 
Foucault, too. Once again, his elusive self-presentation produces numerous 
viewpoints, and Foucault says that he is neither a philosopher nor a writer, but 
someone who does historical and political Sunilarly, he has no theory or 
methodology,s0 just fields of interest, out of and in respect of which he develops 
analytical tools.81 As a consequence, intellectual interpretations of Foucault tend to 
be selective or to bridge academic disciplines. Typically, they are sympathetic82 and 
exegeti~al ,~~ although for the most part these intellectual interpretations range from 
what critical contributions Foucault can make to sociology,&2 politics,S5 historyp6 or 
phil~sophy,*~ to inter-disciplinary anthologies which are organised around his 
critical history.** During my research for this dissertation, these intellectual 
’’ Foucault, “Verite, pouvoir et soi”, p. 777. 
’(’ Miller, La Passion Foucault, pp. 9-24. 
Macey, 771e Lives ofMiclzel Foucault, pp. xi-xxiii. 
7s Eribon, Miclzef Foucault (1 926-1984), pp. 7-13. 
79 Foucault, “Le pouvoir, une E t e  magrufique”, p. 376. 
Foucault, “Entretien avec Michel Foucault (1971)”, pp. 156-158. 
*’ Foucault, ”Pouvoir et savoir“, pp. 404-405. 
** Major-Poetzl, Miclzef Foucault’s Arckology ofIWestcrn Culture. 
s3 McHoul and Grace, A Foucault Primer. 
” Smart, Miclzel Foucault. 
Barry, Osborne and Rose (eds.), Foucault and political reason. 
86 Goldstein (ed.), Foucault and tlze Writing ofHistory. 
*’ Armstrong (ed.), Michel Foucault: Philosoplzer. 
*’ Couzens Hoy (ed.), Foucault: A Criticaf Reader; Gane and Johnson (eds.), Foucault’s Neu~ Domains; 
Lloyd and Thacker (eds.), The Inzpact of Michel Foucault on the Social Sciences a d  Hunianitics. 
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interpretations have helped me to clarlfy some of the difficult aspects of Foucault’s 
writings. 
There are, thirdly, philosophical interpretations of Foucault, and my reading 
of his self-designated critical history is related to them. To be sure, other 
commentators discern a core philosophical theme at the heart of Foucault’s 
writings, too, whether hs e h c  of free interpretive analytics,w topos of 
the symbolic,91 experiences of t h ~ n k i n g , ~ ~  or political anatomy.93 In each case, these 
commentators distinguish what they take to be Foucault’s main phdosophical 
theme, and some actually worked in close collaboration with him, for example, 
James Bernauer (who attended Foucault’s courses in Paris and America),% Hubert 
Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (who, as Foucault’s interlocutors at Berkeley, enabled 
him to ”undertake a theoretical and methodological reformulation”),95 and Alan 
Sheridan (who ‘has translated many of Foucault’s books into English). However, 
they neither develop my philosophical theme of critical history as it is defined by 
Foucault hmself, nor do they apprehend my idea of the continuity in his work of 
critical thought which, mindful of Kant’s understanding of enlightenment, is 
articulated through Nietzsche’s priority of critique before maturity. 
In addition, these commentators interpret their phdosophical themes in 
parallel to a periodisation of Foucault’s writings - usually, an archaeology of 
knowledge and a genealogy of both power and the subject96 - which allows them to 
view some periods as more decisive than others. For instance, Sheridan hails 
Foucault’s post-archzological political anatomy of truth and power as a model 
post-marxist political theory and practice,97 Rajchman hghlights Foucault’s early 
1970s turn to Nietzsche as a decisive reformulation of his Bernauer 
distinguishes Foucault’s progression through cathartic, dissonant, dissident and 
ecstatic critical thought,% and Dreyfus and Rabinow speak of how Foucault’s 
89 Rajchman, Michel Foucault, p. 5. 
’O Dreyfus and Rabiiiow, Mzchel Foucault, p. xxii. 
91 Racevskis, Mzclzel Foucault and the Subversion ofInteIlcct, p. 30. 
O2 Bernauer, “Micliel Foucault’s Ecstatic Thinking”, p. 45. 
O3 Sheridan, Mrclzel Foucault, p. 217. 
(w Bernauer, ”Michel Foucault’s Ecstatic Thinking”, p. 76, f. 8 and p. 77, f. 17. 
95 Foucault, Tlzc Use of Pleasure, p. 8. 
9h McHoul and Grace, A Foucault Pnrner, p. viii. 
O7 Sheridan, MzclzeZ Foucault, p. 221. 
98 Rajcliman, Mzchcl Foucault, p. 114. 
FI Bernauer, ”Michel Foucault’s Ecstatic Tlunking”, p. 46. 
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interests shift away from discursive practices after May 1968.100 While I also follow 
the standard division of Foucault’s work into periods - archzology, genealogy and, 
when combined, critical history - I place a greater emphasis on, firstly, the specific 
target of each critique, namely, humanism’s objectivity, normativity and 
subjectivity. Secondly, I argue that these mutually inclusive axes of humanism’s 
experience, whch describe finitude in the present, allow Foucault to articulate who 
we are qua subjects of knowledge who are the same, subjects of power who are both 
objectdied and subjected, and subjects who suffer the submission of subjectivity. 
Thirdly, I also detail how, once Foucault’s archixological, genealogical and critical 
historical critiques politicise the experience of who we are along humanism’s path 
to enlightenment,101 they provide alternative conceptions of sazioir, pouvoir and 
ethxo-morality, which enables hun to carve out a critical ontology that is pertinent 
to the present. 
In its own right, Foucault’s critical history of thought can be distinguished 
from a history of both ideas and mentalities, which analyse systems of 
representation and human behaviour, respectively. Foucault says that thought 
allows one to step back from one’s conduct and to present it to oneself as an object 
in order to question its rneaning.Io2 Thought permits one to apprehend the 
historicity of forms of experience rather than, as in the case of humanism, to see 
thought as the prerogative of the capacities of the phdosophcal subject. Foucault 
hereby circumvents a philosophical anthroDology, which grounds humanism’s 
account of experience, with a nominalist reduction of its claims about the subject’s 
autonomy and recogr~tion.1~3 He conceives of experience in the domain of the 
history of thought, where it is formed, developed and transformed. The aim is to 
problematise experience in order to reveal the p e n s ,  which are dispersed within 
the correlative fields of objectivity, normativity and subjectivity, and through 
which the subject is constituted.104 Subsequently, these givens are developed into 
questions, whch thought answers, for example, with the concepts of snooir, pouooir 
and etluco-morality.~O5 For Foucault, it is not the transcendental, historical, political 
or interpretive capacities of self-consciousness, or anything else akin to man’s 
loo Dreyfus and Rabinow, Miclzel Foucault, p. 104. 
hope by problematizing the rules and institutions that have reified the substance of daily life”. 
Kritzman, “Foucault and the Politics of Experience”, p. xxv. 
’’* Foucault, “Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations”, p. 388. 
Relatedly, Lawrence Kritzman proposes a foucauldian politics of experience, which “elicits new 
Foucault, ”Preface to The History of Sexuality, Volume 11”, p- 334. 
Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p. 4. 
lo5 Foucault, “Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations”, p. 389. 
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authentic being, which act as the conditions of possibility for experience. Instead, 
experience ”is the rationalization of a process, itself provisional, which results in a 
subject, or rather, in subjects . . . [who display] a subjectivity which is of course only 
one of the p e n  possibilities of organization of a self-consciousness”.IW 
Insofar as a critique of experience is prior to an ontology, critical history 
gauges ”the politics immanent in hstory and the hstory indispensable for 
politics”.1o7 It analyses ”what in the past is still operative in our present”.lN The 
indispensable history that enables politics is the unknown processes, movements 
and forces that define events,’Og whilst the politics immanent in hstory concerns the 
truth which, if not the most profound lie ii ln Nietzsche, is, as Canguilhem suggests, 
the most recent error that emerges out of events.11o In respect of the latter, 
Foucault’s critique focuses on what, for the humanist, is the more familiar politics 
of social contract liberalism and the historical materialist, phenomenological and 
communitarian variations on a hegelian theme. Critical history, which lies between 
social history and logcal analyses of thought,ll’ illuminates the micro-political 
heritage of these form of humanist critical thought. It analyses the objective, 
normative and subjective axes of truth which have formed, and continue to 
constitute, who we are in the nctuel passe, or the present, which is Canguilhem’s 
term for what Foucault says is our ”extremely rich and complex philosophical 
relationship” to the enlightenment.ll* 
Foucault’s critical history demands engagenzent from the philosopher, too, for 
pro-enlightenment critique that is anti-humanism is necessarily concerned with a 
post-humanist mode of being which can sustain maturity. Initially, through the 
practice of critical history, the critical ontologist constitutes his subjective 
experience.113 But, apart from its transformation of the self, critique has political 
connotations, too, as it directly relates to who we are as subjects who think and 
act.114 In this regard, the critical ontologist tests the limits of experience, and if 
necessary he inaugurates the agonistic transformation of it.115 Of course, it is not 
’06 Foucault, ”The Return of Morality”, p. 253. 
lo7 Foucault, ”Power and Sex”, p. 121. 
log Rajchman, Miclzcl Foucault, p. 31. 
’09 Foucault, ”La scene de la philosophie”, p. 573. 
‘I” Foucault, ”La vie: l’experience et la science”, pp. 775-776. 
‘ I1  Foucault, ”Verite, pouvoir et soi”, p. 778. 
Foucault, “Postface”, p. 37. 
Foucault, ”Interview de Michel Foucault”, p. 667. 
‘ I 4  Foucault, The Use ofPleasure, p. 9. 
‘I5 Foucault, “Jean Hyppolite. 1907-1968”, p. 781. 
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that Foucault’s pessimistic activism automatically assumes that humanist 
experience is defective. Rather, it is dangerous because it fails to recognise its 
limitations, whch means that, like ethical subjectivity, critique is a never-ending 
process.”6 In his role as a critical ontologst, Foucault accepts Kant’s invitation to 
participate personally and collectively in the ongoing development of 
enlightenment.117 Foucault’s critique proceeds: 
with the analysis of ourselves as beings who are historically determined, to a 
certain extent, by the Enlightenment. ... [Critique is] oriented toward the 
contemporary ’limits of the necessary’, that is, toward what is ... no longer 
indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects.118 
Apart from a personal and political resource for the critical ontologist, who 
analyses reason’s ambivalent aspects, thought is a practice which poses the 
question of a subject and an object. Critical history examines the conditions of 
pouuoir/snuoir, which form and modify the relations of the subject to the object and 
make possible the human sciences’ connnissance that is necessary to understand 
ourselves in the present.’19 Through critical history’s twin moments of archzology 
and genealogy, Foucault concentrates on the interrelation between the subject and 
the object in two modes, the relations of subjectivation and the relations of 
objectivation. The question, he says, 
is to determine that which has to be the subject, on what conditions it is 
subjected, the status it must have, and the position it must occupy in reality or 
the faculty of intuition in order to be a legitimate subject of this or that 
coiziraissance-in brief, it is a question of determining its mode of subjectivation; 
... . But the question is also, and at the same time, to establish under what 
conditions a thing becomes an object of coirizaissarzce, how it is problematised as 
an object to be known, by what procedures of division it is subjected, and the 
precise aspect of it which is considered relevant. This is a matter of ascertaining 
its mode of objectivation.I2” 
Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Eth~cs”, p. 343. 
‘I7 Foucault, “’What is Enlightenment?”’, pp. 34-35. 
Foucault, “‘What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 43. 
’I9 Foucault, “Foucault”, pp. 631-632. 
120 ” La 
avoir, quclle position il doif occuper duns le re‘el ou dans l’imaginaire, pour dcvcnir sujct legitime de tel ou tel 
type de connaissance; breJ il s‘agit de de‘tcrminer son mode de ‘subjectivation‘; . . . . Mais la question est aussi et 
en minze fenzps de de‘ternziner a quelles conditions quelque chose peuf deaenir un objcf pour une connaissance 
possible, conznzenf e lk  a pu Zfre prohlknzatisic conznic ohjet a connaitre, a quelle procedure de de‘coupagc e lk  a pu 
&e sounzise, la part d’elle-me^me qui est considerke coniine pertinenfe. 11 s‘agif donc de determiner son mode 
d’objectivafion”. Foucault, ”Foucault”, p. 632. 
question est de de‘ferminer cc que doit itre le sujcf, a quelle condition il esf souniis, que1 sfatuf il doit 
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By enunciating the relations of subjectivation and objectivation of a specific 
discursive object - for example, the madman, the delinquent or the pervert - 
Foucault actualises in thought the games of truth in respect of which subjectivity is 
constitxted. Intrigued by the fact "that there is so little truth in truth",121 Foucault's 
critical hstory analyses the emergence of games of truth in both discursive and 
non-discursive practices. The focus of his critique is the history of veridictions, 
namely, the pouvoirl snuoir which, as an "institutionalized system for the production 
of knowledge in regulated language",122 verify that one speaks truly. Foucault limits 
his focus to scientific,'Z political and ethico-moral games of truth, where through 
the processual relations of subjectivation and objectivation man is posited as an 
object of bodies of comzaissance -that is, as a subject of knowledge, power and 
freedom- whch render experience objective, normative and subjective.124 In virtue 
of a critical history of games of truth, Foucault writes that the subject "is the general 
theme of my research' and not, as his critics believe, a late addtion to it.125 Indeed, 
Foucault asks if it is possible to pose a more classical philosoplvcal question than 
that which examines the relation between objectivity, normativity and subjectivity. 
Further, he wonders if there is a more systematic way to answer it than to research 
each independently of the other as it appears in humanism in order, through sauoir, 
potiuoir and ehco-morality - specifically, in their correlation in the domain of 
thought through which sex is experienced126 -to reconceive the self's relation to 
thought, which is mediated by games of truth where one is simultaneously an 
object and a subject.'Z7 
This overview of critical history shows that, together with Rawls and Taylor, 
Foucault practices enlightenment critical thought. Also, like them, he acknowledges 
after Kant that, whilst we do not "live in an enlightened age", we do "live in an nge of 
ediglztenment" .12* Unlike h s  critics, however, Foucault does not believe that 
humanism can shepherd us to an enlightened age via reason that is unequivocally 
universal in its remit. Instead, to the extent that reason always falls short of its 
gesture of universalism, which humanism exacerbates such that it is part of the 
'*' Foucault, quoted in and by Veyne, "The Final Foucault and His Ethics", p. 8, f .  1. 
12* Bove, "Discourse", p. 53. 
'23 As Smart says, this game of truth aspires to 'scientificity', or, for Rabinow, 'scienbfic classification'. 
Smart, Mzclzel FoucauIt, pp. 106-107; Rabinow, "Introduction", pp. 7-11. 
124 Foucault, "Foucault", pp. 632-633. 
Foucault, "The Subject and Power", p. 209. 
126 Foucault, ''Foucault", pp. 635-636. 
12' Foucault, "Verite, pouvoir et soi", pp. 782-783. 
128 Kant, "What is Enlightenment?", p. 290. 
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problem rather than the solution to a critique of history and its reason, we oscillate 
between an age of enlightenment and the enlightened age this gesture hints at. 
Thus, apart from their concurrence about Kant’s call for critique and maturity, these 
philosophers differ fundamentally over how to do critical thought. Disputes about 
the history and potential of reason to realise freedom scar the academic landscape, 
from the liberal and communitarian debate, to the modern versus post-modern 
controversy and the politico-philosophical opposition to humanism in France. The 
distinction is clearest between the endeavours of Rawls, Taylor and Habermas, who 
promote Kant’s paradigm of freedom as the public use of reason in which 
epistemological and political critique that is grounded in the philosophical subject 
proposes an enhghtened age of autonomy and recognition, and Foucault, whose 
critical history advances strvoir, pouuoir and ethico-morality subsequent to its focus 
on the costs of humanism’s partial objectivity, its normativity that confines those 
who are different and objectdies and subjects those who are normal, and its 
subjectivity that equates to a disciplined body and a regulated citizenry. In fact, to 
the extent that the enhghtenment discovers freedom and invents practices whch 
submit subjectivity, Foucault’s critical history that uncovers disciplinisation, or 
subjection in the guise of freedom,129 precedes his outline of a mode of being.130 
Hence, in defence of Foucault from the criticisms of his critical history and 
ontology, which with their alleged anormative critique and amoral freedom 
embody his anti-enlightenment, I would llke to argue that critical history is 
fundamental to an adequate conception of the experience which h u t s  the self’s 
resolution and courage to use his reason, as well as to an account of snvoir, pouzioir 
and ethico-morality, which herald critical ontology’s ethical subjectivity as an 
agonistic practice of freedom qun maturity in the present. In a word, Foucault’s 
critical history is central to his nietzschean path that is anti-humanism and pro- 
kantian enlightenment. 
l.iii. The Relations of the Parts to the Whole and its Limits 
The opposed practices of critical thought - humanism’s legslative and interpretive 
critiques and Foucault’s critical historical critique - structure the parts of the 
dissertation. In chapters 2 and 3, I first mark out the former’s path to 
enlightenment. Humanism, I suggest, is sketched by Rousseau, designed by Kant, 
layed by Hegel and maintained by Rawls and Taylor, all of whom propose 
Baker, ”A Foucauldian French Revolution?”, p. 188. 
Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 222. 
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epistemological or political critique as the vehicle of maturity. Following this, in 
chapters 4, 5 and 6, I explicate Foucault’s archaeological, genealogical and critical 
historical critiques of objective knowledge, normative power and subjective moral 
identity, and I also grve an account of his alternative conceptualisations of savoir, 
pouvoir and ethico-morality . I then conclude Foucault’s nietzschean path to 
enlightenment in chapter 7, where I articulate the ontology that comes out of these 
three critiques and how, in tandem with his modern attitude of critical hstory, the 
critical ontologist’s ascetic zsthetic etlucal subjectivity amounts to Foucault’s 
kantian derived and nietzschean inspired critical thought. 
I commence chapter 2 with Thomas Hobbes’ and John Locke’s introduction 
into the hstory of reason of a philosophy of the subject qua man, whose abllity to 
ground knowledge suffices to regulate the remit of the juridical state in furtherance 
of freedom. In Rousseau’s criticism of man’s bourgeois perspective on knowledge 
and power, I claim that h is  substantiation of classical liberal autonomy through the 
political process of the ziolonte genirale, which leads to recogrution, provides the 
blueprint for humanist critical thought’s path to enlightenment. The rousseauian 
subject’s authentic being, or his capacity for reason and language and lus desire for 
re-assurance with others, is then the prototype for Kant and Hegel, who personify 
the epistemologcal critique that procures autonomy and recognition. In this light, I 
first examine Kant in respect of his definition of the critical thought that can sustain 
enhghtenment. I outline his account of critical philosophy, wluch Kant uses to 
ground both the subject’s apparent knowledge in transcendental idealism and 
man’s autonomy in the idea of freedom that is the cornerstone of Moralifit. For his 
part, I demonstrate that Hegel’s scientdic philosophy takes him beyond Kant to an 
absolute idealism of actual knowledge. Similarly, I illustrate that Hegel’s 
rousseauian notion of recogrution, which is affirmed by Sittlichkeit, concretises 
kantian autonomy. 
Insofar as political critique that promises political liberty and political 
liberation is concerned, I argue in chapter 3 that Rawls’ political liberalism utilises a 
procedural justice to normatively regulate juridical power in the interests of the 
liberty of the individual. In response, Taylor, who desires to imbue the juridical 
state of rawlsian right with the hypergoods central to man’s identity, articulates a 
substantive justice that uses politics to effect recogrution. Hence, because the 
communal good is to liberal right what Sitflickkeif is to Mornlitrit, namely, the 
condition of possibility for recogrution that enables the self-actualisation of 
autonomy, I close my examination of humanist critical thought at the end of 
chapter 3 with the suggestion that, just as G i s t  envelopes Aufkliirung at the start of 
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the nineteenth century, at the end of the twentieth century political liberalism 
compromises with a politics of recognition around a notion of maturity that I term 
embedded individuality. On humanism’s path to enlightenment, philosophers of 
the subject are not much more inventive when it comes to freedom than they are 
when it comes to critique, whch is why they are caught in a vicious circle where 
one humanist’s maturity is another man’s immaturity. 
To explain the intellectual climate that gives rise to Foucault’s critical thought, 
I start chapter 4 with a contextualisation of the hstory of reason in France. 
Although Kant is side-lmed in the 1930s by a marxian, existential and 
phenomenological interpretation of Hegel, I show how the transcendental dialectic 
is attached to the subject’s transcendental capacity of apperception to constitute the 
foundation of obectivity in the human sciences, which produce empirical 
knowledge of man’s being. It is this formal a priori of man, who knows and is 
known, or what Foucault in 77ze Order of TIrings terms the empirico-transcendental 
doublet, that archzological critique reveals to be contingent upon the historical a 
priori of srzuoir. Next, I portray Foucault’s attempt to use a theory of language, whch 
he finds in the counter-human science of lmguistics, as an alternative condition of 
possibility for man for objectivity in those counter-human sciences such as 
psychoanalysis and ethnology. Yet, while Foucault exposes the inability of 
humanist knowledge to teach one how to thmk freely, the connnissnnce in these 
discursive practices that is causally related to savoir detaches them from the world, 
which May 1968 reveals to be in need of transformation. To meet this challenge, I 
claim that the archzologist frames snuoir against the non-discursive practices of 
pou voir. 
As such, I argue in chapter 5 that the critical historian uses genealogical 
critique to problematise humanism’s political critique. A proto-genealogy of 
humanist normativity in Madness and Ciuilisrztion, for example, reveals its negahve 
condition of possibhty as the confined exclusion of the mad, whle the genealogy 
proper of the objectification and subjection of the juridical subject of right is 
elaborated in Discipline and Punish and The Histonj of Sexunlit~~.’~~ In t h s  respect, I 
contend that discipline and regulation, rather than the right or the good, 
characterise the normative experience proposed by Rawls and Taylor. Further to 
these constraint on how to act freely, I describe how, in response to the question of 
how pouiioir is exercised, Foucault’s critical history brings to light the extra-juridical 
131 I write of The History of Sexuality in reference to La Volonte‘ de sauoir, volume 1 of Foucault’s project, 
whch is translated as An Introduction (also, in respect of volumes 2 and 3, I refer to Tlte Use of Pleasure 
and The Care of the Se$ which are direct translations of L’Usage des plaisirs and Le souci de soi). 
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productive mechanisms of pouvoir, which underlie the repressive mechanisms of a 
theory of state-centred power. Thus, my point of departure in chapter 6 is a 
discussion of what is the nature of pouvoir, which Foucault answers through h s  
reconceptualisation of capillary pouvoir as governmentality, one’s action upon the 
actions of others, that places its vis-a-vis of freedom on I s  agenda. After the 
archzological and genealogical critiques of objectivity and normativity, I maintain 
that a critical hstory of subjectivity analyses the political rationality exercised by 
the modern state, which through humanism’s hermeneutic relation to self effects 
the submission of subjectivity. In reply, I suggest that Foucault investigates the 
subject of desire in TIE Use of Pleasure and The Care of tlze Se& where he uncovers 
ancient practices of the self in which the self constitutes hmself as an ethical subject 
of his actions in furtherance of a stylised zsthetics of existence. Finally, in chapter 7 
I summarise the above argument by contrasting the way the critical ontologist does 
critical thought with that of the legislator and interpreter. I also respond to the 
criticisms of Foucault, which entails combining his ontology of an agonistic prachce 
of freedom from chapter 6 with the critical historical critiques of chapters 4 and 5, 
such that I conclude that he is an exemplar of enlightenment critical thought. 
All that now remains is to reveal the huts beyond which this dissertation 
neither seeks nor is able to go, and to highlight the silences in it. Firstly, although I 
have employed the primary texts of the protagonists of humanism’s path to 
enlightenment, my aim in doing so is not a definitive reading but a plausible 
interpretation. To ensure this, as well as to lend me support, I refer in chapter 2 to 
several respected commentators on Kant (Henry Allison and Lewis White Beck) 
and Hegel (Robert Pippin, Taylor and Merold Westphal), and in chapter 3 I refer to 
prominent commentators on contemporary critical thought (amongst others, Will 
Kymlicka, Ra ymond Plant, Michael Sandel and Michael Walzer), although the 
exegesis of Rawls and Taylor is my own. 
In the same vein, my interest in and aim with Foucault is not a decisive 
interpretation in respect of the philosophical themes of his eminent commentators, 
whom I mentioned in section l.ii.. Rather, I have a personal and political concern in 
my reading of Foucault - personal, because hs conceptualisation of experience in 
the present, and what freedom is in the face of it, strikes a chord with me; and 
political, because I believe that Foucault’s critique and maturity are indicative of 
how to practice critical thought. But if I do not offer any ultimate interpretation of 
Foucault, I hope at least that my reading is sufficiently persuasive with regard to 
critical thought and a philosopher acutely attuned to who we are. 
In this respect, my understanding of Foucault is primarily mediated through 
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the English translations of the main texts alluded to in the preceding paragraphs, 
and numerous interviews and articles published as Language, Counter-Memoy, 
Practice; Pon)er/Knowledge; TIE Foucaul t Reader; and Politics, Pliilosophy, Culture. 
Further, I have made extensive use of his collected works published posthumously 
in French as the four volume Dits et Ecrifs 1954-1988. These contain numerous 
interviews and articles, as yet untranslated, whxh demonstrate that from the start 
of h s  career Foucault was an unremitting advocate of enhghtenment. As with the 
German sources in the dissertation, I have relied on practical language skills to read 
Dits et €crits 1954-1988, and where I have directly quoted the German or French I 
have put the original in a reference note to ensure that the meaning of my 
translation is not at the expense of accuracy or misrepresentation. A last scholarly 
note concerns citations, which appear as (reference) footnotes in the order of 
author, book or article title (often abbreviated), and page, section, book and/or 
chapter number. The full reference can then be found in the bibliography. 
A final silence to be accounted for concerns the absence of empirical politics 
in a dissertation on critique and maturity, especially as I conceive an agonistic 
freedom in ethico-political resistance to the experience of pouzioir/ sazioir. Firstly, I 
defer to William Connolly’s observation that politics not only involves the open- 
ended interaction of individuals and groups, who share a range of concepts 
imperfectly, but it allows people to resolve, accommodate and transcend initial 
differences within the context of political disco~rse.~3~ In t h s  sense, critical thought 
is itself a praxis with important political irn~lications.~~~ It turns on what Walter 
Gallie designates as essentially contested concepts, ” [ o]ne very desirable 
consequence of . . . [which is] a marked raising of the . . . quality of arguments in the 
dispute of the contestant parties” .IM Secondly, examples of contested concepts 
within the practice of critical thought include truth, power, freedom and critique 
itself, which as Gmberly Hutchmgs argues to substantiate her idea of a politics of 
critique ”reflects the deep lmk between philosophical and political conditions and 
problems”.135 Whence, for instance, Owen’s trajectory of critique from Nietzsche to 
Weber and Foucault, which he uses ”to re-open the question of the form of critique 
against Habermas’ efforts to impose closure on t h s  It is this politics 
inherent to critical thought that follows in my examination of knowledge, power 
132 Connolly, The Ternzs $Political Discourse, pp. 6-7. 
133 Hutclungs, Kant, Critique and Politics, pp. 3-5. 
Gallie, ”Essentially Contested Concepts”, pp. 171-175 and p. 193. 
135 Hutchings, Kant, Critique and Politics, p. 7. 
136 Owen, Maturity and Modernity, p. 3. 
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and autonomy and recognition in humanism, and it pervades Foucault's 
reconceptualisations of srrzioir, pouzioir and ethico-morality in his critical history of 
who we are in the present, and hs critical ontology that posits how to be otherwise. 
So although, as Alasdair MacIntyre argues, critical thought leaves everything as it is 
except concepts, th is  in itself is politics, 
since to possess a concept involves ... being able to behave in certain ways in 
certain circumstances, ... . [T]o alter concepts, whether by moddying existing 
concepts or by making new concepts available or by destroying old ones, is to 
alter behaviour. ... A history which takes this point seriously, which is 
concerned with the role of philosophy in relation to actual conduct, cannot be 
philosophically neutral.137 
137 MacIntyre, A Short History ofEfhics, pp. 2-3. 
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My aim in chapters 2 and 3 is to portray how autonomy and recogrution are 
secured by epistemological and political critique along humanism’s path to 
enlightenment, whch is the point of departure for Foucault’s critical hstory of the 
experiential thought that defines our limits. To begin with, I discern the o r i p  of a 
philosophy of the subject, who grounds man’s order of things. After Hobbes’ 
reduction of objective experience to a material ontology, Locke’s deployment of the 
subject’s rational capacities makes freedom a matter of the non-interference by 
others in the autonomous will of the man who desires and knows, respectively. In 
contrast, for Rousseau knowledge of the world depends on the sociality of 
language, whilst a sense of oneself as free is based on a universal capacity for 
reason that is mediated bv the establishment and contmual affirmation of the 
i 
volonte‘ ge‘ne‘mle. Autonomy only gets beyond pride and 
substantiated by a process of recogrution, and I argue that 
specify the province of man’s reason Rousseau still heralds 
political critique. 
It is out of a desire to thwart dogmatism and skepticism 
alienation if it is 
even if he does not 
epistemological and 
through limiting the 
remit of man’s objective experience that Kant’s critical philosophy introduces 
Aujklaruizg, the obligation to thmk and act freely, whch he meets with a 
metaphysics of experience and the idea of freedom that h k s  moral autonomy, duty 
and Moralitat. Apart from the centrality of Kant to enhghtenment critical thought, 
he is the spur for Hegel’s critique of kantian man’s bifurcation from his empirical 
self, who lives in and is shaped by the world. To alleviate diremption, I trace 
Hegel’s advocation of a phenomenology of the objective experience of Gis t  and the 
moral moderation of man’s recogrution by the state, whch is the culmination of 
Sittliclzkeif. From its origins in Hobbes and Locke, and via its reformulation with 
Rousseau, Kant’s and Hegel’s epistemologcal critique of things acts as the 
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precondition for autonomy and recognition in humanist critical thought,l and in 
chapter 3 I will explain how Rawls and Taylor similarly direct humanism’s path to 
enlightenment, but with a political critique of normative experience that regulates 
power on behalf of freedom. Notwithstanding, I shall argue in chapter 4 that 
because Kant’s and Hegel’s knowledge is the basis for an anthropocentric 
dialectical thought in twentieth century French philosophy which is founded on the 
identity of man, it affirms a perspectival objectivity that realises autonomy and 
recognltion for those who are the same only. 
2.i. The Philosophy of Man in Hobbes and Locke 
Hegel writes that after the reformation in the sixteenth century humanity ”becomes 
aware of its having a value of its own in the morality, rectitude, probity and activity 
of man”? His words order the world and replace medizval Christianity’s ontology 
of things, which are grounded in the word of God. As Heidegger portrays it, the 
subject of knowledge conquers the world as a picture via re-presentation. He sets 
out before and in relation to himself a thing as a structured image.3 With h i s  essence 
of the will to will, or man’s subjectivity of hunzanitas, he-man-replaces Him as 
the lord of being4 And while Descartes’ cagito ergo sum is perhaps the most famous 
conception of man, Hobbes is the first to make an explicit connection between his 
capacity for knowledge and freedom,5 and in this section I show how the question 
of a human epistemology as the ground of autonomy is answered by man, the sum 
of contradictions, who Hobbes and Locke seek to discover and order.6 
Hobbes’ desire to order the politico-relipous chaos of mid-seventeenth 
century England forces him to consider who man is as a potential source of 
knowledge. To this end, he embarks upon his quest with reason rather than the 
prudeiztia of tradition, which is propagated by Christian ontology. For Hobbes, the 
wisdom of reason derives from speech, which forms the basis of intersubjective 
relations. It allows man to gather the things he re-presents in concepts-”True and 
False”, Hobbes says, “are attributes of Speech, not of  thing^".^ Secondly, he 
’ O’Hagan, “On Hegel’s Critique”, p. 135. 
* Hegel, PIzilosopIzy ofHistonj, p. 344. 
Heidegger, ”The Age of the World Picture”, pp. 132-135. 
Heidegger, “Letter on ’Humanism”’, pp. 243-247. 
For Hobbes, what man knows is true because his ”Knowledge of Fact . . . is nothing else, but Sense and 
Nietzsche, The Will to Pouwr, § 97, p. 61. 
Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. IV, p. 105. 
Memory, and is Absolute Knoudedge;“. Hobbes, Leziiatlzan, ch. IX, p. 147. 
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combines speech with a mechanistic view of nature and a deductive scientific 
method: which defines Hobbes' anti-metaphysical science of reason. Here, to read 
oneself as a means to know one's thoughts and passions is to read and know the 
thoughts and passions of  other^.^ This mechanico-deductive approach instructs 
Hobbes that man's basic ontology is material, and he works from the first principle 
of autonomous man in a state of nature up to theorems about knowledge and 
power.'O 
The material nature of hobbesian man is determined by sensations and 
emotions, which interact with his ideas. When he moves directly toward or away 
from the thing imagined, man's reaction is unrnediated, pure endeavour.11 It is only 
when he deliberates on the thing he desires or wishes to avert that one discovers 
who man is for Hobbes. He is a self-mediated, mechanical subject who, aware a 
priori of h s  wads and preferences, knows no tranqudhty of mind. Life is nothing 
but perpetual motion between the basic emotions of appetite and aversion.12 
Hobbesian man has no sunznzunz h o n u n ~ ~ 3  His understanding is distinct from his 
will, and uppermost in h s  mind is his felicity, whch requires the prioritisation of 
the will qua capacity to reason upon the activity necessary to realise the imperatives 
of the emotions. Hobbes' philosophy is a science of the consequences of the 
unhappy lives of mechanical men in a state of nature, where in virtue of their 
subjective naturall Passions their wills produce a condition of Warre.I4 In parallel, 
liobbesian moral pfulosophy points out the Lawes of Nature, for instance, liberty 
and justice, which enable men who have the capacity for self-institution to will 
their escape and covenant into Leviathan.15 Together with man's innate capacity for 
speech, Hobbes turns a material ontology of perpetual motion into a right to 
political liberty, which Leviathan's sword guarantees to men in their attempts to 
gratify an insatiable will to happiness. The basic capacity of reason, which enables 
man to realise h s  desires and know the thoughts and passions of others, is 
Hobbes, Leviatlzan, ch. V. 
' Hobbes, Leviatlzan, The Introduction. 
I o  Balibar, "What is 'Man'?", pp. 221-223. 
l1 Hobbes calls man's mental reaction to a sensation an idea, an idea committed to memory an image, 
the coilsciousness of an image imagmation, all images remembered sensory experience and, insofar as 
he uses h i s  memory to foresee and react to new sensations, Hobbes describes man's orientation by this 
experience as prudence. Hobbes, Leviathan, chs. 1-111. 
l2 Hobbes, Leviatlzan, ch. VI. 
l3 Balibar, "What is 'Man'?", p. 215. 
I4 Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. XIII. 
l 5  Balibar, "What is 'Man'?", p. 225; Hobbes, Leviathan, chs. XIV-XV. 
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constitutive of a juridical state that harmonises intersubjective relations16 In 
Hobbes’ elegant words, 
[tlhe finall ... Designe of men, ... in the introduction of that restraint upon 
themselves, ... is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more 
contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out of the miserable 
condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent ... to the natural1 Passions 
of men, when there is no visible power to keep them in awe.17 
A hobbesian material ontology discloses a speaking, mechanical man who 
desires in respect of his appetites and aversions. His words order an objective 
experience of things, and he authorises Leviathan’s power in the interests of the 
fulfilment of his desires. But an even more innovative statement on man as the 
ground for epistemological critique of the world in the interests of autonomy comes 
from Locke, which he develops on the hypothesis that the man behind the mask of 
the cartesian ego is a tabula rasa.18 For Locke, man’s faculty of understandmg 
enables the capacity of sensation that gives him simple ideas about the external 
objects of his senses, for this faculty is like a closet wholly shut from light with only 
a little hole left to let in the external resemblance of things. Secondly, through the 
capacity of reflection man observes the internal objects of his mind, which are 
independent of empirical things. He experiences himself by the ideas of, amongst 
others, thmking, doubting, loving and fearing.19 Ideas that derive from either the 
objects of the senses or the operation of the mmd are then lent meaning by reason, 
and from a foundation in empirically derived ideas man rationalises a knowledge 
of a thing-for-itself to arrive at complex ideas of substances, modes and relations20 
Of most relevance, the rational capacity of consciousness, which procures 
phenomenal knowledge, is synonymous with man’s self-mediation of himself into 
what Locke terms the person, who is: 
a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider 
itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it 
does only by that co~zscZouszzcss, which is inseparable from thinking, and, it 
seems to me, essential to it ... . [B]y this every one is to hiniself that which he 
calls self. . . . For, it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to 
l 6  Hobbes, Leaiatlzan, ch. XXI- XVII. 
” Hobbes, Leoiathan, ch. XVII, p. 223. 
l8 Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book I, Chs. 1-11, pp. 1-14. Locke also introduces 
philosophy to the concepts of the self (hence, das Selbst and le soi [in place of le nzoi]), consciousness 
(thus, das Beuiu§tsein instead of conscience, das Geu~issen), self-consciousness (das SeZbst-Beu~uj3tsein and 
le conscience de soi), and personal identity. Balibar, “What is ’Man’?”, pp. 233-234. 
l 9  Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book 11, Ch. I, pp. 26-33. 
20 Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book 11, Chs. XXII-XXVI, pp. 139-162. 
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himself, personal identity depends on that only.21 
Locke’s concept of the person is reducible to and identifiable with 
consciousness qua self, who is aware of pleasure and pain and capable of happiness 
and misery? Yet, because consciousness tends to be interrupted by forgetfulness, 
such that man loses sight of hs past self, Locke introduces memory as the 
guarantor of the continuity of the person to hmself.23 Llke Hobbes‘ mechanical 
man, who w i t h  the civil society he asks Leviathan to regulate is taken to be a 
Naturall Person whose words and actions are ~elf-authored,~~ Locke also conceives 
of the self in terms of an intelhgent agent with a capacity for law? The forensic self 
is the epistemological condition behmd right, reward and punishment, as well as 
the raison d’itre of toleration, for happiness and misery are the concerns of each self 
and, collected as memory, define personal identity.26 In essence, Locke’s personal 
identity is constituted in a realm of knowledge that is distinct from power. It 
implies that nobody but the person has any right to the property of his body, whilst 
the power of property necessitates a mutually conducive civil society of toleration 
and bourgeois right that facditates its exchange.27 With Locke, the rational capacity 
of consciousness enables man’s objective experience of both the h g s  in the world 
as phenomena - a metaphysics of empirical realism- and the truth of hs authentic 
being as a unique personal identity, an a priori autonomy, that calls for toleration, 
which the juridical state guarantees as political liberty. 
2.ii. Rousseau and the Recognition of Self-Love 
In their attempts to create an enlightened, self-ruling humanity out of alienation 
from God,28 Hobbes and Locke invoke a philosophy of the subject to stabilise 
objective experience. As a consequence, man procures political liberty from the 
juridical power that he also constitutes. Rousseau, however, rejects the exclusive 
English focus on autonomy, and he calls for a process of recoption in respect of 
21 Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book 11, Ch. XXVII, pp. 165-166. 
22 Locke, An Essay concerning Hunzan Understanding, Book 11, Ch. XXVII, pp. 170-171. 
Locke, An Essay concerning Hunzan Understanding, Book 11, Ch. XXVII, p. 165-169. 
24 Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. XVI. 
Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book 11, Ch. XXVII, p. 174. 
26 Locke, An Essay concerning Hunzan Understanding, Book 11, Ch. XXVII, p. 170. On current debates 
about Locke’s concept of personal identity, see Lowe, Kinds of Being, pp. 115-137; Diamond, ”The 
Importance of Being Human”; Wiggins, Sameness and Substance, pp. 150-187. 
27 Balibar, “What is ’Man’?”, pp. 234-239. 
28 Velkley, “The Crisis of the End of Reason in Kant’s Philosophy”, p. 78. 
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the volontk generale, which enables man’s self-actualisation. In so doing, he paves 
the way for Kant’s understanding of enhghtenment which promises autonomy, and 
for Hegel’s desire for recogrution from G i s t  in modernity, and I turn now to look at 
how Rousseau establishes the framework of freedom for humanist critical thought 
of epistemological and political critique. 
Although he also beholds the spectacle of man raising himself from nothing 
by the light of Rousseau pleads that whilst Hobbes and Locke claim to 
know the true nature of man they do no more than confound kum with the 
merchants they see daily before their eyes.3o Hobbes’ and Locke’s misplaced 
advocacy of political liberty is a result of their philosophy of man’s mechanical 
nature and sovereign memory. For Rousseau, man on his own has neither the 
capacity of speech with whch to covenant out of a state of nature,31 nor the words 
essential for h i s  rational capacity of understanding to provide kum with an objective 
experience of hgs .32  In their conception of language’s pre-social and pre- 
experiential existence, Hobbes and Locke simply re-iterate the metaphysical 
presuppositions of Christian ontology, whereas Rousseau’s emphasis on speech as 
the first social institution is indicative of what Derrida calls an epistemological 
b~eak.3~ For Rousseau, language, society and a knowledge of the world evolve 
together, and although the autonomy implied by Hobbes and Locke might be 
definitive of modern man’s authentic being, without recogrution through political 
self-actualisation it remains unfulfilled. 
In addition to Hobbes’ and Locke’s failure to appreciate the social nature of 
language, the modern arts and sciences in respect of which man mediates his 
29 Rousseau, ”Discourse on the Arts and Sciences”, p. 4. 
Rousseau, “Discourse on the Origin of Inequality”, pp. 50-59. 
31 Rousseau speaks of the need to avoid the blunders of those ”who, in reasoning on the state of 
nature, always import into it ideas gathered in a state of society”, an example of which is the 
confusion between “an explanation of how languages already formed are taught, . . . [which] by no 
means explains how languages were originally formed”. The answer to the problem of the origin of 
language, Rousseau continues, can be discerned from men collected and compelled to live together, 
where “a common idiom must have arisen much more easily than among those who still wandered 
through the forests”. Rousseau, ”Discourse on the Origin of Inequality”, p. 65 and p. 89. 
32 A Za lockean man’s capacity of reflection, via which he observes the internal objects of the mind or 
ideas, Rousseau suggests every general idea is purely intellectual. Nevertheless, he alludes to 
language as the condition of possibility for knowledge, as “general ideas cannot be introduced into the 
mind without the assistance of words, nor can the understanding seize them except by means of 
propositions. . . . [Ilmages . . . [and plurely abstract beings . . . are only conceivable by the help of 
language”. Rousseau, ”Discourse on the Origin of Inequality”, p. 67. 
33 Although Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin ofLanguage defines a theoretical science of language that 
opens the field of linguistics and systematises the concepts within it, Derrida writes that Rousseau also 
inaugurates the closure of concepts. See Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, pp. 139-146. 
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freedom fling garlands of flowers over his socio-economic chains? They lead, 
Rousseau laments, to indolence, luxury and an absence of virtue. The arts and 
sciences exacerbate the inequality of modern civilised society, divorce man from h i s  
natural liberty and infatuate him with ~lavery.~5 In this regard, Rousseau contrasts 
pride (amour propre), which is typical of eighteenth century society, with man’s 
natural capacities for self-preservation and compassion? These determine his pre- 
social self-love (anzour de soi), where the virtue is to love oneself without the 
mediation of others, hence a natural liberty. Nevertheless, the mediation of man’s 
being in respect of the arts and sciences and inequality- that is, recogrution in a 
society that honours pride and valorises egoism- leads to man’s alienation from 
hi1nself.3~ The very society of production that Hobbes and Locke first acknowledge, 
which throws man into intersubjective relations and raises the question of his 
autonomy and desire to be recogrused, also foists upon him alienated egoism, 
wluch enjoins the compromise of b h d  obedience to appearance. As a result of 
pride, to seem to be what one is not reigns over to be who one is.% 
Rousseau is clear that he is not concerned with the reconciliation of savage 
man to hs natural liberty.39 Despite its vices, modern society is indicative of the 
collective maturity of a people, who are ready to shape their own laws rather than 
defer to traditi0n.4~ The problem of freedom is asked in respect of the civilised man 
as he is, so that he may reconstitute state power accordingly. Whilst savage man is 
endowed with the capacities for self-preservation and compassion that enable self- 
love, it is only through the capacity for reason, which is particular to a civilised 
language user, that he can be It is thanks to this potentially universal ability 
that Rousseau argues man is born free, yet under the conditions of pride and 
inequality his capacity to reason is shfled. As man does not live by the laws he 
makes himself, which would realise his autonomy, but through the appearance 
reciprocated between alienated egoists subject to pride, man’s freedom is in 
chains.42 
Rousseau’s solution is for the community to jointly constitute juridical power, 
34 Rousseau, ”Discourse on the Arts and Sciences”, pp. 5-21. 
35 Rousseau, ”Discourse on the Arts and Sciences”, pp. 25-29. 
36 Rousseau, ”Discourse on the Arts and Sciences”, pp. 71-74. 
37 Rousseau, “Discourse on the Arts and Sciences”, pp. 84-92. 
38 Rousseau, “Discourse on the Arts and Sciences”, p. 95. 
39 Rousseau, ”Discourse on the Arts and Sciences”, pp. 49-51 and pp. 125-126. 
40 Rousseau, ”The Social Contract”, chs. 9-10. 
41 Rousseau, ”Discourse on the Origin of Inequality”, pp. 46-47. 
42 Rousseau, ”The Social Contract”, chs. 1-4. 
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which protects every one’s liberty and goods and simultaneously allows each man 
to be the author of the law.43 Language and reason enable him to partake in the 
virtuous communal activity of the legislation of the ziolonte ge‘nerale. It is a process of 
reciprocal dialogue, in whch men recogruse themselves in others and acknowledge 
the universality of their interests. At the same time, through obedience to the laws 
he makes himself, man realises his political liberty. He throws off his obedience to 
appearance and, as the master of himself, he is autonomous in his thought and 
action.44 Man is mature, and no longer bifurcated by pride from his authentic 
autonomous being. The unmediated self-love of savage man, for whom liberty is 
the mere impulse to appetite-slavery, as Rousseau calls it-is transcended in the 
people’s formation of the body politic. And, as civilised man, he is reconciled to 
himself insofar as political liberty enables the realisation of the capacity of reason 
through political liberation in the volonte‘ generale. Rousseau’s man moves beyond 
pride and into generally willed mutual recogrution, which still allows particularity 
in the shape of autonomy that is akin to a socialised self-love. For the watchmaker’s 
son who is proud in regard to what he is, in spite of hs origins, and beside himself 
when one reminds hun of it,45 the linguistic nature of knowledge justdies the 
substantiation of autonomy through the recogrution that is afforded by the juridical 
state. ”Each of us puts his person and all hs power in common under the supreme 
direction of the general will”, Rousseau writes, 
[which] takes [the name] of Republic or body politic; it is called by its members 
State when passive, Soziereigiz when active, and Pozoev when compared with 
others like itself. Those who associated in it take collectively the name of people, 
and severally are called citizens, as sharing in the sovereign authority, and 
subjects, as being under the laws of the State.46 
2.iii. Kant and the Question of Maturity 
After the insights of Hobbes and Locke into man’s ability to realise objective 
experience in pursuit of political liberty, Rousseau’s account of the social nature of 
language and the alienation of autonomous man inaugurates, through the 
constitution of the juridical state’s uolonte ge‘ize‘rale, the communal mediation of 
man’s self-love a propos of his capacity for reason and need for political liberation. 
43 Rousseau, ”The Social Contract”, chs. 6-7. 
Rousseau, ”The Social Contract”, ch. 8. 
45 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 5 100, p. 63. 
46 Rousseau, “The Social Contract”, pp. 192-193. 
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Nonetheless, the worry with Rousseau’s dream of a transparent society, which is 
based on the philosopher’s epistemolopcal and political critique, is that the self- 
love he reifies as autonomy to escape pride requires a politics to process recoption 
which tempts man into the role of overseer and co~nrade .~~ In intimation of a 
rousseauian nightmare, Kant puts a break on the eighteenth century’s domination 
by coeur over la te^te.48 After 1781, he endeavours philosophically Ci la Rousseau on 
behalf of humanity and autonomy,49 which necessitates critical philosophy’s 
reformulation of epistemological critique to nullify the skepticism of empirical 
metaphysicists such as Locke, and the dogmatism of Christian ontology. 
To overcome philosophy’s pedantic university practice and realise its 
rousseauian potential to deliver critique that is based on man’s autonomy,50 Kant 
reduces philosophy to four questions: what can I know?; what ought I to do?; what 
may I hope for?; and what is man?.51 With respect to what may I hope for?, critical 
philosophy does not proffer knowledge of things beyond human experience.52 
Similarly, what is man? is a subsidiary of the second question rather than the basis 
of normative justice as for Hobbes and Locke, who make a pernicious error in their 
moral ground of man’s heteronomous In response to the first two 
questions, Kant’s rousseauian reflection in Antlzropology fioni a Pragiizlrtic Poiiz f of 
Vieiii is to say that “man is destined by his reason to live in a society of people, and 
. . . to apply hmself to a moral purpose’’.% Thus, for the creator of time,55 Kant, who 
is a whole solar system at once,56 what can I know? demands an objective 
knowledge of the things in the world that is suited to, and derived from, man’s 
experience of his authentic being of autonomy. Further, h s  is also the key to what 
ought I to do?, because autonomy translates into the idea of freedom that is 
47 Foucault, “The Eye of Power”, p. 152. 
48 Nietzsche, The Will to Pmwr, 5 95, p. 59. Although, as Roger Chartier argues, it is important to avoid 
an ”oversimplification of any analysis of the Revolution that plays the game of retrospective 
dovetailing to inscribe 1793 in 1789, . . . terrorist violence in the theory of the general will”. Chartier, 
”The Chimera of the Origin”, p. 177. 
49 Knippenberg, ”The Politics of Kant’s Philosophy”, p. 156. 
50 Beck, Early German Philosophy, p. 426. 
51 Williams, Kaizt’s Political Philosophy, p. 23.  
52 Kant argues that God cannot be the ratio detenniizans antecedenter of tlungs, although a ratio 
cognoscendi of God’s existence is possible as a derivative concept and crucial, along with the idea of 
immortality, to a moral teleology. Kant, ”Critique of Practical Reason”, pp. 214249. 
53 Kant, “Introduction to The Metaphysics ofMorals”, pp. 44-45 and pp. 40-41. 
5.1 Quoted in Williams, Kanf’s Political Philosophy, p. 223. 
55 Merleau-Ponty, cited in Waxman, Kant’s Model o f f h  Mind, p. 27, f. 14. 
56 Abbott, ”Memoir of Kant”, p. xiii. 
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affirmed by Mo~ali tat .~~  Firstly, though, it is fruitful to consider the German 
intellectual climate of the eighteenth century, especially the PantlzeismuJtreit and 
the Sturm und Drang, which challenge man’s capacity for, and ability to achieve, 
maturity, and Moses Mendelssohn, whose clarification of Aufklri‘rung in opposition 
to these challenges mfluences Kant, who eventually establishes how to thlnk and 
act freely with a metaphysics of experience and morals. 
Between Martin Luther’s publication of the Disputatioiz against Scholastic 
TlzeoZogy in 1517 and Friedrich 11’s coronation in 1740, the German speaking regions 
of Europe suffer the Thirty Years’ War, absolutist principalities, bureaucratic rule 
and economic stagnation.58 Among the intelligentsia, critical thought and political 
commitment are as scarce as a public culture of debate and informed opinion? 
Philosophers are overly professorial and parochial in comparison to their foreign 
counterparts, and the intellectual climate lags behind that of England and France.60 
But scientific humanism slowly gains in popularity as Hoclzdeutsclz replaces Latin 
and writers start to publish in the vernacular.61 In the universities, scientdic 
humanism aids the secularisation of aristotelianism away from its monopolisation 
by the Christian ontology of the orthodox Protestants or pietists? Further, even 
though Friedrich 11’s pretensions to be a phdosopher-king are questionable,63 he is a 
politically enlightened, francophle kaiser who manages to modernise Prussia,a so 
that by the late eighteenth century Prussia-if not B e r h ~ ~ ~ - i s  the home of the 
AUfkZiiruizg.66 Amidst all ths,  the relation between philosophy and religion comes to 
57 In my analysis of what ought I to do?, I focus on the Groundwork oftlze Metaplzysics ofMorals and the 
Critique of Practical Reason. The former classifies and the latter justifies the supreme principle of 
Moralit;it, autonomy, whereas the Metaphysics of Morals applies it. Allison calls this Kant’s mature 
doctrine, rather than his semi-critical doctrine of the Critique of Pure Reason. Further, although Mary 
Gregor argues it is unfortunate that the Groundwork ofthe Metaphysics ofMorals, and not the 
Metaplzysics ofMoraZs, is taken as Kant’s definitive position on Moralitit, I follow Beck who claims that 
the Metaplzysics ofMorlzls is the least sigruficant of Kant’s works on Moralitut. Allison, Kant’s theory of 
freedom, pp. 66-67; Gregor, “Translator’s Introduction”, pp. 1-6; Beck, ”Introduction”, pp. 16-17. 
58 Pascal, TIze Gernzan Sturnz und Drang, p. 42. 
59 Engell, Tlze Crcalive Inzngination, pp. 91-101. 
60 Reiss, “Introduction”, pp. 6-8. 
61 Wolff, Die Weltanschauung der dcutschen Aufklhzng, pp. 66-68. 
Randall, 77zc Career o f  Philosophy, pp. 50-55. 
63 Denis Diderot, Pages inidites contrc un tyran, cited in Gay, The Enliglztennzent, Voluine 2, p. 487. 
61 Hegel, The Philosophy of His t o y ,  p. 437. Friedrich 11’s Codex Fridericianus (1747) establishes a Prussian 
judiciary, which upholds religious diversity and abolishes the use of torture, whilst his Allgcnzeines 
preussischcs Landrecht (1796) combines natural law with German and Roman law. 
65 Though, as Peter Gay and others argue, a more commercially driven Aufkliirung occurs beyond 
Prussia, too, in Frankfurt-am-Main, Halle, Hanover, Hamburg, Leipzig and Dresden. See Gay, The 
Enliglztennzent, Volunze 2, pp. 47-72; Randall, The Career of Plzilosophy; Garland, ”Germany”. 
“ Brunschwig, Enlightenment and Romanticism, p. 1. 
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the fore in the Pantheismufitreit, in which man as a subject of knowledge is rejected, 
as does the question of an authentic German culture under the challenge of the 
Stiirnzer und Driinger, who repudiate the use of reason to articulate justice. 
The English, Scottish and French dilemma over the appropriate balance 
between man and God characterises the Pnn tlzeisnzuptreit, which centres on the 
mutually exclusive belief of aufklarers and pietists in reason or faith as the basis for 
objective experience. After Leibniz's harmonisation of reason with faith, Christian 
Wolff develops a secular morality that commands allepance on the basis of an 
ontology of formal rather than Christian Under pressure from the pietists, 
Friedrich I expels Wolff from his post at the rationalist, anti-aristotelian Halle 
Uniuersztri'P After sporadic flourishes between 1650 and 1730, faculties of 
philosophy are subject to the faculties of theology which are headed by the pietists, 
who are supported by Friedrich I.69 However, Wolff is re-instated upon the 
succession of Friedrich I1 to the Prussian throne, which rekindles the main 
philosophical debate about whether the formal, structural elements of thought, on 
which the Aufklarung is predicated, might be grounded in man's experience of the 
w~rld.~O In their emphasis on the limitations of human understanding, the pietists 
maintain that the principles of sufficient reason cannot be deduced from formal 
logic, whch they demarcate from Christian ontology in the interests of a return to 
the scriptures for questions about knowledge.71 But by the 1780s a strong anti-pietist 
opposition develops, which is spurred on by the Berlinisclzes Journnl f i r  Aufkliirting 
and other publications where rzufklri'rers advocate man as the condition of possibility 
for know ledge .72 
Parallel to the phlosophical dispute between reason and faith, a politico- 
cultural reaction to the Aufiliirung arises from the Stiirnzer und Di.iinger. In drzs Lnnd 
licr Diclzter und Denker, the Pnntlzeisnzujltreit seems far removed from the concerns of 
many people.73 The dispute over a pious versus abstract morality provides fertile 
soil for a revolt against both the Aufkliining's faith in reason as a basis for justice 
and its cultural enthralment with antiquity,74 which are perceived as a h e a t  to 
cultural originality and the unique propensity of the German language to produce 
h7 Randall, The Career of Philosophy, p. 56; Zammito, 77zc Genesis of Kunt's C r i t i p ~  q f  Judgenrcnt, pp. 17-18. 
Zammito, The Genesis of Kant's Critique ofIudgcnzcnt, p. 11. 
69 Kuhn, "The German Aufklarung and British Philosophy", pp. 309-311. 
7" Randall, The Career of Philosophy, pp. 57-58. 
Zammito, n z c  Genesis of Kant's Critique of judgcmelzt, pp. 19-22. 
72 Brunschwig, Enliglztennzent and Romanticism, pp. 88-89. 
73 Pascal, The German Sturm und Drang, p. xiv. 
74 Bruilschwig, Enlightenment and Ronzanticisnz, pp. 89-90. 
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literary geniuses.75 Stiirnzer und Dranger oppose the aufklarers on several fronts - 
truth and culture as an end versus truth as a means to self-interest and profit;76 
genius and sensuous consciousness versus reason;n and an idyllic, medizval sense 
of Genzeinsclmfi versus modern GeseZZsclmfP - and through the two Johanns, Herder 
and Goethe, and the Frankfurter GeZehrte Anzeigen journal the Sturm und Drang’s 
popularity coincides with the pietists’ success between the 1750s and the 1770s.79 
An important reason why it finally loses its momentum is the counter-Sturm und 
Drang stance of Mendelssohn in the 1780s, whose urban cosmopolitanism, fluency 
in English and introduction of David Hume’s philosophy to Berlin prepare the 
ground for Kant.80 In addition, Mendelssohn’s conception of AufkZirung is further 
proof that the theme of epistemological critique in the name of autonomy and 
recognition, which enamours Kant and animates Hegel, depends on Rousseau’s 
field of humanist discursivity. 
In September 1784, three months prior to the publication of Kant’s essay on 
the same topic, Mendelssohn’s essay, ”Uber die Frage: was heBt aufklaren?”, 
appears in the BerZinisdze Monatsclzrifi. He begins with a clarification of the three 
key concepts of BiZdung, KuZtur and AufkZirung. Accordingly, ”civilisation, culture 
and enlightenment transform existence and are the product of man’s diligence and 
endeavour to improve his social condition’’ .81 In particular, Mendelssohn suggests 
that culture is radically altered by modern society, and to moderate man’s efforts 
and ensure he does not get lost within it he proposes the yardstick of die 
Bestiiizmung des Mensdzeiz, man’s determined purpose,82 which is not unlike a 
natural uoZonte gkizeraZe.83 What it amounts to for Mendelssohn is AufkZL+ung itself, 
75 Zammito, The Gencszs of Kanf‘s Critique offudgenzenf, pp. 13-14. 
76 Wolff, Die Weltansclzauuizg dcr deufsclzen Aufkliirung, pp. 251-255. 
Garland, “Germany”, p. 102; Pascal, 77ze Gcrnzan Sfurnz und Drang, pp. xv-xvi. 
78 Pascal, Tlze Gevnzan Sturnz und Drang, pp. 48-50. 
79 Brunschwig, Enlighfeniizenf and Romanticism, pp. 90-95. 
Kiihn, ”The German Aufklarung and British Philosophy”, pp. 316-320. This is not to suggest that 
Kant is influenced by Mendelssohn’s essay. Indeed, on the day he finishes his own essay on 
enlightenment, Kant says that ”I read today . . . [of] Mendelssohn‘s answer to the same question . . . . I 
have not yet seen this journal, otherwise I should have held back the above reflections. I let them stand 
only as a means of finding out by comparison how far the thoughts of two individuals may coincide 
by chance”. Kant, ”An Answer to the Question: ’What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 60, note. 
” ” Bildung, Kultur und Aufklarung sind Modlfikationcn des gcselligen Lebens; Wirkungen des Fle$cs und dcr 
Beiiziilzungeiz der Mensclzen ilzren gcselligen Zustand zu ~ierbcsscrn”. Mendelssohn, ”Uber die Frage: was 
heiiSt aufklaren?”, p. 115. 
s2 Mendelssohn, “Uber die Frage: was heiBt aufklaren?”, pp. 115-116. 
83 On the prevalence and meaning of die Bestirnnzung des Menschen in seventeenth and eighteenth 
century German philosophy, see Grimm and Grimm, Dcutsches Worterbuclz, Band I, pp. 1678-1679. 
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which is related to culture as theory is to practice, and philosophy to morality.” 
And, just as language is the best indicator of a people’s civilisation, their level of 
culture is indicative of their Aufklurung. Nevertheless, man does not need culture- 
he is, h la Rousseau’s self-love, at ease with himself-but, contra the pietists and the 
Sfiirnzer und Dranger, he does need A ~ f k l a r u n g . ~ ~  
On Mendelssohn’s reckoning, Aufklarung is the intermediary of culture, 
which is subject to the vicissitudes of modern society. These include a disturbance 
of its ranks and the status of men w i t h  it, and only a deference to the progress of 
enlightenment (Menscl2enaufkltirung) by men who know and honour their social 
position (Bzirgeraufklri‘rung) can alleviate it. Should they seek to deny their 
determined purpose and challenge the Aufklarung ’s mediation of culture, then 
egoism, atheism and anarchy would replace enlightenment, and lavishness, 
effeteness, superstition and slavery would engulf culture.86 At the same time, it 
would be necessary for the aufklarer, who is in constant touch with the determined 
purpose, to fail to authorise the legislation necessary to prevent this in the first 
place. For Mendelssohn, the role of Aufklarung is the safe delivery of modern 
culture, and together they give birth to and enable one to gauge a nation’s level of 
civilisation. Men who know their station (BzirgeraufkLirung) and perform their duty 
(Mensclzennufllli‘rung) are the core ingredients of an enlightened culture and a 
civilised nation, and only an excess of pride in its new found spiritual and material 
prosperity can negate the inevitable process of A ~ f k l a r u n g . ~ ~  
2.iv. Aufilarung and the Metaphysics of Objective Experience 
Konigsberg Uniuersiflif, where Kant is a Privafdozenf in logic, ethics, jurisprudence, 
geography and anthropology from 1755 up to his appointment as a professor of 
logic and metaphysics in 1770, is no exception to the rule of Christian ontology in 
German universities since the thirteenth century.8s Nonetheless, Kant’s frequent 
visits to B e r h  ensure that he is a committed aufklirer, and upon the deaths of 
Lessing (1780) and Mendelssohn (1786) he assumes the responsibihty for 
Aufklarung. There is an added urgency to Kant’s task, too. Between 1781 and 1790, 
84 Mendelssohn, ”Uber die Frage: was heat aufklaren?”, p. 116. I translate Sittlichkeit as morality 
rather than ethical life because, until Hegel demarcates them, in Kant’s day and in his philosophy 
Siffliclzkeit is synonymous with Moralifiit. lnwood, “Hegel and His Language”, pp. 12-13. 
85 Mendelssohn, ”Uber die Frage: was heat aufklaren?”, p. 116. 
86 Mendelssohn, ”Uber die Frage: was heat aufklaren?”, pp. 117-118. 
87 Mendelssohn, ”Uber die Frage: was hest aufklaren?”, pp. 118-119. 
Beck, Early Geman Philosophy, pp. 78-179. 
37 
EpistemolbgicaCcritqu in Kant andHegeC 
the cause of the pietists and Stiirmer und Dranger is bolstered by the support of 
Friedrich Wilhelm 111, the conservative son of Friedrich 11, who dies in 1786.89 The 
pietists’ hold on objective experience and the Stisrnzer und Driinger’s desire to rescue 
civilisation from an overly abstract Aufklarung, which they say causes rather than 
mitigates a decadent culture, define Kant’s philosophical task: shift the ground of 
an objective experience of things from Christian ontology’s dogmatism to man; and, 
vis-a-vis Locke’s and Hume’s skepticism, locate the seat of knowledge in man’s 
reason rather than his perception. Once t h s  is done, Kant’s epistemolopcal critique 
can guarantee Aufklarung and realise man’s autonomy through Moralitut. But what 
is kantian Aufiliirung and the critical thought it establishes? 
Kant is not a plulosopher to beat about the bush. Aufklarung, he proclaims, 
”ist der Ausgang des Mensclzen aus seiner selbst uerschuldeten Unrniindigkit”.~ 
Enligli fennzenf i s  nians eniergence froiii his self-iricurred inziiiaturity. linniaturity is 
the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. 
This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack 
of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto 
of the enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own 
~nderstanding!~’ 
For Kant, the scarce use of understanding results from laziness and cowardice. 
They leave the door open for guardians- the pietists, for example- who, with their 
dogmas that anchor immaturity, step in and supervise Me. As a result, self-incurred 
immaturity is, somewhat hke rousseauian pride that causes slavery, like a second 
nature to man. Immaturity (Unmiindigkeit) denotes how, in the face of what to thlnk 
and how to act, man is unreasonable (Unuerniinftig), unreckoning 
(Ui?ztirechnunss~ri‘~zig), helpless (HilIflasigkeit) and mentally dependent (geistige 
Uizselbstri‘izdigkeit).Y’ In Beck‘s apt term, Unnziindigkeit is man‘s tutelage in thought 
and action.93 On his own, Kant argues, man is unhkely to find the exit to maturity,% 
for which he requires the ”most innocuous freedom of all-freedom to make public 
use of one’s reason in all matters”.95 In this respect, Kant speaks of the citizen’s right 
and duty to make unconstrained use of his reason in learned circles, whereas in his 
89 Zammito, Tlzc Genesis o f  Kant’s Critique ojludgcnzent, pp. 8-10; Reiss, ”Introduction”, pp. 1-3. 
90 Kant, ”Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklarung?”, p. 35. 
‘)’ Kant, ”An Answer to the Question: ’What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 54. 
y2 On interpretations of Unrniindigkeit from Luther to Goethe, see Grimm and Grimm, Deutscizcs 
Worterbuclz, Band XI, pp. 1192-1195. 
93 Kant, “What is Enlightenment?”, p. 286. 
‘I‘ Kant, ”An Answer to the Question: ’What is Enlightenment?”’, pp. 54-55. 
95 Kant, “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 55. 
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private use of reason the same citizen might reasonably suffer restrictions attendant 
upon the duties and obligations of his civilian office.% As for Mendelssohn, with his 
Biirgeraufkliirung and Mensclzenaufklarung, Kant’s citizen’s private and public use of 
reason have their place, and like Rousseau, who speaks of man’s political liberty in 
the context of a zmbnte‘ ge‘ntrale, the priority lies with the latter rather than the 
former. 
In addition, man’s lzumanitas - to recall Heidegger - of a capacity for reason, 
which helps Rousseau’s subject to transform his self-love through recogrution into 
autonomy, is re-iterated by Kant, for whom to renounce enlightenment for oneself 
or future generations is to violate the sacred rights of A balance must be 
struck, therefore, between a people’s intellectual freedom that carries Aufklarung 
forward, and civil freedom or autonomy whch often sets up barriers to it. With 
Kant, as for Mendelssohn, Aufklarung is the go-between of culture, which is 
delivered through a head of state who, re-assured by the aufklarers, is confident in 
his own authority and the ability of reason to inculcate maturity without the threat 
of revolution.98 An edghtened king, Kant says, can tell his subjects what no 
republic would dare say to its citizens: ”Argue as much as you like and about 
whatever you like, but obey!”, for a kaiser like Friedrich Wilhelm I1 can rest assured 
that: 
a lesser degree of civil freedom gives intellectual freedom enough room to 
expand to its fullest extent. Thus once the germ on which nature has lavished 
most care - man’s inchation and duty to f lz i izk fiecly - has developed within 
this hard shell, it gradually reacts upon the mentality of the people, who thus 
gradually become increasingly able to ficffieely.w 
Kantian Aufilri’rung is a carefully orchestrated process of epistemological and 
political critique. On the basis of man’s authentic being, critique mediates between 
the autonomy that Aufklarung demands, and the public order that sustains 
intellectual freedom and inculcates civil freedom. Aufilri’rung requires a 
metaphysics of experience to teach man how to think freely, and subsequently a 
metaphysics of morals to secure the conditions for man to act freely. These ideal 
answers to what can I know? and what ought I to do? define the twin axes of 
kantian critical thought. 
96 Kant, ”Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklarung?”, pp. 36-38. 
O7 Kant, “An Answer to the Question: ’What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 58. Cf. Rousseau, “The Social 
Contract”, p. 186. 
98 Kant, ”An Answer to the Question: ’What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 55. 
99 Kant, ”An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 59. 
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With regard to the first question, Beck argues that Kant is haunted by the 
paradox of the lopcal incompatibility between the objective and subjective 
conditions of scientific knowledge.100 How, that is, can man produce scientific 
knowledge of both things and himself and at the same time be the origin and agent 
of this objective experience? In many ways, the slow but progressive development 
of Kant’s czuvre reflects tlus dilemma,lo1 especially Kant’s eventful relationship to 
what he calls his mistress, metaphysics,102 in respect of which he shifts from an 
infatuation with rationalism (1746-1759) to a scepticism about it as a viable 
epistemology (176O-1766);lo3 hereafter, Kant embraces a modest ontology for 
metaphysics (1766-1772) before, after a temporary separation from his mistress 
(1772-1780),’01 he is reconciled with her on his terms of the synthetic a priori and a 
critical philosophy focused on Grundlegung rather than Enueiterung.105 
As I argued in the previous section, Kant’s metaphysics is concerned with the 
threat the pietists’ Christian ontology poses for Aufklarung. They treat time and 
space as independent variables and apprehend a thing-in-itself that conforms to 
God’s order of the world, such that man’s objective experience is defined by a 
dogmatic relation between words and h g s  of transcendental realism.1oG What 
then is wrong with empirical metaphysics, in whch man% knowledge of things is 
characterised by a skeptical relation of empirical realism? 
If Descartes sets the wheels in Locke extricates metaphysics from 
the grips of Christian ontology.108 His esprit plzilosoplzique is no longer concerned with 
Christian ontology’s fundamental objects,’W the soul, the cosmos and God,11o but 
with an objective experience of a thmg-in-itself which is known to the extent that, 
subsequent to his perception of it, man makes sense of a thing through rational 
loo Beck, “Introduction”, pp. 1-2. 
Io1 Nelson, Progress and Regress, Volume I, p. 101. 
lo2 Kant, Dreams o f a  Spirit-Seer, Illustrated hy Dreams of Metaphysics, cited in Beck, Early Gernzatz 
Philosoplzy, p. 445. 
I o 3  Nelson, Progress and Regress, Volume I, pp. 93-98. 
l W  Beiser, ”Kant’s Intellectual Development: 1746-1781”. 
lo5 Nelson, Progress and Regress, Volume I, p. 104. On the evolution of Kant’s plUl0~0ph~7, see Beck, Earl!/ 
Gernzan Plzilosophy, pp. 430467; Guyer, “Introduction”, pp. 5-11; Williams, Kant ’s Political Plzilosophy, 
lo6 Allison, Kaizf’s Transcendental Idealism, pp. 15-16; Ameriks, ”The critique of metaphysics”, p. 254 
lo7 Hampson, Tlze Enlightennzent, pp. 16-29. 
pp. 18-28. 
d’ Alembert, Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopaedia of Diderot, p. 62. 
Berlin, The Age of Enlighfenment, pp. 11-14. 
Belaval, ”Le conte plulosophique”, p. 310. 
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principles.II1 From Kant's perspective, empirical metaphysics is dogged by the 
antinomies. Every time reason goes beyond experience and, a propos of perception 
that is subjective, claims to have a knowledge of a thing-in-itself, it falls into 
unavoidable contradiction.112 Whilst Christian ontology's Grundlegung in faith 
suffers an inevitable decline in the age of reason, the attempt by empirical 
metaphysics to put the queen of the sciences, philosophy,113 onto a truly scientific 
path to Enueiterung is successful neither philosophically, insofar as objective 
experience is dependent on perception, nor politically, because classical liberal man 
acts out of interest rather than duty. What is needed to carry Aujklarung forward, 
Kant suggests, is an epistemologcal critique of the capacity for reason itself and all 
that it tries to estabhh,"4 and only a critical philosophy of Grundlegung can discern: 
whether the task [of inquiring into the hidden qualities of things] be within the 
limits of our knowledge, and in stating its relations to conceptions derived from 
experience; for these must always be the foundation of all our judgements. To 
this extent metaphysics is the science of the boundaries of human reason.115 
An epistemological critique of the capacities of reason is the kantian key to 
autonomous man's objective experience of a thmg, which he must know prior to his 
perception of it. Also, Kant says that it must be possible to derive more predicates 
about the thing than can be obtained from an analysis of the concept of it. 
Knowledge of a thing has to be non-empirical and extra-conceptual, or determined 
by an n priori and synthetic relation. With Kant, the paradox between knower and 
known becomes how is it "possible to extend one's knowledge beyond a given 
concept, independently of any experience of the object thought through that 
concept''?1'6 For his answer, he turns neither to faith nor perception but reason,'I7 
which enjoys the "prerogative of being the ultimate touchstone of truth".11s Kant's 
task is to vindicate reason, which in its negative moment disciplines metaphysics 
into a science that provides principles which guide man in the already to hand 
' I 1  Terre, "Philosophe des Lumieres et Revolution", p. 25. 
'I2 Williams, Kaizt's Political Philosophy, pp. 52-53; Nelson, Progress a i d  Regress, Volunzc I, pp. 21-51. 
'I3 Hutchings, Kant, Critique and Politics, pp. 12-13. 
Kant, "Preface to Tize Metaphysics ofMorals", p. 36. 
Kant, Dreams o f a  Spirit-Seer, Illustrated by Dream ofMetapltysics, quoted in Beck, Early German 
Philosophy, p. 445. 
' I6  Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealisni, p. 78. 
'I7 Nelson, Progress and Regress, Volume I, pp. 87-92. 
'I8 Kant, "What is Orientation in Thinking?", p. 305. 
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ways of thought and action.119 Epistemological vindication for Aufklarung, therefore, 
and Kant’s synthetic n priori objective experience of things requires nothing less 
than the transformation of metaphysics, as he in fact realises. 
Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. 
But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something 
in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, 
ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more 
success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to 
our knowledge.120 
Kant’s anthropocentric epistemological critique - his revolutionary 
philosophical thesis121 -presupposes that the generically different faculties of 
intuition, understanding and reason satisfy the epistemic conditions necessary for 
objective experience. Accordrng to Kant, man’s intuition and understanding 
constitute form, the urufying structure of experience. Intuition and understanding 
also entertain a tlung, which appears in the form of each faculty, whilst reason’s 
form is the structure of thought that is devoid of a thmg. Irutially, man knows a 
thing through h s  perception and sensory experience of it. The faculty of intuition’s 
outer and inner pure or n priori forms of space and time, which are the twin pillars 
of Kant’s epistemological critique, allow man to perceive things? Secondly, the 
thing becomes an object of the pure but general concepts of thought in the faculty 
of understanding. Here, the logcal use of reason, the science of mathematics, 
manipulates the concepts of pure intuition via thmking.123 Thirdly, in the pure 
forms of the structures of thought, which are situated in the faculty of reason, the 
(science of the) logical use of reason orders and subordinates pure concepts.124 
The translation of man’s intuition of a t h g  into knowledge about it is 
completed by the transcendental unity of apperception. As a pure concept that acts 
as Kant’s condition for the structure of thought,125 the transcendental unity of 
apperception is the spontaneous activity of thmking that is generated by reason.’26 
It is self-consciousness qun pure thought in the faculty of reason, and to ensure that 
man also experiences hmself in his daily existence Kant introduces empirical self- 
O’Neill, ”Vindicating reason”, p. 291. 
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, quoted in Allison, Kant’s Traizscendental Idealisnz, p. 28. 
l 2 I  Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealisnz, p. 29. 
Parsons, ”The Transcendental Aesthetic”. 
Beck, Early German Philosophy, pp, 458-460. 
124 Kant, “Preface to the Fundamental Principles of the Mcfaplzysic of Morals”, pp. 1-2. 
Hatfield, “Empirical, rational, and transcendental psychology”, p. 204. 
126 Wartenberg, “Reason and the practice of science”, p. 229. 
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consciousness into the faculty of under~tanding.]~~ Man intuits himself, so to speak, 
and apperception unifies hs outer intuitions in thought, which makes them into 
subjective h g s  of the phenomenal world or humanly conditioned empirical 
knowledge.12s The transcendental ’I’ in kantian man has the power of apperception 
that synthesises hs  intuition^.^^^ As a result, a thing appears to him as a 
phenomenon only, a thing-for-itself, to which man’s knowledge must confine itself. 
For Kant, a thing does not appear in terms of its noumenal or in-itself quality, 
which man can reason upon but not actually 
In effect, Kant’s critique of reason’s limits extends a Copernican mathematical 
method into the empirical sciences of nature and philosophy. His metaphysics of 
objective experience, commonly known as transcendental idealism,131 drives a 
wedge between the conditions that effect man’s knowledge of a thing-for-itself and 
the extra-scientlfic conditions required for a knowledge of a thing-in-itself.132 
Armed with the synthetic IZ priori, Kant successfully challenges the transcendental 
realism and dogmatic objectivity of the pietists’ Christian ontology. The sceptic’s 
antinomies are resolved, too. Man‘s empirical, phenomenal knowledge leaves a 
thing as it is in-itself w i t h  a realm of unknown causal determinism to which 
everything is subject. Kant’s Copernican revolution not only re-defines objective 
experience through a specification of the conditions necessary for man’s knowledge 
of things and human experience in the world, but a metaphysics of experience is 
the saviour of epistemological critique that is grounded in man’s autonomy and 
central to Aufiliirung. 
127 Nelson, Progress and Regress, Volunzc I ,  pp. 204-205; Brook, Kant and the Mind, p. 11. 
128 An intuition can only be lent meaning if man is aware of the intuition as €us own. It must of 
necessity be possible (though not necessarily actual) for man to reflectively attach ’ I  think‘ to his 
intuition. This is the ’I’ of apperception. But man’s intuition of a thmg, which is initially as a single 
complex thought, must be grasped as a unity, which requires a single thinking subject. This is the task 
of the kantian ’I’, the unity of consciousness, which is evident in every act of thought. As the ’I’ of 
apperception and the ’I’ of thought are indissolubly one, they signlfy a logically simple subject, man. 
They are contained together in the concept of thought, and the transcendental unity of apperception is 
hence an analytic proposition about man qua transcendental subject. Allison, Kant ‘s Transc-endental 
Idealism, pp. 258-278 and pp. 137-139. 
129 Brook, Kant and tlze Mind, pp. 90-91. 
130 Guyer, ”Introduction”, pp. 12-16. 
13’ Allison writes that “Kant’s idealism is ’formal’ in the sense that it is a theory about the nature and 
scope of the conditions under which objects can be experienced or known by the human mind. This is 
to be contrasted with idealisms of the Cartesian or Berkelian sort, which are first and foremost theories 
about the contents of consciousness . . . . Again, this idealism is ’critical’ because it is rounded in a 
reflection on the conditions and limits of human knowledge, and not on the contents of consciousness 
or the nature of an siclz reality”. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, pp. 25-26. 
132 Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealisnz, p. 66. 
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2.v. Autonomy and Moralitat 
Because he thinks freely through objective experience that is rendered by the 
faculty of understanding, a transcendental idealist with resolution and courage is 
able to partake in AufkZiirurzg. Kant’s epistemological critique, which is grounded in 
the apperceptive capacities of the transcendental subject, secures man his right to 
intellectual freedom. But what of the civil freedom that is crucial to AufkZiirung? 
What ought I to do to be mature, such that the head of state need have no fear of 
actions which flow from (my) autonomy? In answer, Kant proposes that man’s 
reason, which teaches him how to think freely via a metaphysics of experience that 
is regulated by his understanding, can also show man how to act freely within the 
confines of the laws he makes himself. He says that a practical phdosophy of moral 
wisdom can elucidate Morditit’s compatibility with atltonomy,l33 and although it 
grounds justice in man’s WiZZe rather than God’s Kant’s metaphysics of morals 
establishes a universal Morditiit ir Za Christian ontology, whilst it carries Rousseau’s 
dream of liberty as obedience to a law man prescribes to himself forward. 
Kant believes that reason is bestowed on man as a practical faculty to help 
h m  act freely via the fundamentally good WiZZe.134 When man’s volition is 
motivated by the maxims of the Wille, which is a formal synthetic a priari 
proposition, duty as necessity is performed and the ideal legality of Marditiif is 
realised.135 Kant argues that man’s actions should be susceptible to universal laws 
because all other men possess the capacity of WilZe, t 0 0 . l ~ ~  This potential 
synonymity of action gives rise to the categorical imperative, where man’s duty 
when he acts freely is to bear others in mind as an end and never to use them as a 
means.13’ Each man is an end in himself in virtue of his WiZZe, the basis of human 
dignity,138 which gives every man the capacity of autos noiizus, or the self-legislation 
of universal laws that constitute Morditiit: ”AUTONOMY OF WILL IS THAT 
QUALITY OF WILL BY WHICH A WILL (independently of any object willed) IS A 
LAW TO ITSELF”.139 
‘33 Kant, ”Introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals”, pp. 4345. 
134 Kant, ”Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics”, pp. 4-12. 
135 Kant, ”Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics”, p. 13. When man’s maxims relate to external 
actions and conform to law, they are juridical and the action has legality, and when in relation to 
external actions man’s maxims conform to Moralitiit, they are ethical and the action is morality. Kant, 
”Introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals”, p. 42. 
136 Kant, “Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ehcs”, p. 25. 
137 Kant, ”Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Etlucs”, pp. 27-42. 
138 Kant, “Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics”, pp. 49-50. 
139 Kant, “Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics”, p. 55. 
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But a difficulty for Kant is the relationship between ought and is, duty and 
desire. Is it possible for man to be a subject of Moralitat and to act freely in the 
empirical world? In other words, Kant must show how man’s autonomy constitutes 
the Konigsberg version of the volonte‘ ge‘ne‘rak and, simultaneously, how man is free 
within its borders, which requires the introduction of the idea of freedom that 
describes the non-experiential aspect of M ~ r a Z i t a f . ~ ~ ~  Kant considers the WiZle as a 
kind of causality that can be attributed to men with the capacity of reason. The idea 
of freedom is the property of h s  causality, and it enables the WiZZe to originate 
events independently of the empirical Kant’s idea of freedom thus entails 
WiZZe and WzZZkiir,142 and apart from its constitution of Moralitat WiZZe is also the 
basis of man’s autonomy in the shape of the WiZZkiir, or man’s ability to act freely.143 
Somewhat akin to the ‘I’ of thought and the ’I’ of apperception as the conditions 
b e h d  Kant’s metaphysics of objective experience, kantian moral man has the 
capacity of reason, Wille, which is present in all men as the legislative will and 
makes them the source of Moralitat, as well as the capacity for choice, WiZZkiir, or the 
executive will that in its ideal execution allows man to choose and act freely in 
accordance with the idea of freedom. WiZZe is the negative concept of freedom and 
WiZZkiir the positive-as Allison describes them, the capacity of autonomy or moral 
agency, and spontaneous subjectivity or rational agencyY Together, they constitute 
Moralitat, in which duty and desire are ccmpatible. 
Through the mediations of the WiZZkiir, which relates man back to his W i l k  
every time he acts, spontaneous subjectivity is a reflexive task of self-discipline,14j 
an arbitrium liberum, where ”a simple desire [is] subjected to some degree of 
rational control” .146 Nonetheless, Kant worries that while it is possible to 
demonstrate in theory how duty and desire coincide, it may not be so easy in 
practice. To prove Morditat’s reality and objective necessity to man in his 
spontaneous subjectivity requires an escape from h s  labyrinth of the idea of 
freedom, and Kant wonders: 
Schneewind, ”Autonomy, obligation and virtue”, pp. 314-317. 
14’ Kant, “Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ehcs”, pp. 57-60. 
142 In the Mctaplzysics ofMorals, Kant introduces the Wille to qualify (pure) practical reason, and the 
Willkiir to qualify how man is confronted by the Willc‘s practical laws through imperatives. Allison, 
Kunf’s tlzcory offieedom, pp. 129-131. 
143 Kant, “Introduction to The Metuphysics ofMoruls”, p. 41. The Latin origins of Wille (Volunfus) and 
Willkiir (Arbitrium) draw out their difference well. Hegel, Elements o f fh e  Plzilosoplzy ofRiglzt, p. 399, f. 2. 
144 Allison, Idealism andfieedonz, p. 129. 
145 O’Neill, ”Vindicating reason”, pp. 292-295. 
146 Beck, ”Kant’s Two Conceptions of the Will”, pp. 41-42. 
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if we do not occupy an entirely different station, when we regard ourselves, as 
by means of freedom, spontaneous a priori causes, from that station which we 
hold when we represent to ourselves our actions as events in the system we see 
presented to our 
It is in the Critique of Practical Reason that Kant elaborates man's dual stations 
and talks of the idea of freedom as the keystone of the whole architecture of human 
reason. Freedom is the ratio essendi of Moralitat, and Moralitat is the ratio cognoscendi 
of Whereas Kant proclaims in the Critique of Pure Reason that man 
experiences things as phenomena, he now argues that practical reason gives man 
access to the noumenon of the idea of freedom, namely, man-in-himself.149 The 
essential point is that from his phenomenal station man cannot establish any 
universal maxims that can be willed into Moralitat. Indeed, in the empirical world 
man is exposed to pathological phenomena that result in heteronomy, which is an 
arbitrary, contingent ground for Moralitat and the antithesis of the universal 
inchations of the Wille. Only the noumenal station, where there is autonomy of 
Wille, satisfies the key kantian issues of obligation, duty and universal M0ralifiit.~50 
And, because normative justice demands that man be represented through his 
capacity for the idea of freedom, Kant implies that man has a sense of hrmself as 
both Iioiizo nounrenon and Izoino pIIif3noimxon, or as both a transcendental and an 
empirical subject.15' In the language of Aufiliirung, intellectual freedom has the right 
of way over civil freedom, or mendelssohruan Mensclzenaufklaruizg before 
Biirgeraufilumng. Kant blfurcates man between the transcendental and the 
empirical worlds, for: 
THAT NECESSITY OF NATURE, WHICH MAY NOT CONSORT WITH THE 
FREEDOM OF THE SUBJECT, ATTACHES SINGLY TO THE 
MODIFICATIONS OF A THING STANDING UNDER CONDITIONS OF 
TIME, i.e., TO THE MODIFICATIONS OF THE ACTING SUBJECT AS 
PHENOMENON; ... yet, e contra, THE SELF-SAME SUBJECT, being self- 
conscious of itself as a thing in itself, CONSIDERS ITS EXISTENCE AS 
SOMEWHAT, DETACHED FROM CONDITIONS OF TIME, AND ITSELF, SO 
FAR FORTH, AS ONLY DETERMINABLE BY LAWS GIVEN IT BY ITS OWN 
147 Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics", p. 62. 
148 Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason", pp. 118-120. 
149 Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason", pp. 124-144. 
lS0 Kant, "Inquiry into the A Priori Operations of tlze Will", pp. 99-100. 
15' Kant, 77ze Metaphysics ofMoraZs, p. 65. Kant is reluctant to attribute freedom to man under the 
concept of causality, as it abandons lum qua honio pk~nonzenon to blind chance in tlze empirical world. 
So tlze concept of causality of freedom is attributed to the same man qua honzo rzounzenon. In fact, both 
of Kant's revolutions, tlie Copernican and rousseauian, stand or fall on this separation, for they contain 
mutually incompatible concepts that would, as Kant acknowledges, contradict each other were there 
not the honzo nournenon/homo phnornenon distinction. Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason", pp. 195-201. 
46 
EpistemohyicaCCritique in Kant adHegeC 
REASON; ... in its consciousness of an intelligible cogitable existence, ... [the 
subject is] NOUMENON.152 
2.vi. Hegel‘s Critique of Aufklarung 
To realise the free thought and action pivotal to maturity, Kant’s critical philosophy 
advocates a metaphysics of experience which gives man an objective knowledge of 
things, and a metaphysics of morals in which man’s autonomy enables freedom 
and the constitution of Moralitat. However, his epistemological critique that 
depends on the faculty of understanding to limit reason also requires hoi~zo 
nouinenoiz to bear Moralitit in mind every time he acts as honzo phirnonzenon in the 
empirical world. Essentially, AufiZiirung is true in theory but not in practice, and 
whilst Hegel applauds Kant’s distinction between reason and understanding, he 
rejects the discipline of the former by the latter. Reason, Hegel claims, proffers an 
objective experience of things as they are rather than they appear, and the task of 
epistemological critique is to ensure that thmking freely is synonymous with truth. 
Also, because the formality and abstractness of MoraZitat bifurcate man when he 
thinks from himself when he acts, Hegel seeks to reconcile lzonzo nounzenon’s duties 
with lionio p1i;unamenon Is desires. He gives content and substance to Moralitii’t 
through Sittliclzkeit, which enables the self-actualisation of the autonomous subject’s 
authentic being. With absolute idealism and the prioritisation of recognition as the 
means to autonomy, Hegel introduces the post-AufiZiimng world of Geist that is the 
product of scientdic rather than critical philosophy, and in this section I elaborate 
Hegel’s critique of Kant’s metaphysics of objective experience and morals before, in 
sections 2.vii. and Il.viii., I consider Hegel’s epistemological critique of man’s 
phenomenology of objective experience and his science of socially mediated 
recogrution. 
Hegel’s epistemology of a rational knowledge of the absolute personifies 
Kant’s classical sense of metaphysics, ”the attempt to know the unconditioned 
through pure reason” .I53 On this basis, Hegel’s epistemological critique portrays 
man’s objective experience of absolute idealism, which is grounded on a relation 
between words and thmgs that is neither dogmatic, skeptical nor critical, but ideal. 
It represents the apotheosis of the criticism levelled at Kant by pietists and fellow 
logicians, who criticise him on grounds of causality and deduction,’% as well as by 
152 Kant, “Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics”, pp. 138-139. 
153 Beiser, “Introduction”, pp. 3-4. 
Nelson, Progress and Regress, Volume 11, pp. 26-33. 
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the post-kantian idealists, most notably Johann Fichte, who spearheads the search 
for knowledge of a thing-in-itself,l55 and Friedrich S c h e h g ,  who completes the 
return of German philosophy to neo-platonic idealism.’% For Fichte and Schelling, 
Kant’s metaphysics is absurd in its method of the prioritisation of understanding, 
but correct in the problem of grounding it is derived from.157 The task is to reconcile, 
”in a higher systematic unity, ... Kant’s fundamental dualism of nature and 
freedom” 
Hegel, who takes on board Fichte’s concern with the reality of th1ngs,l59 
endeavours to complete ths reconciliation. To do so, he reconceives Schelling’s 
Absolute as Geist,160 which becomes a relation of philosophical identity between 
thought and reality that idealises the world.161 Consequently, Hegel says that Kant 
errs in his prioritisation of understanding and in the straight jacket he designs for 
reason. To examine knowledge in an attempt to establish its conditions is akin to 
the resolution not to venture into the water until one has learnt to swim.162 Kant 
rightly takes man beyond the traditional love of knowledge, but he denies the 
platonic concept of reason its right to know a thing-in-itself,163 which would give 
man access to the true structure of the world.164 Hegel thus distances himself from 
Kant’s metaphysics that grounds objective experience in a monochromatic 
formalism.16j In contrast, Hegel says reason is constitutive of truth and not just 
ls5 Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism, pp. 45-53; Nelson, Progress and Regress, Vo2ume 11, pp. 38-59. 
’j6 In 1799 Fichte is accused of atheism for his belief that God is a moral force rather than a person. He 
is forced to leave Jena Universifiit- he moves to Berlin Universifiit- where Fichte is replaced by 
Schelling, who secures Hegel the post of Primtdozenf. Later, in 1816 and after a short tenure at 
Heidelberg Uniswsituf, Hegel succeeds Fichte at Berlin. Inwood, ”Introducing Hegel”, pp. 20-22. 
157 Pippin, Hegel‘s Idealism, pp. 63-65. 
158 Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism, p. 44. 
‘59 Llewelyn, ”Kantian Antinomv and Hegelian Dialectic”, pp. 92-95. 
160 ”Since Schelling‘s absolute excluded its modes, which determine tlie specific characteristics of a 
thing, Hegel likened it to ’a night when all cows are black’. If we are to remain true to its definition, 
Hegel argued, then it is necessary to conceive of the absolute as tlie zuhole of substance and its modes, 
as the unify of the infinite and finite. Since the absolute must include all the flux and appearance 
within itself, Hegel called it ‘a Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunken”’. Beiser, 
“Introduction”, p. 7. 
reason, and in lus logic it is the Begriff(concept or notion) qua identity of concepts with the subject of 
them, man, with the objects of concepts and with other concepts themselves. Thus, insofar as the 
world is ultimately determined by the concept of Geisf, Geisf is Hegel’s ultimate Bcgrif. Inwood, Hegel, 
pp. 26-42; Priest, “Subjectivity and Objectivity in Kant and Hegel”, p. 116; Smith, Hegel’s Critique of 
Liberalism, pp. 34-35. 
162 Hartnack, ”Categories and Thgs-In-Themselves”, pp. 77-81. 
163 Hegel, Phenomenology ofSpirif,  p. 3. 
In Hegel’s metaphysics, Geisf is an identity between form and things that is supplied by dialectical 
Findlay, ”Hegelianism and Platonism”. 
Hegel, Phenomnolosy of Spirit, pp. 5-9. 
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regulative of its apparent possibihty.lb" Man's knowledge of things must "not stop 
half way but, as it were, go over into things; Hegel's absolute idealism, in which 
Spirit [takes] over from the mere unity of apperception, professe[s] to show how 
this [can] be Scientific philosophy grasps a thing in- and for-itself, as an 
ontologically primary substance and a subject.168 
Without the phdosophical reign of reason over the understanding, the 
transformation of the post-reformation world into Geisf's world, where thought can 
govern reality and autonomy is real, remains a dream.169 And so Hegel's scientific 
philosophy entails a shift from transcendental idealism's ground of the unmediated 
experience of man, to absolute idealism's unmediated experience of Gei~t.1~0 Or, as 
Pippin suggests, Kant's n priori and the analytic-synthetic propositions of reason are 
exchanged for Hegel's notion of Geist and dialectical reason.171 With his 
metaphysics of absolute idealism, Hegel deems hmself to have overcome the four 
core problems of Kant's metaphysics of objective experience: it is finite, or limited 
to understanding; it is subjective, which implies things are dependent on man; it is 
abstract, or, insofar as things are conceived atomistically and not relationally, 
undialectical; and it is personal, for reality is constructed psychologically, not 
socially.172 For Hegel, Moralitci't is positive because it establishes that the 
autonomous subject is the hinge on whch epistemological critique swings.173 But he 
also claims that with Kant phlosophy reaches the summit and the h u t  of the 
concept of the autonomous, self-conscious will,174 for, as Pippin says, 
the Kantian account of human subjectivity restricts itself to the point of view of 
'consciousness' alone, and so does not understand subjectivity as it should be, 
166 Lukacs, Hegel's Falsc and His  Genuine Ontology, p. 77; Priest, "Introduction", pp. 4-12. 
167 Walsh, "Kant as seen by Hegel", p. 211. 
1 6 *  Inwood, "Kant and Hegel on Space and Time", pp. 59-64; Hegel, Phenomenology of Spint, pp. 10-14. 
169 Stern, Hcgcl, Kant and tlze Structure ofthe Object, pp. 35-41. 
170 Ritter, "Hegel and the Reformation", pp. 183-188. Hegel describes his similarities with and 
differences between Kant on the question of consciousness as follows: "[Kant's] view has at least the 
inerit of giving a correct expression to the nature of all consciousness. The tendency of all man's 
endeavours is to understand the world, to appropriate and subdue it to himself and to this end the 
positive reality of the world must be as it were crushed and pounded, in other words, idealized. At 
the same time we must note that it is not the mere act of our personal self-consciousness which 
introduces an absolute unity into the variety of sense. Rather, this identity is itself the absolute. The 
absolute is, as it were, so kind as to leave individual tlungs to their own enjoyment, and it again draws 
these back to the absolute unity". Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic, quoted in Stem, Hegel, Kant and tlze 
Structure of the Object, pp. 39-40. 
Pippin, Hegel's Idcalisnz, pp. 249-251. 
172 Priest, "Introduction", pp. 21-28. 
Priest, "Introduction", pp. 40-41. 
174 O'Hagan, "On Hegel's Critique", p. 136. 
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as ’spirit’, Geist. To make good such a charge, Hegel attempts to reformulate the 
notion of subjectivity itself, attacking virtually all of the post-Cartesian 
assumptions, denying that consciousness is ’private’, ’inner’, or a ’spectator’ of 
itself and world, and asserting that it is, in a special sense of the term, 
’communal’, ’public’ , and even socially interactive. 175 
Of Hegel’s four main criticisms of kantian Moralitif, it is his classical objection 
to Kant’s abstract universalism and moral formalism that are most relevant to a 
post-Aufklirung reconciliation of autonomy with recog~ution.~~~ Firstly, Hegel 
argues that the transcendental subject, who has the lord of duty in himself, 
legislates himself into rather than out of immaturity. The difference between the 
soul of medizval Christianity, Hegel writes, and Kant’s transcendental subject, 
whose noumenal idea of freedom obliges him toward the universal duties of 
Moral i tat, 
is not that the former make themselves slaves, while the latter is free, but that 
the former have their lord outside themselves, while the latter carries his lord in 
himself, yet at the same time is his own slave. For the particular-impulses, 
inclinations, pathological love, sensuous experience, or whatever else it is 
called -the universal is necessarily and always something alien and objective.ln 
The reigns to how to thmk and act freely, which Kant wrestled from Christian 
ontology and commandeered with critical phlosophy’s four moments of 
objectivity, normativity, immortality and subjectivity, are effectively ceded by the 
abstract universalism of his Moralitit, and it falls on Hegel to remind the 
philosopher of Aufiliirung that man belongs to this world, Dies~ei ts .~~*  
Secondly, the empirical subject is separated from the particular, or what 
Hegel’s student, Ludwig Feuerbach, coins man’s Gattungsn~esen, his empirical 
species-being.179 Insofar as he performs pure duty vis-a-vis a beyond, a Jenseits, that 
is unfathomable to man, the formality of kantian Moralztiit merely exacerbates lzomo 
nounwnons tyranny over homo plwnomenon.180 Each time the empirical subject is 
tempted by the particular, his transcendental capacity for autonomy carries him 
175 Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism, pp. 35-36. 
1 7 ‘  Allison, Kant’s theory offrccdonz, pp. 180-191. Hegel further contests Kant’s metaphysics of morals in 
respect of the impotence of its ought, such that moral insight into the empirical subject’s practice- 
man’s is - remains unrealised, as well as of the latent terrorism of its pure conviction, which sanctions 
the ought of the Gcsinnungstcrror of 1793-1794 that Hegel witnesses the dusk of. Habermas, “Morality 
and Etl-ucal Life”, pp. 327-331 and p. 333, f. 5. 
In Hegel, The Spirit of Christianity and I fs  Fate, quoted in Allison, Kant’s theory offrcedonz, p. 185. 
17* Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, pp. 146-153. 
179 Toews, ”Transformations of Hegelianism: 1805-1846”, p. 396. 
Soll, An Introduction to Hegel’s Metaphysics, pp. 142-145. 
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back to the purgatory in which Aufklarung is suspended, Moralitat. Kant’s 
intellectual and civil freedom, whch are based on the capacities of autonomy and 
choice that are executed by the Wille and Willkiir, fail to reconcile man to himself.181 
The diremption that Hegel and his generation believe Plato first grapples with 
persists in Aufklarung,182 and Rousseau’s analysis of social man, who lives 
constantly outside himself and through opinion, ” ... so that he seems to receive the 
consciousness of his own existence merely from the judgement of others”,183 is 
exacerbated by Kant’s bifurcation of man into a transcendental and an empirical 
subject. What the empirical inclinations propose, the kantian formal maxims man 
ought to live by dispose? 
2.vii. Geist and the Phenomenology of Objective Experience 
Hegel’s critique of Kant expresses the insecurity of a generation which, after the 
Gesinnungsferror of 1793-1 794 and the bloody adventures of Napoleon, is 
apprehensive of the consequences of Aufiliiuu~~g.~~~ A metaphysics of objective 
experience does not grasp the truth of the world, and Kant’s epistemoloscal 
critique leaves man at the centre of it without actually being there. Relatedly, the 
metaphysics of morals outlines the conceptual armoury of freedom, but it does no 
more than provide man with abstract and formal strategies about how to exercise it. 
Man’s ability to thlnk and act freely needs re-assurance, and in the prefatory and 
introductory remarks to the Plzenoimzology of Spirit Hegel charges scientdic 
philosophy with knowledge of a thing-in-itself, which reconciles the essence of 
man-in-himself with the empirical world.186 Further, in opposition to romanticism’s 
flight into the abstract Abso1ute,’S7 and its treatment of the state as a servant of 
man’s emotions and feelings,la Hegel makes phdosophy exoteric and intelligible to 
the gesunder Mensclzenverstrrnd of the man on the Jena h~rse-cart?~ For the most 
part, however, Hegel’s phenomenology is an epistemological critique of 
philosophy’s historical modes, whch includes kantian critical philosophy, and he 
1 8 ’  Nelson, Progress and Regress, Volume 11, pp. 33-37. 
I S 2  Smith, Hegel‘s Critique of liberalism, pp. 17-18; Dallmayr, G. W. F. Hegel, pp. 94-95. 
183 Rousseau, “Discourse on the Origin of Inequality”, p. 116. 
I M  Westphal, ”The basic context and structure of Hegel’s Plzilosophy qf  Right”, pp. 252-253. 
Ig5 Dallmayr, G. W. F. Hegel, pp. 79-87. 
186 Lukacs, Hegel’s False and His Genuine Ontology, pp. 72-74. 
lg7 Findlay, “Preface”, pp. v-vii. 
188 Hegel, Elements oftlze Philosophy ofXight, Preface, p. 18. 
Is9 Sallis, ”Hegel’s Concept of Presentation”, pp. 25-26; Norman, Hegel‘s Phenonzelzology, pp. 9-14. 
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seeks to channel it into a scientific mode that reconciles man to himself in G i s t  and 
Sit tlichkei t .Iw 
Although it is not a dialectical method,191 phenomenology describes the 
lstorical modes of individual and social consciousness or experience? The 
phenomenology of social experience depicts the dialectic of man’s desire, which 
involves his consciousness of the socio-cultural limits of each historical mode of 
spirit, relipon and absolute knowledge. Phenomenology portrays how man raises 
himself up (nupzeben) through modes of social experience, which culminate in 
Geist’s frustration by the limits of AufkZtimng.’93 Man’s social experience is examined 
in the next section in terms of the recognition that is fulfdled in SittZichkeit,l~ 
whereas here I explicate man’s individual experience of the dialectic of knowing 
with its modes of consciousness, self-consciousness and reason.195 In his individual 
experience, that is, man cognates himself through his recogrution of h i s  otherness 
from things in terms of sense-certainty, perception and kantian understanding.’% 
Hegel especially criticises the last of these, the transcendental subject’s ”wanderlust 
born of the desire to explain”,197 because it allows understanding to mediate 
between man’s reason and thmgs.198 What man finds is that his truth is somethmg 
other than himself, whch only his post-AufiIimng individual experience of Geist’s 
moment as reason and man’s social experience of SittIicJzkeit can resolve.’% In the 
meanbme, Hegel says, 
[rlaised above perception, consciousness exhibits itself closed in a unity with 
Flay, ”The History of Philosophy”, pp. 54-58. 
191 Dove, “Hegel’s Phenomenological Method”, pp. 52-57. 
19* According to Westphal, a mode (or form) of consciousness ”is an expository device consisting of a 
pair of basic principles. One of these principles specifies the kind of empirical knowledge of which a 
form of consciousness presumes itself capable. The other principle specifies the general structure of 
the kind of object which that form of consciousness presumes to find in the world. Taken together, 
these two principles constitute what Hegel calls a form of consciousness’ ‘certainty’ (Gecl7ij3lzcit)”. 
Westphal, ”Hegel’s Solution to the Dilemma of the Criterion”, pp. 84-85. 
193 Aujzebung in its verbal form, aufheben, is a term of art that is paradoxical-sounding. It denotes that 
which is contained in a new mode of experience, and to proceed to his new individual-social unity 
man has to sublate present contradictions, even modify them out of their original, particular sense, in 
order to move on to h i s  real and universal experience in Geist. Cf. Forster, ”Hegel’s Dialectical 
Method”, pp. 132-133; Sallis, “Hegel’s Concept of Presentation”, p. 49, f. 7; Jagentowicz Mills, ”Hegel’s 
Antzgone”, p. 243. 
‘94 Hegel, Phenonzenology of Spirit, pp. 55-56. 
‘‘)5 Norman, Hegel’s Plzcnonzcnology, pp. 24-25. 
19‘ Hegel, Plzenonzenology of Spirit, pp. 58-102. 
197 Westphal, “Hegel’s Phenomenon of Perception”, p. 129. 
198 Norman, Hegel’s Phenonzenology, pp. 40-43. 
‘‘)9 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p, 35. 
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the supersensible world through the mediating term of appearance, through 
which it gazes into this background [lying behind appearance]. ... This curtain 
[of appearance] hanging before the inner world is therefore drawn away, and 
we have the inner being [the ’I,] gazing into the inner world ... [or] serf- 
coizsciozmess. ... [But] this knowledge of what is the truth of appearance as 
ordinarily conceived, ... is itself only a result of a complex movement whereby 
the modes of consciousness ’meaning’, perceiving, and the Understanding, 
vanish; and it will be equally evident that the cognition of what consciousizess 
kizozus in knowing itself, requires a still more complex movement, the exposition 
of which is contained in what follows.200 
In terms of man’s experience of objectivity, with Kant’s tautology of ’I am I’ 
man has m e d i a t e d  being-for-himself only, and Hegel’s goal is to demonstrate 
that man’s attainment of transcendental subjectivity commences in the dialectic of 
the embodied subject’s animal desire for self-preservation.2o1 Or ipa l ly  located in 
the world, man’s animal desire moves him to satisfy his material needs by 
reproduction, which entails an expression of individuality that places lum at the 
centre of the world but dirempts hrm from the universality it marufests. 
Importantly, individuality is the pre-condition for man’s human desire for 
SeZhstgewlj3lwit, or the truth of self-certainty. 202 It designates man’s notion of hmself 
and the aims he strives for, which can only be fulfilled by the recognition of another 
self-consciousness.203 Human desire thus implores man to leave behind the 
colourful show of the sensuous here-and-now, as well as the kantian nightlike void 
of the supersensible beyond. In so doing, the hegelian subject steps out into the 
spiritual daylight of the present where recogmtion takes place.2w 
But before man can step into post-Az@iirung daylight, in which scientdic 
philosophy reigns in Geist’s world of the lnfinite living unity of all things,205 Hegel 
must first chart the phenomenological journey that transforms animal desire into 
human desire. The satisfaction of human desire through recognition - the reciprocal 
esteem, value and acknowledgement of worth between two people - is precipitated 
by the acknowledgement between men of the existence of others in their 
individuality and the universal endeavour of all men toward G i s t .  In reference to 
Kant, Hegel says that man recogruses that others are not utilisable for his own 
2oo Hegel, Plzenonzenology of Spirit, pp. 102-103. 
201 Westphal, History and Truth, pp. 122-126. 
202 Hegel, Phenonienology of Spirit, pp. 108-109. Individuality should not be confused with identity qua 
the outcoiiie of the intersubjective relation of recognition that is fulfilled in Sittlichkit. Individualiv is 
unmediated and man’s being-for-himself is temporary and dependent on the world. 
203 Taylor, Hegel, pp. 137-138. 
204 Hegel, Pknomenology of Spirit, pp. 110-111. 
205 Lamb, Hegel, pp. 156-159. 
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purposes,2o6 and to show the other that he is independent of the world necessitates 
that each man abolish the things upon which his animal desire depends.207 Yet 
neither man can labour on tfungs while the other watches, for it demands that he 
risk his Me to impress the other and it implies that the other already possesses pure 
self-consciousness, such that he is the sole arbiter of man's independence. As a 
result, they engage in a life-and-death struggle to demonstrate their independence 
from animal desire and to receive the recognition that each man's being-for-itself is 
h s  essence. 
Although the death of either man would obviously be self-defeating, Hegel 
suggests that through this experience self-consciousness learns that life is as 
essential to it as pure self-consciousness.2o8 The human desire for permanent 
Selhsfgemzj3lwif awakens man to the fact of his material dependence on the world. At 
the same time, he becomes aware that human desire is a spiritual need for the 
freedom recogrution affords. Indeed, such is humanity's desire for freedom that 
man risks death to procure it, for to follow the impulse of appetite is inhuman, 
whilst the unloved life is not worth living.2o9 Thus, the life-and-death struggle ends 
in a truce, where one man is independent and a being-for-hmself, whdst h s  
opponent remains embroiled in thinghood as a being-for-another. Their mutual fear 
of death enforces the first social relation of inequality in the shape of the 
dependence between the lord and bondsman, instead of the mutual reciprocity that 
is desired. 
Nonetheless, Hegel is quick to dispel the intuition that the lord prospers from 
political and socio-economic inequality. His Selbsfge7ozj3lwit is dependent on the 
recogrution of the servile, unessential consciousness of the bondsman, whilst in his 
relation to the world, which is mediated by the bondsman, the lord's truth of self- 
certainty is contingent and impermanent. To the extent that he does not labour, he 
is alienated from h s  species-being or animal desire. What is absent is the absolute 
certainty of the truth of fumself, which only another autonomous self-consciousness 
can provide.2'0 Like a jilted lover, the lord is left to equivocate whether his being- 
for-himself is indeed who he essentially is. 
206 Hegel, Phenonzenology of Spirit, p. 112. 
2"7 Taylor discusses the dialectical idea of abolition in terms of Hegel's concepts of Aufizehung (to 
preserve at the same time as to annul) and VersGlznung (to reconcile). Taylor, Hegel, p. 118. 
208 Hegel, Plzenonzenology of Spirit, pp. 112-115. 
209 Hegel uses the conceptual metaphor of love to aid the comprehension of recognition in Sittliclzkeit; 
that is, "only in love are we one with the object, neither dominating nor dominated, a reciprocal 
giving and taking, a Juliet: the more I give to thee, the more I have". We see "only ourselves in the 
beloved, and in turn, we see the beloved as not ourselves". Westphal, History and Truth, pp. 131-135. 
2'o Hegel, Plzenornenology of Spirit, pp. 116-117. 
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By contrast, through work the bondsman fulfils his desire and avoids a 
fleeting relation to the world, as work forms and shapes things.211 It is through the 
bondsman’s formative activity, when labour quo reproduction of needs becomes 
work qun production of socio-cultural goods, that he gives an element of 
permanence to the world and establishes his independence from it? Work 
socialises man’s animal desire into reflexive, human desire. It gives the bondsman a 
self-will w i h  the permanent order of thmgs, and through his capacity to be 
autonomous the bondsman posits himself as a being-for-himself whose human 
desire for Selbstgeiu$heit is derived from the things he produces. In opposition to 
Kant’s identity of identity without difference, or the unmediated subject who 
intuits things in picture-thoughts without reflection, there is Hegel’s bondsman’s 
identity of identity and difference, or actual rather than virtual self-consciousness. 
The bondsman knows himself and the world because he transforms the things 
which constitute it.213 As Hegel summarises, with the bondsman: 
we are in the presence of self-consciousness in a new shape, ... which thinks or 
is a free self-consciousness. For to tlzi~zk does not mean to be an abstract ’1’’ but 
an ‘I’ which [relates] ... itself to objective being in such a way that its 
significance is the being-for-self of the consciousness for which it is [an object]. 
For in thki izg ,  the object does not present itself in picture-thoughts but in 
Nofioizs, i.e. in a distinct beiizg-iiz-itself,214 
It is through the bondsman’s absolute mediation of the world by thought or 
notions, Hegel argues, that man raises himself up from the world to be a 
transcendental s~bject .~l j  Where Kant posits the transcendental subject n priori as his 
condition of possibility for epistemological critique, Hegel examines the conditions 
of possibility for the transcendental subject.216 From Socrates to Descartes and Kant, 
transcendental philosophy uses a constructive metaphysics with its logical circle of 
knowing before you know.2I7 In contrast, Hegel’s descriptive epistemological 
critique departs from man’s iiiciividual embodied consciousness as one 
phenomenon in the world of phenomena and climaxes in the social experience of 
Gcisf.218 Through the bondsman Hegel shows how man’s self-understanding and 
211 Hegel, Plzcnonzcnology o f  Spirit, p. 118. 
212 Bernstein, “From self-consciousness to community”, pp. 34-35. 
2 1 3  Westphal, History and Truth, pp. 122-126. 
214 Hegel, Phenomenology of  Spirit, pp. 119-120. 
2’5 Hegel, Plzenonzcnology of Spirit, p. 21. 
2’6 Wood, Hcgcl’s Ethical Tlzouglzt, p. 91. 
217 Lamb, Hegel, pp. 3-13. 
218 Lamb, Hegel, pp. 34-41. 
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(an unequal) society are born together. The lord-bondsman relation is the 
superstructure of the human desire for recognition, whch albeit subsequent to the 
satisfaction of animal desire's material needs is only fulfilled where there is social 
equality.219 Phenomenological critique is a dialogue between man's individual and 
social experience, between the historicity of man's modes of consciousness, which 
culminate in the human desire for recogrution, and the history of man's practico- 
social conditions, which make this experience possible.220 For its part, Hegel's 
scientlfic phlosophy apprehends the post-Aufklri'rung world of the rational state, 
where the journey of the transcendental subject of reason collides with the progress 
of the historical career of Geisf that is marufest as Sittliclzkeit. 
2.viii. Recognition and Sittlichkeit 
Hegel's epistemological critique identlfies the social modes of experience of spirit, 
religon and absolute knowledge, which mirror man's individual experience of 
consciousness, self-consciousness and reason. Yet, because the individual is 
dirempted from the social, Geist is imperfectly marufest in the first two modes of 
social experience as true and self-estranged spirit. It is only in the post-Aufklri'uung 
world of Geist, when Hegel observes the social experience that is mediated by 
Sittliclzkeit, that subjectivity is resolved as self-certain spirit, where individual 
experience qua reciprocal recogrution leads to the union of the subjective in the 
0bjective.u' 
Geist, however, has a long history and first appears as Sittliclzkeit in greek 
antiquity. Here, it is bifurcated between the polis, where duty and customs 
determine the citizen's immediate social experience, and the d o s ,  in which the 
citizen's individuality allows h m  reflective individual experience. Subsequently, in 
grzco-roman antiquity, communal Sittliclzkeit is overcome by G i s t  as empire. The 
primacy of law supersedes custom, and apart from his socio-political roles the 
citizen's non-legal experience is irrelevant to the rights-based empire.m After the 
extreme of immediate social experience in Athens, the opposite of unrecognised 
individual experience in Rome causes antiquity to founder. Similarly, diremption 
persists in mediaeval Christianity through to 1789. Self-estranged Geisf is manifest as 
man's attempt to know nature and to place himself at the centre of a garden of 
219 Westphal, Histo y and Truth, pp. 136-138. 
220 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 55-56. 
Westphal, "Hegel and Husserl", pp. 116-129. 
Taylor, Hegel, pp. 396-397. 
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Eden.= It results in a split between the material world, where a struggle ensues 
between absolutist state power and capitalist wealth, and a schism in the 
transcendental world between faith and enhghtenment, which results in the 
dominance of the latter’s rational will.224 Finally, after 1789 G i s t  migrates to Berlin, 
where it emerges in Kant’s Moralitit as self-certain spirit, or man who has being- 
for-hmself, and it cedes digruty and recogrution irrespective of who one is.m 
Hegel’s hstory of man’s socio-moral experience and his historicity of man’s 
epistemologco-individual experience is a descriptive critique of the hstorical 
estrangement of the individual from the Although Aufklarung prepares the 
ground for their reconciliation, it ultimately fails to re-assure the autonomous 
subject of the self-actualisation necessary for the recogrution of his authentic 
being.z7 Thus, in addition to the epistemologcal critique of man’s individual 
experience of objectivity, Hegel’s scientdic phdosophy of right allows him both to 
explore the rationality of man’s social experience and to apprehend in thought the 
presence of Sittliclzkeit, where the particular is reconciled to the universal.28 As with 
Rousseau, Hegel conceives of freedom as an intersubjective question insofar as man 
is born socially and his subjectwity is a posteriori to politically mediated recogrution. 
The transcendental subject’s human desire is tantamount to a will or mode of 
thought, which translates itself into existence due to its need to know itself as 
united in its innermost being qua comprehended by others within the truths of 
comrnunity.~9 If Rousseau implies autonomy and recogrution, and Kant perfects the 
former to the abstract and formal detriment of the latter, Hegel concretises 
autonomy via recognition, for the right of individuals to their subjective 
determination of freedom is only possible insofar as they belong to an ethical 
actuality where the certainty of freedom, or Selhstgeu~zj3heit, has its truth.nO 
As Taylor suggests, Hegel’s philosophy of right attempts to re-urufy the 
radical freedom of the capacity of autonomy with man’s desire for recog~ution.~~~ 
223 Westphal, History aiid Truth, pp. 154-172. 
224 Taylor, Hegcl, pp. 403-416. 
Ritter, ”Morality and Ethical Life”, pp. 151-158. 
226 Hofmeister, ”Moral Autonomy in Kant and Hegel”, pp. 147-149. 
227 Westphal, History aiid Truth, pp, 173-181. 
228 Hegel, Elenzcnts of the Philosophy of Right, Preface, pp. 21-23. PIiilosoplzisclzcs Rcchtslclirc is concerned 
with the idea of law or right, where the idea is the confluence of the essence of free will and the 
existence of community. Hegel contrasts it with positive law, which is based on a mix of tradition and 
rationality. Dallmayr, G. W. F. Hegel, pp. 102-104. 
229 Hegel, Elenzents of tlze Philosophy of Right, Preface, p. 11. 
230 Hegel, Elenzents of the Philosophy of Right, 55 153-155, pp. 196-197. 
231 Taylor, Hegel, pp. 23-49. 
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Man w h g l y  fulfils-indeed, finds his liberation in-his duties to the social 
institutions and practices of ethical life, which as they determine his character make 
duty synonymous with virtue. And, if a virtue that is essential to man’s character 
can be called a custom, then duty appears as habit to him.232 The gap between duty 
and desire, which is expressed by Kant through homo noumenon and Izorno 
plmnonzenon, is reconciled through the individual and social journeys of Izomo 
dialecticus,~3 who depends on SittZichkeit for hs self-actualisation. Man’s purpose is 
to will his free will through each dialectical stage of abstract right and morality 
until, in the ethical sphere via the mediation of the family and civil society, the 
concept of freedom determines the content of the rational state? Homo dialecticus 
proceeds from a being-in-himself (will in its concept), who is safeguarded by 
abstract right qua freedom as p r ~ p e r t y , ~ ~  and a being-for-hmself (will of the 
individual) in the realm of morality qua subjective freedom,% to a being-for-himself 
for and with another (self-sufficient individuality with universal substantiality) .B7 
That is, man’s Selbstge-toz@eit is recogrused in Sittliclzkeit through family and civil 
society, and in its highest actuality his freedom is self-actualised in the context of 
the rational state, whch is the madestation of Geist. 
Thus, ethical life is the unity of the will in its concept and the will of the 
individual ... . Its initial existence [Dasein] is again something natural, in the 
form of love and feeling [Enzpfinduizg] -the fanzily; here, the individual [das 
Individuunr] has overcome [aufgelzoben] his personal aloofness and finds himself 
and his consciousness within a whole. But at the next stage [of civil society], we 
witness the disappearance of ethical Me ... . [Tlhe family becomes fragmented 
and its members behave towards each other as self-sufficient individuals, for 
they are held together only by the bond of mutual need. ... [The] state emerges 
only at the third stage, that of ethical life and spirit, at which the momentous 
unification of self-sufficient individuality with universal substantiality takes 
place. . . . [I]t is freedom in its most concrete shape, which is subordinate only to 
the supreme absolute truth of the world spirit.238 
In Sittlichkeit, the I knows himself in the We a propos of Geist, which 
incorporates aspects of the divine insofar as it is causa sui, or transcendent of 
individual self-consciousness as its other and the ground of man’s actions and his 
232 Hegel, Elcnzents of the Philosophy of Right, §§ 144-152, pp. 189-196. 
233 Foucault, “La folie, l’absence d’oeuvre”, p. 414. 
Hegel, Elenzents of the Philosophy of Right, §§ 27-29, pp. 57-59. 
235 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy ofnight, §§ 43-46, pp. 74-78. 
Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 55 107-108, pp. 136-138. 
237 Hegel, Elements ofthe Philosophy ofliight, 55 141-142, pp. 185-189. 
238 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, § 33, pp. 63-64. 
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goal and purpose.239 Sittlichkeit is a concept that remains true to Kant’s idea of 
freedom which links homo nournnon to Moralitat, whilst Hegel’s aristotelianism 
enables h m  to introduce the human desire for SeIbstgezu$llzeit as fundamental to 
self-actualised recog~ution.~~~ Through his return to Aristotle, Hegel’s state is able to 
realise the ethical idea.241 In place of Moralitit’s formality, Hegel offers Sittliclzkeit, 
and to overcome Kant’s amoral - because abstract - homo nournnon, Hegel 
proposes lus reconciliation with lzonzo plzznomenon .242 Kant’s bifurcated man is 
reconciled by homo dialecticus, who has personahty safeguarded by abstract right, 
subjectivity or autonomy in the realm of morality, and recogrution, Selbstgezu$lzeit, 
in Sittliclzkeit. 
ix. Synopsis 
In this chapter I have described how, on basis of the subject who desires or 
rationally knows, Hobbes’ material ontology and Locke’s empirical realism justify 
an epistemologtcal critique that sponsors man’s right to autonomy. I have 
suggested that their ideas of objective experience and freedom are re-articulated by 
Rousseau, who conceives of the modern socio-economic chains which enslave man 
and of the coterminous birth of language and social relations. The latter fuels his 
epistemological critique, which highlights man’s universal capacity for reason, 
whence autonomy, and the former his political critique, which ensures that through 
the constitution of the zdonte‘ gene‘mle man’s autonomy is concretised by the process 
of recogrution. 
On this understandmg, I have claimed that Rousseau defines the terms of 
reference for humanist critical thought. Thus, subsequent to critical philosophy’s 
clarification of them with Aufklarung’s twin pillars of how to thmk and act freely, I 
have demonstrated that Kant proposes how to realise maturity through the 
metaphysics of the objective experience of an apparent world and man’s reahsation 
of his freedom through the referral of lus motivation to act to Moralitit. 
Nevertheless, as impressed as he is with Kant’s subject’s authentic being of 
autonomy, I have illustrated that Hegel’s perception of man’s diremption from 
things and his bifurcation qua homo noiurzenon and homo p l ~ n o i ~ z c n o n  give rise to a 
239 Westphal, History and Truth, pp. 138-146. 
240 Wood, ”Hegel’s ethics”, pp. 216-217; O’Hagan, ”On Hegel’s Critique”, pp. 137-138. 
241 Hofmeister, “Moral Autonomy in Kant and Hegel”, pp. 142-145; Avineri, Hegel’s Tlzcory of the 
Modern State, pp. 177-178. 
242 The extent to whch Hegel is successful in this enterprise is disputed by Allen Wood, who argues 
there is an unresolved tension in Hegel’s ethical thought between the systematic superiority of 
Sittliclzkeit and the lustorical superiority of Moralitut. Wood, HegeI‘s Ethical 7?zouglzt, p. 133. 
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phenomenology of G i s t ,  which charts man’s idealisation of reahty, whilst Hegel’s 
scientific philosophy describes the social experience that reaches its completion in 
the rational state’s madestation of Sitfliclzkeit, where autonomy is cultivated 
through recogrution. Hegel completes the epistemological critique which, from 
Hobbes and Locke to Kant via Rousseau, defines humanism’s path to 
enhghtenment. Homo dialecticus is obliged by already existent customs and duties, 
sitten, whch specify the content of his moral actions, such that the gap between 
Sollen and Sein, about which Kant is silent, is bridged.243 In summary, I have argued 
that Hegel’s post-Aufklurung world of Geist, whch is characterised by man’s true 
knowledge that orders his objective experience of the world of things, affirms an 
epistemological critique at the centre of humanism, which re-assures the 
autonomous subject that his authentic being can be self-actualised in modernity 
through recognition. 




in Raw& andTayCor 
In chapter 2 I argued that Kant and Hegel epitomise humanism’s epistemologcal 
critique which ‘proceeds with a prior phdosophy of the subject’s autonomy and 
recogrution, and my purpose here in chapter 3 is to explicate how freedom is 
advanced through political critique. To this end, I focus on Rawls and Taylor, who 
further to the objective experience proposed by Kant and Hegel safeguard and 
extend humanism’s path to enhghtenment. They do so via a justification of critique 
in a philosophy of the subject of right, who shoulders the normative experience that 
is necessary for political liberty and political liberation. 
Rawls and Taylor use political critique either to legislate a moral doctrine of 
procedural right, which is based on the idea of public reason, or to interpret within 
a language community a moral ontology of hypergoods. Most importantly, as the 
philosophcal descendants of Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, Rawls and Taylor initially 
refer to the moral agent’s capacities for rational and reasonable autonomy, or to h s  
capacity for self-interpretation and h s  desire for expression. Through political 
liberalism or a politics of recogrution, they advocate procedural or substantive 
normative justice to regulate power, the nature and exercise of which is defined as 
the juridical state and mechanisms of repression, respectively. Like Kant and Hegel, 
Rawls and Taylor imply that the best way to do critical thought is through critique 
that is grounded in an a priori conception of freedom, and in t h s  chapter I examine 
them as current custodians of humanism’s attempt to realise these normative 
conditions for maturity. 
Yet, as I shall argue in chapter 5, these conditions require the confined 
exclusion of those who are different and the normalisation of the citizen who is the 
same. Further, insofar as political critique turns on a theory of the subject’s freedom, 
which as a compromise between autonomy and recognition is tantamount to 
embedded individuality, I claim that Taylor’s politics of recogrution, which takes 
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into account the central claims of Rawls’ political liberalism, recapitulates Hegel’s 
conclusion of Kant’s Aufkliirung in Gist’s  world. Whether from the point of view of 
epistemologrcal or political critique, the humanist path to enlightenment, which is 
first suggested by Rousseau and practiced today by Kant’s and Hegel’s heirs, Rawls 
and Taylor, requires from those who travel along it a prior o u t h e  of a philosophy 
of the truth of the subject’s being. In the name of critique, they assume that truth is 
independent from, rather than inherent to, pouvoirlsavoir. As such, because truth is 
always perspectival, humanism fails to realise a universal state of being 
autonomous in thought and action. 
3.i. Political Philosophy and Normative Experience 
To answer normative questions about the role of the juridical state, what justice is 
or the subject’s needs are, the humanist political philosopher develops conceptual 
schemas and employs social contract or hermeneutic methods.’ These act as the 
rational basis for his politico-moral norms, which according to Raymond Plant and 
Joseph Raz are tantamount to a political morality.2 In this respect, Robert Nozick 
argues that moral philosophy is the background of, as well as the boundary for, the 
normative prescriptions of political critique.3 One of political philosophy’s main 
roles is to justdy the relation between juridical state power and man’s freedom in 
terms of a moral theory of procedural justice that upholds political liberty, or of an 
articulation of the moral ontology of the substantive hypergoods that are central to 
political liberation. The subject of knowledge who grounds the objectivity that is 
promoted by epistemological critique doubles as the subject of right who justifies 
normative experience, and Rawls’ and Taylor’s political phdosophy re-affirms 
humanist critical thought and its attempt, through critique that is based on a 
philosophy of the subject, to realise enlightenment. 
Once again, for example, freedom is understood as a moral identity. After 
Kant’s and Hegel’s notion of it vis-a-vis knowledge, moral identity is constituted in 
relation to juridical power either a priori as autonomy, or a posteriori as recogrution. 
Together, these humanist notions of what is required from politics if man’s maturity 
is to be real capture, firstly, individual or collective selfhood, which is a 
’ In order to emphasise the connection of Rawls and Taylor to the philosophical tradition of humanism 
that I discussed in chapter 2, I refer to political phdosophy rather than political theory. On t h ~ s  
distinction, see Partridge, Politics, Phlosophy, Ideology”, pp. 40-46. 
Plant, Modern Po2itzcal Thought, p. 2; Raz, 171~ Morality ofFreedonz, pp. 1-4. 
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. 6. 
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fundamental condition of social being that invokes something deep and worthy of 
preservation. Autonomy and recognition serve, secondly, as a ground for social and 
political action, which is opposed to class interest. Thirdly, autonomy denotes an 
essential sameness. Finally, recognition refers to the processual development of 
collective self-under~tanding.~ In a nutshell, autonomy defines the normative 
subject’s authentic being and recogrution the way in whch it is to be self-actualised. 
Autonomy and recogrution justdy political critique which advocates political liberty 
and political liberation: they enjoy the status of an authentic moral identity, as 
morality is presumed to be a private, apolitical matter that is distinct from power.5 
One could say that autonomy and recogrution are the normative cement of 
humanism’s path to enlightenment. 
On the liberal hand, for instance, political philosophy investigates the extent 
to whch there should be a state at all, and by definition if there is a need for political 
philosophy.6 Somewhat less radically, Kymhcka writes that political philosophy 
ought no longer to be concerned with those areas central to the constitutional state, 
and he takes as one of kus examples the semantic analysis of the concept of power.7 
Instead, political philosophy ought to evaluate rival theories of justice: which are 
”primarily concerned with the relationship between the individual and the state, 
and with limiting the state’s intrusions on the liberties of  citizen^".^ In the liberal 
case, political philosophy and a theory of justice are synonymous.1o The assumption 
about the nature of power, which is state-centred, and its exercise by repressive 
mechanisms, is held constant. It allows the legslation of a normative theory of 
procedural justice through which political liberalism keeps a grip on juridical state 
power in the name of the subject’s political liberty. 
On the communitarian hand, political philosophy is not only concerned with 
Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond ’identity”’, pp. 6-11. I borrow these senses of the concept of identity 
from Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper. They point them out to argue that the identity industry 
suffers from a crisis of overproduction and a consequent devaluation of meaning, which requires a 
shdt beyond identity “in the name of conceptual clarity required for social analysis and political 
understanding”. Brubaker and Cooper, ”Beyond ’identity”’, p. 3 and p. 36. 
In the subjectivist turn of the eighteenth century, the moral accent that had previously emphasised 
the subject’s intuitive moral sense of right and wrong is eroded by an ethxc of authenticity. It is, Taylor 
argues, an ethic first elaborated by Rousseau, and it describes the subject who chooses a moral sense 
without the intervention of others. Taylor, The Malaise ofModernify, pp. 25-29. 
Nozick, Anarchy, Sfafe, and Ufopia, p. 4. 
Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, p. 1. 
Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, pp. 7-8. 
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, p. 1. 
’O Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. xxiv-xxv. 
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a normative check on the power of the state on behalf of autonomy, or of “justifying 
the right ... ways and identdying the wrong ways in which political power is to be 
exercised, but also with evaluating ”the nature of the claims whch citizens can 
make on the state and on each other”.I1 Comrnunitarianism raises the issue of 
intersubjective relations over and above liberalism’s basic concern with the subject’s 
relation to the state. As Taylor sees it, because selfhood and morality are 
inextricably intertwined themes, political philosophy must elucidate the subject’s 
moral ontology,JZ At the same time, a politics of recognition maintains the 
hypergoods which are necessary for the subject’s political liberation,’3 as ”[tlo know 
who I am”, Taylor suggests, “is a species of knowing where I stand”? Again, 
though, a communitarian theory of substantive justice, which charges politics with 
the normative mediation of power as a means to recogrution, takes a state-centred, 
repressively exercised interpretation of power for granted. In its guise as Anglo- 
American political philosophy, and on the basis of its theory of power, humanism 
uses political critique to foster maturity through a procedural or a substantive 
conception of normative justice that regulates the juridical state. 
3.ii. Rawls and Procedural Justice 
As lnheritors of the tradition of humanist critical thought, Rawls’ and Taylor’s 
political philosophy is partly related to the political ideologes of welfare liberalism 
and social dem~cracy.’~ In t h s  regard, social democracy and communitarianism 
share the political heritage of collectivism, as well as a hostility to liberal 
individualism and formal equality.16 They are equally indebted to Hegel, and 
it is possible to understand the communitarian emphasis on recogrution as the 
logical contmuation of social democracy’s challenge to the hegemony of liberalism.ls 
Plant, Modern Political Tlzought, p. 2. 
Taylor, Sources oftize Se$ p. 3. 
l3 Taylor, ”The Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice”, pp. 290-291. 
l4  Taylor, Sources o f fh e  Se$ p. 27. 
l5 Based on its observations about human nature and the processes of history, a political ideology 
provides a relatively coherent set of beliefs and thought about socio-political relationships, whch 
includes a normative blueprint for their organisation. In contrast to the issue of knowing, which 
connects the concept of ideology to epistemology, a political ideology is related to doing and ideas 
about power. See Carver, ”Ideology: The Career of a Concept”; Eatwell, “Ideologies: Approaches and 
Trends”; MacKenzie, “Introduction: The Arena of Ideology”. 
l6 Barry, An Introducfion to Modem Political Theory, pp. 24-29; Gutmann, “Communitarian Critics of 
Liberalism”, pp. 120-121. See especially Miller, ”In What Sense Must Socialism Be Communitarian?” . 
Plant, Modern Political Thought, pp. 324325. 
’* Beiner, “What Liberalism Means”. 
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Already in 1968, for example, Robert Wolff speaks of community-affective, 
productive and rational-as the basis for a new social philosophy to counter 
liberalism.19 However, as Richard Bellamy argues, welfare liberalism and social 
democracy serve as the combined point of departure for Rawls, the social 
democrabc liberal,20 whose alteration of the premises of political philosophy and re- 
affirmation of autonomy subsequently revitalises a communitarian opposition from 
a left-wing perspective.21 On t h s  assumption, I look in this section and the next at 
Rawls, and via a background of the liberal and communitarian debate I turn to 
Taylor in sections 3. iv. and 3.v., for as George Kateb points out, 
Rawls' work, the great statement of individuahsm in this century, has helped 
many anti-individuabt theorists to collect their thoughts and find their voice. 
Like any genuine work in political theory, A Theonj $Justice energizes not only 
its cause but that of its opponents.22 
Rawls rehabilitates Anglo-American political philosophy with the publication 
of its benchmark thesis in 1971. In general, A T/zeonj of Justice disagrees with 
teleological e h c a l  theories, which define the good independently of the right and 
the right as that which subsequently maximises the good? Of particular concern to 
Rawls is utditarianism's theory of justice, whch as it is grounded in an etl-uc that 
seeks to maximise the satisfaction of desire defines uthty in terms of an aggregation 
of happiness.24 In so doing, individual rights and socio-economic equality have at 
best a secondary importance in a society that practices a utilitarian theory of 
justice.25 For Rawls, the primary virtue that the institutions of the basic structure of 
society ought to promote is a distributive justice which balances freedom and 
equality. He reasons here in term of the basic structure's profound effects on the 
l9 Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalisnz, pp. 162ff.. 
2" Bellamy, "Introduction", p. 10. 
21 Gutniann, "Communitarian Critics of Liberalism", p. 122. 
22 Kateb, "Democratic Individuality and the Meaning of Rights", p. 184. 
23 Because they tend to valorise moral hedonism, Rawls takes issue, like Kant before him, with the 
ethical theories of perfectionism, intuitionism and eudaimonism. Rawls, A 77zeory of lustice, pp. 22-45 
and pp. 548-560. 
24 Plant, Modern Political Thought, ch. 4, provides a philosophical background to utilitarianism, and 
Rawls' reaction to it is discussed by Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Plzilosoplzy, ch. 2. 
E Rawls, A Theory offusticc, pp. 329-332. In addition to his disagreement with utilitarianism, Rawls 
writes in response to the socialist demand for the satisfaction of the material needs whch are 
necessary to realise bourgeois freedom. Bell, Conirnunitarianzsrn and Its Critics, pp. 2-3. 
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subject, because it determines in part who one is and who one can become.26 
Through political critique, Rawls wishes to establish the subject’s inalienable right 
to be who he is within the basic structure of a constitutional democracy. The 
primary principle of equal liberty that is central to Rawls’ theory of justice as 
fairness promotes, in the face of moral diversity within a society, a public system of 
rules which proceduralise intersubjective relations between subjects who possess 
liberty as a natural right.27 
Rawls commences with a theoretical conception of the rational subject, whose 
practical reason enables his capacities for a conception of the good and a sense of 
justice.28 Rawlsian man is a quasi-kantian rational autonomous subject, who is 
already constituted a priori to his experiences of h g s  and others.29 Conveniently, 
the subject’s capacities for the good and justice mirror the liberal’s normative 
preferences for liberty and a theory of distributive justice. Firstly, the subject’s 
capacity to conceive of the good is typically expressed as a rational, deliberative and 
continuous plan of life, whch must be respected and reciprocated by others.30 
Secondly, the subject’s capacity for justice denotes something akin to a social 
consciousness, whch makes the subject aware of the socio-economic benefits of 
society and the duties that are required to maintain them.31 A subject who shares 
with others the lnherent capacity of practical reason needs little persuasion, 
therefore, about the benefits of a normative theory of justice that guarantees man’s 
autonomy and provides equality of opportunity to fulfil it.32 
26 Rawls, A Theory oflustice, p. 259. Rawls’ basic structure of society refers to the fundamental rights 
and duties and the division of the advantages that accrue from social co-operation, both of which are 
distributed by the social institutions found in a property-owning democracy or a liberal socialist 
regime. In addition, Rawls believes that the basic structure’s socio-economic processes that realise 
justice ought themselves to be surrounded by background politico-legal institutions, which are akin to 
the democratic government of a self-contained national community. Rawls, A 77zeor-y ofIustice, pp. 7- 
11, pp. 274-284 and p. 457; Rawls, ”Preface for the French Edition of A Theory of]ustice”. 
27 Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, pp. 85-90. Sandel captures th~s point well when he says that, for Rawls, 
“society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with lus own aims, interests, and conceptions 
of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any 
particular conception of the good . . . [so much as] conform to the concept of the right, a moral category 
given prior to the good and independent of it”. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice, p. 1. 
2s Rawls, A Theory oflustice, pp. 560-567. 
29 Rawls’ quasi-kantianism allows him to substitute the metaphysical status of kantian autonomy with 
the conditions of human life, whlst Rawls treats Kant’s noumenal self, who is motivated by the 
categorical imperative, as a collective noumenal body that chooses procedural justice. Rawls, A 77zcont 
offustice, pp. 251-257. On Rawls’ relationship to Kant, see Wolff, Understanding Rauds, pp. 1Olff.. 
3o Rawls, A Theory oflustice, pp. 407-424. The reciprocity of respect accorded to others in virtue of their 
autonomy is itself a form of ehcal justice, which is prior to a procedural theory of justice. Rawls, 
”Justice as Reciprocity”. 
31 Rawls, A Dzeory oflustice, ch. VIII, esp. pp. 490-491. 
32 Rawls, A Theory oflustice, pp. 126-130. 
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The methodological vehicle that vindicates Rawls’ political critique, and from 
which the legitimacy of normative justice in politics that watches over power 
originates, is the method of the social contract that is found in Hobbes, Locke and 
R o ~ s s e a u . ~ ~  Based on the assumption of an already existent society that is 
characterised by moral pluralism, Rawls argues that the kantian congruity between 
reason and autonomy means that, at the moment of the contract’s negotiation, 
politics is temporarily suspended? In its absence, the political philosopher who is 
above the immediate concerns and attitudes of the everyday develops a universal 
perspective, wl-uch he puts on the table.35 Via l-us conception of the normativity 
required to demarcate power from the autonomous subject’s authentic being, Rawls 
demonstrates to the contractors how the principles of justice, which are to be 
established by the contract, mirror the moral doctrines which they already h0ld.36 
Rawls calls h s  the state of reflective equdibrium, which is attained by subjects who 
are competent jl1dges.3~ They are endowed with an ability to adopt the general 
moral point of view in order to collectively order power via a normative moral 
doctrine.% In this hypothetical position of equality, contractors consent from within 
a veil of ignorance to a theory of justice as They choose the fundamental 
principle of equal liberty, whch secures both political and personal justice, or 
citizenship and autonomy.40 And, secondly, contractors agree on the subordinate 
principle of democratic social equality and equality of economic opportunity, whch 
together amount to fairness.41 In the end, a normative theory of justice that is 
grounded in practical reason, and which is definitive of man’s autonomy, finds 
support from the free citizen in a well-ordered society.42 
Despite his efforts to resuscitate political critique, Rawls’ political philosophy 
33 Traditionally, the social contract demonstrates the origrns and legitimacy of moral and civic 
background institutions, especially those concerned with political authority, whereas Rawls’ 
constitutional social contract method seeks to jus@ a political association via furnishing its basic 
structure with the principle of justice. See Lessnoff, ”Introduction”; Boucher and Kelly, “The Social 
Contract and its critics”. 
34 Rawls, A The0 y of justice, pp. 515-516. 
35 Rawls, A The0 y of Justice, p. 587. 
36 Rawls’ archetypal contractor is socially honest, morally altruistic and materially self-interes ted 
rather than selfish. Rawls, A Theo y of justice, pp. 142-150. 
37 Rawls, ”Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics”. 
38 Wolff, Understanding Razuls, pp. 60-63. 
39 Rawls, A The0 y of Justice, pp. 48-51 and pp. 136-142. 
40 Rawls, A The0 y of justice, pp. 243-250 and ch. IV. 
41 Rawls, A The0 y of Justice, pp. 75-83 and ch. V. 
42 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 560-561. 
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and its basic premise of autonomy are subject to vehement, and at times polemical, 
criticism from a communitarian perspective which challenges liberalism about its 
objectivity, normativity and subjectivity. In the appropriate language of Stephen 
Mulhall and Adam Swift, Rawls’ political philosophy raises the questions of 
subjectivism or objectivism, universalism and anti-perfectionism, and the 
conception of the person and asocial indi~idualism.~~ Given that, in sections 3.iii. 
and 3.iv., I examine how the element of objectivity shifts from a metaphysical to a 
political ground for Rawls in Political Liberalism, and how Taylor’s early critical 
thought is defined by an attempt to overcome epistemology, I s h e  the spot&ght 
here on the communitarian critique of Rawls’ de-ontological subjectivity and the 
normative right with whch he imbues state power? 
In keeping with the liberal tradition, Rawls’ critics argue, he adopts and is the 
outstanding example of an individualist social His moral individuahsm, 
which derives from the autonomous subject, assumes that only interests matter in 
normative justice.46 Rawls’ subject’s a priori capacities for a conception of the good 
and a sense of justice are tantamount to an unproblematic performance criterion of 
consciousness.~7 They imply what Sandel notes as an antecedently individuated 
self.48 Further, Sandel argues that if practical reason is the faculty by which the self 
comes by his ends, Rawls can be said to favour a voluntarist rather than cogrutive 
dimension to subjectivity. Essentially, Rawls is less interested in the self‘s cogrutive 
voyage of discovery than in man’s self-interested choice of his ends.49 With echoes 
of Hegel’s critique of Kant, Sandel calls this Rawls’ unencumbered self, who is 
bifurcated from his substantive experiences.jO It is a de-ontology with a humean 
face,5’ whch re-iterates the formal, abstract nature of the unmediated subject.j’ 
For communitarians, Rawls’ unencumbered self and the social contract he 
signs up to betray political critique that legitimates the formal procedures of 
normative justice, rather than interpretively analyses its substantive content. Like 
Mulliall and Swift, Liberals and Conzn.runitarians, pp. 9-33. Also, see Frankel Paul et. al., The 
Conrinunitariaiz Challenge to Liberalism, pp. vii-xiv; Bell, Conirnutzi tarianisnz and Its Critics, pp. 4-8. 
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Conznzunity, and Culture, pp. 21-23; Plant, Modern Political Tlzouglzt, pp. 25-37. 
45 Ben-Zeev, ”Who is a Rational Agent?”; Young, “The Ideal of Community”. 
46 Gautliier, ”The Liberal Individual”; Gray, Liberalisnz, pp. 45-55; Kukathas and Pettit, Ra~ids, pp. 11-16. 
47 Taylor, “The Concept of a Person”, p. 112. 
48 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 147. 
49 Sandel, Liberalism and tlze Limits oflustice, pp. 57-60 and pp. 153-159. 
Sandel, “The Procedural Republic”, p. 87 and p. 93; Plant, Modern Political Tlzouglzt, pp. 339-348. 
51 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, pp. 13-14. 
52 Raz, The Moralify of Freedom, ch. 8 passim. 
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David Gauber,  who uses the device of the social contract to ground his libertarian 
theory of justice as mutual advantage,S3 Rawls starts with the individual who 
employs an analytical method to resolve problems between principles and political 
practice? Disenchanted with the modern world that has lost its t e l o ~ , ~ ~  his 
autonomous subject is an article of faith? He is beyond the reach of politics in the 
fulcrum of the justificatory process,S7 the origmal position. Of necessity, rawlsian 
man gives rise to the principle of individual rights, which take primacy over 
principles of belongmg or obligation.% A procedural, rights-based politics obviates 
the needs which are relevant to the substantiation of re~ogrution,~~ whilst it 
produces intersubjective relations of self-sufficient independence between atomistic 
selves.60 Because rawlsian methodological individualism overlooks the rousseauian 
process of recogrution fundamental to autonomy,6* his political critique furnishes 
juridical state power with normative right along a ”grid that allows self-governing 
individuals to co-ordinate reciprocal relations in ways that maximise the attainment 
of their own purposes”.62 
3.iii. The Rational/Reasonable Subject 
If there are academics who are commentators, academics whose lucidity makes 
them eminent thinkers, and phlosophers who happen to be academics, then like 
Foucault Rawls is the last, and thus unllke Taylor who matches the middle 
category. The practice of critical thought in Paris and Harvard is a stoical 
endeavour along a Socratic road to the love of wisdom, and in tlie early 1990s Rawls 
53 Unlike Rawls, Gauthier’s subject does not commence from behind the veil of ignorance. Gautluer 
simply uses the contract method to show how the subject’s practical reason effects a capacity for self- 
interest, which is followed by the logical choice of a theory of justice that upholds self-interestedly 
advantageous, but rationally constraining, rights. On Gauthier, see Moore, ”Gauthier’s contractarian 
morality”; Kymlicka, Contemporary PoliticaZ PhiZosophy, pp. 125-132; Gaus, Justificatory Liberalisnz, ch. 8. 
54 Barry, An Introduction to Modern Political Theory, pp. x-xii. 
55 Sandel, Liberalism and the Linzits of]ustice, pp. 175-178. 
56 Sandel, Liberalism and the Linrits of]ustice, p. 183. 
57 Sandel, Liberalism and fhe Linzits ofJustice, p. 47 and pp. 62-64. 
58 Taylor, ”Atomism”, pp. 30-32. 
59 MacIntyre, “Justice as Virtue”; Buchanan, ”Assessing the Communitarian Critique”; Taylor, The 
Malaise ofModernity, pp. 17-18. 
6o Taylor, “Atomism”, pp. 34-43; Gardbaum, ”Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community”. 
61 Lukes, Individualisnz, pp. 76ff.; Wolff, The Poucrty ofLiberalism, p. 166. 
62 Beiner, ”What Liberalism Means”, p. 191. Similarly, John Dunn argues that the premise of Rawls’ 
social contract method, the voluntary relation between selves, ought not to be the cause of relations in 
society but the standard these relation should meet. See Dunn, ”Contractualism”. 
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emerges after a multi-staged trek of two decades with his idea of political 
l iberal i~m.~~ A normative theory of procedural justice as fairness, he claims, can be 
understood as a political version of liberalism if it is shorn of its de-ontological 
meta-etl~ic.64 mist it is not grounded in the autonomous subject's authentic being, 
Rawls' political critique still deploys a normative moral doctrine of right to uphold 
the political liberty possessed a priori by man in a moral realm that is distinct from 
power. 
From Rawls post-1970s perspective, the question of moral identity is no 
longer pivotal to political liberalism for reasons that relate to an earlier theoretical 
failure. Whilst justice as fairness remains the means to the consistent rawlsian end 
of a well-ordered society, in A 7'1zeonj of Justice the conception of normativity 
depends on everyone's endorsement of it as a part of their comprehensive religious, 
phlosophcal or moral doctrine.65 But under conditions of reasonable plurahsm and 
in respect of American constitutional issues in the 1980s, morality can no longer be 
the basis of legitimacy for normative political justice? As a consequence, Rawls 
divorces the e h c a l  from the politicaP7 Further, in reference to his 1971 mode of 
theorising, Rawls says that hu political phdosophy is indistinguishable from moral 
philosophy and its associated aid of moral reasoning, the social contract? 
In his ventures to change his way of lookmg at things, which culminate in 
Political Liberalism, Rawls discovers that the task of moral philosophy is to elaborate 
concepts and truths, whilst h i s  new practice of moral theory articulates the 
doctrines purchased by the subject in the moral sphere. These include 
comprehensive doctrines like Rawls' own theory of justice, Kant's concept of 
autonomy, or Mill's idea of individ~ality.~' It then falls to the political philosopher's 
critique to deliver a quasi-hermeneutic understanding of just democratic 
63 Rawls claims that none of his post-A Theory oflustice political philosophy is a reply to criticisms 
made by communitarians. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. xvii, f. 6. 
Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics of Liberalism", p. 127. 
65 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. xv-xvii. 
66 Bellamy argues that because rawlsian, neutralist liberalism has no moral theory, it ought to give up 
on any moral values. Instead, like Bellamy's own democratic liberalism, it should focus on a political 
theory of institutions and procedures which can accommodate moral pluralism. Bellamy, Liberalism 
and Modern Society, pp. 219-240. 
67 Rawls seeks to legitimise the conditions of human life that pertain to an industrial democratic 
society, which one of its standard citizens would choose to legitimate as his theory of justice (instead 
of the sanction of the collective noumenal body evident in A Theory of]ustice). Rawls, "Justice as 
Fairness: Political not Metaphysical". Also, see Kukathas and Pettit, Xmols, pp. 121-133. 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 36-38. 
69 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 195-200. 
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institutions in terms of their manifestation of the common elements of moral 
doctrines. In a stable society of free and equal citizens who are profoundly divided 
by doctrinal pluralism, people exist side by side vis-a-vis juridical state power 
because they have jointly rendered it normative.70 
Rawls introduces the idea of public reason as the normative ground that 
legitimates political justice. His political critique assumes that, in a society which is 
characterised by a plurality of incompatible doctrines, everyone adheres to their 
doctrine reasonably and believes in democratic politics.71 Out of each subject’s 
formal recognition of another’s capacity to form an idea of the good and to embrace 
a moral doctrine, there comes a demand for the capacity to be constitutionally 
guaranteed. For Rawls, justice draws the limit and the good shows the point, or the 
political meets the moral in the overlapping consensus between moral d0ctrines.~2 
That is, public reason enables each citizen to be conscious of justice personally and 
publicly. Also, because the normativity that arises out of this overlapping consensus 
is neither dependent upon, nor a product of, the subject’s moral doctrines but a 
consequence of the free reign of public reason in society,73 Rawls calls it a political 
and reasonable, rather than metaphysical and true, conception. In keeping the 
domain of the political distinct from the moral, Rawls’ political critique offers a 
conception of justice to govern state power that he calls political liberalism, which 
embodies the values that are the very groundwork of existence. Politics in a 
constitutional regime is consequently a closed domain, where power is exercised 
coercively, albeit constitutionally, by a corporate body of free and equal citizens 
over a normatively proceduralised moral 
Accordingly, Rawls has to reformulate his philosophcal idea of man through 
a conception of practical reason that renders the subject an objective political 
con~truct.~j  He introduces the political subject or citizen, that democratic idea since 
70 Rawls, PoliticaZ Liberalism, pp. 44-46. 
71 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 223-230. 
72 However, Rawls, says that justice does not draw the limit too narrowly. Political liberalism includes 
some ideas of the good, for example, rationality, primary goods and political virtues. Rawls, Political 
Liberalism, pp. 174ff.. 
73 Rawls uses the concept of society in distinction, firstly, to an association, which is an open social 
system that the subject joins with an already existent identity, and, secondly, a community, which 
unlike a society is governed by a comprehensive doctrine and thus limits the scope of public reason. 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 40-42. 
74 Rawls, PoZitical Liberalism, pp. 135-139. 
75 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 107-110. 
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Greek antiquity of a fully co-operating member of society over a complete life,76 
whom he justifies in terms of the freedom between citizens which is grounded on 
the powers of moral personality. Citizens recognise in each other the ability to act 
publicly and privately, or an institutional and moral identity, in virtue of the 
capacity to conceive of the good; secondly, each citizen recogruses in himself and 
others the capacity for a sense of justice that makes them self-authenticating sources 
of valid claims about political justice; and, thirdly, each citizen is responsible for his 
conception of the good and the claims he makes about normativity in p0litics.n For 
Rawls, the citizen acts rationally when he pursues the fruits to be harvested from 
his capacity for a conception of the good, and the citizen acts reasonably when he 
acts from the capacity for a sense of justice and establishes a society of mutual co- 
operation and the rule of law. The rational and the reasonable are thus two distinct 
conditions of political justice as fairness, and whilst the second element that is 
reciprocated between citizens cannot be derived from the first, they are 
complementary in the citizen in a similar manner to Taylor’s philosophy of the 
hermeneutic and expressivist self, which I discuss next.78 
When the rawlsian citizen employs h s  intellectual powers of judgement and 
thought, rational autonomy is in operation.79 It is applied by the citizen in h s  social 
and individual life.80 But rational autonomy is also the basis of equality and the 
arMice of reason with which Rawls constructs a political subject, the citizen, in the 
original position.81 This same citizen displays full reasonable autonomy, and he 
publicly recogruses and then acts in compliance with the principles of justice in 
public affairs. Rawls’ constructivism in moral theory uses rational autonomy to 
hypothesise a moral subject, who is connected via an overlapping consensus to the 
normativity that typifies the relations between citizens with full autonomy in a 
76 The concept of the person is not an account of human nature but a normative conception, which for 
Rawls’ purposes equates to a moral conception of the person. As the basic unit of thought, deliberation 
and responsibility, this person easily accommodates a political conception of justice. Rawls, ”Justice as 
Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, p. 397, f. 15. 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 29-35. 
78 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 48-54. 
79 In addition to a reasonable moral psychology, which is a consequence of moral capacities and 
intellectual powers, Rawls mentions two other features of rational autonomy, the subject’s determinate 
conception of the good interpreted vis-6-ais a coinprehensive doctrine, and the subject’s requisite 
desire to be normal and co-operative in order to receive recognition as a self-respecting citizen. Rawls, 
Political Liberalism, pp. 81-89. 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 77-80. 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 72-77. 
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well-ordered society.82 Finally, in political liberalism reasonable autonomy is a 
political value whch is dependent on, but demarcated from, the rational autonomy 
relevant to the sphere of morality.83 Rawls, in other words, envisages intersubjective 
relations between subjects whch are regulated socio-economically by equality of 
opportunity, and politically by constitutional freedoms. Political liberalism s e m e s  
normative justice in the objective situation of individuals vis-a-vis one another.84 
Nevertheless, Rawls’ political liberalism offers a disingenuous revision of A 
171eon,y of Justice. In the face of a plurality of incompatible moral doctrines, he 
divorces the moral identity of autonomy from its position as the basis of a theory of 
normative justice. Yet what he calls political liberalism continues to revolve around 
the freedom of the autonomous subject? Further, although Rawls discards a 
metaphysical for a political conception of the subject, the tenability of political 
liberalism depends on the bifurcated rational-reasonable subject, who is torn 
between the moral and political. For Rawls, this is justified partly because reason 
underpins our considered convictions of a normatively well-ordered society:6 and 
partly because rationality allows the notion of the free person to decide, be solely 
responsible for, and at liberty to revise, hs fundamental interests and ends.B7 
On this definition, Rawls closely resembles Raz’s perfectionist ideal of 
autonomy, whch orders power normatively to sustain self-authored, autonomous 
lives.88 Similarly, autonomy implies a notion of equal respect and justdies the 
fundamental right to political liberty.89 Autonomy is also crucial to the subject who 
recognises his motivations as his own, and unrestrained by others takes 
responsibhty for his actions.% This subject fashions, through successive decisions, a 
unified and continuous subjectivity.91 In liberal political philosophy, where Rawls is 
the most elegant figure, a deep theory of the self 9ua autonomous chooser is both 
82 Rawls, ”Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”, p. 308; Mulhall and Swift, Liberals and 
Conznzunitarians, pp. 192-205. 
83 Rawls, ”The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, p. 586. 
84 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 265-271. 
85 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, pp. 16-19. 
86 Rawls, ”Social Unity and Primary Goods”, p. 383. 
87 Rawls, “ A  Kantian Conception of Equality”, pp. 259-260. Relatedly, Gerald Dworkin claims that 
autonomy is the self‘s second-order capacity to reflect critically upon his first-order ends, as well as the 
capacity to accept or change these ends in respect of higher-order preferences. Dworkin, ”Autonomy”. 
ss Raz, Tlze Morality of Freedom, pp. 371-378. 
89 Dworkin, ”The Original Position”; Rosenblum, Another Liberalism, pp. 69-72. 
Situation”; Rosenblum, Another Liberalism, p. 51. 
91 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 154; Barry, 77ze Liberal Theory oflustice, pp. 126ff.. 
Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, chs. 1-2 passim; Archard, ”Autonomy, Character and 
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the cause and intended consequence of political critique,% which grounds the 
normative regulation of juridical power in the capacities of the subject for private 
rationality and public reason. 
3.iv. The Self-Interpreting/Expressivist Subject 
Taylor proposes interpretive political critique as the best way to do critical thought. 
With this approach, he opposes Rawls, whose legislative political critique promotes 
normative procedural justice to watch over state power on the basis of, to b e p  
with, the metaphysical subject’s n priori capacities for the good and a sense of 
justice, and lately with political liberalism in virtue of the normal political citizen’s 
capacities for rational and reasonable autonomy. Thus, instead of Rawls theoretical 
explanations of moral doctrines and political justice, Taylor adopts a self- 
interpreting approach to the language community, in which he finds the moral 
ontology crucial for recognition. In this respect, he is indebted less to Rousseau’s 
social contract method, which influences Rawls, than to a rousseauian conception of 
the self-actualisation necessary for the autonomous subject’s authentic being. Taylor 
also works through Hegel’s political sense of the recogrution afforded by the 
community, as Hegel is indispensable to any attempt ”to gain a conception of man 
in which free action is the response to what we are”.93 Nonetheless, through his 
influence by Heidegger’s epistemological critique of Rawls’ other partner, Kant, 
and Herder’s philosophy of language, Taylor is not a phenomenologist of Gis t  but 
a post-heideggerian hermeneutist who articulates the hypergoods which are central 
to an hegelian sense of political liberation.% Out of these origins, Taylor fashions 
political critique on the basis of a philosophical anthr~pology,~~ which jusbfies a 
substantive theory of justice for a normative politics that supports the process of 
recognition. Consequently, I focus first on Taylor’s efforts to overcome 
epistemology with a philosophcal anthropology of the interpretive, expressivist 
subject. 
Since Descartes, Locke and Kant, Taylor says that epistemology has been 
charged with the validation of claims to truth in the social sciences.” To be sure, 
criticism of foundational epistemology’s anthropology dates back to Hegel, and it is 
92 Scanlon, “Rawls’ Theory of Justice”; Rosenblum, Another Liberdisnz, p. 52. 
O3 Taylor, Hegel, p. 571. 
94 Taylor, ”Hegel: History and Politics”, p. 189. 
95 Taylor, “Introduction”, p. 1. 
96 Taylor, “Overcoming Epistemology”, pp. 1-6. 
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carried forward by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. They all reject its associated 
identity that connotes a disengaged free, rational self, a punctual a priori mediated, 
instrumental self, and a socially atomistic, individualistic self.97 For Taylor, 
nevertheless, these philosophers share Kant’s epistemological predicament, namely, 
how to characterise the indispensable condition for there to be experiential 
awareness in the first place. Rather than re-present the world through the subject’s 
disengaged reason or desire for transcendence, Taylor argues that the conditions for 
experience can be articulated by reason, which discloses the background where the 
engaged, being-in-the-world, Dasein, is ”first and mostly”.98 This enables Taylor to 
reject punctual identity in favour of identity as depth, whilst Herder’s conception of 
language as the constitutive background of morality sees off atomistic notions of 
identity.% Yet, although he breaks radically from foundationalism, Taylor carries 
the project of modern, self-responsible reason forward in order to conclude its task 
of the self-clarification of our nature as knowing selves.1oo Taylor describes h s  task 
as the need for self-understanding, or awareness about the limits and conditions of 
knowing, whch requires the articulation of a community’s background moral 
ontology .Io1 
The post-heideggerian hermeneutical method that sustains Taylor’s political 
critique originates from hs attempt, through a philosophy of language and not an 
ontology of Dasein, to answer the basic ontolopcal question that Heidegger, and 
more recently, Hans-Georg Gadamer, pose: what exactly is marufest in the language 
community?lo2 In h s  efforts to get beyond disengaged, punctual and atomistic 
accounts of identity, Taylor uses a herderian philosophy of language to illuminate 
the communal background of He suggests that the hypergoods 
contained in the language community - ”goods whch not only are incomparably 
more important than others but provide the standpoint from which these must be 
97 Taylor, ”Overcoming Epistemology”, pp. 7-8. 
% Taylor, “Lichtung or Lebensform”, p. 77. 
99 Taylor, “The Importance of Herder”, passim. 
loo Taylor, “Overcoming Epistemology”, pp. 9-13. For a defence of h n  foundationalism, see Gaus, 
JustiFcatory Liberalism, pp. 91-109. 
lol Taylor, “Overcoming Epistemology”, pp. 14-15. 
Io2 Taylor, ”Introduction”, p.11. 
lo3 Taylor talks about language in terms of speech or energeia, not work or ergon. Language is a pattern 
of activity that realises man’s humanity qua a way of being in the world, that of reflective awareness, 
whilst every speech act expresses and constitutes relations between speakers. For Taylor, the pattern 
activity of language is employed against a background web that one can never fully dominate, and 
which exists only because humans speak. Taylor, ”Language and Human Nature”, pp. 232-234. 
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weighed, judged, decided about”IM - support the self-interpreting self‘s attempt to 
be faithful to something beyond himself, and constitute the expressivist self‘s 
condition for recognition. For Taylor, if man is to know who he is, he must look 
beyond himself to where he is.lo5 Specifically, in contrast to Rawls’ theoretically 
derived capacities for rational and reasonable autonomy, Taylor’s political critique 
depends on a phenomenological understanding of the interpretative capacities of 
the subject and a hguistic account of expressivist self-consciousness.’& 
The embodied subject is engaged with the world, both in virtue of hs causal 
dependency on his body and because his constitutive experience is that of an 
embodied subject.107 Bodily self-identity is one aspect of the engaged self, and 
subsidiary engagement takes place in a world shaped by the embodied experience 
and thought of man. According to Taylor, a linguistic path characterises the 
condition of self-interpretation that is necessary for the experience of recognition by 
the expressivist self. It involves four procedures that organise the human agent, the 
language user, into a moral agent or self.Io8 Firstly, an engaged self is a subject of 
experience, who imports a language to express the objects of h s  experience as 
feelings.lW Yet, secondly, the expression of certain feelings - shame, guilt, pride, 
moral remorse or, in short, the life of the subject in the realm of what it is to be 
human - remain the property of the self, to whom, thirdly, we always refer to for an 
articulation of these subject-referring feelings. Finally, subsequent to the self’s self- 
interpretation of those feehgs  which were first articulated through language, it is 
possible to know who man is.11o Because, as a language user, Verstelzen is the self‘s 
Seiizsimdus,I1’ Taylor speaks of the self as a self-interpreting animal, whose 
articulated feelings are a central part of his existence and for whom the further 
articulation of these feelings through language and self-interpretation is a life-time 
’04 Taylor, Sources offhe Se$ p. 63. 
Taylor, “Heidegger, Language, Ecology”, p. 126. 
lo6 To note, the interpretive and expressivist self are two sides of the same person. The former is 
engaged in a monological journey of discovery through self-interpretation wittun associations like the 
family. It is then up to the expressivist self to ensure that lus subjectivity, which is discovered in self- 
interpretive monologue, does not become his prison (of the association), and through dialogical 
recognition the expressivist self is able to go beyond his hermeneutic subjectivity into the language 
community, where his identity is affirmed. Taylor, “Legitimation Crisis?”, pp. 258-278. 
Taylor, ”Transcendental Arguments”, passim. 
Taylor, ”Language and Human Nature”, p. 216. 
lo9 Taylor, ”Self-Interpreting Arumals”, pp. 48-57. 
Taylor, “Self-Interpreting Animals”, pp. 59-62. 
Taylor, ”Self-Interpreting Animals”, p. 72. 
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process 
For Taylor, human beings and animals share the common feature of desire, 
but the fundamental ontology of self-interpretation and the prime capacity of 
language, which enables the self-evaluation of desire, distinguishes the former from 
the latter as moral agents.113 More specifically, the self-evaluations of the 
expressivist self are definitive of identity when applied to strong evaluations, where 
the self makes a qualitative distinction between the worth of deep desires and h s  
motivations for them.114 The self of strong evaluations is capable of an articulate 
reflection on his deep desires vis-Ci-ziis questions about the quality of his Me, and the 
capacity for strong, articulate self-interpretations is essential to any notion of 
identity.ll5 In this way, the strong evaluator carves out the depth of the self, though 
not from his de facto desires but through the relation of his desires to the moral and 
zesthetic intuitions of the language community, which is a process wherein one 
draws a moral map of oneself and tries to give shape to one's experience.116 Because 
of the crucial feature of the expressivist self's capacity for strong evaluations, the 
notions of reflection, will and responsibility characterise identity, to0.117 The self's 
fundamental, deep evaluations are inseparable from him, and he is re-assured of 
their validity by the language community's moral ontology. These fundamental 
evaluations, whch are the product of the expressivist self's articulations of hs sense 
of worth, and of the self-interpretations of the self that constitute his experience of 
what matters, make up the identity of the self realised through recogrution.118 
3.v. Taylor and the Politics of Recognition 
Taylor's political critique derives from a philosophical anthropology which 
emphasises the centrality of the language community to the constitution of moral 
Taylor, "Self-Interpreting Animals", p. 65. 
113 Identity requires reflexivity for the subject to know what matters to him, and consciousness is 
essential to reflexivity because it enables tlungs to matter in the first place. In this sense, taylorian 
consciousness is synonymous with language, for it is language that opens the subject up to the human 
concerns that matter and constitute identity. Taylor, "The Concept of a Person", pp. 104-105. 
114 The self evaluates weak desires, too, but these are concerned with outcomes, and not the relative 
worth of, and motivations for, desires. Taylor, "What is Human Agency?", pp. 16-23. 
'I5 Taylor, "What is Human Agency?", pp. 25-27. 
for these secondary capacities that are pivotal to identity, namely, tlie capacity of communication, 
which relates the self to the language community, and the capacity of responsibility, which the self 
assumes for his depth. Taylor, "What is Human Agency?", pp. 29-33. 
117 Taylor, "What is Human Agency?", p. 43. 
'18 Taylor, "What is Human Agency?", pp. 35-37. 
Taylor, "Self-Interpreting Animals", pp. 66-68. The capacity for strong evaluation is the condition 
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identity. Language, which translates the norms harboured in the institutions and 
practices of a community, is the means to self-consciousness of the self-interpreting 
self, whlst its hypergoods provide the content for the fulfilment of the expressivist 
self's desire for re~ogrution?~ As Taylor justdies h s  philosophical anthropology of 
the self-interpreting/ expressivist subject, "[mly identity is defined by the 
commitments and ident-rfications which provide the frame of horizon within whch 
I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to 
be done, or what I endorse or oppose".120 Subsequent to hs philosophy of the 
subject, Taylor brings in the question of politics as the protector and promoter of the 
language community's hypergoods that characterise its background horizon. 
Further, Taylor's hegelian politics of recogrution signals the moral obligations one 
owes to the community and the duties that are required to realise what one already 
is.121 With political critique, Taylor demonstrates why the crucial relation between 
moral existence and membership of a community necessitates a shift beyond 
political liberalism,'= and in this penultimate section of chapter 3 I examine his 
normative theory of the substantive justice whch recogrution requires from 
juridical state power. 
If Rawls' two decade trek is a solitary path that circumnavigates the liberal 
and communitarian debate, Taylor's humanist critical thought with its self- 
interpreting, expressivist maturity finds its moment of political critique therein. He 
suggests, for instance, that both ontological and advocacy arguments are at stake in 
Anglo-American political phdosophy.123 On this basis, it is possible to be, ldse 
Taylor, an ontological holist who espouses a basic principle of political liberty, 
precisely because issues of moral identity and community uphold the dignity of the 
self.124 These issues are of concern to all contractors, who choose a conception of 
substantive justice favourable to the conditions for recogrution. What one must 
realise, Taylor argues, is that the ontologically disinterested liberal's procedural 
conception of justice is blind to these important Instead of the liberal's 
'I9 Taylor, "Hegel: History and Politics", p. 184. 
I2O Taylor, Sources o f fhe  Self, p. 27. 
Taylor, "Hegel: History and Politics", p. 177. 
Taylor, "Hegel: History and Politics", pp. 179-180. 
123 Ontological issues account for the self, and advocacy issues concern the conception of justice one 
supports, and whilst the first is implicit in the latter, it need not determine one's theory of justice. 
Taylor, "Cross-Purposes", pp. 160-162. 
124 Taylor, "The Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice", pp. 308-312. 
125 Taylor, "Cross-Purposes", pp. 163-164. 
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representation view of autonomy, which emphasises radical choice, Taylor talks of 
the sigruficance view of the person.126 It is because the language community’s 
hypergoods are constitutive of what matters to the self-interpreting self that it 
ought to take centre stage in any discussion about justice, and it is because one 
attributes sigruficant purposes to the expressivist self, whose identity embodies a 
unique point of view in the world, that autonomy should be valued.127 
Rather than the atomistic autonomy associated with the rawlsian citizen’s 
capacity for rational and reasonable conceptions of the good and justice, Taylor’s 
idea of autonomy is that of an ethic of authenticity. In Sources of tlze Serf. he 
highlights its origins - commercial, bourgeois activity; the narrative novel; the 
privacy of marriage; and the emotional sentiments of love, concern and affection- 
from early eighteenth century European society.128 Parallel to the evolution of the 
e h c  of authenticity, Taylor talks of the rise of a critical public sphere, in which 
authenticity can be cultivated by the self-interpreting self.129 He also speaks of the 
political case authenticity makes for a distinct civil society, where the expressivist 
self articulates his strong desires free from the interference of others and the state.130 
Taylor’s point is that the e h c  of authenticity is an individualised identity that is 
personally constituted in respect of a communal moral ontology. As such, h s  
authentic identity forms the basis of a theory of substantive justice that promotes a 
hypergood such as political liberty, which also allows Taylor to avoid the 
unencumbered self’s demand for proceduralised normative right. As with Hegel’s 
concrebsation of Morulitiit with SittIiclzkeit, Taylor says that without substantive 
hypergoods as the basis for normative justice, a procedural political liberalism does 
no more than encourage individuals to ”strike out on their own and define their 
identity as individuals. Individualism comes ... when men cease to i d e n ~ y  with 
the community’s life”.131 
In a modern society no longer based on the principle of honour and an 
inequality of status, the d i p t y  fostered by Taylor’s e h c  of authenticity and 
lz6 Taylor, “The Concept of a Person”, pp. 113-114. Only the representation view of the person 
pretends to an absolute understanding of the self, whereas the self whose core identity depends on the 
capacity for self-interpretation always retains a subjective element to lus depth. He can only be 
understood through an account of the language coinmunity, out of which depth is formed and 
recognition realised. Taylor, “Introduction”, p. 3. 
lZ7 Taylor, ”The Concept of a Person”, pp. 99-101. 
128 Taylor, Sources of the SeK pp. 285-294. 
129 Taylor, ”Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere”, pp. 257-287. 
130 Taylor, ”Invoking Civil Society”. 
131 Taylor, “Hegel: History and Politics”, pp. 186-187. 
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presupposed by the processes of recognition translates into a political principle of 
equal respect.’3* Taylor calls it a politics of recognition, which he contrasts with a 
rawlsian politics of universahsm, as well as with a politics of difference.133 On the 
proviso that certain basic rights are enshnned in a constitution, a politics of 
recogrution acknowledges the normative sigruficance of the hypergoods to the 
constitution of moral identity.’% In particular, a community’s moral ontology is 
crucial to the self-actualisation of the autonomous subject’s authentic being. Identity 
is only realised in relation to the public Me of the community, and not through the 
private self-definition of the alienated individ~a1.I~~ The ethic of authenticity, which 
digrufies the self-interpreting and expressivist self, is the justification for the 
principle of equal respect, whilst it also politicises recognition in terms of the 
substantive justice that normatively administers juridical power.’% In fact, political 
critique that fails to harness normativity to the juridical state via politics denies the 
self a sense of who he is,137 because, as Taylor argues, 
when we think of a human being, we do not simply mean a living organism, but 
a being who can think, feel, decide, be moved, respond, enter into relations with 
others; and all ths implies a language, a related set of ways of experiencing the 
world, of interpreting his feelings, understanding his relation to others, to the 
past, the future, the absolute, and so on. It is the particular way he situates 
himself within this cultural world that we call his identity.’% 
3.vi. Humanist Critical Thought’s Path to Enlightenment 
I have argued above that, as the descendants of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century German philosophy of Kant and Hegel, Rawls and Taylor 
exemphfy how contemporary Anglo-American political phlosophy continues to 
follow a humanist path to enlightenment. It proceeds with the twin components of 
critical thought, critique and maturity, via a philosophy of the subject’s capacity for 
13* Taylor, ”The Politics of Recognition”, pp. 25-32. 
133 A politics of universalism advocates procedural justice, in whch a principle of equal liberty values 
the capacity to be autonomous, but not the self’s actual autonomy because it is neutral about the 
hypergoods necessary for identity. With a politics of difference, a principle of universal equality 
informs justice as an instrument to recognise identity, as it is different rather than the product of a 
fundamental human capacity. Taylor, ”The Politics of Recognition”, pp. 37-44. 
131 Taylor, ”The Politics of Recognition”, pp. 56-61. 
135 Taylor, ”Hegel: History and Politics”, p. 188. 
136 Taylor, ”The Politics of Recognition”, pp. 32-37. 
137 Taylor, ”The Politics of Recognition”, p. 64. 
‘ 3 ~  Taylor, “Hegel: History and Politics”, p. 182. 
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transcendental apperception or for the transcendental dialectic, which then prompts 
the epistemological critique of Kant and Hegel. Or, where Rawls and Taylor are 
concerned, political critique operates on the basis of a theory of the subject’s 
rational/ reasonable autonomy or a philosophical anthropology of the self- 
interpreting/ expressivist subject. As a result, humanism’s objective and normative 
experience fosters a state of being autonomous in thought and action that equates to 
autonomy and political liberty from juridical state power, hence Moralitat and 
political liberalism, or recogrution and political liberation realised through it, 
whence Sittlichkeit and a politics of recognition. 
Before I turn to chapters 4, 5 and 6, in whch I will develop Foucault’s 
nietzschean path to enhghtenment where critique pves shape to maturity, I suggest 
in this last section of chapter 3 that Rawls’ and Taylor’s approach to critical thought 
serves as a template for many of their colleagues, whether liberals, communitarians, 
multiculturalists or civic and liberal nationalists. In the end, however, and like the 
progenitors and current practitioners of humanism’s path, their critique depends on 
a philosophy of the subject. It enlightens a mature practice for the normalised only, 
who accord with this philosophy, whch is at the expense of those who do not. 
As it is fruitful to frame Rawls and Taylor against a liberal and 
communitarian background, it can be noted that the substantive justice and process 
of recognition which Taylor and other communitarians advocate,139 for example, 
Walzer’s spheres of justice within a distributive community of social goods,140 or 
MacIntyre’s narrative account of identity,I4l draw a response from liberals that 
equals the vociferousness of the communitarian criticism of Rawls’ procedural 
justice for an unencumbered self. In the main, the limited worth of autonomy is 
taken on board by liberals,142 who direct concern at the exact normative status of 
hypergoods, in as much as they are deeply embedded in the traditions of civic 
republicanism and paternalistic communities.143 Typically, communitarians suffer 
historical amnesia and lapse into republican revisionism.la They promote the 
139 On communitarian justice, see Bell, Conzrnunitarianisrn and Ifs Critics, Acts 111, IV and V; Oakeshott, 
”Political Education”. 
lJ0 Walzer, Spheres ofjusfice, pp. 7-29. For an account of Walzer‘s primary social good, the monopolv of 
local power in the political community, and h s  more pertinent social goods relevant to justice of need, 
desert and the family, see Walzer, Spheres of Justice, clis. 2-4 and ch. 9, respectively. 
141 MacIntyre, After Virtue, pp. 201-209; MacIntyre, ”The Virtues”, p. 127. 
142 Mulhall and Swift, Liberals and Cornnzunifarians, p. 164. 
143 Badliwar, ”Moral Agency, Commitment, and Impartiality”, pp. 1-2; Waldron, “Particular Values 
and Critical Morality”; Dworkin, ”Liberal Community”. 
Herzog, ”Some Questions for Republicans”. 
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hypergoods of a fraternity of men,I45 which is implicit in Taylor’s nostalpa for the 
maritime village,146 MacIntyre’s version of the aristotelian P O Z ~ S , ~ ~ ~  and Sanders 
support of the jeffersonian town council.148 Despite their deliberately sanitised, 
holistic conceptions of benevolence and fraternity cannot be the 
source of substantive normativity. As Amy Gutmann says, it is simply not possible 
to live in Salem without the witches.’50 
However, and despite the minority who argue liberalism is either a victim of 
its own success,151 or of the success of communitariani~m,~~~ the liberal and 
cornunitarian debate ultimately affirms the prevalence in Anglo-American 
political philosophy of humanist critical thought. A prupus of a conception of 
freedom that I characterise as embedded individuality, there is a rappruclzernent of 
normative justice, whch if not of convergence as some believe,’53 is tilted in favour 
of a liberal or communitarian politics.154 It mixes the right with the good, justice 
with virtue.155 Communitarian liberals move away from pure procedural justice to 
honour the role of the language community in the process of recogrution,l% whilst 
liberal communitarians dilute their substantive justice in acknowledgement of the 
political liberty necessary for aut0nomy.15~ The normative distinction is now 
between the definition of the subject’s interests - a question of the political right to 
decide the good-and the principles of justice, which stem from the assumption 
that each subject’s interests matter equally and so demand socio-economic rights.’% 
145 Pateman, “’God Hath Ordained to Man a Helper”’; Okin, Justice, Gender and the Fanzily, ch. 3; 
Sypnowich, “Justice, Community, and the Antinomies of Feminist Theory”. 
146 Taylor, Sources of the Se& pp. 314-317. 
147 MacIntyre, After Virtue, ch. 11. 
‘48 Sandel, ”The Procedural Republic”. 
149 Holmes, “The Permanent Structure of Antiliberal Thought”, pp. 227-229. 
I5O Gutmann, “Communitarian Critics of Liberalism”, pp. 129-133. 
15’ Spragens, ”Communitarian Liberalism”, pp. 39-43; Richardson, “The Problem of Liberalism”. 
152 Bellah, “Community Properly Understood”; Conner, ”Finding a Place for Community”. 
153 Buchanan, ”Assessing the Communitarian Critique”; Macedo, ”Community, Diversity, and Civic 
Education”, p. 241. 
‘ ~ 4  Caney, ”Liberalism and Communitarianism: A Misconceived Debate” (but see Muhall and Swift, 
”Liberals and Communitarians: whose Misconception?”, who contest Caney’s liberal politics); Walzer, 
”The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism”. 
155 O’Neill, Touiards justice and Virtue; Slote, From Morality to Virtue; Gutmann, ”The Virtues of 
Democratic Self-Constraint”. 
156 Dworkin, ”Liberal Community”; Elshtain, “The Communitarian Individual”; Selznick, 
“Foundations of Communitarian Liberalism”. 
157 Badhwar, ”Moral Agency, Commitment, and Impartiality”; Conway, ”Capitalism and 
Community”; Kukathas, ”Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Political Community”. 
158 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, pp. 21-43. 
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In short, autonomy is embedded in the language community that is central to 
recognition.159 The moral identity of embedded individuality implores political 
critique which proposes normative justice that provides for, but enables the self to 
constitute, identity. 
In support of multiculturalism, for example, K y d c k a  alludes to the political 
community of Canada, whch encapsulates a heritage comprised of several cdtural 
narratives. Through linguistic and historical processes, the self becomes aware of 
his identity as a member of a cultural narrative, which is the precondition for 
intelligent choices about how to lead one's life.16o Although Kymlicka is close to 
Taylor's self-interpreting self here, he argues that cultural narratives ought to be 
normatively embodied as substantive justice in the juridical state because they are 
the condition for the self-actualisation of autonomy.161 Hypergoods such as 
memories, values and common institutions form the groundwork or context of 
choice only.16* Kymhcka values the context provided by cultural narratives simply 
as a means for the self-interpreting subject to attain self-consciousness qua 
autonomy, and only a rawlsian inspired procedural justice guarantees the right to 
accept, reject or revise the ways of Me implicit in the numerous cultural narratives 
of a political C O I T U ~ U ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~  
Embedded individuality features in current debates over the post-sovereign 
state,lM too, especially attempts to develop a form of civic nationalism that is 
relevant to multi-national states.l65 Civic nationalists such as Neil MacCormick, for 
instance, propose a conception of substantive justice in which the subject is situated 
in socio-politico-legal institutions, for it is here that the subject comes to know his 
political identity through a process of collective self-determination.166 At the same 
time, because procedural justice underlies the subject's autonomy, civic nationalism 
is also conducive to individual self-realisation outwith a quasi-social democratic 
politics .' h7 
In much the same way, liberal nationalism envisages a theory of substanto- 
15' Selznick, "Personhood", p. 125; Bevir, "The Individual and Society", pp. 103-105. 
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, pp. 164-168. 
16' Kymlicka, Liberalism, Comnzunity and Culture, pp. 172-178. 
1 6 *  Kymlicka, Mul ticultural Citizenship, pp. 76-82. 
163 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 82-84 and pp. 91-93. 
MacCormick, "Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-sovereign State", pp. 561-563. 
165 MacCormick, "What Place for Nationalism in the Modern World?", pp. 87-93. 
166 MacCormick, "What Place for Nationalism in the Modern World?", pp. 83-86. 
167 MacCormick, "What Place for Nationalism in the Modern World?", pp. 80-82. 
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procedural justice, which is based on associative obligations Liberal nationalists 
embrace both universalism and individualism.la For Yael Tamir, the institutions 
that encapsulate the subject’s associative obligations are constitutive of political 
identity, whch approximates to a voluntaristic political affiliation, whilst the 
subject’s moral identity is constituted in a plural cultural context.169 In either 
moment, Tamir’s embedded subject’s political and moral identity is defined by self- 
authorshp, which as for MacCormick is a form of autonomy 9ua individuality that 
generates identity.170 Tamir calls this the contextual individual, who albeit always 
free within a context, is never ~ontext-free.’~’ Perhaps, with regard to Anglo- 
American political philosophy’s normative rapprocltenlent around substanto- 
procedural justice, MacCormick sums up best the embedded individuality on which 
political critique turns. He says that: 
[pleople acquire character and self-consciousness, and a capacity for self- 
command, only in a specific social setting. An axiological individualism that 
treats individuality as a value, ... stipulates indeed that social contexts 
favourable to the developing of autonomous selves have fundamental value 
morally and politic ally. 172 
vii. Synopsis 
In summary, I have concentrated in this and the previous chapter on stalwart 
humanist critical thinkers-Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau; Kant and Hegel; as well 
as Rawls and Taylor-and I have described their practice of critical thought. I have 
argued that, because they engage in critique subsequent to, and based on the 
foundation of, a philosophy of the subject 9ua man, they persorufy a humanist path 
to enlightenment. To be specific, the autonomous subject who knows and desires 
recognition is re-assured of his maturity through epistemological critique. It 
advances man’s objective experience of the world, whether as an apparent or real 
knowledge of h g s .  Similarly, the rational and reasonable subject, whose self- 
actualisation is a self-interpretive, expressive process, is guaranteed a state of being 
autonomous in thought and action by political critique, which secures man’s 
normative experience vis-ci-ziis the juridical state, whether through procedural or 
Tamir, Liberal NationaZism, pp. 95-102. 
169 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, pp. 20-25. 
Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, pp. 25-34. 
17’ Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 14. 
17* MacCormick, ”Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-sovereign State”, p. 564. 
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substantive justice that orders power. Indeed, as I have suggested at the end of 
chapter 2 and a moment ago here in chapter 3, Hegel’s scientific philosophy of Gist  
corroborates Kant’s critical phdosophy of Aufkliirung via the consolidation of 
Morulitiit’s formal abstractness in Sittliclzkeit’s customs and practices, whilst Taylor’s 
politics of recognition accommodates the procedural right to political liberty of 
Rawls’ political liberalism, as well as the substantive hypergoods necessary for 
political liberation. This trend is then followed by other Anglo-American political 
philosophers, for example, K y d c k a ,  MacCormick and Tamir, whose political 
critique assumes that the subject’s autonomously generated individuality is as 
important as the embedded context essential to recogrution. 
In broad terms, along the path to enhghtenment that is defined by critique IZ 
propos of a philosophy of the subject, critical thought is caught in a humanistic 
circle. Inevitably, it returns to its ontological origin, namely, Rousseau’s authentic 
autonomy of self-love that is actualised through the recognition produced by the 
joint constitution of the ziolonte gknerale. Hence, in the remainder of the dissertation, 
I will illustrate why Foucault’s nietzschean path to enlightenment rejects this 
humanistic circle, and how he overcomes it to practice critical thought that 
manifests maturity after critique. 
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In h s  chapter and the two whch follow, I intend to demonstrate why Foucault is a 
skeptic about the path to enlightenment that is taken by Kant, Hegel, Rawls and 
Taylor, who from the evidence in chapters 2 and 3 are imprisoned in a humanistic 
circle. Foucault’s skepticism, whch is marufested as a critical history of the 
objective, normative and subjective axes of the experience that determines who we 
are, is instead elaborated along a nietzschean path to enhghtenment. From here, an 
appropriate notion of maturity is only formulated once critique has elucidated 
finitude. 
I shall discuss Foucault’s conception of freedom, which is developed through 
critical ontology, in chapter 7, the conclusion. Prior to that, I will o u t h e  in chapter 
6 Foucault’s critical historical critique of subjectivity, whch shows humanism’s 
immaturity in terms of the submission of autonomy and recognition by political 
rationality. I will also detail hs conception of the nature of pouuoir and his account 
of ancient practices of the self, which he employs to re-articulate maturity as an 
agonistic ethical subjectivity. Lastly, in chapter 5 I will cover Foucault’s 
genealogical critique of normativity. Together with his reconception of how 
pouuoir/ sauoir is exercised by mechanisms of discipline and regulation, it reveals 
”the way in which a culture can determine in a massive, general form the difference 
that limits it”,l namely, the costs of humanism’s nonnativity of confined exclusion 
and normalisation. 
Before this, I look here in chapter 4 at Foucault’s archarological critique of 
objectivity and savoir, which the humanist views as the source of objective 
connaissance. To begin with, I trace the introduction of Kant and Hegel to French 
philosophy and the connotations this has for both the Dreyfus Affair and the 
existential and marxist interpretations of Hegel by Alexandre Kojeve and Jean 
Foucault, The Order of Things, p. xxiv. 
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Hyppolite, who outline a transcendental subject of empirical connaissance as the 
basis for critique. I then illustrate why this diachronic, formal a priori for 
connaissance, man, who grounds the thought at the heart of the human sciences, is 
rejected by Foucault. In respect of the goal of kantian maturity that connaissance is 
designed to realise, his archzology confirms the limited extent to which, under 
humanism, the human sciences teach one how to thlnk and act freely. Subsequent 
to an examination of Foucault’s nominalist archEologica1 method, I show that in 
77te Order of Tlzings he observes “how a culture experiences the propinquity of 
things, ... establishes the tabula of their relationships and the order by whch they 
must be considered”.* Archzology erases the kantian and hegelian subject of 
epistemolopcal critique, whose sameness fosters humanism’s objective experience 
of tlungs, and in The Arclzaeology of Knowledge Foucault proposes that savoir holds 
the key to connaissance in the human sciences. 
Nonetheless, in his retrieval of Kant’s philosophische Arclaiologie, which 
Foucault uses to re-orient critical thought via philology’s theory of language - 
whence an objective connaissance in the counter-human sciences of psychoanalysis 
and ethnology - he runs up against the events of May 1968. In response to the need 
for more concrete engagement with extra-juridical power, I suggest that Foucault 
situates an analysis of savoir within a genealogical critique of pouvoir. He maintains 
that objectivity is a function of normative right, which in turn is explained by the 
might effected by non-discursive relations of force3 and domination.4 I thus close 
chapter 4 with an analysis of the interrelationship between archzology and 
genealogy, whch is a prelude to my discussion of Foucault’s genealogical critique 
in chapter 5. 
4.i. Kant and Hegel in French Philosophy 
As a general rule, nineteenth century French phdosophy does not threaten the 
juridical state. When it does, philosophers are simply co-opted by the July 
monarchy (1830-1848) or neutralised by the second empire in the 1 8 5 0 ~ . ~  The 
sporadic political effectiveness of phdosophy-the June days of 1848 or the Paris 
Foucault, The Order of Things, p. xxiv. 
Foucault speaks generally about the relation of force (rapport deforce) and specifically about the 
relation of forces (rapport deform) .  For convenience, in the discussion that follows I use the general 
idea of the relation of force. Cf. Foucault, ”Cours du 4 fevrier 1976”, p. 79; Foucault, “A quoi &vent les 
phdosophes?”, p. 706. 
I employ the concept of domination throughout the analysis as a compression of the relations of 
domination (rapports de domination). See, for example, Foucault, “Cours du 14 janvier 1976”, p. 24. 
Hazareesingh, Intellectuals and the French Communist Party, pp. 34-39. 
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commune in 1871 -only proves the maxim that, between Napoleon’s rise to power 
in 1799 and the Dreyfus Affair in 1898, epistemolopcal rather than political 
questions are predominant in French philosophy. Although this cannot be 
explained by the infiltration of Kant and Hegel into post-revolutionary France, their 
arrival does coincide with the removal from politics of the eighteenth century 
engagt? philosophe, who is institutionalised in the university. He only crosses back to 
the streets at the start of the twentieth century; that is, once the critical conservatism 
of the university philosopher is rejected by the intelligentsia, the latter’s agent of 
political critique, the intellectual, is born. Hereafter, in the 1930s, Kojeve’s and 
Hyppolite’s existential and marxist rendition of Hegel is attached to kantian 
transcendental subjectivity by the intellectual, which results in an epistemologrcal 
ground of anthropocentric dialectical history in the human sciences. It fuels 
Foucault’s archEologica1 critique of the kantian-hegelian subject of objective 
experience. For these reasons, I describe in ths  section the place of Kant and Hegel 
in French phdosophy, as well as its tradition of engagement whch, as I will show in 
chapter 7, Foucault redefines and upholds. 
Nineteenth century lockean empirical positivism is bolstered by the 
introduction to France in the 1850s of Kant’s transcendental idealism? In parallel, as 
French phdosophers struggle to grasp the politically charged phlosophy that lurks 
w i h  Hegel’s German texts, positivism in France is aided by the subterranean 
arrival of his absolute idealism.7 The spread of Hegel’s ideas depends on the word 
of emigres in Paris like Marx and Friedrich Engels, or on French philosophers who 
attend Hegel’s lectures in Berh.8 Yet, with the advent of the second republic in 
1848 and the second empire in 1852, Kant’s advocates, together with the catholic 
scholars who adhere to Christian ontology, tarnish Hegel with political radicalism 
and atheism outside Prussia, as well as with conservatism inside it, which leads to a 
purge of his followers from the CoZZkge de Nevertheless, a kantian 
transcendental subject and an hegelian halectical history continue to lnform 
positivism, which is the dominant epistemology in France until the middle of the 
third republic (1870-1940).10 At this point, it is possible to discern the emergence of 
what Colin Smith calls the experience of kart,” which eventually defines the 
Bembi ,  La Philosophie Contemporaine en France, pp. 286-296. 
’ Kelly, Hegel in France, p. 3. 
Kelly, HegeI in France, pp. 11-18. 
Kelly, Hegel in France, pp. 19-25. 
lo Clark, The Foundations of S truchrralism, pp. 9-16; Poster, Existential Marxism, pp. 113-114. 
” Smith, Contemporary French Philosophy, pp. 9-19 and pp. 249-253. 
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projects of, amongst others, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Albert Camus defines it as 
absurdity,l2 and k a r t  signals something akin to Hegel’s understanding of Kant’s 
bifurcated subject, who dirempted from things he knows only as they appear, 
motivates Hegel’s desire to reconcile them through an idealisation of the world. 
Consequently, there is a shift in plulosophical focus from Kant’s conditions, to 
Hegel’s certitude, of knowing to known, and Isaac Benrubi confirms the attachment 
of an hegelian phenomenology to a kantian transcendental subject? He claims that 
there is a ”joint effort, intentional or otherwise, amongst pl-ulosophers to conceive 
from out of the depths of consciousness a sui generis knowledge of the world, whch 
can lend an ever deeper understandmg to exis ten~e” . ’~  
It is in respect of an epistemological critique grounded in man that Nietzsche 
damns the nineteenth century as the decadent age.15 He scorns the pl-ulosopher’s 
ressentinzenf of the world, which is evident in a psychology of metaphysics that 
blindly trusts in reason to reveal being-in-itself and a world free of contradiction? 
For Nietzsche, university philosophers are servile to the state in virtue of their 
institutionalised position,17 and he claims that they will soon fall asleep.18 And, by 
critical consent, the Dreyfus Affair in 1898 bears out Nietzsche’s prophesy in France 
as the phdosopher’s epistemological critique is directed at politics by his 
dissatisfied colleagues, who become intellectuals. The result is that, by the 1930s, 
there is an indissociable practico-political dimension to French philo~ophy.’~ 
A detailed review of the Dreyfus Affair need not detain the argument. Suffice 
to say that Alfred Dreyfus, a jew from Alsace who is a captain in the French army, is 
framed in 1894 as a German spy by an anti-Semitic, patriotic Parisian 
establishment.20 Imprisoned on Devil’s Island off the coast of present day French 
Guyana, Dreyfus’ plight attracts the sympathies of those philosophers who, like 
Rousseau and Voltaire before them, work outside the university.21 In January 1898, 
l2 Cluari, Twentieth-Century French Thought, pp. 68-76. 
l3 Cliiari, Twentieth-Century French Thought, pp. 60-63. 
l4 ”[U y a] une collaboration, consciente ou non, a l’muure de realisation spontanee de conceptions de vie sui 
generis surgissan t des profondeurs de I’ttre ef par consequent d’unc inte‘riorisation progressizw de l’existence”. 
Benrubi, La Philosophie Contemporaim en France, p. 1037. 
Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 55 40-44, pp. 25-27. 
l6 Nietzsche, The Will to Puuwr, 5 579, pp. 310-311. 
l7 Kaufmann, Nietzsche, pp. 107-110. 
Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustru, pp. 28-31. 
l9 Montefiore, “Introduction”, pp. xix-xxiv. 
2o ”Zola’s 100-year-old message given a modern slant”, in The Scotsman, 14 January 1998. 
21 ”France tries to revive fading spirit of Zola”, in The Guardian, 13 January 1998. 
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to the consternation of the catholic and nationalist press,= Emile Zola brings the 
injustice against Dreyfus to the attention of the French president in a public letter - 
Lettre a Monsieur Fklix Faure, prksident de la RepubliqueD- the subtitle of which, 
J’accuse!, becomes the most celebrated of newspaper headlines? Ironically, it takes a 
protest against Zola, which is authored by the university philosophers in the Revue 
Blanche, to label the philosoplze’s twentieth century heir an intellectuel, and an article 
by Maurice Barres, La protestation des intellectuels!, before the intellectual becomes a 
recogrused figure. 
The point is that 1898 encapsulates a crisis of political representation in 
France. Despite the rise of an educated intelligentsia in the nineteenth century, the 
lzaute bourgeoisie maintain their pre-eminence in the d t a r y ,  civil and political 
spheres.= Further, because of politico-cultural centralisation in Paris since the 
twelfth century and the radicalisation of political experience after 1789,26 the French 
intelhgentsia thrives on political With the spokesman for the lzaute 
bourgeoisie in the university lost for words by the Dreyfus Affair, a critical vacuum 
arises which the intelhgentsia fdl with their own representative, the intellectual.= 
Amongst others, S u b  Hazareesingh mentions the philosophcal ascendancy of 
the republican intellectual over the conservative p h l ~ s o p h e r . ~ ~  For the conservative, 
the intellectual’s engagenzent transforms hnn into the spiritual militia man who, 
because he conflates morality and politics,3o fuels Julien Benda’s charge of the 
intellectual’s treason against hs duty to truth.31 Yet, from the intellectual’s 
viewpoint, 1898 presents the opportunity to practice political critique on behalf of 
the reign of reason and democratic government.32 Based on h i s  rejuvenation of the 
plzilosoplze’s tradition of engagement,33 the intellectual communicates his universalist 
“Belated pat on the back for Zola”, in The Financial Times, 10-11 January 1998. 
23 Ory and Sirinelli, Les Intellectuels en France, pp. 5-6. 
24 ”Dreyfus: the name of our century”, in 77v Independent on Sunday, 11 January 1998. 
15 Charle, Naissance des ’intellectuels’ 1880-1 900, pp. 57-64. 
26 Hazareesingh, Intellectuals and the French Comnzunist Party, pp. 25-28. 
27 Ory and Sirinelli, LEs Intellectuels en France, pp. 11-12. 
28 For an extended discussion of the socio-political birth of the intellectual in the nineteenth century, 
see Brym, Intellectuals and Politics, pp. 1-12; Feuer, ”What is an Intellectual?”; Hamlyn, Being a 
Plzilosopher, pp. 75-1 24; Shls, ”The Traditions of Intellectual Life”. 
29 Hazareesingh, Intellectuals and the French Communist Party, pp. 44-47; Jennings, ”Introduction: 
Mandarins and Samurais”, pp. 13-15. 
3(’ Benda, The Treason of the Intellectuals, pp. 54-57. 
31 Benda, 77ze Treason of the Intellectuals, pp. 67-77. 
32 Noack, Die Intellektuellen, p. 10; Hazareesingh, Intellectuals and the French Conrmunist Party, pp. 49-54. 
33 Gauchet and Westerwelle, ”Fur eine historisch wahre Geschichte des Subjects”, p. 669. 
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ideas through political networks, petitions, essays and articles,M and he assumes a 
”socio-professional identity ... [as] a thinker, producer of culture, adviser to the 
prince, and political activist’l.35 
To a large extent, both Kant and Hegel d o r m  the epistemology behind the 
intellectual’s political critique? Indeed, from the 1930s it is plausible to characterise 
the critical thought that defines the French path to enlightenment as humanist, for 
objective experience is grounded in the kantian subject’s transcendental 
apperception and the hegelian subject’s transcendental dialectic, whlst normative 
experience is mediated by an existential and marxist reading of Hegel’s lord- 
bondsman relation. In h s  respect, the d u e n c e  of Kant and Hegel in the twentieth 
century can be gleaned from whom the French philosophical establishment deem to 
be important. Almost without exception, its members are located at several 
prestigious institutions in Paris, if not the fifth and sixth arrondissements, wluch 
include the grandes ecoles like the Ecole Normale Superieure, the grands e‘tablissenzen fs, 
for example, the ColZ2ge de France or the Ecole des Iznutes etudes en sciences sociales, and 
the Universite & Paris. The jury d’aggregation and its president at the Ecole Normale 
largely decide which phlosophers are to be taught and read in France,S7 and who 
one has to know in order to make a profession of phdosophy and a professor of the 
phdosopher.38 During the thnd republic, for instance, Kant’s transcendental 
idealism predominates thanks to the kantian president of the jury d’aggregation, 
Leon Brunschvicg.39 Although the tide turns in favour of Hegel in the 1930s, and 
finally reaches its high mark in 1954 when Hyppolite is appointed director of the 
h o l e  Normale, Plato, Descartes and Kant still feature prominently in French 
plulosophy due to the mfluence of Br~nschvicg.~~ 
The traitorous philosophers, who through the Dreyfus Affair become 
intellectuals, are a prelude to the ascendancy within the French plulosophxal 
establishment of Hegel. He is one of the three H’s-Edmund Husserl and 
Heidegger are the other two- taught between 1930 and 1960.41 Out of the three, 
Heidegger is an important mfluence on Foucault’s archzology of snuoir. For his 
34 Ory and Sirinelli, Les IntellectueIs en France, p. 9. 
35 Hazareesingh, Intellectuals and the French Conzrnunist Party, p. 55. 
36 Chari, Twentieth-Centu y French Thought, pp. 21-43. 
37 Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault, pp. 15-30; Eribon, Michef Foucauft, pp. 34-38; Descombes, Modern 
French Philosophy, pp. 5-7. 
3s Desanti, “ A  path in philosophy”, p. 52. 
39 Foucault, “Prison Talk”, p. 51; Benrubi, La Philosophie Contemporaine en France, pp. 524536. 
40 Desanti, “A path in plulosophy”, pp. 53-57. 
41 Descombes,Modern French Philosophy,p.3. 
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part, Hegel, who is rehabilitated amongst catholic scholars as the great transposer 
of religion into philosophy and whose portrayal as the intellectual father of Marx 
helps French socialists to establish the PCF in 1905,42 is most relevant to Foucault’s 
archaeological critique of objectivity. Or rather, Hegel as he appears in the human 
sciences through his portrayal by two existentialists: firstly, Kojeve, who relies on 
Heidegger’s Being and Time for his existential orientation, and who lectures to the 
1945 generation at the €cole Pratique des Hautes €tudes between 1933 and 1939; and, 
secondly, Hyppolite, who approaches existentialism through Sartre’s Being and 
Nothingness, and who provides the first French translation of the Pknomenolopj of 
Spirit in the year the civilised nations of Europe go back to war for a second time.43 
Kojeve distinguishes between a non-dialectical interpretation of Hegel, which 
keeps to a rational-irrational, same-other opposition, and lus own dialectical 
reading. He points out that, historically, power induces reason to move to what is 
foreign to it, its other. The question is whether the other is returned to the same in 
the movement of reason or if, in its desire to embrace both the same and the other, 
reason in fact transforms itself, loses its identity as the same and goes over into the 
other? In the mind of Kojeve, reason does in fact become the other. Its violation of 
the other leads to a war of each against all that ends in brutish domination. On tlus 
basis, he rejects the parallel progress of man’s individual experience of the world 
that is traced by a phenomenology of Gist ,  and his social experience of freedom 
that is charted by a scienhfic philosophy of Sittlichkeit. In their place, Kojeve speaks 
of political cynicism and tyrannical politicians who seek to realise philosophxal 
ideals through violence. After Marx’s interpretation of history, politicians are the 
bourgeois lords who deny the proletarian bondsmen their right to recognition. 
Terror, rather than the progress of Gis t  and Sittlichkeit, characterises history. 
Kojeve’s epistemologico-political critique is driven by a terrorist philosophy, at the 
heart of which lies a nietzschean conception of truth that reflects the balance of 
terror sustained by capitalrsm.q2 
For Kojeve, Hegel advocates a revolutionary social theory which, in place of 
the dialectical progression of individual and social experience, details the 
confrontation between the bondsmen and the lords in respect of juridical state 
power.45 His interpretation depends on a dualist ontology between the individual 
42 Kelly, HegeZ in France, pp. 27-36; Clark, The Foundations of Structuralism, pp. 17-24; Poster, Existential 
Marxism, pp. 28-32. 
43 Poster, Existential Marxism, pp. 5-10. 
44 Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, pp. 9-22. 
45 Poster, Existential Marxism, pp. 11-16. 
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and social: due to the asymmetry of recognition between the worker and the 
capitalist, man’s animal desire is suspended in a cyclical mode of becoming; also, 
man’s human desire to be different rather than recognised moves him towards a 
communist conclusion to hist0ry.~6 
Of equal if not greater importance to French humanism is Hyppolite’s post- 
war historico-logical, instead of -dialectical, interpretation of Hegel. Hyppolite, who 
in 1945 catches Foucault’s schoolboy imagination for philosophy with his lectures 
on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit at the Ly&e Hen~i-W,4~ also lectures at the 
(Universite de Paris IV-) Sorbonne before his 1962 nomination to the chair of History 
of Phlosophical Thought at the College de France, where he stays until h s  death in 
1968 .48 
According to Hyppolite, the core tension in Hegel is between phenomenology 
and scientdic philosophy. Instead of an either-or interpretation, of a 
phenomenological description of man’s progress across history versus a reduction 
of history to the dialectic of reason, Hyppolite claims that, at its terminus of G i s t  in 
the world, Hegel’s absolute idealism is historical and The post-Aufklurung 
daylight of the present is a new epoch, in which individual and social experience 
unfold in human time. To hs faith in Hegel’s notion of history as the dialectical 
progress of freedom, Hyppolite adds Marx’s idea that freedom has to be fought for. 
It is man’s duty to take responsibhty for the social conditions that realise it.% As 
Foucault claims, Hyppolite first draws attention in France to Hegel’s arrogation to 
philosophy of the right to oversee its origin as well as its acc~mplishments.~~ In so 
doing, a hyppolitean Hegel ceases to be the professor’s professor, or the master 
46 Descombes, Modern French Plzilosoplzy, pp. 29-35. 
47 In 1951, when at hs second attempt Foucault passes the agrigation de plzilosoplzie, Hyppolite and 
Canguilhem are two of the three members of his jury de aggrigation at tlie Ecole Nornzale. The year 
before, Foucault is thwarted from the promotion - the handful from across France who annually pass 
the agrigation de philosophie - by a different jury, which Louis Althussser (Foucault’s ripititeur or tutor) 
alleges is a result of Foucault’s communist sympathies. Ironically, Foucault’s randomly chosen topic 
for hs oral exam in 1951 is sexuality, which Canguilhem proposes in an attempt to update the topics 
for examination, and Foucault th& is quite unsuitable for an agrkgation de plzilosoplzie. Eribon, Miclzel 
Foucault, pp. 61-64; Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault, pp. 43-46. 
48 Two years later, Foucault succeeds Hyppolite at the Collige de France. Earlier, in 1961 when Foucault 
decides to submit Histoire de la Folie as hs tGse d’itat, Hyppolite, who supervises Foucault’s petite tlz2se 
of a translation and extended introduction of Kant’s anthropology, Anthropologie du point de z)ue 
pragnzatique, suggests Canguilhem as a supervisor for the Histoire de la Folie. This is partly a question of 
Canguilhem’s expertise, and also a question of tact: a doctorats 2s lettres requires the prior publication 
of the tlGse d’itat, which in turn depends on the inrprinzatur of the Sorbonne, where Canguilhem is a 
professor. Macey, The Lives ofMicheI Foucaulf, pp. 103-104 and pp. 233-236. 
49 Poster, Existential Marxism, pp. 27-28. 
Miller, La Passion Foucault, pp. 56-59. 
Foucault, ”Jean Hyppolite. 1907-1968”, p. 784. 
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system builder, and becomes the influence behind Feuerbach, Saren Kierkegaard, 
Marx and Nietzsche.52 
For Kojeve and Hyppolite, Hegel lends support to an epistemologico-political 
critique of the diremption of history and reason.53 Hyppolite’s concept of alienation 
as man’s basic ontological condition posits that, on the basis of the autonomous 
subject’s authentic being, man seeks recogrution as a means to bridge reason and 
history? In addition to this anthropology, Hegel’s modes of individual and social 
experience are treated as modes of productive existence, and the power struggle 
between the bondsman qua worker and the lord qua capitalist is the perspective 
from which to judge historical materialism. 
Together with their anthropology of the subject of knowledge, Kojeve’s and 
Hyppolite’s dialectical hstory inspires Merleau-Ponty, whose phenomenology 
describes the process of abridgement of the dirempted man to the world he hitherto 
only knew in appearance,55 and Sartre, whose revolutionary man is the being who 
brings nothingness into existence as a means to transcend diremption? Indeed, 
Sartre’s concept of existence, man-for-himself, is a universal condition that 
precedes, and only becomes through the negation of, the essential in-itself that 
defines man’s historical conditions of finitude. In this movement of negation that 
ceaseth only in death, man continually transcends himself in his will to 
authenticity. Sartre’s ’I am’ is conceptually prior to ‘I thi1&’,5~ and what man comes 
to think in the passage from existence to essence is both defined by and definitive of 
the community of humanity: in fashioning oneself, Sartre proclaims, one fashions 
man.% Man’s authenticity is the sartrean human condition of freedom that justdies 
humanism’s critique, and its failure to be realised results in immaturity, or an 
unhappy consciousness who lives a life of nzauvaise foi.59 
4.ii. Archaeological Critique 
I read the first moment of Foucault’s critical history, archaeology, as an attempt to 
52 Eribon, Michel Foucault, pp. 3943. 
53 Poster, Existential Marxism, pp. 32-35 and pp. 18-22. 
5.1 Poster, Existential Marxism, pp. 24-26. 
55 Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, pp. 55-62. 
j6 Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, pp. 48-54. 
57 Poster, Existential Marxism, pp. 79-89. In Merleau-Ponty’s case, the ’I  perceive’, who constructs out of 
its perceptions of a thing an absolute knowledge of an object, but which an experiential subject can 
describe, precedes the ‘ I  think’. Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, pp. 65-80. 
58 Sartre, Existentialism and Hunlanism, pp. 26-30 and pp. 4547.  
59 Sartre, L’Ctre et le neant, pp. 83-88. 
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rescue kantian enhghtenment - minus critical philosophy’s subject of 
transcendental apperception - from humanism, which grounds objective experience 
in the dogmas of anthropolopcal foundation, master narrative schemes and 
universalist history? As a skeptic about the subject of anthropological dialectical 
history in the human sciences, Foucault endlessly questions constituted experience 
in pursuit of an ethic of free undogmatic thought.61 To aid hs escape from 
imprisonment w i h  humanism’s thought and practices, which Foucault believes 
are so intimately a part of who we are that we embrace them as the authentic 
structure of our being,62 he draws on Heidegger’s critique of anthropocentrism, 
Nietzsche’s conception of truth and power, and the epistemological history of 
Bachelard and Cang~llhern,~~ who problematise dialectical history from the point of 
view of hstoricised truth and the determination of concepts by extra-scientific 
material practices.” In addition, Foucault is influenced by Georges Dumezil,65 
Ferdinand Saussure,& Sigmund Freud and H u s ~ e r l , ~ ~  whose respective introduction 
of historico-geographcal structures, the sign, the unconscious and sense also 
challenge man’s monopoly of objectivity. Together with Jacques Lacan’s focus on 
symbols, which sustain a society’s cultural narratives through the structuration of 
unconscious desire,a and Claude Levi-Strauss, who proposes a structuralist 
methodology for the human sciences that moves from the social to the in&vidual,69 
French philosophers seek to reconstitute critical thought in the 1960s. According to 
Vincent Descombes, the important ones critique anthropocentrism and dialectical 
history,70 and Foucault’s archzology, which attempts to eradicate anthropology and 
to dethrone I’ordre de l’honzme from history in favour of discursive practices,” 
Rajchman, Michcl Foucaulf, pp. 2-4; Descamps, “Philosophy in France”, p. 6. 
61 Rajchman, Michel Foucault, p. 7. 
62 Bernauer, ”Michel Foucault’s Ecstatic Tlunking”, p. 45. 
63 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 189-190. 
de Paris, and occupants of its chair in the History and Philosoplzy ofscience. On these epistemological 
historians and their influence on Foucault, see Delaporte, ”The History of Medicine according to 
Foucault”; Major-Poetzl, Miclzel FoucauZt‘s ArchoZogy of Western Culture, pp. 78-83; Tiles, 
”Epistemological History”. 
65 Foucault, “La verite et les formes juridiques”, pp. 635-637. 
66 Foucault, “Qui i?tes-vous, professeur Foucault?”, pp. 610-612. 
67 Foucault, ”Introduction, in Binswanger (L.), Le Rhw et I’Existence’’, pp. 69-80. 
Bachelard and Canguilhem are successive directors of the Institute ofthe Hisfury of Sciences, Univcrsite 
Poster, Existential Marxism, pp. 319-321. 
69 Clark, The Foundations ofStmcturalism, pp. 34-109; Merquior, From Prague to Paris, pp. 35-95. 
70 Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, pp. 108-109. 
71 Foucault, “Les monstruosites de la critique”, p. 220; Foucault, ”Michel Foucault, Les Mots et les 
Chos-”, pp. 500-504. 
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spearheads how to think freely via a critique of humanism’s epistemology, which 
Descombes describes in the following terms. 
Whether [an] ... object is henceforth a ’perspective object’ (Merleau-Ponty), or 
whether ... consciousness is compared to nothingness (Sartre), the essential 
point . . . is the irruption of the self into the equation of being and being for myself, 
. . . . Phenomenology is thus imprisoned within the ’closure of representation’ . . . 
inasmuch as it retains the principle of the subject. Here the critique of 
phenomenology links up with the critique of the dialectic. ... But what is the 
dialectic, if not precisely a superior concept of identity ... which leads to 
recognition of the absolute, not as substance but as subject (Hegel)? The double 
attack on phenomenologcal consciousness and the logic of identity is therefore 
conducted under the banner of a single crusade against the subject in generd7* 
My concern with how to do critical thought that realises maturity necessarily 
focuses on the importance to Foucault of kantian critique and Nietzsche’s ontology. 
In h s  last interview in June 1984, for example, Foucault says that although ”[mly 
entire philosophcal development was determined by my reading of Heidegger[,] 
... I nevertheless recogruze that Nietzsche outweighed h m 1 ’ ’ . ~ 3  For Foucault’s 1960s 
generation, it is the masters of suspicion, Freud, Nietzsche and Marx, who are 
crucia1.74 They make interpretation a renewable and never ending duty,75 and 
although Foucault ”would not have read Nietzsche” without Heidegger,7c 
Nietzsche was ’’a revelation for me. I had the impression of discovering an author 
completely different to those who were taught to me. I read hun with a passion and 
he transformed my life’’.n Nonetheless, with regard to an archaeological critique of 
objectivity and sauoir, Foucault is d u e n c e d  by Heidegger’s anti-humanist freedom 
of the clearing of possibilities.78 In ths  respect, Foucault is also skeptical about other 
reactions against humanism’s anthropocentric dialectical history, whether the 
hermeneutist’s efforts to recover ultimate objectivity, or structuralism’s explanation 
of freedom as a function of objective, rule-governed m0dels.~9 It is then useful to 
know how, as a nominalist history, archzology’s object of conditions of existence, 
72 Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, p. 76. 
73 Foucault, ”The Return of Morality”, p. 250. 
73 Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, p. 4. 
75 Foucault, ”Nietzsche, Freud, Marx”, pp. 566-568. 
7 h  Foucault, ”The Return of Morality”, p. 250. 
qu‘on m’avait enseigne‘. ]e l‘ai lu avec beaucoup de passion, et j‘ai rompu auec ma aie”. Foucault, “Verite, 
pouvoir et soi”, p. 780. 
78 Rajchman, Michel Foucault, p. 18 and pp. 4445.  
79 Sheridan, Michel Foucault, p. 204. 
“Nietzsche a e‘te‘ une rhdation pour nzoi. j’ai eu l’irnpression de de‘couzi~ir un auteur hien diflirent de celui 
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the historical a priori, differs from structuralism’s focus on conditions of possibility, 
the formal a priori. Once I have discussed this here, I detail in the next section 
Foucault’s archzological critique of objectivity in humanist critical thought. 
In section l.ii. I distinguished Foucault’s critical hstory of thought from a 
history of ideas, whch analyse systems of representation, and a history of 
mentalities that examines human behaviour. The latter defines Levi-Strauss’ focus 
on the macro-structures that govern experience, as well as the Annales school of 
historiography which investigates the continuity of micro-structures of experiential 
relations across epochs, rather than in their progress from one to the next.m For 
Foucault, the annaliste’s disputation of the divide between the human sciences and 
history proves the fallibility of the notion of hegelian time,81 which raises up 
connaissance in each mode of consciousness.82 Further, the annaliste provides the 
alternative methodological tools of extra-epochal innovation, contradiction, 
description, transformation and periodisati~n.~~ In place of anthropocentric 
dialectical hstory, the Annales school operates on a functional-structural paradigm. 
It bypasses narratives of grand political events to advocate a scientific philosophy of 
social hstory, which is discerned out of oft neglected micro-structures.84 The 
annaliste writes the myths of Me that are in perpetuum mobile beneath the historian’s 
grand narratives. From as far back as the first annaliste, Titus Livy, their annually 
renewed discourse bears witness to how these micro-structural myths jusbfy and 
redorce the powers that be and their right to rule.85 
Archaeology is neither antithetical nor reducible to the history of mentalities 
of the Annales school and structuralism. Instead, Foucault’s concern is the hstory of 
thought, which gives birth to the history of mentalities.86 Further, because it makes 
the realist assumption that man perceives things whch have an existence and 
8o Foucault, “La phlosophie structuraliste permet de diagnostiquer ce qu’est ’aujourd’hui”’, p. 581; 
Foucault, ”Michel Foucault explique son dernier livre”, p. 773. Foucault differentiates between 
structuralism, the Annales school, Bachelard and Canguilhem, as follows: Ppiste‘mogruphie (the 
description of discourses that function and are institutionalised as scientdic discourses); 
kpiste‘rnononzique (the attempt to locate the internal epistemological controls of a scientific discourse); 
kpiste‘nzocritique (the analysis of the truth and falsity of a scienhfic discourse’s statements); and 
kpiste‘rnologiques (the analysis of a scientific discourse’s theories, conceptual material and the field of 
application and rules of use for its concepts). Foucault, ~’(Dis~wssion)”, p. 28. 
Foucault, ”Sur les facons d’ecrire l’hstoire”, p. 586. 
82 Foucault, ”La scene de la plulosophe”, p. 580. 
83 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knaudedge, pp. 141-177. 
Major-Poetzl, Michel Foucault’s Arckology of Western Culture, pp. 15-17. 
ss Foucault, ”Cours du 28 janvier 1976”, pp. 57-60 and p. 73, f. 1. On the Annales school, see Le Roy 
Ladurie, “History in France”. 
86 Foucault, ”La philosophie structuraliste permet de diagnostiquer ce qu’est ‘aujourd’hui’”, p. 583. 
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nature that is independent of consciousness, an archaeology of thought opposes the 
history of ideas that traces advances in systems of representation. Archaeology 
challenges history-as-memory, which recounts what really happened. It also 
jettisons words and h g s ,  or the historian’s hstory of the ideas that represent the 
world, for in place of things archaeology examines discursive objects, whilst words 
are irrelevant insofar as archizology’s focus is not scient-rfic discourse but its very 
histori~ity.~~ In short, archizology indicates Foucault’s nominalism, which is not to 
deny a thing exists, ”but only that, in order to say what it is, it is necessary to 
recount its history”.B Rajchman calls dus Foucault’s nominalist h t o r y ,  which 
proceeds with four anti-realist tropes: argument by dispersion of hstorical unity 
and totality; argument by reversal of received ideas; argument by critique of the 
present through writing its past; and argument by singular enlightenment, whch 
rejects universalism so as to enhghten the present.89 
Thus, whilst archaeology, structuralism and Heidegger’s existential 
phenomenology forsake humanism’s man as the ground of experience, the first two 
diverge from heideggerian hermeneutics with the claim that, in the absence of 
dialectical history, experiential objectivity is discursive rather than discernible from 
background practices.% Further, Dreyfus and Rabinow argue that structuralism’s 
focus on extra-subjective conditions of possibility - kantianism without the 
transcendental subject, as Levi-Strauss understands it91 - diverges from 
archzology’s heideggerean discovery of conditions of existence,92 a point which 
Rajchman re-iterates when he says that Foucault’s nominalist “hstory is not 
’structuralist’ in ... [the ’strong’] sense ... [that] its aim in reconstituting deep 
traditions is to question their very reason for exi~tence’?~ 
Within the 1960s c h a t e  of hostihty to humanism’s epistemological critique, 
hermeneu tics seeks to re-assure modernity of the self-actualisa tion necessary for 
recognition, which it does via the derivation of objectivity from background 
practices, while structuralism tries to restore a kantian understanding of the present 
with structural conditions of possibility for objectivity. Archizology has elements of 
87 Delaporte, “The History of Medicine according to Foucault”, p. 142. 
ss Pasquino, “Michel Foucault (1926-U)”, pp. 40-41. 
s9 Rajchman, Michel Foucault, pp. 5459. 
9” Dreyfus and Rabinow, MicheZ Foucault, pp. 56-57. 
91 Poster, Existential Marxism, p. 315. 
92 Foucault’s conditions of existence ”bear a striking similarity to what Heidegger, in Being and Time, 
calls an existential analytic. But . . . Heidegger’s method is hermeneutic or internal, whereas Foucault’s 
is archaeological or external”. Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michcl Foucault, p. 57, f. 5. 
93 Rajclunan, Michel Foucault, p. 55. 
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both, but it resists the former’s search for ultimate objectivity and the latter’s 
location of objectivity in social structures through a history of mentalities. Instead, 
archwological critique determines to establish how the human sciences, which have 
man as their condition of possibility, are historically possible, and it asks if the 
historical consequences of their existence is the abllity to think and act freely.% 
Foucault pursues these themes in 7 7 ~  Order of Things, which together with 
Madness and Civilization and The Birth of the Clinic constitute, within the discursive 
fields of savoir, madness and clmica1 science, descriptive experiments on the 
discursive objects of man, psycho-pathology and phy~io-pathology.~5 Although The 
Order of Things is a corrective to Foucault’s earlier analytical over emphasis of 
words at the expense of their discursive objects,” The Birth o j t k  Clinic h t s  at the 
orientation of 77ze Order of T l ~ i n g s , ~ ~  insofar as it elucidates the discursive conditions 
of existence for connaissance in clmica1 science. With its focus on the concepts of 
death and disease as crucial factors in the constitution of the clrnical science of 
physio-pathology, Tlze Birth of flze Clinic signals Foucault’s debt to Cangullhem, 
whose ”displaceiizents and transformations of concepts show that a history of a 
concept is not wholly and entirely that of its progressive refinement ... but that of 
its various fields of constitution and validity”.98 As the subtitle suggests, Une 
Arclkologie du regard m’dical, and on the basis of these concepts that shape the 
medical gaze, Foucault establishes the discontinuity between the renaissance 
conception of disease, where speaking about and gazing at the sick body resemble 
each other, and modern c h c a l  science, in whch representation demarcates the 
doctor’s words from the patient’s sick body.% Modern man is the condition behind 
the doctor’s objectdying gaze, which produces connaissance of the body-in-itself, 
and the explanation of why disease meets the forced residence of its truth in the 
hospital.100 Foucault’s claim is that the reason behind the birth of clrnical science is 
the post-renaissance realisation of death as man’s limit, which accounts for the 
94 Gordon, ”Afterword”, pp. 230-231. 
95 Foucault, ”Sur I’archeolope des sciences”, p. 709. Because its focus on the confined exclusion of the 
madman qua other is tantamount to a proto-genealogy of the conditions that make humanist 
nonnativity possible, I will discuss Madness and Civilization in chapter 5. As Foucault says, Madness and 
Ciirdization is the history of difference, wlulst The Order of Things is the history of the same, or of the 
philosophical subject’s identity. Foucault, ”Michel Foucault, Les Mob et les Choses”, p. 498. 
96 Foucault, ”La situation de Cuvier”, p. 62. 
’’ Foucault, ”Entretien avec Michel Foucault (1971)”, pp. 159-160. 
” Foucault, The Archaeology of Knoudedge, p. 4. 
Until 1790, the doctor and the patient engage in dialogue - what is wrong with you? - and from 
1820 a monologue takes over every time the doctor asks of the patient: where does it hurt?. Guedez, 
Foucault, pp. 28-31. 
loo Foucault, The Birth o f fhe  C h i c ,  cited in Dews, Logics ofDisintegration, pp. 174-175. 
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concern with disease and the demand for a science that knows and cures the body, 
or rather postpones death. It remains a decisive factor for our culture, Foucault 
argues, 
that its first scientific discourse concerning the individual had to pass through 
this stage of death. Western man could constitute himself in his own eyes as an 
object of science . .. only in the opening created by his own elimination: ... from 
the integration of death into medical thought is born a medicine that is given as 
a science of the individual. ... It is understandable, then, that medicine should 
have had such importance in the constitution of the sciences of man-an 
importance that is not only methodological, but ontological, in that it concerns 
man's being as object of positive knowledge.101 
Further to The Birth ofthe Clinic, 77ze Order of TIzings is a critique of the post- 
kantian system. of thought that turns on the autonomous subject's authentic being 
that requires self-actualisation. If Foucault's motivation is to transcend 
anthropocentric dialectical history, his catalyst is the chance discovery of an alien 
system of thought. It not only reveals the impossibhty for the European mind to 
thmk fhf, but the scandal of its experiential limitation to the same rather than to the 
experience of a large number of possible orders that exist separately and irregularly. 
A propos of man, "things are 'laid', 'placed', 'arranged' in sites so very different 
from one another that it is impossible to define a common locus beneath them alY.102 
To sustain his critique of humanist objectivity, which the realist historian of ideas 
explains in terms of the uninterrupted development of the history of reason since 
the renaissance, Foucault analyses the epistemological transformations which 
determine the historicity of experience to demonstrates that the responsibility to 
thmk freely does not rest on the ever broadening shoulders of man but with an 
epoch's s a z ~ o i r . ~ ~ ~  Conditions of existence are a priori to conditions of possibihty, and 
an archzology of sauoir investigates: 
on the basis of what historical a priori ... ideas could appear, sciences be 
established, experience be reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed, 
only, perhaps, to dissolve and vanish soon afterwards. ... [Wlhat I am 
attempting to bring to light is the epistemological field, the episfeme in which 
knowledge ... grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history which is 
lol Foucault, The Birth offhe Clinic, quoted in Sheridan, Miclzel FoucauZt, pp. 43-44. My summary of 77ze 
Birth o f fh e  Clinic draws on Racevskis, Michel Foucault and the Subversion ofIntcZlect, pp. 51-57; Major- 
Poetzl, Michel Foucault's Archology of Western Culture, pp. 134-148. 
lo2 Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. xvii-xviii. 
lo3 Foucault, "La situation de Cuvier", pp. 30-36. 
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not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its condition of possibility.104 
Foucault describes three epistemes which are specific to epochs he calls 
renaissance humanism, classical rationalism and modernity.lo5 But his concern with 
a critical history of the present means these are descriptive terms that simply denote 
prehlstory and what is contemporary,106 or pre- and post-kantian critical thought. It 
is the change in the mode of being of things, whch appears in savoir, that is of 
interest to Foucault. In the renaissance and classical epochs, words resemble and 
represent h g s ,  and in virtue of an alteration in the order that divides things up 
before they are presented to the understanding ths prehistory matures into the 
contemporary modern epoch.Io7 What Heidegger calls the metaphysics of 
subjectivity, where Kant's absolute self-knowing conditions all objectivity and 
Hegel's dialectic produces the subjectivity of the absolute subject who knows 
reality,'N ultimately orders the truth of experience through the human sciences. Yet, 
Foucault claims, their wrlnkle in connaissance, man, is no more than a rift in the 
order of things, who along with hls dreams of humanism and an anthropology qua 
universal, half-empirical, half-philosophcal critique, will disappear when 
connaissance discovers a new form? However, before Foucault clears the field of 
the human sciences in Tlze ArcImology of Knozokdge and elaborates the method 
relevant to new forms of connaissance, he must first erase man in TIE Order of Tlzings. 
The next section shows how he does h s .  
4.iii. Foucault's Erasure of Man from Objective Experience 
The renaissance episteme of resemblance, which is a syntactic system of words that 
exist physiognomically,"O is prominent in the sixteenth century. A coiznnissmzce of 
things is made possible on the basis of the s i d t u d e  between them. It is 
understood through the discursive practices of comenientin, aenzulatio, analogy and 
sympathies, which show how the world folds in upon, duplicates, reflects and forms 
a chain with itself. The s i d t u d e  of these discursive practices determine that the 
episteme of resemblance's epistemological statements correspond with the things 
'04 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. xxii. 
Io5 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 318. 
Io6 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 304. 
Io7 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. xxii. 
Io8 Heidegger, "Hegel and the Greeks", p. 325. 
'09 Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. xxiii-xxiv. 
'Io Habermas, The PhiZosophicuZ Discourse of Modernity, p. 258. 
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they articulate."' Each thing has a macro-cosmic purpose within the great chain of 
being, but because meaning is often hidden it needs to be divined and then 
signatured into words that hold true.112 The renaissance's connaissance of things 
demands undistorted similitude. It depends on the method of interpretation, where 
a divine semiology is superimposed upon the hermeneutics of the scholarly powers 
that be. God is the historical a priori, as it were, who precedes the formal a priori of 
similitude in discursive practices. They require interpretation to map out their 
objectivity, for in the episteme of resemblance an "infinite play within nature finds 
its lmk, its form, and its limitation in the relation of the microcosm to the 
macrocosm, . . . [whilst] the Infinite task of commentary derive its strength from the 
promise of an effectively written text whch interpretation wlll one day reveal in its 
entirety" .I13 
Descartes signals the beginrung of the classical epoch in the middle of the 
seventeenth century. The discursively produced similitude of the renaissance's 
episteme of resemblance is replaced in the classical episteme of representation by 
two discursive practices: matlzesis, which is a mathematical science for the 
measurement and order of things into identities; and taxonomia, which classifies 
things in their differen~e.1~~ Where the renaissance episteme characterises the 
resemblance of things to words-in the prose of the world, the sign is indicative of 
the thing-in the classical episteme the sign becomes an instrument by which to 
order things. An ordering of the difference of things by words that represent their 
identity replaces interpretation,"5 and Foucault says these: 
new arrangement[s] brought about the appearance of a new problem, unknown 
until then: in the sixteenth century, one asked oneself how it was possible to 
know a sign did in fact designate what it signified; from the seventeenth 
century, one began to ask how a sign could be llnked to what it sigrufied.116 
The new classical relation of words to things is evident, Foucault argues, in 
the empirical sciences of general grammar, natural history and the analysis of 
wealth. They have matlzesis and taxonomia as their hstorical a priori, and (general 
Conuenientia portrays the resemblances between thngs that have related properties; aenzulutio shows 
the resemblance of distant objects to each other; analogy relates resemblances that are neither visible 
nor essential to things themselves; and synzpathzes define resemblances between all objects. Foucault, 
77ze Order ofTlzings, pp. 18-25. 
Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 27-30. 
Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 41-42. 
'I4 Foucault, ??w Order of Things, pp. 71-76. 
115 Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 57-67. 
116 Foucault, The Order ofThings, pp. 42-43. 
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grammar's) classical language, which mirrors nature, as their formal a priori. 
Connaissance is ordered by the name, and in classical language to name is to move 
towards the sovereign act of nomination, where words and things are conjoined in 
their essence. This act of unity in general grammar is the task of the verb, which is 
the key to the attributive function that gives rise to the proposition that names via a 
noun.117 By the same token of verb-noun in general grammar's classical language, 
structure-character and value-money establish propositions in natural hstory and 
the analysis of wealth. Classical language is the power that connects living human 
beings to the concept of the table, and it is the principle of their ordering via the 
concept of exchange.l18 In the classical episteme, objectivity depends on classical 
language that is a universal mode of representation. The sovereignty of its words 
form a colourless network through which things manifest themselves. Via the 
power of language, and without recourse to any science of man, the classical 
episteme of representation links 'I think' and 'I am', human nature and nature.119 
Together with its ordering of the world into identities and differences, the 
classical episteme's representation of h g s  to thought through the transparent 
medum of classical language comes to a relatively abrupt halt at the end of the 
eighteenth century. In its place arises the modern episteme of analogy and 
succession, "that is, of internal relations between elements whose totality performs 
a function" in virtue of a behind-the-scenes world deeper than representation 
itself.120 Kant's critical philosophy signals the threshold of the modern episteme, in 
which the relation between the verb and noun, between the attribution and 
articulation of a thing, is broken, as is the fixity of the name of a thing through 
time.121 For Foucault, the discontinuity between prehistory and the contemporary is 
the result of two forms of modern phlosophy: the first is kantian, whch questions 
the relation between logic and ontology, whlst it continues to grapple with the 
classical problem of representation, especially rnatlzesis; the second is hegelian, 
which inquires into the relation between sigrufication and time, and brings the 
renaissance's method of interpretation back into prominence. In its use of 
components from transcendental and absolute idealism, Foucault argues that 
epistemologcal critique in the modern episteme fundamentally questions "the 
relation of meaning with the form of truth and the form of being: in the firmament 
117 Foucault, The Order of Tlzings, ch. 4. 
118 Foucault, The Order of Things, chs. 5-6. 
'19 Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 309-311. 
I2O Foucault, 7k.e Order of Things, p. 218 and p- 239. 
121 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 242 and pp. 206-211. 
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of our reflection there reigns a discourse ... which would at the same time be an 
ontology and a semantics’’.122 
The reign of the subject with a transcendental capacity for apperception and 
dialectic, who determines both the mode of being of things and the transformation 
of their meaning in history, is established between 1775 and 1825. With Kant, the 
conditions of possibihty for the objects of experience are identified with the formal a 
priori of experience itself, whilst Hegel seeks the formal a priori of experience in the 
conditions of possibility of objects and their existence.IB The empirical sciences of 
general grammar, natural history and the analysis of wealth are strangers in the 
modern episteme, where critique is grounded in the transcendental dialectical 
subject. They are superseded by philology, biology and economics, which develop 
with the concepts of language (quo grammatical system), Me (qua organic structure) 
and labour (qua production) .Iz4 Individuals in their factual, contingent existence 
become objects of connaissance in the nineteenth century philosophies of the word, 
life and the will,l25 which determine the analytic of finitude and human existence.126 
These empirical sciences that turn on an ontology and a semantics are grounded in 
the epistemologcal mode of consciousness of man, who assumes the role of an 
empirico-transcendental doubzef Insofar as connaissance has anatamo- 
physiologcal conditions in the faculties of intuition and understanding, empirical 
man is the object of connaissance that is attained via the analysis of the 
transcendental aesthetic. Further, aware of his diremption from things, man is the 
subject of all possible connaissance. He makes the transcendental dialectic, whch 
points to the historical, social and economic conditions of snuoir, analytically 
feasible.’28 In the upheaval of the archzological mutation that is personified by Kant 
and Hegel, Foucault argues, 
man appears in his ambiguous position as an object of knowledge and as a 
subject that knows: enslaved sovereign, observed spectator, he appears in the 
place belonging to the king ... [and demands] that the entire space of ... 
representation should at last be related to one corporeal gaze.129 
122 Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 207-208. 
I Z  Foucault, The Order ofThings, p. 244. 
124 Foucault, The Order of Things, ch. 8. 
125 Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 237-243. 
126 Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 317-322. 
127 Foucault, The Order ofThings, pp. 306-308. 
lB Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 312-316. 
Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 312. 
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Consequently, epistemological critique in the empirical sciences of philology, 
biology and economics is caught in a criticism-positivism-metaphysics triangle that 
continues through to Bergson in the 1 9 2 0 ~ . ’ ~  Critical thought is defined by an 
empirico-transcendental reduplication, which makes man qua subject of 
connaissance the foundation of the finitude that requires connaissance of man as an 
object in the first ~ 1 a c e . l ~ ~  In their drive against diremption, philology, biology and 
economics are ”imbued with the necessity of thmking the unthought - of reflecting 
the contents of the In-itseZfin the form of the For-itself, of ending man’s alienation by 
reconciling him with his own Critical thought and the empirical 
sciences find themselves in a position of reciprocal borrowing and contestation.133 
Kant and Hegel share the same archizologcal subsoil, and their epistemological 
consciousness, man, defines the conditions of existence for the modern episteme’s 
analytic of finitude, its empirico-transcendental reduplication and its relation of the 
cogito to the unthought.134 Humanism’s anthropocentric dialectical history is 
dependent on the subject of both transcendental apperception and halectic. An 
hegelian pseudo-metaphysics of language, life and labour, which induces an 
anthropological sleep,135 has as its indispensable correlative the synthetic activity of 
the kantian foundational subject, who offers certainty and a place of tranquillised 
sleep.136 Foucault’s archizological critique of humanism’s objective experience is a 
wager against its critical thought, in which he stands to gain, firstly, the erasure, 
”like a face drawn at the edge of the sea”, of its condition of possibility, man, and, 
secondly, the inheritance of kantian Aufkllirung and the responsibility to thlnk and 
act freel~.I3~ 
If the discovery of the Return is indeed the end of philosophy, then the end of 
man, for its part, is the return of the beginning of philosophy. It is no longer 
possible to think in our day other than in the void left by man’s disappearance. 
For this void does not create a deficiency; it does not constitute a lacuna that 
must be filled. It is nothing more, and nothing less, than the unfolding of a 
space in which it is once again possible to think.y38 
130 Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 244-245. 
131 Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 325-340. 
132 Foucault, The Arclzaeology of Knouiledge, p. 327. 
133 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 162. 
Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 335. 
135 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 341. 
136 Foucault, The Archaeology ofKnowledge, p. 13. 
137 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 387. 
138 Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 342-343. 
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4.iv. A Philosophische Archaologie of Savoir 
On first appearances, this talk of the beginning of philosophy would seem to 
vindicate Habermas’ charge, which I mentioned in section 1 .i., that Foucault’s 
critique of humanism is indicative of an anti-enlightenment philosophy. However, 
this claim can only make sense to those who are unable to comprehend that a viable 
way to do critical thought is to let critique precipitate a conception of maturity. 
Order of Things is then an archzeological critique of humanism’s amalgamation, in 
man, of Kant’s transcendental apperception with Hegel’s transcendental dialectic. 
As the subject of anthropocentric dialectical history, this philosophy of man 
grounds epistemological critique in the empirical and human sciences, and 
Foucault opposes those who, despite Kant’s demonstration of the division between 
them, surreptitiously confuse the empirical and tran~cendental.’~~ Indeed, 
Foucault’s post-humanist critical thought is based on Kant’s understanding of the 
present, albeit cleansed of the transcendental narcissism of the subject as the source 
of empirical obje~tivity.’~~ It is Nietzsche, whose sense that the death of God invites 
the disappearance of man, that helps Foucault retrieve Kant. He (Nietzsche) marks 
”the threshold beyond which contemporary philosophy can begin thinking 
again”.’4’ In this respect, chapter 10 of Tlze Order of Tlzzngs, together with i7ze 
ArclzaeoZosJ of Knowledge - a theoretical postscript to the former’42 - contain 
Foucault’s summary of contemporary critical thought’s relation to humanism, and 
his suggestion of how to proceed beyond it. This is my topic for analysis here, and 
in section 4.v. I examine how, once May 1968 raises the problem of cause and effect 
in objective experience for the archzeologst, Foucault looks to Nietzsche and makes 
pouvoir the non-discursive and dominant other of the smoir that is behind 
discursive practices. 
The human sciences, Foucault claims, constitute a body of knowledge which 
takes as its object the empirical entity of man. They-primarily literature, 
psychology and sociology-appear in virtue of the formal a priori of the modern 
‘39 The cause of the confusion, Foucault argues, comes from the fact that, of Kant’s four critical 
questions (what can I know?, what ought I to do?, what may I hope for? and what is man?), the first 
three find themselves referred to the fourth by humanism and inscribed to its account. Foucault, Tlze 
Order of Tlzings, p. 341. 
130 Foucault, The Archaeology ofKnmc&dge, p. 203. That is, after Kant ”distinguished the nihil negativunz 
and the nihil privatiurn - a distinction known to have opened the way for the advance of critical 
thought . . . [he] ended by closing ths opening when he ultimately relegated all critical investigations 
to an anthropological question; . . . we have subsequently interpreted Kant’s action as the granting of 
an indefinite respite to metaphysics, because dialectics substituted for the questioning of being and 
limits the play of contradiction and totality”. Foucault, “A Preface to Transgression”, pp. 36-38. 
Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 342. My emphasis. 
142 Sheridan, Michel Foucault, p. 89. 
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episteme, or Kant’s and Hegel’s empirico-transcendental doublet, which must be 
conceived of (ontology) and known  semantic^).'^^ Yet the human sciences that are 
dependent on man’s epistemological consciousness are in turn the effect of the 
historical a priori, which determines that the modern episteme has three 
dimensions: firstly, the rigorous physical sciences of the necessary, where 
mathematics helps truth and pure reason to emerge;144 secondly, the empirical 
sciences of philology, biology and economics, which are mathematicalisable; and, 
thirdly, (philosophical) critique, which in its guise as humanism’s anthropocentric 
dialectical history is related to the empirical sciences as a philosophy of symbols, 
life and alienation, and to the physical sciences in terms of the formalisation of 
thought.145 In principle, the human sciences exist outside this epistemological 
trhedron. Practically, they flourish in the interstices of these discursive practices, 
from whch they borrow mathematical formulae and the concepts of the empirical 
sciences, or they address themselves to the ontology of radical finitude that 
preoccupies critique. Simdarly, the physical and empirical sciences, as well as 
critique, easily deviate from their domains of practice into that of each other, or the 
human sciences themselves, whence Foucault’s perception of the threat to 
connaissance today of humanism’s anthropol~gisation.~~~ 
However, Foucault says that his archEologxa1 critique of the historical a priori 
of the human sciences reveals that, contrary to the humanist who speaks of the 
continuity and progress of reason, neither the human sciences nor their formal a 
piori, man, appear as the effect of the physical sciences, in which reason does 
indeed foster progress. Instead, the human sciences arise 772s-k-772s the objects of the 
empirical sciences and critique, or language, life, labour and the analytic of 
fFnitude.147 The human sciences are addressed to man insofar as he speaks, lives and 
produces, though not in terms of what he is by nature, 
but ... what man is in his positivity (living, speaking, labouring being) ... [and] 
what enables this same being to know (or seek to know) what life is, in what the 
essence of labour and its laws consist, and in what way he is able to speak. The 
human sciences thus occupy the distance that separates (though not without 
connecting them) biology, economics, and philology from that which gwes them 
143 Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 344-345. 
144 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. ix. 
145 Foucault, % Order of Things, pp. 346-347. 
146 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 348 
147 Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 350-352. 
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possibility in the very being of man.148 
In other words, the human sciences are meta-epistemological sciences of 
d~pl icat ion. ’~~ They give rise to three epistemological regions, in which concepts are 
borrowed and models utilised from other domains of connaissance ”to create groups 
of phenomena as so many ’objects’ for a possible branch of knowledge”.*50 Strictly 
speaking, th is  regionalism of the human sciences between the empirical sciences 
and critique defines them as disciplines, or groups of statements that borrow their 
organisation from science, tend to coherence and demostrativity, and are 
institutionalised and sometimes taught as The nineteenth century, 
Foucault argues, is characterised by: a literary model of sigrufication and system 
that is gleaned from philology; a psychologcal model of function and norm that is 
gained from biology; and a sociological model of confhct and rule that is gathered 
from economics. In addition, internal criticism shifts the focus from the first to the 
second of these terms, because the system in relation to the sigrufication it makes 
possible, the property of the norm in relation to the function it determines, and the 
rule in relation to the conflict it regulates, are not given to consciousness. 
Sigrufication, function and codhct must be represented by the subject, who is also 
an object of connaissance. Lastly, history is the background that acts as a h t  to the 
epistemological regions of literature, psychology and sociology, or rather the 
history of man demands a hstory of his language, lrfe and labour.152 In these 
disciplinary regions of the human sciences, the continuity and progress of a 
dialectical history is combined with an analytic of finitude undertaken as a 
transcendental interrogation,153 This combination is possible due to the general 
arrangement of the epistenw, 
[which] provides them with a site, summons them, and establishes them - thus 
enabling them to constitute man as their object. We shall say, therefore, that a 
’human science’ exists, not wherever man is in question, but wherever there is 
analysis ... of norms, rules, and signdying totalities which unveil to 
consciousness the conditions of its forms and contents.154 
148 Foucault, Tlze Order ofThings, p. 353. 
149 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 355. 
Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 356. 
I s 1  Foucault, The Archaeology of Knmdedge, pp. 176-178. 
ls2 Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 359-373. 
l S 3  Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 181-185. 
Foucault, The Order of Tlzzngs, p. 364. 
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Nonetheless, Foucault detects three counter-human sciences that lead the 
human sciences back to their epistemological basis and m a k e  man as their formal 
a priori. Psychoanalysis, for example, investigates the unconscious qua desire 
(Freud), law (Lacan) and death (Nietzsche), and ethnology studies the historicity of 
reason through other cultures (Dumezil) and their social structures (Levi-Strauss).155 
Thrdly, in much the same way that general grammar’s classical language acts as 
the condition of possibility for natural hstory and the analysis of wealth in the 
classical episteme, Foucault alludes to the potential in the empirical science of 
phdology for a pure theory of language that can serve as the formal a priori of 
psychoanalysis and ethnology. He speaks of a critical impetus in these counter- 
human sciences that dsplaces the basis of Kant’s request for a history of reason 
from man to a post-humanist condition of possibhty, language.’% It is in this sense 
that Foucault’s archaeology is proposed as a move beyond the human sciences and 
the epistemologcal critique of humanism, to which they are related within the 
modern episteme. ”The thought of finitude laid down by the Kantian critique as 
philosophy’s task - all that still forms the immediate space of our reflection”,157 but 
without the epistemological consciousness of man. Instead, Foucault proposes an 
archaeological description of the conditions of existence that determine connaissance, 
which mediates the subject’s objective experience of things and the limits of who 
we are. 
As Foucault sees it, an episteme is an anonymously written Weltanschuung 
that imposes norms and postulates. It is common to all discursive practices.’j8 The 
role of the archaeologst is to examine the episteme’s non-formal connaissance, which 
is contained in its discursive formations, positivities and philosophical, scientific 
and literary texts.159 Despite its informality and dispersal, this non-formal 
connaissance amounts to an episteme’s archve, its conceptual framework or 
paradigm.160 Foucault approaches the archwe not as a document, but in terms of 
Canpilhem’s idea of a monument, an arch!, out of which the archaeologst 
distinguishes the rules that differentiate discursive practices in their unitary 
existence and duration.’bl These unitary, durable discursive practices are the 
ls5 Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 374-379. 
ls6 Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 381-383. 
ls7 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 384. 
lj8 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knmdedge, pp. 190-191. 
IS9 Foucault, ”Sur I’archeologie des sciences”, pp. 724-725. 
Couzens Hoy, ”Introduction”, p. 5. 
161 Foucault, ”Sur I’archeologle des sciences”, p. 708. 
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condition of possibility for a positivity, a science, which gives rise to formal 
connaissance on the basis of systematic statements of rules for the formation of 
things (for example, the types of syntax, semantic elements and operational 
possibilities that govern things) and systematic statements of rules of enunciation162 
Foucault designates the space in which the reality of statements of discursive 
practices are formed as the historical a priori, ”the border of time that surrounds our 
present, ... [and] whch, outside ourselves, d e b t s  us”.163 This atom of discourse 
precedes the formal a priori,164 the condition for the possibility of connaissance, and 
through the analysis of the hstorical a priori an understanding of an episteme’s 
discursive order of things, its smoir, is realised?~ For Foucault, sazioir resides 
between the physical and empirical sciences that determine an episteme’s codes 
and critique. 
The fundamental codes of a culture - those governing its language, its schemas 
of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its 
practices-establish for every man ... the empirical orders ... within which he 
will be at home. At the other extremity of thought, there are the scientific 
theories or the philosophical interpretations which explain why order exists in 
general, ... and why this particular order has been established and not some 
other. But between these two regions, ... lies a ... certain unspoken order; ... . It is 
on the basis of this newly perceived order that the codes of language, 
perception, and practice are criticized and rendered partially invalid ... . [I]n 
every culture, between the use of what one might call the ordering codes and 
reflections upon order itself, there is the pure experience of order and its modes 
of being. . . . [Arch~ology] is an attempt to analyse that experience.’& 
Foucault’s articulation of an episteme through an archzological analysis of 
the archve’s historical n priori completes the work of Bachelard and Canguilhem, 
who first open up the epistemological field of non-formal c o n n / ~ i s s ~ l n c e . ~ ~ ~  To be sure, 
archzeology suspends those concepts at the heart of the history of ideas-for 
example, tradition, evolution, the book or eu7ire - which are believed to harbour the 
progress and continuity of formal connlzissance.168 Further, archixology’s emphasis 
162 Foucault, ”Sur l’archeologie des sciences”, pp. 710-719. 
163 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knoudedge, pp. 128-131. “This a priori is what, in a given period, delimits 
in the totality of experience a field of knowledge, provides man’s everyday perception with theoretical 
powers, and defines the conditions in which he can sustain a discourse about things that is recognized 
to be true”. Foucault, The Order of Things, p- 158. 
163 Guedez, Foucault, pp. 72-75. 
165 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 125-127. 
166 Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. xx-xxi. 
167 Foucault, ”Sur l’archeolope des sciences”, pp. 697-698. 
Foucault, The Archaeology of Knouiledge, pp. 21-30. 
110 
Angrcholbgy of  O6jectivity andSavoir 
on the extra-subjective conditions of existence for connaissance translates into an 
indifference toward the historian of science’s author, who is the cause that effects,’@ 
especially avant-garde writers emancipated from the w0rld.1~0 
Like the epistemological consciousness of man, the notion of the author as an 
individualised figure whose powers of expression recount narrative stories, or u7ho 
can be characterised by a unique, definable ~ u i r ~ r e  that is also characteristic of who 
the author is, are no longer tenable.171 In their place, Foucault talks of the author 
function, which locates the writer outside and antecedent to their text that is 
contingent upon the historical a priori.172 Occasionally, hke Marx and Freud, there 
will be unique authors, or founders of discursivity, who establish a formal a priori.1n 
But even here, Foucault notes (in respect of Hyppolite’s cruvre), the prose of an 
author takes on a voice and Me of its own only if it is released from the texts in 
which it originates, and from the academic rigours that accompany their 
emp10yment.l~~ Finally, as Foucault argues in ‘flze Order of Tlzings, archaeology 
opposes the anthropological view of the diachronic subject who shoulders 
conditions of existence and dialectical history,175 for it gives rise to realist 
assumptions which describe discursive practices rather than the discursive objects 
inside them.176 
Although he acknowledges that he is not the first person to use archaeological 
critique, Foucault claims originality for his critique de nofw temps. It includes 
retrospective analyses of the historical phenomena of exclusion and of the 
conditions of existence that enable the constitution of reason and the clinical and 
human sciences.1n His science of the archive is a critique of anthropocentric 
dialectical hlstory,178 as well as an attempt to retrieve kantian critical thought from 
its self-induced tranquillised sleep courtesy of the transcendental subject, and from 
the anthropologcal sleep effected by a humanistic reading of Hegel. Archzology’s 
description of the historical a priori that conditions all possibility in discursive 
practices is Foucault’s riposte to the objective experience of humanism’s subject of 
169 Foucault, ”What is an Author?”, p. 101. 
170 Foucault, ”The Functions of Literature”, pp. 308-310. 
17’ Foucault, “What is an Author?”, pp. 102-105. 
172 Foucault, ”What is an Author?”, pp. 108-113. 
173 Foucault, ”What is an Author?”, pp. 114-116. 
174 Foucault, ”Jean Hyppolite. 1907-1968”, p. 785. 
175 Foucault, The Archmology of Knmdedge, pp. 200-206. 
176 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knmiledge, pp. 137-140. 
I77 Foucault, “Conversation avec Michel Foucault”, pp. 182-183. 
17* Foucault, ”La naissance d’un monde”, p. 786. 
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knowledge that he finds so wanting. Based on Kant’s idea for a philosophisck 
Arclziiologie, Foucault’s archzologcal critique is an excavation of that which renders 
necessary a certain form of thought.’” It is a non-subjective means to describe the 
nature of reason, the hstorical a priori, which constitutes the facts of reason or the 
discursive practices of connaissance through whch the subject experiences an 
objective world. As Kant outlines it, an archzeological critique of thought: 
is neither an historical nor an empirical, but a rational, a priori philosophical, 
history. Although it establishes the facts of reason, it does so not on account of 
reason’s history, but as a philosophisclze Archiiologie that excavates them from the 
nature of reason itself.lsO 
4.v. May 1968 and Foucault’s Archaeology and Genealogy 
As I have shown in the two preceding sections, archzology has a dual purpose. 
Firstly, in Tlze Order of Things Foucault uses archaeology to critique the subject of 
anthropocentric dialectical history, who drives the epistemological critique of the 
human sciences that produce objective experience of finitude. Secondly, upon its 
successful erasure of humanism’s empirico-transcendental doubkf,  archzology 
explains the cause of man’s experience of objectivity in terms of snuoir, or the 
historical n priori. In the discursive practices which produce connnissance, objectivity 
comes from above rather than below, from the conditions of existence, snvoir, and 
not the modern episteme’s condition of possibihty, man. Yet, whilst Foucault is 
successful in his first archx?ological purpose of the eradication of anthropologsm 
and the dethronement of the dialectic from history-that is, in his critique of 
humanism’s objectivity - his second purpose, the restoration of language as the 
formal a priori of discursive practices, which have their condition of existence in 
snvoir, is less so. As Dreyfus and Rabinow point out, Foucault’s archzological 
critique of savoir brackets the objectivity of truth and meaning that is given by a 
transcendental subject, but its post-humanist constructive purpose entails the 
rejection of the status of discursive practices as objective causal laws, subjective 
Macey, The Lives of Miclzel Foucaulf, p. 162. 
” Une hisfoire philosophique de la philosophic est elk-mtme possible non pas hisforiqucnzcn f ou 
cnzpiriqucnzent, mais rafionnellemenf, c’esf-a-dire a priori. Car, encore qu’elle e‘fablissc des faits dc Raison, cc 
n‘esf pas au re‘cif hisforique qu’elle les emprunfe, nzais elk les fire dc la nature de la Raison hunzainc au titre 
d’archiologic philosophique (sic ziehf sie aus der Nafur der nienschlichen Vernunft als philosophischc 
Archiiologie)”. Kant, Fortschritfe der Metaphysik, quoted in and by Foucault, ”Les monstruosites de la 
critique”, p. 221, note. 
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rules or horizons of meaningful practices.1s1 In their constitutive relation to the 
historical a priori, discursive practices are a law unto themselves. 
[The archaeologist] must perform an ’ego split’ in order to look on as a detached 
spectator at the very phenomena in which, as an empirical interested ego[,] . . . 
one can’t help being involved. Foucault the archaeologist looks on, as a 
detached metaphenomenologist, at the historical Foucault who can’t, if he 
thinks about human beings in a serious way, help thinking in terms of the 
meanings and truth claims governed by the latest discursive formation.182 
For Dreyfus and Rabinow, Foucault’s critical thought displays an underlying 
continuity-what I call his critical hstory-and an important switch from 
archzology to genealogy. The shift is not indicative of the futhty of archaeology, 
but comes about because Foucault’s underlying continuity is an ability to push one 
way of thinking to its luruts, at which point he recogruses them-archaeology’s 
failure to explain objectivity in the human sciences-and then tries to overcome 
them.183 Also, as Sheridan argues, Foucault’s specific target of archaeological critique 
is the humanist subject of knowledge, who in supporting marxism’s focus on the 
objectivity of superstructures overlooks the archve previous to them.1a In a surular 
vein, with my thematic of critical history I understand Foucault’s archaeologxal 
critique in relation to its first purpose, namely, a rejection of humanist 
epistemology. Notwithstanding, there is a problem with the second purpose, 
especially the causal ground of objectivity in the archzologist’s conception of 
discursive practices that depend on savoir. The prompt for its solution is May 1968, 
and the saviour is Nietzsche. 
Only a brief summary of the events in 1968 is necessary. Although reformed, 
from an institution that transmits liberal culture for an elite lzaute bourgeoisie to a 
mass-university that produces scientists and social e n p e e r s  for a modern society, 
French universities in the 1960s are antiquated, hierarchcal and reproductive of a 
bureaucratic elite.185 In March 1968, students at Nanterre University in the western 
suburbs of Paris demand the reform of the grandes ecoles, which if only a few 
kilometres away on the rizie gauche are five centuries away philosophically.’S6 The 
official h t o r y  of ideas taught in the grandes ecoles, for example, maintains the 
Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucuult, pp. 79-85. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucuult, p. 87. 
183 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucuult, pp. 98-100. 
Sheridan, Michel Foucaulf, pp. 209ff.. 
ls5 Dews, Logics of Disintegration, pp. 171-172. 
ls6 Gutman, ”L‘avant-mai des phdosophes”, p. 27. 
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juridical power of the fifth republic in that it is basically a history of official ideas, if 
not an official history.187 Within two months, on the night of the barricades, there is 
a violent turn in the student protests.188 Sporadic violence continues until the middle 
of June, when left-wing parties (the PCF excepted) and the Confkdkrntion ge‘ne‘rnle du 
trnziail (CGT) go on strike in support of the students. Shortly hereafter, once the CGT 
signs the GreneIle Accords, strikes are called off and left-wing parties withdraw their 
support for the students. Although, as Hannah Arendt points out, 1968 is a classic 
revolutionary situation, it is resolved by the same politicians and professors whose 
power and knowledge are the object of protest. Potential revolution concludes in 
reform because the only person prepared to seize power and take responsibility is 
Charles de Gaulle, who negotiates sufficient concessions to push the fifth republic 
into its second decade.189 1968 supports Foucault’s claim that protests are not a 
function of general theories, which contain the truth of the protester’s cause, but 
merely indicative of the systematic exercise and application of power itself.’% 
There are two legacies for critical thought from 1968. One comes from those 
who continue to say they want a revolution to change constitutions and institutions, 
whch is a solution based on evolution. The other comes from those who would also 
like to change the world, yet without a clear idea of the solution’s plan and only 
evidence of the destruction of revolution, they insist one should free the mind 
instead and change the revolutionary’s head. Humanist critical thought 
encapsulates the desire for revolutionary political critique, whilst 1968’s second 
legacy demands a reconceptualisation of knowledge and power, especially the 
relation between them, for if knowledge and power ”were identical, I would not 
have to study them and I would be spared a lot of fatigue as a re~ul t ’ ’ . ’~~  
May 1968 is the fruition of the eschatologcal theme, present since the 1950s 
amongst the generation raised on the classics of the end, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche 
and Heidegger, of anthropocentric dialectical hstory and the philosophy of the 
subject.192 If 1968 signals the failure of humanist epistemological critique and a 
wider refusal to entertain the question of connnissnnce without an epistemological 
lS7 Glucksmann, “Eclate l’hexagone”, p. 191. 
188 On 10 May 1968, the International Herald Tribune reports: ”The police set off flares and fired in their 
grenades. The students put up red flags. The police shot in concussion grenades. The students 
mounted the roofs and shelled them with paving stones. The police charged the barricades. The 
students replied with molotov cocktails. Before long most of the barricades were in flames. It was 
warfare without bullets”. Quoted in Roberts, ”May ’68: Legacies and Legends”. 
Arendt, “Communicative Power”, p. 67. 
‘90 Foucault, ”Les intellectuels et le pouvoir”, p. 315. 
19* Foucault, ”Critical Theory/Intellectual History”, p. 43. 
19* Derrida, Specters o f M ~ r x ,  pp. 51-55; Akoun, “Entre I’existentialisme et le marxisme”. 
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consciousness,193 it also allows recognition as a philosopher without the attached 
identity of marxist, phenomenologist or structuralist.1M 1968 liberates the energy of 
revolution from the idea of it.195 As Foucault says, 1968 is the voice of those who 
struggle at the grass-roots level in the fine meshes of power.’% Paris echoes to the 
sound of the mature subject. It is the free speech of the governed, who question 
those who govern them about the truth.197 Essentially, 1968 is a refusal by the 
individual of the government of his everyday life by others. The word on every 
one’s lips, Foucault claims, is pouzioir,198 and Sheridan writes that what ‘‘7cins truly 
revolutionary was the reahzation that the state was not sufficiently in one place to 
be seized, that the state was everywhere and that therefore the ’revolution’ had to 
be . . . ubiquitous as well as permanent’’.199 
In this respect, 1968 confirms Foucault as a visionary of pouvoir.200 He discerns 
”an autonomous, non-centralised kind of theoretical production . . . whose validity 
is not dependent on the approval of the established regimes of Foucault 
now determines to sponsor ths local snzioir des gens,202 which he juxtaposes with the 
unitary bodies of theory that claim to be true.203 What it requires is a departure from 
a strict archaeology, that is, from a description of savoir as the sole condition of 
existence of the objectivity of discursive practices, toward an account of the relation 
between the non-discursive realm of pouvoir that surfaces in 1968 and the savoir 
behind the human sciences. To concretise archaeology, Foucault turns from 
Heidegger to Nietzsche.204 Despite the fact that TIze Arcluxeology of Knomledge is 
Foucault’s only systematic theoretical analysis,205 he slufts from the detachment of 
archzology to his genealogcal commitment to critique.2o6 As Rajchman argues, 
Foucault’s use of Nietzsche is a natural outcome of hs desire to make Heidegger’s 
193 Gutman, “L’avant-mai des plulosophes”, pp. 29-30. 
Foucault, ”The Minimalist Self”, p. 8. 
195 Gordon, “Question, ethos, event”, pp. 20-22. 
Foucault, “Truth and Power”, p. 116. 
197 Foucault, ”An Aesthetics of Existence”, pp. 51-52. 
Foucault, ”Entretien avec Micliel Foucault (1978)”, pp. 82-83. 
Sheridan, Miclzel Foucault, p. 113. 
2oo Said, ”Foucault and the Imagination of Power”, p. 152. 
201 Foucault, “Two Lectures”, pp. 78-81. 
202 Foucault, “Cours du 7 janvier 1976”, p. 9. 
203 Foucault, “Two Lectures”, p. 84. 
204 Rajchman, Michel Foucault, pp. 114116. 
205 Rabinow, ”Introduction”, p. 9. 
206 Smart, Michel Fuucuult, p. 48. 
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philosophical anti-humanism, which is so central to ?Tze Order of Things, political. 
For Rajchman, Foucault’s nietzschean turn is driven by a concern with ”what are 
the politics of the philosophical problematization of the subject; in what sense is 
anti-humanist philosophy of political importance?” .207 
With his rehabilitation of a kantian analysis of finitude, minus the baggage of 
the empirico-transcendental doublet, Foucault is directed by Nietzsche toward 
pouzioir as the non-discursivity in which objectivity’s existence is conditioned.208 
Nietzsche, Foucault notes, ”is the philosopher of power, a philosopher who 
managed to thmk of power without having to confine himself within a political 
theory to do so”.2o9 The battle against humanism’s epistemological critique, which 
ruled u n a  the 1950s but continues to define the present,21o recommences in respect 
of its political critique. It is, for example, based on the normative experience that is 
carried by the rawlsian or taylorian subject, who wills or desires procedural or 
substantive justice. 
Foucault’s post-1968 introduction of non-discursive practices as the 
background to discursive practices, of pouvoir as the condition of existence for 
sazioir, necessitates several methodologico-conceptual clarifications. In archaeology, 
the objectivity of the episteme derives from savoir, and in Tlw Order of Tlzings 
Foucault critiques the modern episteme’s discursive practices, the human sciences, 
which claim to produce truth.211 The genealogist is interested in both the production 
of connaissance within an episteme, and how truth imposes itself against and over 
another episteme.2I2 Rather than abandon archEology, Foucault uses genealogy to 
re-order his analytic priorities, which is in line with the demands of 1968 to rethmk 
eizgagemnt.213 To be sure, the weighting and conception of each approach changes, 
but there ”is no pre- and post-archaeology or genealogy in F o u c a ~ l t ” . ~ ~ ~  Instead, after 
1970 the archzological analysis of systems of thought, which organise and regulate 
experience, are placed into the historical problematic of how such systems, which 
define the experience of the subject, come into existence through contingent 
historical pr0cesses.~15 ”Archaeology is the method with whxh a genealogical 
207 Rajchman, Michl Foucaul t ,  p. 115. 
*08 Foucault, “Le monde est un grand asile”, p. 434. 
’09 Foucault, ”Prison Talk”, p. 53. 
210 Foucault, ”Par-dela le bien et le mal”, p. 236. 
211 Davidson, ”Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics”, pp. 221-222. 
212 Meuret, “A political genealogy of political economy”, pp. 49-50. 
Smart, Michel Foucault, p. 47. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow, MicheZ FoucauZt, p. 104. 
215 Toews, “Foucault and the Freudian Subject”, p. 127. 
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purpose can be realized ... -the means are archaeological, the ends 
genealogical” .216 In Foucault’s words, archzological research incorporates a method 
and a tactic.217 Archzology specifies the field, and genealogy targets and finalises an 
analysis of it. As Foucault says in ”The culture of the self”, 
[wlhat I mean by archaeology is a methodological framework for my analysis. 
What I mean by genealogy is both the reason and the target of analyzing those 
discourses as events, and what I am trying to show is how those discursive 
events have determined in a certain way what constitutes our present and ... 
ourselves -either our knowledge, our practices, our type of rationality, our 
relationship to ourselves or to others . . . genealogy is the finality of the analysis, 
and . . . archaeology . . . the material and methodological framework.21s 
If archzology analyses savoir rather than man as the condition of existence for 
discursive practices and the connaissance they manifest, by the early 1970s pouuoir 
constitutes the condition of existence of savoir. It is in this sense that pouvoir and 
savoir are inseparable conceptually, hence the solidus inserted between them in the 
heuristic device, pouvoir/savoir: ”the relation is such that knowledge is not gained 
prior to and independently of the use to whch it will be put in order to achieve 
power . . . but is already a function of human interests and power relations”.219 And, 
because pouvoir produces rather than prevents sazIoir,220 Foucault inserts pouvoir 
before savoir. Objectivity is no longer a function of sauoir, but of the nietzschean 
ontology prior to it, pouvoir, which is nevertheless operative through discursive 
practices and mamfest as a volonte‘ de s a ~ o i r . ~ ~  In the summary of his first lectures on 
the history of systems of thought delivered in 1970-1971 at the College de France, 
Foucault says that discursive practices d e h t  a field of objects, define a leptimate 
perspective for the agent of knowledge and establish norms for the elaboration of 
concepts and theories. However, in addition to their modes of objectivation and 
subjectivation, Foucault says, 
discursive practices are not purely and simply ways of producing discourses. 
They are embodied in technical processes, in institutions, in patterns for general 
behavior ... and in pedagogxal forms which, at once, impose and maintain 
them. . . . These principles of exclusion and choice . . . are not based on an agent 
of knowledge (historical or transcendental) who successively invents them or 
216 Racevskis, Miclzel Foucault and tlze Subversion of liztellect, p. 16. 
217 Foucault, ”Two Lectures”, p. 85. 
Quoted in Malion, “Michel Foucault’s archaeology”, p. 135 and p. 140, f. 10. 
219 Hoy, ”Power, Repression, Progress”, p. 129. 
220 Foucault, ”Body/Power”, p. 59. 
221 Foucault, “La volonte de savoir”, p. 241. 
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places them on an original footing; rather, they designate a will to knowledge 
that is anonymous, polymorphous, susceptible to regular transformations, and 
determined by the play of identifiable dependenciesm 
Finally, given the relocation of objectivity to a will to knowledge that has 
pouiroir/savoir as its condition of existence, Foucault ceases to speak of the episteme. 
Instead, objectivity is constituted in, and truth is to be understood as the product of, 
a dispositifd’ensernble, a grid of intelligibilityfm or, more literally, an apparatus. As 
Foucault writes, 
[wlhat I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly 
heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural 
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions - in short, the 
said as much as the unsaid. . . . The apparatus itself is the system of relations that 
can be established between these elements. Secondly, what I am trying to 
identrfy in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the connection that can exist 
between these heterogeneous elements[,] . . . whether discursive or non- 
discursive, [because] there is a sort of interplay of shifts of position and 
modifications of function which can ... vary very widely. Thirdly, ... the term 
’apparatus’ ... has as its major function at a given historical moment that of 
responding to an urgent need. . . . [It] has a dominant strategic function.224 
vi. Synopsis 
In this chapter, 
existential and 
transcendental 
I have outhed how, in twentieth century French philosophy, an 
marxist interpretation of the hegelian subject’s capacity for 
dialectic, and the kantian subject’s capacity for transcendental 
apperception, constitute the empirico-transcendental subject who grounds 
humanism’s epistemological critique. Like lus elder brother born from a virgin 
mother, man wants be the condition of all possibhty in the world. He is the 
transcendental subject of those human sciences which search for empirical 
connaissance of man as an object. 
In response to th is  experience of objectivity at the hands of the subject of 
anthropologxal dialectical history, I have presented Foucault’s derailment of 
humanism’s path to enlightenment via an archaeologmd critique of the kustorical a 
priori of savoir, which acts as the condition of existence for connaissance. As man is 
222 Foucault, “History of Systems of Thought”, pp. 199-201. 
cultural practices he examines. Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucuult, pp. 120-121. 
224 Foucault, ”The Confession of the Flesh”, pp. 194-195. 
A grid of intelligibility captures the method of the effective historian, as well as the structure of the 
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untenable as the subject of objectivity, Foucault erases and replaces him with what 
philosophische Archiologie discerns as the counter-human sciences of psychoanalysis 
and ethnography. On the basis of philology’s language as their formal a priori, they 
promise a way to think freely that is purged of transcendental narcissism. Yet, 
insofar as a post-humanist condition of possibility for objective experience depends 
on language that is related to sazioir, I have shown that the archzologist is detached 
from the connaissance in which he is situated, and I have argued that 1968 forces 
Foucault to back up archzology with genealogy. Non-discursive practices of pouzioir 
become the background historical a priori of savoir, and by association of discursive 
practices of connaissnnce, too. The critical historian analyses, as I have just 
suggested, the pouvoirlsavoir of an apparatus, in which he uncovers the conditions 
for objective, normative and subjective experience. In his pursuit of critical thought 
that brings about enhghtenment from as early as the 1960s, Foucault uses Nietzsche 
to reject an hegelian semantics and to retrieve a kantian analytical object for 
critique, finitude, whch he pictures against a nietzschean ontology of the will to 
power. On this understanding, it is Foucault’s genealogical critique of humanism’s 
normative experience of who we are, and his genealogy of how pouvoir is exercised, 
that I focus on in the next chapter. 
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For Foucault, Veyne writes, ”knowledge is power: it imposes itself, and one 
imposes it; it does not derive from the nature of ’things’. It has its limit, however, 
the present.”’ So it is that Foucault’s archzological critique of objectivity and savoir, 
which I discussed in the preceding chapter, evolves naturally into a genealogical 
critique of normativity and pouvoir - an evolution, moreover, that is inevitable for a 
critical thlnker concerned with who we are on behalf of how we may become 
otherwise. Or, because Foucault’s path to enhghtenment is nietzschean, his critique 
confronts h u t s  in order to reach its destination of maturity in the present. In 
addition to his analysis of humanism’s subject of knowledge, therefore, Foucault’s 
critical gaze looks to man’s alter ego, the subject of right. From the domain of man’s 
true being of autonomy and recognition,2 this subject supports the political critique 
that advocates the procedural and substantive justice which governs the power of 
the juridical state, and in this chapter it is the humanist’s practice of critical thought 
through political critique which I subject to genealogical critique. 
I commence with an examination of Madness and Civilization. In its exposure 
of the confined exclusion for those who differ from the moral identities of 
autonomy and recogrution, it first reveals the failures of humanism to realise 
maturity. From this point of view, I analyse the second moment - archa2ology is the 
first-in Foucault’s critical history, genealogy. Via its focus on the capillary pouvoir 
of non-discursive practices, genealogical critique uncovers the conditions which 
make possible the normative experience - Rawls’ political liberalism or Taylor’s 
politics of recogrution, for instance-that is at the heart of humanism. But although 
Foucault’s proto-genealogy of madness intimates the themes of objectification and 
subjection, which genealopcal critique subsequently explains in terms of 
Veyne, ”The Final Foucault and His Ethics”, p. 5. 
Foucault, “On Power”, p, 106. 
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humanism‘s political critique, both Madness and civilization and nietzschean 
genealogy share the first of two assumptions that are found in humanism’s theory 
of power. Firstly, the idea that power is exercised by mechanisms of repression- to 
which Foucault adheres untd the mid-1970s-and, secondly, the nature of juridical 
power as state-centred. Consequently, I argue that in hs 1975-1976 lectures at the 
Collt?ge de France and, thereafter, i!7w History of Sexuality, Foucault develops a 
genealogical critique of extra-juridical capillary pouvoir. He demonstrates that 
pouvoir is exercised by mechanisms which are productive of the subject’s body and 
the population. I then substantiate b claim in my discussion of Discipline and 
Punish, where genealogy unearths the technique of examination and the 
mechanisms of disciphe that constitute body or somato-pouvoir, and through my 
analysis of Tl?e History of Sexuality, in whch Foucault excavates the technique of 
confession and‘the mechanisms of regulation that foster life or bio-pouvoir. Finally, 
further to this critical question of the means by whch pouvoir is exercised, whch 
enables Foucault to reject humanism’s normative experience that is rendered by its 
political critique, he starts to thmk of what constitutes the basic nature of pouvoir. It 
is at this point, during the late 1970s, that Foucault’s critical historical critique 
develops the idea of pouvoir as governmentality, which as the intersection of 
normative and subjective experience signals the transition to chapter 6. 
5.i. A Proto-Genealogy of Reason’s Silent Other 
Insofar as Discipline and Punish poses the problem of power and the body, 
especially the imposition of power on bodies, it is Foucault’s first proper 
genealogy? A decade and a half earlier, Madness and Ciuilization appeared, which as 
Foucault later concedes brings h m  “close to admitting an anonymous and general 
subject of hstory”.4 Further, the attempt to escape academic philosophy in Madness 
and Civilization now embarrasses Foucault, as does its remnants of hegelianism.5 
Clearly, it is neither a genealogy nor, strictly speaking, an archzology. Foucault’s 
employment of the methods of existential analysis,6 and his search for the true 
psychology of man,7 betray a realist approach to history. His critical words presume 
Bouchard, “Introduction”, p. 25. 
Foucault, The Archaeology ofKnoudedge, p. 16. Madness and Civilization (1965), which I draw on, was 
first published in 1961 as Folie et de‘raison: Histoire de Zafolie a l‘lige classique, and unabridged in 1972 as 
Histoire de la folie a l’lige classique. 
Foucault, “The Functions of Literature”, p. 312. 
Foucault, ”Preface to The History ofsexuality, Volume II”, p. 334. 
Bernauer, “Michel Foucault’s Ecstatic Tlunking”, p. 46. 
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the existence of a thing called madness beneath the discursive practice of 
psychiatry. As a result, Madness and Civilization receives diverse interpretations, 
from Dreyfus' and Rabinow's claim that Foucault flirts with hermeneutic depth: or 
Hacking's suggestion that it is an "almost Kantian story in which our experience of 
the mad is a mere phenomenon conditioned by our thought": to Hayden White's 
argument that, with its 1950s themes of the end of history and the philosophy of the 
subject, Madness and Civilization represents an eschatological structuralism.10 
Nonetheless, its theme of the confined exclusion that mirrors the historical 
consolidation of reason places Madness and Ciailization at the forefront, albeit in 
proto- form, of a genealogical critique of normative experience, which justifies its 
place in this chapter." 
Lest it be forgotten, Foucault's critical history of systems of thought 
investigates the interdependence of the modes of objectivation and subjectivation. 
They gwe rise to the objective, normative and subjective games of truth through 
which "human beings are made subjects''.12 Foucault examines how, in relation to 
sauoir, pouvoir and ehco-morality - the modes of objectivation- subjectivation is 
effected qua the constitution of subjects of knowledge, subjects who act on others, 
and subjects who are moral agents? A genealogy of pouvoir/savoir allows "the 
analysis ... of the problem of relationships between [sic] subject and games of 
truth? Although evident in a confused manner, Foucault says that all three axes of 
sazioir, pouvoir and ethico-morality appear in Madness and Civilization.'5 It can thus 
be read from the point of view of objectivity, normativity or subjectivity, but p e n  
that the relative importance of each differs according to the experience analysed,16 I 
follow Foucault, who M s  it to the axis of pouvoir and the theme of confined 
exclusion.17 As he says, Madness and Civilization investigates "the type of power that 
Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault, p. 12. 
Hacking, "The Archaeology of Foucault", p. 29. 
lo H. V. Whte, "Foucault Decoded: Notes from Underground", in History and Theory, 12,1973, quoted 
in Major-Poetzl, Michel Foucault's Archology of Western Culture, p. 121. 
11 Foucault, "Conversation avec Michel Foucault", pp. 182-183. Madness and Civilization establishes the 
extra-discursive dependence between the discursive practice of psychiatry and non-discursive 
practices (in 1968, Foucault calls the latter changernents e'conorniques, politiques et sodaux), whilst Tlze 
Order of Things analyses the inter-discursive dependence between the physical and empirical sciences, 
philosophcal critique and the human sciences. Foucault, "Reponse a une question", p. 680. 
l2 Foucault, "The Subject and Power", p. 208. 
l3 Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics", p. 351. 
l4  Foucault, "The e h c  of the care for the self", p. 10. 
Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ehcs" ,  p. 352. 
Foucault, "Preface to 7'84~ History of Sexuality, Volume 11", pp. 336-337. 
l7 Foucault, "Les rapports de pouvoir passent a l'interieur des corps", p. 229. 
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reason has ceaselessly wanted to exercise over madness from the seventeenth 
century to the present’? 
In 1953, after only three years as a member of the PCF, Foucault leaves in 
protest at its anti-Semitism, the s t a h s t  orientation of its communistological 
marxists, who read Marx according to the dictates of the PCF,I9 and the fact that, in 
spite of itself, the PCF clings to the bourgeois whilst it thwarts research into 
the political function of science and the idea of a disciphary society.21 Foucault 
then proceeds to write the archzology of the silence that lies beneath the ruthless 
language of non-madness, psychatry.22 As reason’s monologue on madness, 
psychiatry sustains the normativity which, although it allows one to communicate 
with and recogruse another, requires the denouncement of one’s neighbour. 
Madness and Civilization is not a history of mental Illness, but a nominalist l-ustory of 
the economic, political, ideological and institutional conditions which effect the 
confined exclusion of those who are constituted as discursive objects by philosophy 
9ua discourse of reason, and psycl-uatry 9ua discourse of reason’s frontiers.23 
Foucault locates the undifferentiated experience of madness and reason, or 
what he calls the zero point, between the disappearance of leprosy in the fourteenth 
century and the renaissance of the seventeenth century.24 In t h s  period, he 
describes the diverse but always cs-existent experience of reason and madness, 
which are interrelated by the idea of folly:25 the ship of fools, the Nawenscltifl that 
sails up and down Europe’s rivers with its cargo of madmen in search of their 
reason from water,26 and particularly the ocean, which harbours symbolic powers of 
purification;27 or, in the sixteenth century, the madman, in whom man’s animal 
nature periodically bursts forth to reveal hs o r i p a l  ontolopcal place with thmgs; 
or the intimate relation in renaissance literature of reason as a folly that is identrfied 
l8 “[Lle type de pouvoir que la raison n‘a pas cessk de vouloir exercer sur la folie depuis le XVUe siicle jusqu’a 
notre ipoque”. Foucault, “Pouvoir et savoir”, p. 402. 
l9 Foucault, “Prison Talk,  pp. 52-53. 
2o Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault, p. 40. 
21 Foucault, ’‘Truth and Power”, p. 109; Foucault, “Prisons et asiles”, pp. 523-525. 
Foucault, Madness and Civilization, pp. xi-xiii. Although Foucault speaks for the first time of 
archzology in Madness and Civilization, he does so simply ”to distinguish what he is doing from 
‘history”’. Sheridan, Michel Foucaull, p. 14. 
23 Sheridan, Michel Foucault, p. 12; Foucault, “Les monstruosites de la critique”, pp. 222-223. 
24 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, pp. 3-8. 
* Sheridan, Michel Foucault, pp. 16-17. 
26 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, pp. 9-15 
27 Foucault, “L‘eau et la folie”, pp. 268-269. 
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with romance? Before the cartesian subject, Foucault implies, madness is not the 
denigrated other of reason, but one of its sigruficant others that is to be respected. 
In 1656, five years after Hobbes publishes Leviathan, the Iz6pitul ge'ne'ral in Paris 
is founded and with it the classical epochs experience of madness. The mad are 
moved off the Narrensdziffen into the Iz6pitaux ge'ne'ruux, and voyages to retrieve 
reason are succeeded from the second half of the seventeenth century by 
confinement, which characterises the renaissance experience of madness.29 What 
Foucault calls the great confinement of the mad to the non-medical, semi-juridical 
structure of the h6pitaux ge'neraux is the product of economic measures and a 
requisite social sensibility, which is constituted by the bourgeoisie and instituted by 
the police qua gatekeepers of the community's morality.30 
Madness now represents the impossibihty of the other for rational thought. It 
alienates man qua cartesian subject, who is duty bound to uphold the sovereignty of 
reason over against f0lly.31 Also, the establishment of the ratio is inextricably bound 
up with the ethos of medizval Christianity's morality, such that madness-evil and 
reason-good assume a natural affhation.32 A bourgeois normativity that is a 
synthesis of moral obligation and sovereign right castigates the madman, the 
economically inactive and the unreasonable, from blasphemers to libertines.33 
Through them, the classical age sketches a profile of its other experience of 
unreason and immorality, which is enforced by the new administrators of 
normativity in the polis, the police. "In the shadows of the bourgeois city", Foucault 
writes, "is born this strange republic of the good which is imposed by force on all 
those suspected of belongmg to evil. This is the underside of the bourgeoisie's great 
dream . . . in the classical age'? 
For Foucault, confinement in the classical epoch on the basis of insanity, 
passion or delirium, which signal the madman's incapacity for the responsibilities 
of reason,35 is indicative of the doctor's presence, who first connects madness to the 
body in terms of mania, melancholia, hysteria and hypochondria.% Madness as the 
28 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, pp. 16-37. 
29 Foucault, Madness and Ciir~ilization, pp. 39-45. 
30 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, pp. 46-59. 
31 Sheridan, Michel Foucault, p. 23. 
32 Racevskis, Michel Foucault and the Subversion of Intellect, pp. 43-44. 
33 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, p. 65. 
34 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, pp. 60-61. 
35 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, pp. 66-99. 
36 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, ch. V. 
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empty negativity of reason and the madman as non-being, nothingness37-a slight 
at Sartre-define its essence as a physical disease of the nerves. Although the 
madman's unreason is not yet tantamount to a lack of truth, nor definitive of the 
truth of his being,% Foucault alludes to a panic in the thirty years prior to 1789. The 
medical condition and moral stigma of madness confronts the city as the new 
leprosy. It ushers in lzonzo medicus as the saviour, who neutralises the disease to 
protect the normal. He is, Foucault suggests, helped by the enlightenment's 
darkened mirror of humanism, which chronicles the historical progress of reason in 
terms of the experience of unreason. It is held culpable for the unconditioned return 
and submersion of anthropocentric dialectical thought. 
Man's relation to madness is now mediated temporally, socially and 
historically, and madness is the barometer of the distance man has from his essence 
as a subject of reason.39 Together with socio-economic shifts and increased levels of 
poverty during the nineteenth century, the madman is declared unbearable to 
reason. Inside the h6pitaux ge'ne'raux, his presence is an insult to other confinees, 
who in the years immediately after 1789 are liberated.40 Psychiatry, which 
recogruses madness in its truth as an illness and treats it as a curable disease, 
implores the house of unreason, the asylum. Therein, the object of the discursive 
practice of psychatry, the madman, is constituted as a subject, who the psychiatrist 
pretends to liberate in the name of reason. 
According to Foucault, the asylum is a retreat outside time, in whch the mad 
are to recover their reason through meditation on, and the recogrution and self- 
incrimination of, their madness.41 To aid silence, recognition and judgement as the 
cures for madness, as the ethos that re-establishes the ratio, the doctor who 
commands the modern experience of madness as a mental disease is affirmed. But 
lzonzo nzedicus' apotheosis is unrelated to hs medical skill or power as a practitioner 
of connaissance. Rather, Izonzo medicus enjoys authority because he is a wise man with 
a medical heritage. He is the juridico-moral guarantee to those outside the asylum. 
The civhsation that rests on reason juxtaposes its normativity with madness as a 
disease, and the excluded confinees in the asylum act as the condition for the 
imperative of reason in the city of the normal. In effect, 
37 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, pp. 115-116. 
38 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, ch. VI. 
39 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, pp. 199-220. 
40 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, ch. VIII. 
41 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, pp. 243-268. 
125 
A Genealbgy of Nornativity andPouvoir 
[tlhe asylum ... organized [guilt] for the madman as a consciousness of himself, 
and as a non-reciprocal relation to the keeper; it organized it for the man of 
reason as an awareness of the Other, a therapeutic intervention in the 
madman’s existence. In other words, by this guilt the madman became an object 
of punishment always vulnerable to himself and to the Other; and, ... from the 
awareness of his guilt, the madman was to return to his awareness of himself as 
a free and responsible subject, and consequently to reason.42 
In Tlze Order of Tlzings, Foucault speaks of the potential for a post-humanist 
philosophy in virtue of the presence, in psychoanalysis and ethnography, of 
philology’s formal a priori of language. Similarly, at the end of Madness and 
Civilization Foucault considers psychoanalysis and a critique of finitude as 
alternatives to the pseudo-scienbficity of psychiatry and anthropocentric dialectical 
thought, whch require confined exclusion to function.43 Yet, whilst psychoanalysis 
accesses some forms of madness as a freudian science of the unconscious,M it 
remains a stranger to unreason, whch other than lightning-flashes in the likes of 
Nietzsche has been lost as an experience since the zero Philosophically, 
Foucault’s main culprit for this loss is Hegel’s demonstration-by-absurdity thought, 
which leads critique away from Nietzsche’s retrieval of archaic thought.46 Already 
in 1963, the attraction for Foucault of what he later calls plzilosoplzische Arclzdologie - 
which I discussed in section 4.iv. - is its ability to analyse kantian archival thought, 
the historical a priori for philosopltucal critique.47 Does the dialectic pve  birth to the 
first man who moves toward freedom, Foucault asks, or is it the final convulsion of 
the last dying man at the dusk of the renai~sance?~g Given that the great 
confinement and the asylum appropriate people as mere things in the service of 
modern normativity, Geist’s presence blocks the exit to maturity first illuminated by 
Aufildrung. What Madness and Civilization demonstrates, in the shape of the 
normative control of those who are different, is the reason behmd juridical power 
and the power of reason, for the asylum ”was not a free domain of observation, 
diagnosis and therapy; it was a juridical space where one was accused, judged and 
sentenced, and from which one was released only . . . by repentance”.49 
42 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, p. 247. 
43 Foucault, ”Philosophie et psycholope”, pp. 438-439. 
44 Foucault, ”Phlosophe et psychologie”, pp. 440-441. 
45 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, pp. 269-278. 
46 Foucault, Madness and Civilizalion, pp. 287-289. 
47 Foucault, ”Guetter le jour qui vient”, pp. 267-268. 
48 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, pp. 279-283. 
49 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, p. 269. 
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5 5 .  Genealogical Critique 
Like archzology, Foucault's proto-genealogy is an attempt to establish possibilities. 
Rather than propose, these critical histories problematise the foundational subject 
and his other, both of whom are central to epistemological critique.50 They are 
successful as a critique of anthropocentric dialectical thought, and from the early 
1970s Foucault develops a genealogy proper of humanist normativity. It establishes 
that truth is less the prerogative of the subject of right, who justifies the political 
critique that orders power, than the effect of domination. Truth in procedural and 
substantive justice reflects might, and my purpose in this section is to outline 
Foucault's genealogical critique. It can be contrasted with humanism's notion of 
history, which authorises the constitutional juridical state in virtue of its origin in a 
social contract ,that protects autonomy, or of its emergence and descent from 
hypergoods that are central to recogrution. 
If history makes the past familiar and the present inadvertently subject to the 
norma1,51 genealogy reveals what has historically been thought but typically 
forgotten.52 It recuperates voices silenced and naturalised by reason? A human 
science such as psychoanalysis, for example, can be said to intersect with, and have 
components lnherited from, the discursive practices of confession and nineteenth 
century psychology, and the institution of the asylum (which in turn combines 
components from the hospital and the seventeenth century discursive practices of 
cures and internment).M In union with ths  erudite knowledge, the genealogst 
recovers local memories to establish an historical knowledge of struggles, which he 
employs tactically in the present to challenge normativity.55 Instead of 
epistemologcal foundations, genealogy elucidates the origin of the rational and the 
bearer of truth, the subject, in domination and the relation of force- that is, at the 
micro-level of capillary pouz~oir .~~ 
It is in the essay, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", that Foucault elaborates 
hs genealopcal critique, or the "grey ... and patiently documentary ... [analysis 
that] ... operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments ... scratched 
50 Foucault, Tize Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 114. 
51 Macherey, "Towards a natural history of norms", pp. 177-178. 
52 Hutclungs, "Foucault and International Relations Theory", p. 104. 
53 Bouchard, "Introduction", p. 18. 
54 Noujain, "History as Genealogy", pp. 160-165; Toews, "Foucault and the Freudian Subject", pp. 122- 
126; Meuret, " A  political genealogy of political economy", pp. 51-55. 
55 Foucault, "Two Lectures", p. 83. 
Davidson, "Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics", p. 225. 
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over . . . many times”.57 A la Nietzsche, Foucault opposes the historian’s search for 
an origin (Ursprung), which enjoys the status of a primordial truth. For the 
genealogist, history reveals that there is no timeless essence of the origin, but only 
the difference of tlungs in scattered, accidental lxstorical beginrungs.B To oppose 
the hstorian’s search for the soul of history in terms of a unique origin of truth, the 
genealogist demonstrates that truth is the sort of error which can only not be 
refuted because of the long baking process of The genealogist, who 
opposes the assimilation and equalisation that depends on an origin, makes scant 
reference to the finality of an event in the present. He encourages estrangement 
from the past: genealogy is grey, but ”I forgot to say that such philosophers are 
cheerful and that they like to sit in the abyss below a perfectly clear sky’? 
Foucault’s genealogcal critique of normativity that rests on truth is also 
supported by the concepts of descent (Herkunff) and emergence (Entstehung). In the 
historian’s hands, descent amalgamates the resemblance and foundational 
character of traits and concepts in the present, which are found in a myriad of 
historical events. For the genealogist, descent highlights the infinite origins 
contained withm traits and concepts, which he uses to critique homogeneous 
concepts. The subject’s coherent identity after the process of recognition, for 
instance, is exposed as an empty synthesis by the genealogst’s liberation of lost 
events. In particular, Foucault argues that the human body is the inscribed surface 
of the events that determine history.61 One should not, Foucault writes, denounce 
the neglect of being by incorporeally oriented epistemological critique, but its 
silence about extra-being, or the body.62 
Whilst a genealogy of descent focuses on the reality of the body’s inscriptions 
and cautions against the progressive continuity of anthropocentrism, Foucault 
employs the concept of emergence to reject suggestions that a concept-Geist, for 
example -has an historical endpoint. The historian, who reflects current needs onto 
the origin, treats concepts in the present as a culmination in the emergence of 
normativity, whereas Foucault’s application of emergence posits concepts as 
products of the hazardous play of d~minat ion.~~ Concepts analysed through 
57 Foucault, ”Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, p. 139. 
58 Foucault, ”Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, pp. 139-142. 
59 Foucault, ”Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, pp. 143-145. 
6o Nietzsche, 7h Will to Power, § 988 and 5 990, pp. 516-517. 
61 Foucault, ”Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, pp. 145-148. 
62 Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum”, pp. 170-172. 
63 Foucault, “Nietzsche, la genealogie, I’histoire”, p. 145. 
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emergence are the result of a relation of force that is reconstructed by genealogy. 
Rather than discern the rational and its delivery to the actual, the genealogist 
highhghts the price of the rational to the actuality of the subject. Foucault calls this 
discourse of resistance, whch is regulated and neutralised by humanism,M 
I ’historisicme p o l i t i q ~ e . ~ ~  The genealogist’s analysis of historical politics demonstrates 
that, 
as soon as we enter the relations of power, we are neither in the realms of right 
or sovereignty but domination, which is an historically elusive and 
indescribably rich relation of domination that we cannot escape from - hence, 
we cannot escape history.& 
Genealogy is curative, not contemplative. It is medicinal rather than 
philosophcal, and it affirms that truth is a question of perspective.67 Armed with 
his analytical concepts of origin, descent and emergence, which give the 
genealogist an eye for real effective history, Foucault renders historical politics as a 
theatre of pouvoir. In it, a play of domination is endlessly repeated on a stage that is 
characterised by a specific relation of force, which is neither a struggle among 
juridical subjects, nor the energy generated when the strong encounter 
revolutionary subjects. Instead, the stage of the relation of force is where 
adversaries who are strangers to each other meet and compete to direct the play of 
domination, whch is based on a script that follows the available system of rules. 
Normativity originates in a relation of force and takes its meaning from the 
concept of event. For the hstorian, event signals inferior, unthinkable history, 
whilst for Foucault event is the parchments and documents which are crucial for 
genealopcal interpretation.@ Latently, event resembles the concept of chance, 
which is re-ified into an event through the attempt to master chance by the will to 
power.69 If domination is transformed by a usurpation of power, or the decadence 
Fontana and Bertani, ”Situation du cours”, p. 256. 
65 Foucault, “Cours du 18 fevrier 1976”, pp. 144-146. 
66 ’ ’ [ D ] ~ s  que I’on a affaire ri des rapports de pouvoir, on n’est pas dans le droit et on n’est pas dans la 
souverainefk; on est dans la domination, on est dans ce rapport historiquement indkjini, indkjininzent kpais et 
multipIe de domination. On ne sort pas de la domination, donc on ne sort pas de l’histoire”. Foucault, ”Cours 
du 4 fevrier 1976”, p. 96. 
67 Foucault, ”Nietzsche, Genealogy, History“, pp. 155-157. 
Foucault, “Truth and Power”, pp. 113-114. 
69 Foucault, ”Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, p. 155. The event is indicative of the actual in the present 
that develops out of the struggle of difference in the relation of force. Foucault describes the event’s 
birth to presence in terms of a throw of the dice, which is both the chance w i h  the game (of 
domination) and the game itself as chance (that depends on the relation of force). Foucault, ”Entretien 
avec Michel Foucault (1976)”, p. 145; Foucault, ”Theatrum Philosoplucum”, pp. 194195. 
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of a sterile play of domination that allows the dominated other to recontest the 
relation of the event gives an insight into its re~ersal.~’ As Sheridan argues, 
the event ”occurs in material elements and consists of their relation, coexistence, 
dispersion, accumulation, selection. The event must be seen, paradoxically, in t e r m  
of ’a materialism of the inc~rporeal”’.~~ In short, Foucault uses the event to disable 
truth, which sustains normative experience in a play of domination,73 and the 
genealogist portrays the series of interpretations of each play of domination and its 
normative system of rules as the effect of the event. 
And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can 
account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., 
without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in 
relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the 
course of 
Foucault’s genealogical critique can be juxtaposed with the subordination of 
history to philosophy since platonic metaphysics. This tradition of humanism 
inverts the relationships of will and knowledge in order to ground the objectivity of 
the latter in the universality of the knowing subject and his will.75 In contrast to 
Plato’s modalities of history - recognition, the diachronic autonomous subject, and 
a knowledge of truth - genealogy parodies, opposes and sacrifices each one, 
respectively. Genealogy’s concern is what is? @ouz~oir/sauoir), not who is? (the 
subject),76 and the recuperation of the event provides a counter-memory of more 
individualised, concrete identities, which parody those of recogrution. Also, 
counter-memory opposes the continuous identity of the transcendental subject with 
multiple events that cannot be mastered by synthesis.” Finally, genealogy sacrifices 
man, who wears a mask of neutrality and commitment to truth. 
If, since Aristotle, the will in the wdl to know has designated a natural, 
universal desire to kn0~,78 then it is with Nietzsche that a more fundamental mode 
of being which is prior to it, namely, the will to power, first materiahses. Foucault’s 
70 Foucault, ”Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, pp. 152-154. 
71 Foucault, ”Nietzsche, la genealogie, l’histoire”, p. 148. 
72 Sheridan, Michel Foucault, p. 129. 
73 Foucault, ”Theatrum Philosophcum”, p. 168. 
74 Foucault, ”Truth and Power”, p. 117. 
75 Foucault, ”Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, pp. 158-160. 
76 Foucault, ”Theatrum Philosophicum”, p. 182 and p. 167. 
Foucault, ”Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, pp. 160-162. 
78 Foucault, ”La volonte de savoir”, p. 243. 
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nietzscheanism captures thrs with h i s  idea of pouvoir, in which the will of the will to 
know is neither the autonomous subject’s authentic being, nor man’s desire for self- 
actualisation through recognition. Instead, Foucault’s concept of will (to know) 
denotes each will to power on the stage of the relation of force within the play of 
domination. Moreover, this will also establishes truth in the world, or connaissance 
from pouvoir/savoir. With regard to the relation of force, the gnd of intelligibility,” 
Foucault says that humanity: 
does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal 
reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs 
each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to 
domination.80 
With the historicisation of the subject in pouvoirlsavoir, the wdl to know is 
exposed as a function of events? Normative justice derives from connaissance which 
is effectively the revenge of the w d  to know that triumphs in the relation of force.82 
In contrast to the hstorian’s disclosure of an eternal will to freedom in 
philosophy,83 Nietzsche is first to separate the problem of freedom from the 
problem of the subject’s acquisition of the truth about himself. He makes the will to 
truth conscious of itself as a problem. Foucault’s genealogy continues this 
philosophyH- the will to know pves meaning to history in terms of truth, yet truth 
is forged by and employed on behalf of the wdl to power as normativity-but 
Foucault’s philosophy is ”a theater of mime with multiple, fuptive, and 
instantaneous scenes in which blind gestures signal to each other ... as masks”.85 
Despite the endeavours of humanism to link justice to a form of knowledge which 
is independent of power and indicative of the ideas that order the world, genealogy 
demonstrates that the truth which authorises political critique is the outcome of a 
prior relation of force.86 kght is therefore the effect of might, and because ’’one 
should value more than truth the force that forms [and] ... shape~’’,8~ truth’s 
cohabitation with pouvoir/savoir defines the object of analysis for the genealogst 
79 Foucault, ”Cours du 17 mars 1976”, p. 213. 
8o Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, p. 151. 
*’ Foucault, ”Nietzsche, la genealogie, l’hstoire”, p. 155. 
82 Foucault, ”Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, pp. 162-164 and p. 163, f. 60. 
83 Foucault, ”History of Systems of Thought”, pp. 202-203. 
84 Rajchman, Michel Foucault, pp. 120-121. 
85 Foucault, “Theatrum Phdosophcum”, p. 196. 
86 Foucault, “History of Systems of Thought”, p. 204. 
87 Nietzsche, The Will to P m e r ,  § 602, p. 324. 
131 
%I Gemalbgy o f  Nornativity andPouvoir 
intent on how to think and act freely. 
5.iii. Foucault’s Critique of the Power of Normative Experience 
If genealogy demonstrates that the muse of history, Clio, is forever c l u t c h g  at 
events-except when the owl of Minerva is allowed to cloak Clio in its wingsw- 
Madness and Ciuilization ushers in from the stage wings of the play of domination 
those who are excluded by humanism from Minerva’s flight and confined to 
smooth the owl’s take-off. Foucault’s proto-geneaology of reason’s silent other is 
not, as McNay suggests, an account of the total bankruptcy of enlightenment 
rationality.89 Instead, and after Kant, it is a hstory of reason qua critique of its 
conditions of possibility for normative experience. Nonetheless, although Madness 
and Civilizrrtion is only a proto-genealogy, it is Foucault’s first articulation of the 
price of humanist normativity. As I have just argued, genealogy continues this 
theme with its treatment of truth as the mask each actor wears in the relation of 
force, where the triumphant will to know determines the normativity that 
dominates the theatre of pouvoir. SW, Foucault’s proto-genealogy of madness, as 
well as his nietzschean genealogy of the early 1970s, share the humanist view that 
power is exercised by mechanisms of repression,w and in this section and the next I 
detail Foucault’s genealogical critique of humanism’s theory of power via the idea 
that pouzjoir is exercised by productive mechanisms, which takes him beyond 
humanism. 
In humanist critical thought, Foucault argues, the history of reason describes 
the manifestation of normativity in the skeletal power of the juridical state.91 Yet the 
problem with political critique which presumes truth is the vehicle of man’s 
maturity that, as political liberty, is a priori to power, or, as political liberation, is 11 
posteriori to it, is its theory of power. As a form of critical thought that is based on a 
prior objectification, or the subject of right, this theory merely imitates 
epistemologxal critique with its subject of knowledge who orders things. Political 
critique gives recourse ”to ways of thinking about power based on legal models, 
that is: What legtimates power? [o]r . . . on institutional models, that is: What is the 
s8 Noujain, “History as Genealogy”, p. 174. 
89 McNay, Foucaulf, pp. 71-75. 
“adequate to my purpose in Madness and Civilisation . . . since madness is a special case - during the 
Classical age power over madness was . . . exercised in the form of exclusionN, which only strikes 
Foucault as conceptually problematic ”during the course of a concrete experience . . . with prisons, 
starting in 1971-2”. Foucault, ”The Hstory of Sexuality”, pp. 183-184. 
91 Foucault, ”Truth and Power”, p. 119. 
Foucault, “Truth and Power”, p. 118. However, Foucault says that mechanisms of repression were 
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state?”? Humanism’s theory of the nature and mechanisms of power presumes 
what Foucault calls economism: in the liberal model, there is a formal isomorphism 
between man and the society he contracts into, which leads to the valorisation of 
right as a normative framework; in the marxist model, economism entails the 
functional subordination of the economy to the state, hence the value of 
revo l~t ion.~~ In either case, political critique assumes that state power is exercised 
by mechanisms of repression which prohibit, deny and occlude.% 
The liberal social contract model presumes an exchange of power between 
men who possess it equally and n priori, which is exemplified by Hobbes’ analysis 
of the state of non-difference (nature) in terms of pouz~oir .~~ Therein is the aleatory 
relation of force, which Hobbes defines as the state of war and Foucault calls an 
infinite diplomacy of egalitarian rivalry? The subject’s will is constituted on the 
stage of the relation of force, whilst in the play of domination the subject both 
encounters others with the same will and experiences fear. Foucault says there is a 
wd-fear-sovereignty continuum of legtimacy: Leviatlzan’s sovereignty is 
engendered by the fear of death and grounded in a universal will.97 
Ultimately, the authority of Hobbes’ Leviatlzan prospers so long as domination 
and its n priori conhtion, the relation of force, are kept at bay by Leviatlzan’s 
authority over the subject.% The fear characteristic of domination is exchanged for 
the fear of the repressive mechanisms of Leviatlzan’s power. In so doing, Hobbes 
transposes the problem of domination into a political theory, which is oriented 
towards state institutions and power as an expression of right, while he excludes 
from politics any conception of the relation of force.9 Given that, for the 
genealogist, there is an isomorphism between pouvoir’s normative play of 
92 Foucault, ”The Subject and Power”, p. 209. 
93 Foucault, “Two Lectures”, pp. 88-89. 
91 Foucault, ”The History of Sexuality”, pp. 183-184. 
95 Foucault, “Cours du 4 fevrier 1976”, pp. 77-78. 
96 Foucault, “Cours du 4 fevrier 1976”, p. 80. 
97 Foucault, ”Cours du 4 fevrier 1976”, pp. 82-84. 
98 Hobbes’ ontologcal condition, in whch man’s will to appetite and aversion causes him to desire 
pleasure and avoid pain, relates one man to another in terms of competition, diffidence and glory. 
This requires men to use violence to master and defend themselves from others, and to coerce 
recognition from others’ ”trifles or misrecognition” of oneself. Hobbes defines these intersubjective 
relations as the condition of war, whch ”consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a 
tract of time, wherein the Will to content by Battell is sufficiently known”. However, as Nietzsche 
points out, Hobbes wrongly suggests that the Will to content by Battell is a consequence of man’s will 
to appetite and aversion, when in fact pleasure and pain are epiphenomena of the ontologically prior 
will to power. Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 185186; Nietzsche, The Will to Pmwr, 5 702, p. 373. 
99 Foucault, “Cours du 4 fevrier 1976”, p. 85. 
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domination and the will to power in the relation of force,1w Foucault claims that a 
social body constituted by the universality of wills is a great fantasy. It ignores the 
fact that the social body is an effect not of consensus, but of the materiality of 
pouvoir that operates on the body.101 
Although humanism’s second theory of power opposes the liberal tradition,’02 
it is also based on the cartesian subject. A marxist theory of power suggests that the 
ideology of the dominant social contractors, who monopolise the state, infiltrates 
the subject’s consciousness. Ideology, which is false because it is a truth produced 
in the name of the class who controls the economic base of power, is contrasted 
with the truth free of the determinations of power that drives political critique.103 
Marx’s heirs at the Frankfurt School, for example, promote a dialectic between 
reason and domination that culminates, a pvopos of the truth, in revolution, whence 
undistorted recognition.1w 
Despite the similarities between foucauldian discipline and weberian 
rationalisation,105 or, indeed, between Foucault’s account of domination and 
gramscian hegemony,1ffi the conception of a subject, whose capacity of reason 
defines freedom independently of domination, means that for adherents of the 
Frankfurt School freedom’s other of power is dialectically overcome. In contrast, 
Foucault’s genealogy locates truth inside the theatre of pou~7oiv,~O~ and it notes the 
struggles in the relation of force.lo8 Also, his conception of governmentality posits 
freedom as the 7~2s-&772s, rather than the other, of pouuoir. Ironically, the marxist 
theory of power that emphasises domination at the level of consciousness shares 
the weakness of Hobbes localisation of politics in the institutions of the state. 
Marxism overlooks the way that pouuoir works on the subject’s body, which is 
precisely what 1968 brings into focus.lW 
Like apparently all things before the death of God and man, the magruficence 
of the humanist conception of power is its simplicity. Political critique assumes that 
loo Miller, La Passion Foucault, p. 229 and p. 493, f. 132. 
‘01 Foucault, ”Body/Power”, p. 55. 
lo2 As Gordon argues, Marx’s theory of power critiques the social contract tradition’s ”benign 
sociologcal model of power as the agency of social cohesion and normality, serving to assure the 
conditions of existence of the community”. Gordon, “Afterword”, p. 234. 
’03 Foucault, ”Truth and Power”, p. 118. 
lo4 Gordon, ”Afterword”, pp. 233-235. 
‘Os Dews, Logics of Disintegration, pp. 150-153. 
lffi Smart, “The Politics of Truth”, pp. 159-160. 
Io7 Dews, Logics of Disintegration, pp. 156-161; Hoy, ”Power, Repression, Progress”, pp. 132-133. 
‘08 Smart, ”The Politics of Truth”, pp. 162-163. 
lo9 Foucault, ”Body/Power”, pp. 57-58. 
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”only those who keep their distance from power, . . . shut up in their Cartesian potle, 
. . . only they can discover the truth”.ll0 As a result, Foucault writes that the question 
of the nature and exercise of power, which originates with the philosophe, continues 
to haunt critical thought as a juridical theory of repressive, state-centred power. It 
asks ”what is the sovereign?, how is he constituted as sovereign? what bond of 
obedience ties individuals to the sovereign?”.111 Foucault’s point is that to pose the 
question of power solely in terms of the juridical state simply underwrites a 
homogenous schema of repressive, thou-shalt-not power, which can only be 
transgressed. 
Humanism’s theory of an undifferentiated power leads to a double 
subjectivisation,112 for when the great Superego,113 the state, pronounces law, speaks 
the truth and prohibits, power is conceived as an absolute subject. Alternatively, 
when one is subject to power, emphasis is placed on the moment at wluch, in virtue 
of knowledge as truth, one says yes or no to it.114 Humanism’s universal subject of 
right is oblivious to the fundamental ontology of the will to power. At best, man is 
a simphfied conception of understanding and, at worst, an unjustified 
generalisation that does not exist.115 It is time to thnk of intersubjective relations 
beyond the juridical form of the contract, Foucault argues, whilst political struggle 
that is based on dialectical contradxtion must be freed from these sterile 
5.iv. The Exercise of Pouvoir 
Foucault’s unambiguous argument is that, to understand normative games of truth, 
it is necessarv to expand the definition of power.117 This is not to discard a theory 
that conceives of the nature of power in respect of the state and its exercise via 
mechanisms of repression, but to incorporate it into a genealogxal analysis of 
puuuuiy.“S At the same time, Foucault’s desire to overcome a theory of power 
110 Foucault, ”Prison Talk”, p. 51. 
111 Foucault, “The History of Sexuality”, p. 187. 
112 Aron, ”Macht, Power, Puissance”, p. 272. 
1 1 3  Foucault, “Body/Power”, pp. 59-60. 
‘ I 4  Foucault, “Powers and Strategies”, pp. 139-140. 
115 Nietzsche, The Will to Poum, § 671, p. 354 and 5 692, p. 369. 
Foucault, “Powers and Strateges”, pp. 143-144. 
117 Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, p. 209. 
118 Foucault, ”Powers and Strategies”, p. 141. It is possible, for example, ”for class struggle not to be 
the ’ rat io for the exercise of power’, yet still be the ’guarantee of intelligibility’ for certain grand 
strategies”. Foucault, ”Powers and Strategies”, p. 142. 
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necessitates that he leave behind his nietzschean notion-though obviously not 
genealogy itself-which shares with the humanist the idea that pouvoir is exercised 
solely by mechanisms of repression. In this respect, each professor at the Colgge de 
France is obliged to present their research to the public annually in twelve, two- 
hour lectures, and in the academic year 1975-1976 Foucault’s lectures, ”I1 faut 
&findre Za socie‘te”’, are devoted to a reconsideration of pouvoir in tandem with his 
rejection of the adequacy of a theory of power for critical thought that pursues 
enl~ghtenment.~~~ So, with a nietzschean genealogy of pouvoir in mind, ”why not 
continue to pursue a theory whch in its discontinuity is so attractive and plausible, 
albeit so little verifiable”?120 
Since 1968, Foucault replies, the contest between genealopcal critique and the 
power of scientific discourse has neither exposed, nor specified, the real issue at 
stake: how to conceive of the pouvoir that surges into view contemporaneously with 
the collapse of fascism and stahism, the analysis of whch gets bogged down in 
the question of sovereignty and the state due to the cold war.121 Specifically, to the 
extent that the twentieth century raises the problem of how to deal with an 
overabundance of pouzmir,122 Foucault poses the empirical questions, how is pouvoir 
exercised?, and what is the nature qua relations and effects of pouvoir?. They allow a 
”critical investigation into the thematics of power ... [and] avoid accusing a 
metaphysics or an ontology of power of being fraudulent”.I23 Neither humanism, 
whch uses a contract-oppression schema to specify the leptimate from the 
illegltimate exercise of power, nor Foucault’s pre-1975 nietzschean domination- 
repression schema, whch understands submission as the political consequence of 
the relation of force,124 are able to conceive of the exercise of power outwith the 
mechanisms of repression of a state-centred power. It is obvious, Foucault writes in 
a characteristic moment of self-critique, 
that all my work in recent years has been couched in the schema of struggle- 
repression, . . . which I have now been forced to reconsider, . . . . [Tlhis notion of 
repression ... is wholly inadequate to the analysis of the mechanisms and 
effects of power that it is so pervasively used to characterise today.lE 
Fontana and Bertani, ”Situation du cours”, p. 247. 
12” Foucault, ”Two Lectures”, p. 86. 
12’ Foucault, ”Truth and Power”, pp. 115-116. 
Fontana and Bertani, ”Situation du cours”, p. 249. 
Foucault, ”The Subject and Power”, p. 217. 
124 Foucault, ”Two Lectures”, pp. 89-91. 
Foucault, “Two Lectures”, p. 92. 
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Humanism’s theory of power perpetuates the legacy of monarchical 
sovereignty, evident since the sixteenth century, in whch the king monopolises 
state power and employs right as a means to arbitrate feudal wars? The principal 
features of h s  juridic-discursive power, with a formal leplative power on one 
side that is related, via mechanisms of repression, to an obedient subject on the 
other, include: a negative relation that sets limits; the insistence of the rule, where 
through its hold on discourse power defines the subject’s field of intelligible 
actions - thus, juridico-discursive; a cycle of prohibitions; a logic of censorship; and 
the uniformity of the apparatus, through whch power is exercised homogeneously 
by mechanisms of law, prohibition and censorship.127 Humanism is a continuation 
of top-down power along a sovereign-subject axis, albeit from the point of view of a 
theory of human rather than divine right. Normative justice is sandwiched between 
the state and the citiZen-subject,128 as juridical power displaces God as the site of 
legitimation with the immanent foundation of the governed.129 
Insofar as Nietzsche is concerned, Foucault’s empiricisation of his aphorisms 
through critiques of madness, delinquency and perversion lead him to realise that a 
play of domination does not prosper solely because of repression, but due to the 
exercise of pouuoir through mechanisms and techniques which produce subjects.130 
Foucault’s post-nietzschean concept of pouvoir is most evident in his refinement of 
what it means to be a subject. In addition to the subjugation suffered under 
mechanisms of repression, for instance, Foucault’s concept of assujettissemen f also 
captures subjection,l31 the real and material constitution of the self as an individual 
subject and a subject w i h  the population,132 as well as objecMication, where the 
self is an object of sauoir.’33 Rather than ask what part of himself or his power the 
ideal subject cedes in return for letting himself be subjected, Foucault examines 
”how relations of subjection are able to constitute the subject”.lM 
For Foucault, the right that clothes might glosses over domination and it is 
126 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, pp, 86-91. 
lZ7 Foucault, The History ofsexuality, pp. 83-85. 
128 Foucault, ”Two Lectures”, p. 103. 
129 Pasquino, ”Michel Foucault (1926-&I)”, p. 38. 
130 Foucault, ”Two Lectures”, p. 96. Although Nietzsche speaks of mechanisms of prohibition, he does 
intimate the workings of a society grounded in extra-juridical sornato- and bio-pouvoir. See Nietzsche, 
The Will to Power, § 738, p. 391 and § 717, pp. 382-383. 
131 Foucault, ”Cours du 14 janvier 1976“, p. 24. 
132 Rajchman, Michel Foucault, p. 57. 
133 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 24. 
I M  ”[Clornrnent Zes relations d’assujettissernent peuventfabn’quer des sujets”. Foucault, “Resume”, p. 239. 
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the permanent agent of polymorphous techniques of subjection, which produce 
subjects and are unaccounted for in humanist political critique.135 He thus struggles 
against fomzes d’assujettissement, where subjugation, subjection and objectification 
intersect and result in la soumission de la subjectivitk, the submission of subjectivity.136 
That is, formes d’assujettissement are indicative of pouvoir whch makes individuals 
subjects. Here, 
[tlhere are two meanings of the word subject: subject to someone else by control 
and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self- 
knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of p m e r  which subjugates and makes 
subject to (uize forme de pouvoir qui subjugue et a s s ~ j e t t i t ~ ~ ~ ) . ~ ~  
Indeed, it is because of the explanatory inadequacy of mechanisms of repression 
peculiar to the ‘humanist theory of power, and h s  own nietzschean genealogy of 
pouvoir, both of which fail to account for how the subject is produced in normative 
games of truth, that Foucault says we need a critical: 
political philosophy that isn’t erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor 
therefore around the problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the 
King’s head: in political theory that has still to be done.139 
After Machiavelh, who liberates the study of power from morality, Foucault 
liberates the study of pouvoir from political critique that is centred on the state and 
mechanisms of repression. His aim is to turn the question of pouzjoir against the 
power of the Foucault argues that power mechanisms can be deciphered on 
the basis of a strategy immanent in the relation of force.141 If political critique 
deploys truth to fix limits to the rights of power in the name of freedom, the critical 
question for an analysis of pouvoir that assumes we are ”subjected to the production 
of truth through power[,] and we cannot exercise power except through the 
production of truth”, is: “what rules of right are implemented by the relations of 
power in the production of the discourses of truth?”.142 The right that is proposed 
by humanism constitutes the normative experience which produces subjects, and 
135 Foucault, ”Two Lectures”, pp. 95-96. 
136 Foucault, ”Le sujet et le pouvoir”, p. 228. 
137 Foucault, ”Le sujet et le pouvoir”, p. 227. My emphasis. 
138 Foucault, ”The Subject and Power”, p. 212. My emphasis. 
139 Foucault, ”Truth and Power”, p. 121. 
I4O Ewald, ”Foucault, une pensee sans aveu”, p. 47. 
14’ Foucault, The History of Sexuality, p. 97. 
142 Foucault, ”Two Lectures”, p. 93. 
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Foucault's genealogical critique seeks to make the humanist aware of it as a 
problem in terms of the forms of subjection and objectification it effects. 
Foucault's technico-strategic, rather than juridico-negative,143 analysis of the 
exercise of pouvoir by productive mechanisms proceeds as a critique that is a 
constant checking.14 It is a perpetual articulation of the will to know as a problem 
for maturity. Around, above and below juridical power, the mechanism and 
techmques of the technologies of sornato- and bio-pouzioir and political rationality 
constitute I'ordre du ~ ~ S C O U Y S , ~ ~ ~  the pouvoirl savoir that produce subjects. Foucault 
calls each an economy of pouvoir, or all the procedures whch allow the effects of a 
technology of pouvoir to circulate in a continuous, individuahsed manner 
throughout intersubjective relations.146 Also, the mechanisms and techniques that 
circulate an economy require a corresponding political economy of truth. While the 
economy of pouvoir is a political concern, the political economy is the philosophical 
focus for the post-1968 critical hl~torian~~7- typically, because it moves within and 
coalesces with pouvoir,148 the political economy appears as a regime of t r u t h , 1 4 9  or 
normativity . 
Finally, to avoid any lapse back into a theorisation of state power and its 
repressive mechanisms, Foucault alludes to five methodological guidelines for an 
analysis of how pouvoir is exercised: firstly, investigate the multiple, final 
destinations of capillary pouvoir, which as it less legal in character is more able to 
surmount and extend itself beyond juridical right; secondly, look at pouvoir where it 
produces real effects in practice, or material subjection; thirdly, suppose that pouzioir 
is exercised through a network in which subjects are h k e d  to each other, and upon 
whom pouvoir is articulated as subjection and government~5~- assume, that is, that 
the subject is constituted by, as well as the vehcle of, p o u ~ o i r ; ~ ~ '  fourth, to assuage 
those who state that, as vehicles of pouvoir, everyone thinks and acts the same, 
143 Foucault, "The History of Sexuality", p. 184. 
l a  Foucault, "The Subject and Power", p. 209. 
145 Said, "Foucault and the Imagination of Power", p. 150. 
146 Foucault, "Truth and Power", p. 119. 
147 Foucault, "Truth and Power", pp. 131-132. 
However, Foucault states that "I do not mean to say that the games of truth are but relationships of 
power ... . My problem is .. . to know how games of truth can put themselves in place and be linked to 
relationshps of power". Foucault, "The ethic of the care for the self", p. 16. 
149 Here, "'[tlruth' is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, 
regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. 'Truth' is llnked in a circular relation 
with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and 
which extend it. A 'regime' of truth". Foucault, "Truth and Power", p. 133. 
150 Foucault, "Cours du 14 janvier 1976", p. 26. 
15' Foucault, "Two Lectures", pp. 96-98. 
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undertake an ascendmg analysis of pouvoir from the capillary up to the sovereign 
level; and, fifth, accept that the productive mechanisms and techniques of pouvoir 
are co-extensive with ideology, but that they also function through instruments 
which form savoir, so that their exercise puts into circulation the stratepc 
apparatuses of pouvoir/ s a v o i ~ . ~ ~ ~  According to Foucault, therefore, the condition of 
possibihty relevant to the exercise of pouuoir by productive mechanisms is the 
relation of force, which even if it seems secondary concerns the body and daily 
existence. The intersubjective relation of force is the concrete, sMting soil in whch 
the normative justice of the juridical state is grounded, and the condition that 
makes it possible for repressive power to be exercised.ls3 Pouvoir, Foucault argues, 
must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations . . . . 
Power’s condition of possibility, or in any case the viewpoint which permits one 
to understand its exercise ... and which also makes it possible to use its 
mechanisms as a grid of intelligibility of the social order, ... is the moving 
substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly 
engender states of power, ... . Power is everywhere; not because it embraces 
everything, but because it comes from everywhere. ... One needs to be 
nominalistic, no doubt: power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither 
is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name one attributes to a 
complex strategcal situation in a particular society.154 
5.v. Somato-Pouvoir 
In the two preceding sections, I have discussed the shortcomings of Foucault’s 
proto-genealogy of madness and his genealogy of pouvoir, which mirror the 
explanatory weakness of a theory of power that concentrates on mechanisms of 
repression. Together with its state-centred sense of the nature of power, humanism 
overlooks power’s productive effectiveness, which causes Foucault to ponder why 
this juridical notion of power is so readily accepted. Speculating, he suggests that: 
power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its 
success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms. Would power 
be accepted if it were entirely cyrucal? For it, secrecy is not in the nature of an 
abuse; it is indispensable to its operation. ... Power as a pure limit set on 
I s2  Foucault, ”Two Lectures”, pp. 99-102. The second, third, firstlfourth and fifth of these 
methodological guidelines equate to the rules o f  immanence; continual variation; double- 
conditioning; and the tactical polyvalence of discourses. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, pp. 98-102. 
Foucault, “The History of Sexuality”, p. 187. 
154 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, pp. 92-93. 
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freedom is . . . the general form of its ac~eptability.~~~ 
Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality are genealogical critiques of 
the technologies of somato- and bio-pouvoir, which humanist political critique 
effectively masks to enable juridical state power to operate. Discipline and Punish, 
which also provides intelligibility for prison reform in France during the 1970s, is 
the blueprint for TIE History of Sexuality, which investigates what the real 
mechanisms of pouvoir are.'% Llke madness as reason's subjugated other, both 
books unmask the productive mechanisms whch are the indispensable other of 
juridical power's repressive mechanisms. But Discipline and Punish and TIze History 
of Sexuality also refine Madness and Civilization. Whereas the latter portrays how 
normativity depends on the confined exclusion of the other, whose symptom of 
dlfference to the subject of reason is indicative of a medical condition, these 1970s 
texts are genealopcal critiques of the normalisation effected by productive 
mechanisms outside the asylum w i h  the social body.157 Discipline and Punish 
inaugurates, and The History of Sexuality extends, Foucault's critical hstory of 
finitude in the present.'58 Genealopcal critique traces the descent and emergence of 
normative experience from its origms in subjection and objecbfication. Discipline 
and Punish, which is the focus of this section, investigates the mechanisms of 
discipline and the techruque of examination of somato-pouvoir - sdnza, the Greek 
word for body'jg- which "actually penetrates the density of the body itself without 
any need for its representation by, or its mediation through, the subject's conscious 
intention",'60 and in section 5.vi. I deal with hio-pounoir's mechanisms of regulation 
and its t e c h q u e  of confession. 
Discipline and Punish is a study of punishment as spectacle and as 
representation in the renaissance and classical epochs, and as incarceration in the 
post-1790 modern epoch. Foucault argues that each form of punishment is the 
respective mirror of monarchical and juridical power and sonzato-pouvoir. In 
particular, Foucault critiques incarceration insofar as it reflects the asymmetrical 
155 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, p. 86. 
lS6 Foucault, "On Power", pp. 101-102. 
157 Foucault, "Body/Power", p. 61. 
158 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 31. 
lS9 Foucault, The Care ofthe Se$ p. 27. 
I b 0  "[Lles rapports de pouvoir peuvent passer matericllement dans l'epaisseur mime des corps sans avoir a itre 
relayis par la reprksentation des sujets . . . [ou] intkriorise' dans la conscience . . . . I1 y a un  rkseau de hio-pouvoir, 
de sonzato-pouvoir". Foucault, "Les rapports de pouvoir passent a l'interieur des corps", p. 231. 
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and inegalitarian capillary somto-pouaoir in the social body of western societies.16’ 
Through writing the genealogy of the citizen’s condition of existence, the docile- 
uthty body of subjection and objectsfication, Foucault examines the productive 
mechanisms of disciphe that operate in the modern penitentiary in terms of their 
social function, their use as a political strategy, their investment of the body by 
pouuoir, and their persomfication of the endogenous status of savoir to somato- 
pouvoir.’62 The citizen is the correlative of somato-pouvoir’s mechanisms and 
techniques which are exerted over the body. He is the reality-reference on which 
”various concepts have been constructed and domains of analysis carved out: 
psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc.’’ In effect, the 
enhghtenment’s invitation to establish maturity, whch is taken up by humanism’s 
political critique that normatively regulates state power, fails: man is already in 
humelf the effect of mechanisms of subjection more absolute than himself.164 
Foucault’s genealogy commences with monarchcal power. From the 
thirteenth century to the renaissance epoch, a majority of serious crimes are 
punished by the techmque of torture or supplice, or corporal punishment of a 
horrible degree. Nonetheless, it is a legally codified art of punishment. It extracts 
the penal truth from the criminal through inflicting a certain level of pain, a 
gradation of pain that culminates in death, or death-torture, whereby life is 
maintained in pain. Through this juridical game of innocence or guilt between the 
prosecutor and criminal, monarchical power produces the truth before its spectacle 
of punishment is publicly imposed upon the criminal, which re-activates the 
dissymmetry of the lung’s power over his subjects and the imbalance of right 
between them.165 Foucault writes that monarchical power ”presented rules and 
obligations as personal bonds ... [with] disobedience ... an act of hostili ty... that 
16’ Foucault, “Radioscope de Michel Foucault”, p. 797. Foucault, “Sur les facons d’ecrire l’lustoire”, p. 
599. A note on Foucault’s account of epochs is in order here. To recall, in Madness and Civilization he 
speaks of the renaissance epoch, which proceeds mediaeval Christianity and runs to the mid- 
seventeenth century, and the classical (1656-1789) and the modern epochs (post-1789). Similarly, in 
Tlze Order of Things Foucault refers to renaissance humanism and classical rationalism, and the post- 
kantian modern epoch, which are defined by their epistemes. He largely maintains this chronology in 
Discipline and Punish, albeit in terms of the technologes of monarchical (renaissance epoch) and 
juridical power (classical epoch of 1760-1840) and sornato-pouuoir (modern epoch after the mid- 
nineteenth century) The one inconsistency is the divide between the renaissance and classical epochs. 
In Discipline and Punish, it is the mid-eighteenth, rather than the seventeenth (1656), century of 
Madness and Civilization. 
162 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 23-24. 
163 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 29. 
164 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 30. 
165 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 33-50. 
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[necessitated] the ritual display of its reality as a ’super-power’”.’M 
For the eighteenth century philosoplze, the spectacle of punishment’s juridico- 
physical game exacerbates the shame of the criminal, while the king’s tyrannical 
excess of armed justice stokes violent rebellion in the people. Accordingly, a man- 
measure that defines the legitimate frontier of the power to punish is drawn up. 
Foucault calls it the enigmatic leniency of the classical epoch, where punishment 
must have humanity as its measure. Reform, however, is merely the politics of an 
already existent change, from a monarclucal to a juridical economy of power, and 
from punishment as spectacle to representation. 
Classical punishment as representation is a function of early capitahst society, 
in which juridical power elaborates the right to punish away from the vengeance of 
the sovereign to the defence of the democratic social body.’67 The conditions 
required for juridical power include the objectdication that produces the criminal’s 
soul, who supersedes the tortured body as the object of punishment from withm, 
rather than as a moral superimposition upon, state power. In the classical epoch, 
the power that underlies the exercise of punishment is duplicated by an object 
relation, ”in which are caught up not only the crime as a fact to be established 
according to common norms, but the criminal as an individual to be known 
according to specific criteria” .I@ Punishment as representation to the social body 
invests each crime with a specific law and each criminal with a particular 
punishment.169 Juridical power deploys the soul that connaissance constitutes to 
reconvert the criminal into a subject of right, who can then re-occupy h s  place as a 
citizen in the social body. By the late eighteenth century, Foucault says there is 
evidence in France of punishment as spectacle, representation and incar~eration.~~~ 
We have, then, the sovereign and his force, the social body and the 
administrative apparatus; . . . the vanquished enemy, the juridical subject in the 
process of requalification, the individual subjected to immediate coercion; the 
tortured body, the soul with its manipulated representations, the body 
subjected to training. We have here the . . . elements that characterize the three 
mechanisms . . . according to which the power to punish is exercised . . . . [Hlow 
is it that, in the end, it was the third that was adopted?l7l 
166 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 57. 
167 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 73-89. 
’@ Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 101-102. 
169 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 104-114. 
I7O Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 120-126. 
17’ Foucault, DiscipZine and Punish, pp. 130-131. 
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The adoption of punishment as incarceration after 1810 is the result of 
juridical power, which develops the prison, and somato-pouvoir that provides its 
mechanismdn In the social body where these technologies are co-extensive, 
Foucault claims that the classical epoch's man-the-machine, who is an intelligible 
and functional, anatomico-metaphysical body, is combined with an administrative 
techno-politics of the useful and submissible body. They produce the politico- 
economic docile-utdity body, which is transformed and improved, as well as 
subjected and used. The cause is the seventeenth and eighteenth century 
disciplines, which effect domination in capillary pouvoir through an art of the body. 
It enters a maclunery of pouvoir that explores, re-arranges and breaks the body 
down. Foucault calls this the political anatomy of somato-pouvoir, which gives birth 
to humanism's modern man,I73 and only a genealogy that is grey and meticulous 
can resurrect out of the institutions of the school, hospital, barracks and factory, 
where the smallest details of disciphe are W e s t ,  the essential mechanisms and 
technique of somnfo-pou~ioir.~74 
Genealogical critique uncovers four strateges for the subjection of the body - 
tableaux uivants, nzanoeuiire, exercice and dressage -which are exercised by sonznto- 
pouiioir's productive mechanisms within its four essential disciplines: the art of 
distribution creates cellular pouvoir, which distributes the body;175 the control of 
activity is an organic pou~oir  that extracts productivity from the body;176 the 
organisation of geneses is a h i t l e s s  pouvoir, which accumulates time from the 
body;'" and the composition of forces is an economically productive pouuoir that 
'72 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 117 and p. 128. 
'73 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 28. 
174 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 135-141. 
175 The art of distribution disciplines through the large scale enclosure of individuals and the 
partitioning of individuals in an analytical space. It also disciplines via functional sites, which code 
arclutectural space in order to articulate an administrative and political space, and through rank, 
which holds individuals in disciplinary space. An enclosed arclutectural, functional and hierarchcal 
space is constituted as disciplinary by the tableaux oiaants, wluch as a technique of pouvoir and a 
procedure of savoir distribute and analyse, as well as supervise and make intelligible, the subject qua 
individual and member of an ordered multiplicity. Foucault, DisLipline and Punish, pp. 141-149. 
176 The control of activity operates through a techruque of time-tabling, which applies the body to its 
exercise, and the temporal elaboration of the act that penetrates the body's behaviour with the 
imperatives of time. Further, the control of activity functions via the correlation of the body and flu 
gesture, wluch ensures efficient actions, the body-object articulation that enmeshes the body with the 
objects it manipulates, and the exhaustive use of the body vis-&vis the finitude of time. These techruques 
of subjection of the manoeuvre see the mechanical body of speculative physics superseded by the 
natural body of exercise and duration, which is offered up to new forms of savoir. Foucault, Discipline 
and Punish, pp. 149-156. 
ln The organisation of geneses add up and capitalise the time of the individual through a h e a r ,  
evolutive time, in which each individual evolves in terms of a genesis, whilst administrative and 
economic techniques reveal a cumulative time that intimates the progress of society. The techniques of 
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organises the body into an efficient machine.ln As the other of the philosopk’s 
dream of a perfect society that is constituted by juridical subjects, the disciplines are 
installed in virtue of a military dream of society, where each body is a meticulously 
subjected cog in the social machme.179 For the military dream to be realised through 
the disciplines, the exercise of somato-pouvoir requires the three techniques of 
hierarchical observation, normalising judgement and examination. In fact, it is in 
the examination that hierarchical observation is combined with normalising 
judgement to produce the normalising gaze.1so It gives rise to the exam 9ua economy 
of visibility, which holds the body in a mechanism of objec~ication; the exam qua 
field of documentation, whch inscribes the body in a field of connaissance as an 
analysable object; and the exam 9ua production of each body as a case via 
pouvoirl savoir. As Foucault claims, 
[tlhe examination . . . is a normaking gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible 
to quahfy, to classlfy and to punish. ... In it are combined the ceremony of 
power, and the form of the experiment, the deployment of force and the 
establishment of truth. At the heart of the procedure of discipline, it manifests 
the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of 
those who are subjected. The superimposition of the power relations and 
knowledge relations assumes in the examination all its visible brilhance.lsl 
The anonymous functionality of sonzato-pouvoir marks the reversal from 
his torico-ritual to scientdico-disciphary mechanisms of subjection and 
objectdication. It shifts the political axis from the monarch to the individual, who 
through humanism’s juridico-anthropology is ”a reality fabricated by the specific 
technology of power that I have called ’discipline’” .I82 Somato-poui.)oir substantiates 
Foucault’s claim of the futility, for critical thought that is concerned with maturity, 
subjection of exercice effect a dynamics of continuous social evolution that imposes repetitive and 
different, but always graduated, tasks on the body. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 156-162. 
17* The composition of forces refers to the constitution of the body as part of a multi-segmentary 
machine, which functions according to a composite of time. It optimises each body in relation to 
another via a precise system of command that is practised through techniques of dressage. Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish, pp. 162-166. 
179 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 169. 
eizcastrernent, an embedding pouvoir or physics of the body, whch uses a mechanism of 
architecturalised surveillance to effect the progressive, continuous and functional objectdication of 
behaviour. In tandem with herarchical observation is normalising judgement. It is a mechanism of 
extra-juridical micro-penalties whch, upon the individual’s non-observance of an institution’s norm 
and/or his inability to conform through training to an institution’s purpose, operate through corrective 
exercises that compare, differentiate, hierarche, homogenise and exclude the subject. Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish, pp. 170-192. 
Hierarchcal observation induces an effect of pouzioir on the body through the principle of 
Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 184-185. 
ls2 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 183 and pp. 192-193. 
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of a theory of negative, repressive power. He shows that pouvoir produces 
“domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that 
may be gained of him belong to this production”.183 Moreover, if somato-pouvoir’s 
productive mechanisms and techruque are the nuts and bolts of the confined 
exclusion of the madman that is first articulated in Madness and Civilization, then 
Foucault’s proto- and genealogical critique of the classical epoch reveal that it 
envisages two models to control the subject: exile-enclosure via confinement, 
separation and the marked body; and tactical partition through correct training, 
segmentation and the analysed body. Both in turn fuel the modern epoch‘s political 
dreams of a pure community and a disciphed society, whch are based on a state 
of nature and a state of plague, respectively. In the nineteenth century, these 
dreams become real when the models of exclusion and discipline, whch confine 
and correct, combine.1g4 
Accordmg to Foucault, Bentham’s proposal for a panopticon is the 
architectural personification of these conjoined models. The panopticon turns the 
confined inmate into a separated individual, who isolated in his cell from others 
and guards ceases to be a subject of communication simultaneous to his supervision 
as an object of mformation. A central tower, and the guard hidden from view 
w i h  it, ensure a visible but unverifiable pouvoir. Insofar as the inmate is seen, 
without seeing, whdst the guard sees, without being seen, the panopticon’s 
mechanisms automatise and disindividualise pouvoir. Real subjection materialises 
from a fictitious, because forceless, relation. Houses of security, which confine the 
excluded in the classical epoch, become the modern houses of certainty. Subjected 
to a field of visibility, the inmate inscribes in hmself the duality of pouvoir-he 
assumes responsibility for, and plays spontaneously upon himself, the constraints 
of pouvoir-and in so doing he becomes the principle of h s  own subjection.185 In 
addition, the panopticon’s mechanisms of surveillance render it into a laboratory, 
where experiments are carried out on inmates, such that ”knowledge follows the 
advances of power, discovering new objects of knowledge over all the surfaces on 
whch power is exercised”.186 The panopticon, Foucault writes, is not a dream, but 
the general principle of a society that is penetrated through and through with 
disciplinary 
IR3 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 194. 
Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 197-199. 
ls5 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 200-203. 
Is6 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 204. 
lS7 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 205-209. 
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The bridge between the disciphe-blockade of the plague stricken town, and 
the disciplme-mechanism of the panopticon 150 years later, is the normative 
experience of sornato-pouaoir. To be sure, disciplme is irrevocably altered: firstly, by 
the floating population and increased productivity of industrialisation, which 
encourages an intensification of mechanisms of discipline;lss secondly, although 
somato-pouvoir is neither dependent on, a direct extension of, or independent from, 
the normative justice proposed by political critique to juridical power, it is its non- 
egalitarian and asymmetrical dark underside which operates in capdlary pouvoir. 
Actual, corporal disciplines, Foucault says, constitute the foundation of formal, 
juridical lib er tie^?^ Essentially, the shift from the classical to the modern epoch 
occurs as the disciplines in the school, hospital, barracks and factory break anchor 
from their institutional origin and dock with the police, whose function is to 
oversee somato-pouvoir in the social body? 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, therefore, the shift from 
punishment as representation to punishment as incarceration signals a transition 
from juridical power to somato-pouvoir. And, by the same token that juridical power 
upholds the principle of maturity and somato-pouvoir concomitantly effects 
subjection and objectification, normative justice that is equal, and a legal machinery 
which is autonomous, incorporate the mechanisms and techruques of di~ciplme.19~ 
In its effects, juridical right mirrors penal justice. The penitentiary of despotic omni- 
disciphe,192 whch deprives the criminal of h s  liberty through individual isolation 
and hierarchy, compulsory work, cure and n~rmalization,~~~ is a depiction of the 
citizen's intersubjective relations. In particular, justice is replaced by the extra- 
juridical connnissance of the technicians, who regulate the penitentiary? They 
transform the criminal into the delinquent, who is a danger not because of the 
crime he commits, but in virtue of the Me he led, leads and will lead.195 At the same 
lss Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 218-221. 
189 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 222-223. 
1 9 0  Institutional disciplines perform a finctional inversion of late seventeenth century discipline. Instead 
of the neutralisation of danger, the eighteenth century disciplines start to increase the utility of 
subjects. Further, the swarming of disciplinary mechanisms sees the de-institutionalisation of the 
disciplines, which begin to effect extra-institutional subjects as well. Tlurdly, the state-control of 
disciplinary mechanisms by a police structure, which in addition to its role as the auxiliary of justice, 
infiltrates the capillary pouvoir that juridical power does not reach, means that the disciplines effect 
sornato-pouzmir beyond their institutional origins. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 209-216. 
191 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 231-235. 
192 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 236-244. 
'93 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 248. 
194 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 244-256. 
195 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 17-19. 
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time, fabrication of the delinquent re-enforces the judgements of juridical power, 
which is wdingly dependent on tfus extra-juridical connaissance.’% Further, the 
delinquent serves a political function. He is the agent of juridical power’s bourgeois 
illegalities in the social, economic and political arenas,197 which not only appear to 
reflect justice in virtue of their correspondence to the truth of a certain type of man, 
the delinquent, but they mask the domination of juridical power’s egalitarian code. 
It turns on sonzato-pouvoir that fixes the subject in time, space and an order, or a 
social origm, a political identity and an economic herarchy.198 
Punishment as incarceration reflects Foucault’s analysis of the pouvoir/ savoir 
that effects the submission of subjectivity. Prison-penitentiary technicians work in a 
carceral archpelago, which functions along a continuum of confinement, juridical 
punishment and mechanisms of discipline.’% Juridical power that incarcerates 
s e e m  natural if its object is the abnormal delinquent, who chooses not to follow the 
rule, wlulst somato-pouaoir is legal in virtue of its correction of the delinquent back 
to normality. The penitentiary is the “real, material counterpart of that chimerical 
granting of the right to punish’ established by the social contract,200 and it 
represents a new economy of pou-tloir that is based on juridico-disciplinary right: 
law qua legality and nature, prescription and constitution; and law qun norm in a 
society ruled by the normative power ”of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the 
educator-judge”.201 Although the apparatus of the penitentiary can be transformed, 
the problem is how to halt the spread of sornato-pouvoir and its mechanisms of 
normalisation in a society wherein the body suffers subjection and its actions 
objedication. “I am not saying”, Foucault re-iterates, 
that the human sciences emerged from the prison. But, if they have been able to 
. . . produce so many profound changes in the episteme, it is because they have 
been conveyed by a ... new modality of power: a certain policy of the body, a 
certain way of rendering the group of men docile and useful. This policy 
required the involvement of definite relations of knowledge in relations of 
power; it called for a technique of overlapping subjection and objectification; it 
brought with it new procedures of individualization. ... Knowable man (soul, 
individuality, consciousness, conduct, whatever it is called) is the object-effect 
Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 22. 
197 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 257-282. 
198 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 290-291. 
’* Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 294-297. 
2w Foucault, Disnpline and Punish, p. 303. 
201 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 304. 
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of this analytical investment, of this domination-observation.202 
5.vi. B io- Pouv o ir 
Foucault concludes Discipline and Punish with the reflection that it "must Serve as a 
historical background to various studies of the power of normalization and the 
formation of knowledge in modern s0ciety".*~3 T712e History of Sexuality continues this 
critique of the entwinement of normative experience and pouvoir, although instead 
of the delinquent knowable man is now the pervert, who is the object-effect of the 
apparatus of sexuality. He reflects to the citizen in the social body the nineteenth 
century technology of hio-pouvoir that is exercised over the population, and my task 
in t h s  section is to further explicate Foucault's claim that pouvoir produces subjects 
through mechanisms of dmipline and regulation and techniques based on 
seeing/ examining and spealung/listening, which humanism overlooks such that 
its political critique fosters an exclusive maturity. 
The cross-over from normativity to subjectivity, which to re-iterate will be my 
point of departure in chapter 6, is evident from the outset of Foucault's genealogy 
of sexuality, in which he asks "why, beyond the reproduction of the species and the 
famdy, or the procurement of pleasure and joy, has western sexuality been seen as 
the privileged place where the profound truth of the human subject is found and 
articulated from"?204 Once again, Foucault's genealogical critique renders a different 
story to humanism's realist history. As in the forms of punishment, where the 
ylzilosoplze explains the shift from spectacle to representation to incarceration in 
terms of juridical reforms, humanism's critical discourse of sexuality, 
psychoanalysis, discerns tolerance for the illicit at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century. Over the next two hundred years, the psychoanalyst notes the 
bourgeoisie's clampdown on sexuality.*05 Under a Victorian regime that serves 
capitalism, the psychoanalyst suggests, sexuality is confined to the procreative 
function that defines the conjugal relation in the suburban home. Any other 
*02 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 305. 
*03 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 308. 
204 "[C]omment se fait-il que, duns une socie'te' comme la nbtre, la sexualite' ne soit pas simplement ce qui permet 
de reproduire l'espice, la famille, les individus? Pas simplement quelque chose qui procure du plaisir et de la 
jouissance? Comment se fait-il qu'elle ait e'te' conside'rie comme le lieu privile'gie' ou se lit, ou se dit nofre oe'rite' 
profonde?". Foucault, "Non au sexe roi", pp. 256-257. 
205 Insofar as juridical power exercises mechanisms of repression over sex, Foucault remarks that in 
France they are absent as late as 1810, when the napoleonic code is first introduced. Foucault, "Sexual 
Morality and the Law", pp. 271-275. 
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function, purpose or place of sexuality is condemned to prohibition, non-existence 
and silence. A mechanism of repression is the fundamental lmk between juridical 
power and sex until the start of the twentieth century and the sexual revolution 
driven by Charcot, Freud and psychoanalysis.2w 
Foucault is skeptical about psychoanalysis’ history of juridical power’s hold 
on sex. His skepticism is fuelled by the discursive existence of sex in a regime of 
power-knowledge-pleasure. Under tlus apparatus of a science of sex, the scienta 
sexualis, the truth about sex in the modern epoch is formulated on the basis of the 
subject of desire. But rather than relieve sex from juridical power through the 
liberation of desire, Foucault claims that psychoanalysis is merely the apotheosis of 
the scientu sexualis, not least because this apparatus’ r e p e  of truth constitutes the 
subject’s desire in the first place.2o7 For these reasons, Foucault argues that the 
mechanism of repression is an hypothesis to be challenged hstorically (is the 
Victorian age of repression a fact?), hstorico-theoretically (do mechanisms of power 
primarily repress?) and htorico-politically (does psychoanalysis’ political critique 
halt a repressive mechanism of power, or is it part of the same network-the 
technique of confession - whch it denounces?). In brief, Foucault queries whether 
”there really [is] a historical rupture between the age of repression and the critical 
analysis of repression’’?208 
Firstly, Foucault suggests that man is hstorically incited to tell e v e r y h g  
about his sex-indeed, at the end of the classical epoch in 1789, there is discursive 
explosion209 - whch not only brings multiple effects of displacement, intensification 
and modification of desire, but creates an apparatus that produces an analytical 
discourse about sex.210 Much to the embarrassment of reason, sex is brought into 
discourse by rationality. An economically useful and politically conservative 
discourse of genitally centred sexuality constitutes polymorphous discourses on sex 
and actual subjects,211 which aids the police’s ordered maximisation of collective 
and individual forces within the population.212 
206 Foucault, The History ofsexuality, pp. 3-8. 
207 Foucault, The History ofsexuality, pp. 11-13. 
208 Foucault, The History ofsexuality, p. 10. 
209 Foucault, Tlze History ofSexuality, pp. 17-18. 
210 Foucault, The History ofSexualzty, p. 23. 
211 Foucault, 77ze History ofsexuality, pp. 36-37. 
* I 2  Population emerges as a politico-economic problem in respect of vealth, labour capacity, velfare 
and growth, which require the administration of birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, health, 
diet and standards of living. Sex, Foucault records, intersects this politico-economic problem. The 
sexual conduct of the population, from the age of marriage and legitimate and illegitimate births, to 
the precocity and frequency of sexual relations and contraceptive methods, constitute objects of 
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Secondly, in respect of the historico-theoretical question, nineteenth century 
productive mechanisms of pouvoir focus on the desires and abnormalities of the 
unnatural, who transgress or fall outside the norm of heterosexual monogamy- 
children, and the sensuality of those who dislike the opposite sex, for example. The 
scienta sexualis operates through the juridical qua natural law of marriage, and it 
orders desires as immanent rules of sex. In the process, the subject of desire and the 
pervert are subjected to mechanisms of regulation and objectified by the technique 
of confession.213 Foucault contends that juridical power does not marginalise 
sexuality, but as a nascent bio-pouvoir it invests sexuality in the body as a way to 
classify individuals. We must, Foucault writes, ”abandon the hypothesis that 
modern industrial societies ushered in an age of increased sexual repression” .2j4 
Foucault’s third, hstorico-political point is that, insofar as they recount a 
dubious hstory of the repression, non-existence and silence of sex, the human 
sciences and their classification of the subject’s desire are a symptom of, rather than 
a solution to, the scienta sexuaZis.215 If, during the nineteenth century, sex is 
incorporated into two distinct orders of connaissance - a physiology of reproduction 
based on scientdic truth, and medical theories with their own rules of formation on 
the basis of the subject of desire-then the claims of the human sciences in respect 
of hygiene and public health, or the social and racial purity of the population, never 
mind their rudimentary rationality, suggest a systematic blindness and, in contrast 
to the will to know that sustains the physical sciences, a stubborn will to non- 
knowledge.216 Freud, Foucault argues, does not inaugurate a new rationality. 
Instead, the construction by the human sciences of an apparatus of sex for the 
production of truth situates them within the d e n n i a l  yoke of the technique of 
confession.217 Its standard philosophical assumptions - ”[c]onfession frees, but 
power reduces one to silence; truth does not belong to the order of power, but 
shares an original affinity with freedom”-mean that only ”a ’political history of 
truth”’ can overturn these humanist assumptions ”by showing that truth is not by 
analysis and targets of intervention. Similarly, a pedadogical discourse develops on the sexuality of 
cluldren; medical, biologcal and psycluatric discourses on sexual perversions; and ehcal ,  criminal 
and political discourses on sexual deviants. Foucault, The History of SexuaIify, pp. 25-31. 
213 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, pp. 38-46. 
214 Foucault, The History ofsexuality, pp. 47-49. 
215 Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh”, p. 219. 
216 Foucault, The History ofsexuality, pp. 53-55. 
217 Foucault, The History ofSexuality, p. 61. Freud’s discovery of the sexual aetiology of neuroses, 
Foucault says, is but one moment in the machinery of confession. For Foucault, who reads Freud 
through Lacan, Freud’s strength is his foundation of the field of discursivity of the logc of the 
unconscious. Foucault, ”The Confession of the Flesh”, pp. 211-213. 
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nature free - nor error servile - but that its production is thoroughly imbued with 
relations of power’’.218 
Apart from the ars erotica of the eastern and ancient worlds, where truth is 
derived from pleasure, understood as a practice, accumulated as an experience and 
internal to the practice it enhances,219 Foucault speaks of the European procedure 
that produces the truth from sex. Evident since early christianity,Zo it is the 
technique of confession, or ”all those procedures by whch the subject is incited to 
produce a discourse of truth about his sexuality which is capable of having effects 
on the subject himself”.221 However, the technique of confession evident in the 
classical epoch, out of whch the scienta sexualis origmates, differs from its 
marufestation in medizval Christianity, where under the morality of concupiscence 
the universal obligation is to confess sins of the flesh in return for penance? 
Irutially, confession in the classical epoch governs the individual’s conscience, too, 
but the actual scope of the confession expands to include the insinuations, thoughts 
and desires of the flesh. Subsequently, the self-examination of the desire for sex and 
its confession on the couch replace medmval Christianity’s and the classical epochs 
confession from the pew of an already completed sin qua act of the flesh.* After 
early Christianity’s estabhshment of confession between the monk and h s  abbot, in 
the modern epoch h s  techruque authenticates the individual through a discourse 
of sexuality that extracts the truth from the subject’s 
Techruques for speaking and listening about concupiscence and its object of 
the flesh are, under a plurisecular injunction to talk about sex,m colonised during 
the late eighteenth century by medical techniques, which implore the subject to tell 
or write the story of h s  desire.26 The modern epoch’s techruque of confession 
effects ”men’s subjection: their constitution as subjects in both senses of the 
218 Foucault, The History ofsexuality, p. 60. 
219 Foucault, The History ofsex-uality, pp. 57-58. Foucault subsequently revises his claim about the 
prevalence of the Chnese ars erotica in European antiquity: ”I  should have opposed our science of sex 
to a contrasting practice in our own culture. The Greeks and Romans did not have any ars erotica . . . . 
They had a techne tou biou”. Foucault, ”On the Genealogy of E h c s ” ,  pp. 347-348. 
periodisation of “la spiritualite‘ chre‘tienne et les principes monastiques tels qu‘ils se de‘velopp?rent aux W e  et 
Ve sitdes, sous le Bas-Empire”. Foucault, ”Les techruques de soi”, p. 786. 
221 Foucault, ”The Confession of the Flesh”, pp. 215-216. 
222 Foucault, The History ofSexuaIity, p. 33. 
223 Foucault, ”The Confession of the Flesh,  pp. 210-211. 
224 Foucault, The History ofsexuality, p. 58. 
Foucault, The History ofsexuality, p. 22. 
Foucault, The History of Sexuality, p. 59. The epoch of early Christianity follows Foucault’s 
226 Foucault, ”The Confession of the Flesh”, p. 215. 
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word”.m That is, the objectification of the subject with regard to medico-scientific 
truth, and the subjection of the subject by the authority of his inter1ocutor.m 
Judgement and the moral of abstinence give way to administration and the politico- 
economic aim of the total regulation of the population.m Essentially, the will to 
know about sex situates the techruques of confession at the centre of normativity. 
And so, in this ’question’ of sex ... we demand that sex speak the truth (but, 
since it is the secret and oblivious to its own nature, we reserve for ourselves 
the function of telling the truth of its truth, ... ), and we demand that it tell us 
our truth, or rather, the deeply buried truth of that truth about ourselves which 
we think we possess in our immediate consciousness. ... From this interplay 
there has evolved . . . the project of a science of the subjectm 
Foucault’s genealogcal critique of sexuality’s normativity negates the 
psychoanalyst’s hypothesis of the repression of sex, which deflects attention from 
the exercise and nature of pouvoir to the nature of ahistorical desire.231 As a result, 
Foucault constitutes the political economy of normativity relevant to a will to know 
that is preoccupied with sexuality,232 which is a means to show how this wdl that is 
central to political critique establishes domination by pouvoirl savoir. For instance, 
the scien ta sexudis hysterises women’s bodies, psychatrises perverse pleasure and 
socialises procreation. Real subjects - the hysterical woman, the perverse adult and 
the malthusian couple-are constituted out of the fact of sex by the techmque of 
confession, which objectifies, whilst mechanisms of regulation subject.23 From the 
eighteenth century, the sexualisation of these subjects is an integral part of hio- 
pouvoir’s deployment of sexuality, which is superimposed upon the classical 
epochs deployment of alliance. The latter conserves the social body via the 
discourse of flesh and the moral of concupiscence, whch reproduce sexual relations 
and maintain the juridico-moral code that governs them. A deployment of 
sexuality, in comparison, finds its raison d ’Etre in extra-juridical bio-pouvoir, which 
creates and penetrates bodies and controls populations. If the codes around the 
flesh are juridical in character, the rules of sexuality are those of the law of desire? 
Foucault, 77ze History of Sexuality, p. 60. 
228 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, p. 61. 
229 Foucault, The History ofsexuality, pp. 61-67. 
230 Foucault, Vie His tory of Sexuality, pp. 69-70. 
231 Foucault, Tlze History of Sexuality, pp. 120-125. 
232 Foucault, TIE History ofSexuality, p. 73 and p. 79. 
233 Foucault, The History ofsexualrfy, pp. 103-105. 
234 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, pp. 106-114. 
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The bourgeoisie deploy sexuality to politically order life through an affirmation of 
self vis-a-vis sexuality.235 Foucault’s genealogical critique, which exposes the myth of 
Victorian mechanisms of repression, is an ”archzology of psychoanalysis” that 
reveals its contiguity with sexuality as hio-pouvoir.236 
In reply to monarchical sovereignty, where via mechanisms of deduction that 
seize things, bodies and time, the king monopolises the right of the two-edged 
sword to take life or to let one live, the philosoph’s political critique transfers 
sovereignty from the king to the people, who constitute juridical power to protect 
their lIfe.237 The king’s power of life and death is gradually replaced by both the 
social body’s right to foster Me-and, where this function is thwarted by the 
madman, dehquent or pervert, to disallo-to Me to the point of death-and the 
question of the biologcal existence of the population. A technology of life (bios) 
takes hold of the individual’s rnortalite‘,m with the only limit to the task of the total 
administration of Me la mort, the moment at which life escapes pouvoir.239 Foucault 
re-iterates his earlier argument in Discipline and Punish about somato-pouvoir, which 
individualises the subject’s body through mechanisms of discipline and the 
technique of examination. A propos of the will to know that extracts truth from sex, 
he says that bio-pouvoir is a technology which, because it is exercised by 
mechanisms of regulation and the technique of confession, totalises the population. 
Together, Foucault claims, somato-pouvoir and bio-pouvoir account for a sigruficant 
transformation in political right-but not, to be sure, as a ~oup240-during the 
classical and modern epochs. 
Foucault’s genealogical critique uncovers technologies of individualising and 
totalising pouvoir, which introduce a political economy of normativity over and 
above juridical power’s right.241 An anatamo-politics of the body-as-machme, and a 
bio-politics of the population as a species-body, are exercised by mechanisms of 
discipline and regulation. Somato-pouvoir and bio-pouvoir are mutually inclusive and 
reciprocal, though historically The focus of the former is the organic 
body in an institutional space, which effects organo-discipline, whilst the object of 
235 Foucault, The History ofsexuality, p. 123. 
236 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, p. 130. 
237 Foucault, ”Cours du 17 mars 1976”, pp. 214-215. 
238 Foucault, ”Cours du 17 mars 1976”, p. 221. 
239 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, pp. 135-138. 
240 Foucault, ”Cours du 17 mars 1976”, p. 214. 
Foucault, “Cours du 17 mars 1976”, p. 216. 
242 Specifically, discipline takes hold from the end of the seventeenth century, and regulation from the 
middle of the eighteenth century. Foucault, “Cours du 17 mars 1976”, p. 215. 
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the latter is a biological population withm the context of the state and bio- 
regulation.243 Combined, they constitute a bi-polar technology of pouvoir, ”anatomic 
and biological, individualizing and specifying, directed toward the performance of 
the body, with attention to the processes of life”,244 all of which is symptomatic of 
the entry of man and Me into hstory since the eighteenth century. The premise of 
sornato-pouvoir and bio-pouvoir is bio-hstory, the representation in politics of the 
biologcal existence of juridical subjects, whch entails the subjection of the body to 
administration and its objectification by calculated management. If, as Aristotle 
says, man ”is a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence”, 
Foucault elucidates that ”modern man is an animal whose politics places his 
existence as a living being in 
And so, where juridical power defers for authority to the sovereignty of the 
law and its ultimate sanction of death, the bi-polar technology of pouvoir refers to 
the norm to submit subjectivity. As juridical power is incorporated into institutions 
which operate an individualising sonuzto-pouvoir and a totalising hio-pouvoir, the law 
itself starts to function according to the authority of the norm,246 which oscillates 
between the body and the population. The norm circulates the bi-polar pouvoir’s 
mechanisms and applies its techniques, In the nineteenth century, Foucault writes, 
the society of normalisation that matures is ”criss-crossed by an articulation of both 
the norm of discipline and the norm of regulation. ... [Tlhe technologes of pouvoir 
which disciphe and regulate manage to spread out over the whole of society, from 
the organic to the biological, the body to the In respect of sonzato- 
pouvoir, the practice of sex vis-a-vis norms establishes a micro-power of the body 
and allows ”mfinitesimal surveillances, permanent controls, extremely meticulous 
orderings of space, indeterminate medical or psychological examinations”.248 And, 
where bio-pouvoir is concerned, sex experienced through norms leads: 
243 Foucault, ”Cours du 17 mars 1976”, p. 223. 
244 Foucault, The History ofSexuality, p. 139. 
245 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, p. 143. 
246 Foucault, The History ofsexuality, p. 144. This explains why political struggles are driven by the 
moral imperatives of a n o m  and revolve around the same object that the bi-polar technology controls, 
namely, the body and the population, but are formulated in the language of the law: whence the right 
to life, health, happiness and the satisfaction of needs; or the right to one’s body or to rediscover who 
one is and can be. Foucault, The History ofSexuality, p. 145. 
247 La socie‘tt de normalisation, c’est une socie‘te‘ OM se croisent, selon une articulation orthogonale, la norme de 
la discipline et la norme de la rigulation. Dire que le pouvoir . . . est arri-cx! a couvrir toute la surface qui s’ttend 
de l’organique au biologique, du COTS a la population, par le double jeu des technologies de discipline d’une part, 
et des technologies de rigulation de l’autre”. Foucault, “Cours du 17 mars 1976”, p. 225. 
248 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, pp. 145146. 
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to comprehensive measures, statistical assessments, and interventions aimed at 
the entire social body or at groups taken as a whole. Sex was a means of access 
both to the life of the body and the life of the species. ... Spread out from one 
pole to the other of this technology of sex was a whole series of different tactics 
that combined in varying proportions the objective of disciplining the body and 
that of regulating p~pulat ions .~~~ 
vii. Synopsis 
In summary, what I have shown in this chapter is the untenability of humanism’s 
political critique, which relies on procedural or substantive normative justice to 
regulate the power of the juridical state in the interests of the autonomous subject’s 
political liberty and the political liberation that is central to his self-actualisation. 
After Foucault’s proto-genalogy of madness first reveals the confined exclusion for 
those who differ from h s  normativity that is based on the subject of reason, his 
genealopcal critique shows how those who do critical thought on the assumption 
of an a priori conception of man overlook, via their analysis of the right within a 
moral doctrine or the good articulated by a moral ontology, the relation of force in 
the play of domination of the theatre of pouvoir. In so doing, political critique focus 
exclusively on the juridical mechanisms of repression, which are constituted by the 
subject of right, who seldom if ever experiences them. Yet, as Foucault’s 
genealogical critique of somato- and hio-pouvoir reveals, the citizen’s parallel 
conditions of possibility are the mechanisms of discipline and regulation, which are 
effected by techruques of examination and confession. Indeed, the autonomy and 
recognition that humanist normativity promises along its path to enlightenment is 
in actual fact preceded by man’s objectification and subjection to apparatuses of 
pouvoirlsavoir, such as bodily disciphe, sexuality or health.EO In the end, the failure 
of political critique to procure maturity is a consequence of its dependence on a 
philosophical subject, who grounds humanism’s theory of power, in which it is 
presumed that power is exercised by repressive mechanisms and that its nature is 
s tate-centred. 
Foucault’s genealogical critique makes the humanist cognisant of the 
problematic effects of the normative experience which, because of a will to know, 
political critique advocates for the subject of right. At the same time, a genealogy of 
pouvoir develops an alternative hypothesis of productive mechanisms of pou-rmir. It 
then remains to be shown how, uis-&uis genealogy’s second hypothesis about the 
249 Foucault, The History ofSexuaZity, p. 146. 
250 Foucault, “The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century”, pp. 166-177. 
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nature of pouuoir, Foucault reveals along his nietzschean path to enlightenment that 
pouuoir is a relation of government whch, as it characterises intersubjective 
relations, is the meeting point of normativity and subjectivity. It is Foucault’s 
critical historical critique of th is  experience, from the point of view of subjectivity 
within, and that which is margmalised by, humanism, which I examine in the 
penultimate chapter that follows. 
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Sutijectivity andEt hico-Morality 
In chapters 4 and 5, I illustrated that Foucault’s archzologcal and genealogical 
critiques make the will to know, whch lnforms the epistemologico-political critique 
that proffers objective and normative experience, conscious of itself as a problem. 
Humanism’s pronouncements on maturity are for those who conform to sameness 
and are objectified and subjechfied by somato- and bio-pouvoir, wlulst those who do 
not suffer confined exclusion in the asylum and prison-penitentiary. In opposition, 
archzology discerns the conditions of possibdity for how to think freely in the 
human sciences from savoir. Although it is ultimately unsuccessful, Foucault 
continues archzology’s anti-humanism, pro-enhghtenment trajectory through a 
genealogcal critique of cause and effect in connaissance in terms of might rather 
than right. It necessitates a concomitant re-articulation of the exercise of pouvoir by 
productive mechanisms, and in this chapter I follow genealogy to its conclusion in 
Foucault’s account of the nature of pouvoir and the immaturity of humanist 
subjectivity in the face of it. Further, I describe how genealogy’s terminus is also a 
new beginning, as it leads Foucault into the last of hs three critiques, a critical 
history of etluco-morality, which is the basis for h i s  outline of an enlightened state 
of being autonomous in thought and action that I will discuss in the concluding 
chapter. 
Discipline and Punish and The Histonj of Sexuality, which unmask the 
mechanisms of disciphe and regulation behind normative justice, also uncover the 
techmques of examination and confession through whch the norm is manifested as 
subjective experience. These texts then logxally precede Foucault’s critical history 
of subjectivity and ethico-morality: critical historical critique is not indicative of h s  
flight from the mhihstic implications of archzology and genealogy, whch I have 
shown is not only incorrect but a charge-McNay’s-that personifies the standard 
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conflation of Foucault’s anti-humanism with a rejection of enlightenment.1 Rather, 
Discipline and Punish and The Histoy of Sexuality intimate Foucault’s second 
genealogical question through which he reconceptualises capillary pouvoir after 
1977: and I begin this chapter with his answer to what is the nature of pouvoir?, 
governmentality, which he develops in lectures at the Coll2ge de France in 1977-1978 
and 1979-1980. In particular, he hghlights governmentality’s mheritance of a 
technology of political rationality from pastoral-pouvoir. It links the exercise of 
somato- to bio-pouvoir, and produces the material submission of humanism’s 
freedom that depends on political liberty or political liberation. 
To overcome humanist critical thought’s immaturity, Foucault’s genealogy 
evolves into a critical hstory of the subject of desire’s experience of sex,3 and I 
examine h s  pursuit of maturity that depends on a conceptual distinction between 
ehcs-oriented and code-oriented moralities. In the former, subjectivity is 
constituted through an ascetic practical relation to self (rapport 2 soi), and in the 
latter via a hermeneutics of the self that is mehated by a relation to other (rapport a 
autrui), which defines the constitution of freedom in humanism. Whilst some 
commentators question Foucault’s critical history of antiq~ity,~ I argue that it is the 
subtlety of his conceptualisation of ethics as the forgotten moment of morality that 
is crucial to, and corroborative of, his commitment to articulate how to act freely in 
the present.5 I focus on the constitution, via a hermeneutics of the self, of the 
monk’s moral identity in early Christianity, which albeit chronologically posterior 
can be contrasted with the constitution of ethical subjectivity through practices of 
the self in greek and graxo-roman antiquity. In Tlze Use of Pleasure, ethico-political 
practices of the self demand an agonistic relation to self. Outwith its ancient 
condition of possibhty of asymmetrical relations to others, it is a model for 
maturity vis-a-vis pouvoirlsavoir. Finally, I discern in T”ze Care of the Self the e h c o -  
social practices of the self, who is situated withrn symmetrical relations to others, 
but who avoids mediation by them. As I will claim with critical ontology in chapter 
McNay, Foucault, p. 133 and pp. 102-133. 
In addition to conceptions of capillary pouvoir as relations of communication and relations of 
production, Foucault perceives it as the ontologically prior relations of government between subjects. 
Foucault, “Radioscope de Michel Foucault”, pp. 798-799. 
Foucault, “An Aesthetics of Existence”, p. 48. 
See, for example, Bevis, Cohen and Kendall, ”Archaeologizing genealogy”; Poster, “Foucault and the 
Tyranny of Greece”. Notwithstanding that they were hs colleagues, Paul Veyne and Jean-Pierre 
Vernant, respectively, professor of the History of Rome and Comparative Religions of the Ancient 
World at the CoIZige de France, support, albeit with nuances, Foucault’s interpretation of antiquity. 
Veyne, “The Final Foucault and His Ethics”; Vernant, ”The Individual within the City-state”. 
Davidson, “Etlucs as Ascetics”, p. 69. 
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7, Foucault’s critical historical critique of ethico-morality, which discloses an 
ancient practice of freedom at the limits of experience through an agonistic process 
of becoming free, is the basis for an enhghtened, post-humanist conception of 
maturity in the present. 
6.i. The Nature of Pouvoir 
After i7w History of Sexuality, Foucault plans to ”show how ’sex’ is historically 
subordinate to sexuality”, and he suggests that, because one does not resist power 
when one says yes to sex, it is sexuality ”we must break away from, if we aim . . . to 
counter the grips of power with the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledges”.b 
Although he eventually proposes a critical hstory of knowledge - antiquity’s 
system of thought - rather than bodies and pleasures to resist pouvoir/sazioir, 
Foucault’s immediate purpose in 1976 is to investigate how subjects have their 
experience of misery historically constituted by the scienfa s e~ua l i s .~  For the next ten 
years,S he intends to decipher the relationshp between normative experience and 
mechanisms and institutions of pauvoir/saz~oi~.~ ”The domain we must analyze in 
the different studies that will follow the present volume”, he proposes at the end of 
77ze History of Sexuality, is the deployment of sexuality: 
its formation on the basis of the Christian notion of the flesh [The Body and the 
Flesh], and its development through the four great strategies that were 
deployed in the nineteenth century: the sexualization of children [7ke Clzildreiz’s 
Crusade], the hysterization of women [Woman, Mother and Hysteric], the 
specification of the perverted [Perverts], and the regulation of populations 
[Populafion and Races].’O 
Although he writes these books,11 by 1983 Foucault abandons his project 
altogether, as understanding sexuality and the problem of sex is boring.I2 The volfe- 
face springs from his genealogical critique of the techniques of examination and 
confession, which constitute the subject of desire’s subjective experience in 
medizval Christianity and are essential research for Uze Body and the Flesh. This in 
Foucault, Tlze History of Sexualify, p. 157. 
Foucault, ”Power and Sex”, pp. 112-113. 
Foucault, “Le pouvoir, une b6te magrufique”, pp. 380-381. 
Foucault, ”Sexualite et verite”, p. 137. 
l0  Foucault, The History of SexuaZity, pp. 113-114; Bernauer, “Michel Foucault’s Ecstatic Thinking”, pp. 
49-50 and p. 76, f. 14. 
Foucault, “An Aesthetics of Existence”, p. 47. 
l2 Foucault, ”On the Genealogy of Etlucs”, p. 340. 
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turn refers him back to early Christianity and, finally, the modes of subjectivity in 
greek and grzco-roman antiquity,I3 such that after The History of Sexuality 
Foucault’s genealogical critique displays a re-orientation from normativity to 
subjectivity, which is my prerogative here, whilst the submission of subjectivity by 
the political rationality that is at the heart of humanism’s attempt to realise 
enlightenment is the topic in the next section. 
In section 5.iv. I claimed that, in answer to the question, how is pouvoir 
exercised?, Foucault investigates the productive mechanisms of somto-pouaoir and 
bio-pouvoir. Discipline and Punish and TIze History of Sexuality are necessary criticisms 
of those who misconceive power ”as a unitary system organised around a centre, 
which at the same time is its source, and that tends through an internal dynamic to 
continuously extend itself”.14 Further to his critique of a theory of power’s 
mechanisms of repression, Foucault questions the adequacy of humanism’s second 
assumption, whch suggests that the juridical state encapsulates what is the nature 
of pouvoir?. In contrast, Foucault’s reply represents his redirection from 
pouvoirl sauoir to governmentality, normativity to subjectivity,15 and like the 
productive mechanisms and the techruques masked by, but indispensable to, the 
exercise of mechanisms of repression, governmentality is Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of juridical power’s condition of possibility, capillary pou-noir. 
Still, ”I don’t want to say that the State isn’t important”, Foucault says in 
anticipation of hs critics, 
what I want to say is that relations of power ... necessarily extend beyond the 
limits of the State ... . [Flor all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, [the state] is 
far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations, and . . . 
the State can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power 
relations. l6  
Foucault defines already existing capillary pouvoir as relations of government, 
in which the conduct of the other or others is at ~take.1~ By nature, these relations 
produce subjects and daily existence,Is and in hs 1977-1978 lectures at the Coll2ge de 
France, Securite, Territoire et Population, Foucault’s theme is the passage from the 
l3 Foucault, “Preface to The History of Sexuality, Volume 11”, p. 333. 
l 4  Pomoir is ”plus OM rnoins confuse‘rnent pense‘ comrne un systirne unitaire, organise‘ autour d’un centre qui en 
est en mime temps la source, et qui est porte‘ par sa dynamique interne li s’e‘tendre toujours”. Foucault, 
”Subjectivite et verite”, p. 214. 
I5 Foucault, ”The Subject and Power”, p. 219. 
l6 Foucault, ”Truth and Power”, p. 122. 
l7 Foucault, ”Subjectivite et verite”, p. 214. 
Foucault, “L’intellectuel et les pouvoirs”, p. 751. 
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territorial monarchical state of the renaissance epoch to the state that is defined by 
its population in the classical epoch. The latter politicises governmentality through 
the integration, into juridical power, of the sonzato- and bio-pouvoir which govern 
s~bjects. '~ Specifically, in his fourth lecture, "La 'gouvernementalite'", Foucault 
speaks of a new problematic: "[hlow to govern, how to be governed, how to govern 
others, and who should we accept to be governed by, and what to do to be the best 
possible governor".20 Later, in his 1979-1980 lectures, Du gouvernement des vivants, 
Foucault concretises the notion of governmentality . His research into the 
techniques of examination and confession reveals that, up to the end of medizval 
Christianity, pastoraZ-pouvoir exercises relations of government, whle it is the model 
for the juridical state's government of its population, whether children, people's 
consciences or households.21 
The emergence from the late 1970s of governmentality as Foucault's 
definition of the nature of pouvoir signals the thematic progression from a 
genealogical critique of normativity to a critical historical critique of subjectivity 
and ethico-morality. In other words, the subject is the confluence of techniques like 
confession and examination, whch are exercised over others and effect domination, 
with techniques of the self that enable the subject, either of his own accord or in 
collaboration with others, 
to effect a number of operations on his body or soul, his thoughts, actions and 
mode of being; and to transform himself in an effort to attain a state of 
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality. ... I call 
'governmentality' the meeting place between techniques of domination 
exercised over others and techniques of the self.22 
Foucault admits that a reason for the shdt from normativity to subjectivity is 
that, in his genealogy of how pouuoir is exercised, "I perhaps insisted too much on 
the techniques of domination" .23 Still, he is clear that pouvoir is not disciphe, which 
l9 Foucault, "Scurite, territoire et population", pp. 719-720. 
2o "Comment se gouzierner, comnzent Ctre gouverner, coniment gouverner Zes autres, par qui doit-on accepter 
d'ttre gouvemi, commentfaire pour ttre le meilleur gouverneur possibZe". Foucault, "La 
'gouvernementalite'", p. 636. 
21 Foucault, "Du gouvemement des vivants", p. 125. 
22 Techruques of the self "permettent aux individus d'effectuer, seuls OM uvec l'aidc d'autres, un  certain 
nonzbres d'ope'rations sur leur corps et leur h e ,  leurs pense'es, leurs conduites, leur mode d'ttre; de se 
transformer ajin d'atteindre un certain itat de bonheur, de pureti, de sagesse, de perfection OM d'irnmortaliti. . . . 
]'appelle 'gouvernementalite" Zu rencontre entre les techniques de domination exercies sur les autres et les 
techniques de soi". Foucault, "Les techruques de soi", p. 785. 
23 "J'ai peut-ttre trop insisti sur les techniques de domination et de pouvoir". Foucault, "Les techruques de 
soi", p. 787. 
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is only one of pouvoir’s mechanisms, and Foucault readily speaks of consensual 
disciplines.24 This corresponds with his methodological pains ”to indicate the limits 
of what I wanted to achieve, ... . [Somafo- and bio-pouvoir] can in no way, to my 
mind, be equated with a general analytics of every possible power relation”.x It is, 
Foucault says, incorrect to ”impute to me the idea that power is a system of 
domination which controls everything and whch leaves no room for freedom1’.26 
Instead, domination arises only when the “relations of power are fixed in such a 
way that they are perpetually asymetrical [sic] and the margin of liberty is 
extremely lirmted’ .27 
A genealopcal critique of governmentality implies that the nature of pouvoir 
is neither an evil fluid,= nor a capacity to alter, consume or destroy things, and it 
does not preclude communicative power that is conveyed semantically. Rather, the 
regulated and co-ordinated systems of discipline and regulation invigdate, ever 
more economically and rationally, the conduct of the subject by productive 
mechanisms and techruques, resources of communication and relations of 
government.29 On this understandmg, le pouvoir in the substantive sense does not, a 
propos of consent or delegation, actually exist. Instead, it is put into action by the 
political rationality that exercises governmentality? Caplllary pouvoir, like the air 
we breathe, is the place into which the subject is thrown. It is always already there, 
and the subject cannot be outside g~vernmentality.~~ By implication, the 
foucauldian critical principle to maintain at all times is ”to ask oneself what 
proportion of nonconsensuality is implied in ... a power relation, ... . [Olne must 
not be for consensuality, but . . . against nonconsen~uality”.~~ 
Finally, the subject over whom pouooir is exercised is indispensable to 
governmentalitv. He must be clearly recognised and maintained as a subject who 
acts in an open field.33 In this respect, an analysis of governmentality looks, firstly, 
at the exercise of productive mechanisms, which structure the possible field of 
24 ”Take, for example, . . . love relationships. To exercise power over another, in a sort of open strategx 
game, where h n g s  could be reversed, that is not evil. That is part of love, passion, sexual pleasure”. 
Foucault, ”The ethic of the care for the self”, p. 18. 
25 Foucault, “Politics and E h c s ” ,  p. 380. 
26 Foucault, “The e h c  of the care for the self”, p. 13. 
27 Foucault, “The e h c  of the care for the self“, p. 12. 
Foucault, ”L’intellectuel et les pouvoirs”, p. 750. 
29 Foucault, ”The Subject and Power”, pp. 217-219; Foucault, ”On Power”, p. 105. 
30 Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh”, p. 198. 
31 Foucault, “Powers and Strategies”, p. 141. 
32 Foucault, ”Politics and Ehcs”,  p. 379. 
33 Foucault, ”The etluc of the care for the self“, p. 11; Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, pp. 220-221. 
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action and direct the conduct of others; secondly, although there is an identity 
between capdlary pouvoir and society, only a critical history of institutional 
techniques of government can uncover domination and avoid a fatalistic reduction 
of society to pouvoir;34 thirdly, an analysis must be made of governmentality’s 
strategic relationships, which presuppose resistan~e.~~ In the end, Foucault’s 
genealogical critique of normativity and pouvoir divulge the productive 
mechanisms and techmques of somato- and bio-pouvoirl savoir, which thwart 
humanism’s enhghtenment, whilst the concept of governmentality recapitulates the 
point that I made in section l.ii. of freedom as the vis-a-vis of pouvoir. Not, that is, 
political liberty that is prior to power, or political liberation that is processed 
through it. Instead, what Foucault has in mind is an agonistic freedom, 
[because wjhen one defines the exercise of power as a mode of action upon the 
actions of others, when one characterizes these actions by the government of 
men by other men-in the broadest sense of the term-one includes an 
important element: freedom. Power is exercised only over free subjects, and 
only insofar as they are free. By this we mean individual or collective subjects 
who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, 
several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized. ... The 
relationshp between power and freedom’s refusal to submit cannot therefore 
be separated. ... At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly 
provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom. 
Rather than speaking of an essential freedom, it would be better to speak of an 
’agonism’ -of a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and 
struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation which paralyzes both sides than a 
permanent provocation.M 
6.ii. Foucault’s Critique of Humanism’s Immature Subjectivity 
If the nature of pouvoir is the government of men by other men, and its exercise is a 
mode of action upon the actions of others, then governmentality’s presupposition 
of an agonistic freedom, whch is grounded in a recalcitrant will qua provocative 
other of pouvoir, equates to an ontology of the subject. It invites an analysis of the 
techmques and mechanisms that govern being and determine the relations to self 
and other, and whch provide resources for how to act freely in the present. So, if 
freedom is in question, the confluence of freedom and pouvoir in the subject can be 
analysed from the point of view of subjectivity; or, where pouvoir is at stake, from 
34 Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, pp. 222-223. 
35 Foucault, “Powers and Stratepes”, p. 142. 
36 Foucault, ”The Subject and Power”, pp. 221-222. 
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verifi, 
of Su6jectivit-y andEttiico-Morality 
explains in h i s  1980-1981 lectures, Subjectivifk et 
the history of the ’care’ and the ’techniques’ of the self would then be a way of 
doing the history of subjectivity . . . [by investigating] the putting into place and 
the transformations ... of the ’relations to self’, with their technical armature 
and their effects of knowledge. One could thus take up, under another aspect, 
the question of ’governmentality’: the government of self by the self in his 
articulation through relations to othersM 
Hence, before I move on to distinguish ethics from within morality in the next 
section, this section concludes the explicit study of pouzJoir with an analysis of the 
political rationality at the centre of governmentality in the modern epoch. After the 
erasure of man from, and the cost of confined exclusion, objectification and 
subjection inherent to, epistemologico-political critique, I want to show how 
humanism’s formal conception of autonomy, which is actualised through 
recognition, fails to uphold maturity in respect of the submission of subjectivity 
that is effected by a political rationality fashioned after pastoral-pouvoir. 
Foucault acknowledges that to conceive of the nature of sornato- and hio- 
pouz~oir as governmentality, and the exercise of pouvoir by productive mechanisms, 
poses an analytical problem: without the juridical state, ”isn’t power simply a form 
of warlike d~mination”?~~ The question, Foucault’s interviewer ponders in 1977, is 
whether it is possible to conceive of the relations of government between the micro- 
bodies of subjects and the molar-body of the population outwith domination? In 
response, Foucault says that ”I believe that one must keep in view the fact that ... 
[in] the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a new technology of the exercise of 
power also ernerged’’.40 The new technology is political rationality, an amalgam of 
(the) reason of (the) state and (a) theory of (the) police. It colonises the relations that 
govern subjects, and political rationality is modelled on pre-modern pastord-pouooir 
that ensures and sustains the lives of every Christian ~ 0 ~ 1 . 4 1  By 1979, for instance, 
37 Although, as Pasquel Pasquino argues, freedom and relations of government are inseparable, 
because Foucault problematises subjectivity vis-a-vis Lebensfihrung, or the conduct of life. Pasquino, 
“Michel Foucault (1926-M)”, p. 42. 
38 “L’histoire du ’souci’ et des ’techniques’ de soi serait donc une maniire de faire l’histoire de la subjectivitk . . . a 
travers la mise en place et les transformations . . . des ’rapports U soi-mtme’, auec leur armature technique et leurs 
eflets de savoir. Et on pourrait ainsi reprendre sous un autre aspect la question de la ’gouvernementalite”: le 
gouvernement de soi par soi dans son articulation avec les rapports U autrui”. Foucault, ”Subjectivite et 
verite”, p. 214. 
39 Foucault, ”Truth and Power”, p. 123. 
40 Foucault, ”Truth and Power”, p. 124. 
41 Foucault, ”Politics and Reason”, p. 67. 
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Foucault tells his Californian audience at Stanford that what “I am working on now 
is the problem of individuality-or, I should say, self-identity as referred to the 
problem of ‘individualizing power’”.42 
Foucault’s critical history of the hermeneutic and practical care of the self 
(epimeleia kautou), which I discuss in the following next, also highlights the 
centrality in the transition from antiquity to Christianity of the reformulation of h s  
e h c  into the care of others (epimeleia ~ O T Z U Z I O T Z ) . ~ ~  What the care of others signrfies is 
the individualsing technology of pastoral-pouvoir. Foucault argues that the idea of 
”a shepherd followed by a flock wasn’t familiar to the Greeks and Romans”, 
whereas in ancient hebraic texts, whch chronicle governmentality in Egypt, 
Assyria and Judea, the metaphor of the shepherd-flock is ubiquitous.44 In the 
exercise of pastoral-pouvoir, the shepherd wields power over his flock; he gathers 
together, guides and leads them; he ensures the salvation of hm flock through a 
personalised and purposeful kindness; and he serves his flock out of devotion that 
requires him to keep watch over them.45 At the end of antiquity in western Europe, 
Foucault argues, there: 
evolved a . . . technology of power treating the . . . majority of men as a flock with 
a few as shepherds. ... [Tlhe development of ’pastoral technology’ in the 
management of men profoundly disrupted the structures of ancient society.46 
From this excursus, Foucault explains the transformation from antiquity’s to 
Christianity’s system of thought in terms of the technology of pastoral-pouvoir. 
Along the experiential axis of subjectivity, a relation to self is usurped by a relation 
to other, which incites the subject to hermeneutically render truth from the core of 
his essential being. At the experiential level of normativity, Foucault says that in 
antiquity ”the political problem is that of the relation between the one and the 
many in the framework of the city and its citizens”, whereas with pastoral-pouvoir it 
”concerns the lives of individuals . . . [and] seems to have nothing to do with the 
game of the city surviving through the sacrifice of the citizens”.47 Nevertheless, in 
spite of discontinuous systems of thought between antiquity’s governmentality and 
early Christian pastoral-pouvoir, ’ I  [olur societies proved to be really demonic since 
42 Foucault, ”Politics and Reason”, p. 59. 
43 Foucault, ”On the Genealogy of E h c s ” ,  p. 370. 
Foucault, ”Politics and Reason”, p. 60 and p. 63. 
45 Foucault, ”Politics and Reason”, pp. 61-64. 
46 Foucault, ”Politics and Reason”, p. 71. 
47 Foucault, ”Politics and Reason”, p. 67 and p. 71. 
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they happened to combine those two games-the city-citizen and the shepherd- 
flock game - in what we call the modern state”? 
For Foucault, the birth of the modern state after the decline of feudal 
structures and the end of the protestant reformation, together with the catholic 
counter-reformation, is a crucial moment in the history of the government of 
individuals by their own verity. Via the political rationality implemented to 
exercise post-sixteenth century monarchcal power, reason of state elucidates the 
difference between the government of the state and that of the world or family, and 
a theory of police constitutes the dscursive objects of the state’s rational activity. 
Reason of state is an art of government that necessitates rational connaissance.49 It 
specifies the literal raison d’ttre of government to be no more than the re- 
enforcement of the strength of the state, which is the sum of each of its parts qua 
juridical subjects.50 In parallel, a theory of police is a science for the urban, 
economic, social, political and cultural administration of the relations between the 
subject and things.51 Whereas politics is a negative task of internal and external 
defence, the role of the police is to endow each subject with life as a means to 
supply the state with strength. Based on a statistical analysis of a newly constituted 
discursive object, the population,52 the police execute their authority along the lines 
of the shepherd’s watch over his fl0~k.53 Indeed, by the eighteenth century, a theory 
of police designates a governmental rationality that ”aspires to be a self-maintained 
and all encompassing system of rules for the controlled government of the conduct 
of subjects, in whch intervention would be unnecessary”.54 
Untd 1789, Foucault argues, reason of state and a theory of police vie with a 
machiavellian Conseils au Prince, which is concerned with the sovereign’s relation to 
the domain of the state’s territory, to be the pre-eminent art of government. But at 
the start of the modern epoch reason of state, with its domain of the population that 
is specified by the police, is integrated into a rousseauian science of the art of 
government. They combine in respect of state formation in Germany and Italy, or in 
America and napoleonic France of the maintenance of state sovereignty via the pre- 
48 Foucault, “Politics and Reason”, p. 71. 
49 Foucault, “Politics and Reason”, pp. 71-76. 
Foucault, “La ’gouvernementalite’’’, p. 648. 
51 Foucault, ”La ’gouvernementalite’”, p. 645. 
52 Foucault, ”Politics and Reason”, pp. 77-83. 
53 Foucault, “La ‘gouvernementalite”’, pp. 641-642. 
54 “Au XVlle et au XVllle sitcle, la ’police’ de‘signait un programme de rationalite‘ gouvemementale. On peut le 
difinir comme le projet de crier un systime de re‘glementation de la conduite gine’rale des individus ou tout 
serait contr6le‘, au point que les choses se maintiendraient d’elles-m*rnes, sans qu’une interuention soit 
ne‘cessaire’’. Foucault, ”Espace, savoir et pouvoir”, p. 272. 
167 
-A CnticaCHitory of Sulijectivity a d E t  fiico-Noralty 
eminent science of government, liberaliSm.55 
As a critical discourse of political rationality, liberalism seeks to rationalise 
the government of the actions of subjects through the promotion of mechanisms 
that have the maximum effect at the minimum politico-economic cost.% In France, 
for example, Rousseau’s critical thought, which includes elements of what Foucault 
terms the juridical, administrative and government state, is the turning point for a 
liberal governmentalisation of the Sdl ,  in the modern epoch of 
governmentality a societe‘ de discipline, with its mechanisms of discipline and 
regulation, does not replace a societe‘ de souverainete and its mechanisms of 
repression, and nor does a socie‘te’ de gouvernement, which practices the 
rationalisation of the mechanisms that act upon the actions of others in the 
government of men by other men, supersede a socie‘te‘ de discipline? Rather, Foucault 
posits that there is ”a triangle: sovereignty-discipline-governmental management, 
where the principal target is the population and the essential mechanisms are 
apparatuses of security” .59 
Just as the disciphes are relocated between the seventeenth and nineteenth 
century from schools, hospitals, barracks and factories to the police, who exercise 
them over the citizen, at the start of the classical epoch mediaeval Christianity’s 
pastora2-pouvoir serves as the functional prototype for the political rationality at the 
centre of the modern juridico-administrative-governmental state.60 Whilst they both 
produce the truth of the subject’s identity, pastoral-pouvoir’s original role as the 
governmentality of the catholic church contrasts with the modern state’s political 
rationality. The latter is socio-economically focused (rather than salvation oriented), 
it upholds the principle of sovereignty (as opposed to being oblative) and it is 
juridical (instead of individualising) .61 Political rationality is a matrix of 
individualisation, which integrates the state’s flock as a population and each sheep 
as a subject of the social body. It is exercised on the basis of salvation in terms of 
55 Foucault, ”La ’gouvernementalite’”, pp. 635-638. 
56 Foucault, ”Naissance de la biopolitique”, pp. 818-822. 
57 Foucault, ”La ’gouvernementalite’”, pp. 656-657. 
58 Foucault, ”La ’gouvernementalite’”, pp. 653-654. 
59 ”On a, en fait, un triangle: souzwainete‘-discipline-gestion gouvernenientale dont la ciblc principale est la 
population et dont les rne‘canisnzes essenticls sont lcs dispositifs de se‘curite‘’’. Foucault, ”La 
’gouvernementalite’”, p. 654. 
6o Between early and medizval Christianity, pastoral-pouvoir is re-elaborated. By the fifteenth century, a 
moral tie links the pastor and each subject; the subject is completely dependent upon the pastor; there 
is an exchange of knowledge between the pastor and the subject about his material needs, public 
actions and personal thoughts; and the subject’s telos of the mortdication of this world in the name of 
the next is mediated by the pastor. Foucault, ”Politics and Reason”, pp. 68-70. 
61 Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, p. 214. 
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health, well-being, security and protection, which gives rise to institutions such as 
the police or welfare societies, as well as to apparatuses of pouvoirlsavoir and their 
expert human scientists, who produce quantitative and analytical connaissance of 
the population and the subject.@ 
The mechanisms of discipline and regulation, and techmques of examination 
and confession which are exercised by the apparatuses of somato- and bio-pouvoir, 
are co-extensive with a political rationality that is modelled on pastoral-pouvoir. 
Together, they effect a society of normalisation that ”categorizes the individual, 
marks h m  by h s  own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a 
law of truth on hun whch he must recogruze and which others have to recogruse in 
him”? W l s t  the madman, dehquent and pervert comprise the externalities of 
autonomous citizens and their community of mutual recognition, the personal price 
each citizen pays as a subject of humanism’s experience of enlightenment is 
normalisation, which is antithetical to maturity. For Foucault, this accounts for the 
pertinence, w i b  the juridico-administrative-governmental state, of contemporary 
struggles against the submission of subjectivity to an identity determined to be 
true.@ In his intimation of the failure of humanism’s freedom vis-a-vis the 
”simultaneous individuahzation and totalization of modern power structures”,65 
Foucault says the issue is not whether a society free of constraints is possible, but if 
the strategic games of freedom vis-a-vis pou71oir take place on an open field, for ”a 
system of constraints becomes truly intolerable when the individuals who are 
affected by it don’t have the means of modifying it’? 
Humanism’s axes of objective, normative and subjective experience constitute 
a system of constraints which, if not truly intolerable, are tolerated because they 
purport to operate on the basis of truth. In respect of the apparatus of the scient0 
sexualis, for example, subjectivity is mediated through the i m a p a r y  point of sex 
due to the belief that it harbours a truth that mirrors an essential being.67 
Techruques of examination and confession produce immaturity because, firstly, it is 
Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, pp. 214215. 
63 Foucault, ”The Subject and Power”, p. 212. 
@ In contrast to early modern struggles against domination (ethnic, social and religious) and 
nineteenth century struggles against exploitation (the terms of separation of individuals from what 
they produce), struggles against subjection are transversal and against the immediate effects of 
poumir, rather than a main enemy to be overthrown in the future; they concern the status of the 
individual qua right to be different and with others; and they are against the government of 
individualisation and a rkgime du savoir, in which connaissance and expertise effect pouvoir. Foucault, 
“The Subject and Power”, pp. 211-212. 
65 Foucault, ”The Subject and Power”, p. 216. 
66 Foucault, ”Sexual Choice, Sexual Act”, p. 294. 
67 Foucault, The History ofSexuaZify, p. 158. 
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assumed that sex is a generative principle of meaning, whence intelligibility or 
autonomy. Secondly, sex is perceived as a llnk between particular desire and the 
existence of that desire in history, hence identity or recognition. A will to know sex 
assumes that the subject affirms the essential rights of sex against pouvoir/savoir, 
yet to begin with the desire for sex is constituted by the scienta sexualis' norm, or the 
"mirage in whch we think we see ourselves reflected'.@ There is no realm of 
primal freedom which, a propos of knowledge, is demarcated from power by truth.69 
In the experience of sex that is mehated by humanist critical thought, autonomy 
and recogrution materially fasten the subject to discipline and regulation. Foucault 
argues that we should refuse what we are qua subjects of humanist experience, 
whence the priority of critique along a nietzschean path to enlightenment and an 
ontology that addresses finitude. 
The political, ethical, social, philosophical problem . . . is not to try to liberate the 
individual from the state, and from the state's institutions, but to liberate us ... 
from the type of individualization which is M e d  to the state. We have to 
promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of 
individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries.70 
6.iii. A Critical History of Ethico-Morality 
To resist the political rationality that exercises the somato- and hio-pouvoir of 
humanism, Foucault suggests that maturity "can only come from attacking ... 
political rationality's very roots",7' which requires a kantian type of critique that 
keeps "watch over the excessive powers of political rationality'l.72 By 1983, Foucault 
homes in on the very roots of subjectivity, the techruques of the self.n A year later, 
in 77ze Use of Pleasure, he speaks of his shift from how the self r e c o p e s  humelf as 
a normative subject with regard to the scienta s e ~ u a l i s , ~ ~  to the subjective axis of the 
latter and the "the relationship of the self with self and the forming of oneself as a 
subject" via the discovery, in desire, of the truth of one's being75 
Foucault, The History ofsexuality, p. 157. 
h9 Foucault, "Powers and Strategies", pp. 140-142. 
70 Foucault, "The Subject and Power", p. 216. 
71 Foucault, "Politics and Reason", p. 85. 
72 Foucault, "Politics and Reason", p. 58. 
73 Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Etlucs", p. 342. 
74 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, pp. 105-106. 
75 Foucault, ThE Use ofPZeasure, p. 6. and p. 5. 
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The subject of desire inspires Foucault’s critical history of the hermeneutics of 
the self in early Christianity, which in turn spurs on his research into the practices of 
the self in antiquity, both of which contribute to his wish to write the history of the 
”games of truth and error through which being is historically constituted as 
e~perience”.~~ In his search for “forms of relation to the self” that are unaffected by 
modern objectivity and normativity,n Foucault’s first port of call is ”the Christian 
notion of the where (for ??E Body and the Flesh, the planned volume two of 
TIE History of Sexuality) he analyses the experience of mediaeval Christianity’s sexual 
morality of the sacrament of penance.79 This research eventually sees the light of 
day in the guise of the pastoral-pouaoir implicit within governmentality that I dealt 
with above, and as a study of the axis of subjectivity in early Christianity’s sexual 
morality of les aveux de la c h i r ,  whence ??E Confessions of tlze Flesh, the never to be 
published volume four of Foucault’s history of sexuality which exists as a series of 
interviews and articles? Insofar as early Christianity’s moral discourse ”diverted 
the practices of self towards the hermeneutics of self and the deciphering of oneself 
as a subject of desire”,s’ I discuss in th is  section Foucault’s analytical demarcation of 
ethics from within morality before, in sections 6.iv., 6.v. and &vi., I contrast the 
constitution of moral identity in the sexual morality of the confessions of the flesh- 
the model for humanism- with the ethcal subjectivity constituted in antiquity’s 
sexual ethics of the use of pleasure and the care of the self, which is Foucault’s 
model for enhghtenment. 
Foucault’s progression from the archaeologcal and genealogcal critiques of 
objectivity and normativity to a critical historical critique of subjectivity is 
motivated by an obstinate curiosity, though ”not the curiosity that seeks to 
assimilate what is proper for one to know, but that which enables one to get free of 
oneseW.82 It is born of a knowledge that hs death is imminent, and the critical 
historian displays a stoic indifference as he combines the personal with the political 
76 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, pp. 6-7. 
7; Foucault, “Preface to The History of Sexuality, Volume 11”, p. 339. 
78 Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh”, p. 217. 
79 Foucault, The History ofSexuality, p. 68 and p. 21, note. 
Foucault completes The Confessions ofthe Flesh after volume two, The Use of Pleasure, and it is lus 
inspiration for volume three, The Care ofthe Sev However, although he drew up the final draft of The 
Confessions of the FIesh in April, 1984, hs death two months later prevented its publication, whilst his 
will of three statements-la mort, pas l’invaliditi, et pas de publication posthume-demands that it remain 
unpubhhed. Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics”, pp. 341-342; Gordon, “Man of action in a world 
of thought”, p. 9. 
Foucault, ”The Concern for Truth”, p. 260. 
Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p. 8. 
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along his nietzschean path to enlightenment,83 where to flunk critically is 
tantamount to a critique of thought that shapes how to act freely, 
[for tlhere are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think 
differently than one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely 
necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all. But, then, what is 
philosophy today-philosophical activity, I mean-if it is not the critical work 
that thought brings to bear on itself?s4 
Foucault’s critical history of subjectivity is an investigation into the 
ubiquitous objectivation of sex - its pleasures, acts and desires - for moral 
solicitude. His focus is an epochs objective, normative and subjective experience of 
sex ”through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought”.85 Instead of a 
history of solutions and alternatives, Foucault investigates proble‘rnatiques.86 He 
performs a nominalist problematization of ”the totality of discursive or non- 
discursive practices that introduces something into the play of true and false and 
constitutes it as an object for Because he ”think[s] problematically rather 
than question[s] and answer[s] dialectically”,s8 Foucault’s critical lustory of the 
desiring subject is an archzology of problematisations and a genealogy of 
practices.89 He exchanges a lustory of morality based on interdictions for a lustory 
of ethical problematisations and practices of the self,% as ”men are not much more 
inventive when it comes to interdictions than they are when it comes to 
pleasures” .91 
Typically, the lustory of morality from antiquity to modernity centres on four 
monotonous themes of austerity: sex as an evil; procreative monogamy; a 
condemnation of same sex relations; and a valorisation of self-re~traint.~~ Foucault, 
83 Flynn, “Foucault as Parrhesiast”, p. 102. Veyne recalls, for example, that “during the last eight 
months of . . . [Foucault’s] Me, the writing of . . . [The Use of Pleasure and The Care of fhe S e 9  played the 
role for him that phlosoplucal writing and the personal journal played in ancient plulosophy: that of a 
work of the self on the self, a self-stylization”. Veyne, ”The Final Foucault and His Etlucs”, p. 8. 
84 Foucault, The Use ofPleasure, pp. 8-9. 
85 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p. 11. 
86 Foucault, ”On the Genealogy of Etlucs”, p. 343. 
87 Foucault, ”The Concern for Truth”, p. 257. 
88 Foucault, ”Theatrum Phdosophcum”, p. 186. 
89 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p. 13. 
9o Foucault, ”Usage des plaisirs et techruques de soi”, p. 545. 
91 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p. 32. 
92 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p. EO. Foucault speaks of these four basic themes in terms of the 
expression of a fear (about the consequences of masturbation, for instance), an ideal of conduct 
(usually that of marital fidelity), a threatening image (typically, the homosexual’s inversion of gender 
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however, argues that it is incorrect to infer a continuity in the way in which 
morality solicits being from sex, and an even greater error to suppose its toleration 
in antiquity and a subsequent prohibitionP3 Rather, austerity in antiquity is a 
luxury supplement to common laws and customs, which implore styles of 
moderation from the citizen in the areas where he governs the conduct and actions 
of others and himself. Originally, these themes of sexual austerity represent a 
quadri-thematics of problematisations around ”the hfe of the body, the institution 
of marriage, relations between men, and the existence of wisdom”,% which are 
reformulated in other epochs as an expression of prohibition. In place of a history of 
moral interdictions manifest as austerity, Foucault asks why the practice of 
pleasures vis-ii-uis the body, wife, boys and truth becomes a matter for debate, or 
”[hlow did sexual behavior ... come to be conceived as a domain of moral 
experience”?95 
Foucault’s s M t  of the analysis from interdictions to problematisations, 
history to critical history, enables h s  delineation of ethics from within morality. 
Usually, morality is defined as a moral code, or values and rules of action 
recommended through prescriptive in~tihltions.~~ In addition, morality refers to the 
real actions of the subject in relation to a moral code, and these rules of conduct 
comprise the morality of behaviours. A third aspect of morality concerns the 
manner in wluch the self ought to form himself as an ethical subject in reference to 
the moral code. Foucault calls this the mode of subjectivation, or ”the procedure by 
which one obtains the constiturion of a subject, or more precisely, of a 
subjectivity” .97 
The style and manner of the self‘s elaboration of himself into an ethical 
subject of moral conduct depends on the moral code’s stipulations about the four 
constitutive elements of subjectivation: the ethical substance (the part of the 
individual that is earmarked for his moral conduct); the mode of subjection (tlie 
way the individual establishes his relation to the rule and acknowledges his 
obligation to put it into practice); the ethical work (the practice of the self that 
transforms the self into the ethical subject of his conduct); and the telos (the self’s 
roles or same sex intercourse) a i d  a m ~ k l  of abstention (which promises access to tlie truth of one’s 
being or spiritual wisdom). Foucault, The Usc. of Pleasure, pp. 15-20. 
93 Foucault, ”On the Genealogy of  Ethlcs”, p. 342 and p. 361. 
94 Foucault, The Use of Pleastrre, p. 21. 
95 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p. 24. 
96 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, pp. 25-26. 
y7 Foucault, ”The Return of Morality”, p. 253. 
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contingent integration of his moral actions into a pattern of conduct).% For 
Foucault, these modes of subjectivation, which are ”more decisive for 
comprehending the transformations of moral experience than the history of codes”, 
are commensurate with e h c s  if it is ”understood as the elaboration of a form of 
relation to self that enables an individual to fashion hmself into a subject of ethical 
conduct’’ .% 
An epoch’s mode of subjectivation might implore an ethical subject in either a 
quasi-juridical style, where conduct is referred to the moral code that has the status 
of the law or norm- the mode of subjectivation in the scienta sexualis, for example - 
or through practices of the self that are ascetic in form, and where conduct is a 
question of an appropriate relation to self.’O0 In this respect, Foucault speaks of 
code-oriented and ethics-oriented moralities, respectively. Further, because 
histories of morality emphasise moral behaviour over the mode of subjectivation, 
he focuses on the latter. Ethics-oriented moralities offer a crucial field of historicity 
about the self’s recognition of himself as an ethical subject of hs sexual conduct.IO* 
Ths  is why Foucault’s critical history of the ethico-moral axis of experience, 
specifically the modes of subjectivation, is not a nietzschean genealogy of morals 
but ”the genealogy of the subject as a subject of ethical actions”,1o2 whch necessarily 
incorporates a genealogy of ascetic practices of the self, to0.103 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of ethics, with its four modes of ontology, de- 
ontology, ascetics and teleology,lW describes the work that one carries out on 
oneself as a free being.105 The modes of subjectivation portray a self-employed 
practice.106 They detail ”a mode of being that could be defined by the full enjoyment 
of oneself, or the perfect supremacy of oneself over If the constitution of 
the self’s relation to hmself captures the conceptual subtleties of an agonistic 
freedom which is grounded in a recalcitrant will that provokes its uis-&vis of 
pouvoir/sauoir qua limits of who we are, then it can be said that Foucault’s critical 
history promises a state of being autonomous in thought and action. Instead of 
98 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, pp. 26-29. 
99 Foucault, The Use of PIeasure, p. 251. 
loo Foucault,, The Use ofPZeasure, p. 31. 
Io1 Foucault, ”On the Genealogy of Etlucs”, p. 352; Foucault, 77w Use of PIeasure, pp. 30-32. 
Io2 Foucault, ”On the Genealogy of Etlucs”, pp. 355-356. 
*03 Foucault, ”On the Genealogy of Etlucs”, pp. 341-342 and p. 355. 
lo4 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p. 37. 
Io5 Toews, ”Foucault and the Freudian Subject”, p. 131. 
“hacker, ”Foucault and the Writing of History”, p. 38. 
Io7 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p. 31. 
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kantian or hegelian self-awareness, the relation to self is the means to the end of 
”self-formation as an ’ethical subject’”.108 It is ”the field of a liberty forming itself as 
a subjectivation”,1m and this field in which ethical subjectivity is constituted is 
political because ”we come to recognize ourselves as subjects of a form of 
experience ... [through concrete subjectivization,] which rests on a body of 
knowledge, norm, and models of our nature’? A foucauldian e h c s  is a politics 
which, to borrow Foucault’s use of a concept in an altogether different context, 
promises a &assujetfissernent,lll a desubjectrfication from assujetfissemenf,112 the 
submission of subjectivity that is effected by somafo- and bio-pouvoir and political 
rationality. Foucault’s ethico-morality illuminates the exit to maturity that is 
blocked by humanism. 
6.iv. The Confessions of the Flesh and a Hermeneutics of the Self 
Ethics-oriented moralities in greek and graeco-roman antiquity problematise sex in 
terms of an zsthetics of existence.113 The telos in each epoch-moderation in Me or 
the conversion to self- requires the elaboration of moral conduct through ascetic 
practices of the self. In respect of asymmetrical relations to others they bring about 
the self’s mastery of himself in his use of pleasures, and with regard to symmetrical 
relations to others the practices of the self lead to the self’s care of hmself in h i s  
practice of pleasures.114 Citizens in antiquity, Foucault writes, 
not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, 
to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an 
oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria.l15 
With its practical stylisation of liberty, ethical subjectivity represents the 
frontier between antiquity’s sexual ethics of pleasure and early Christianity’s code- 
oriented sexual morality. As the confessions of the flesh, the latter implores a quasi- 
juridical relation to other, the abbot, who oversees and mediates the self‘s 
hermeneutic relation to self and the constitution of his moral identity through 
’Os Foucault, 77ze Use of Pleasure, p. 28. 
Io9 Bernauer, ”Michel Foucault’s Ecstatic Tlunking”, p. 66. 
l lo  Rajchman, Miche2 Foucault, p. 85. 
Foucault, ”Par-dela le bien et le mal”, p. 227. 
”* Foucault, “Revolutionary Action”, p. 222. 
113 Foucault, ”On the Genealogy of Ethics”, pp. 357-358. 
114 Foucault, The Use ofPleasure, p. 36. 
115 Foucault, 77ze Use of Pleasure, pp. 10-11. 
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practices and techniques of decipherment, confession, renunciation and spiritual 
combat.116 There is what Foucault calls a restructuration of the mode of relation to 
self, as well as a transformation of the practices on which subjectivation is based.117 
Essentially, Plato’s philosophy of erotics, which first demands that the self 
constitute hmself as a subject of metaphysical truth, is taken to heart by scholastic 
philosophers. They discard antiquity’s ethics-oriented morality, especially its 
notion of the self who stylises his subjectivity, in favour of a morality of 
renunciation and a hermeneutics of desireY8 It commandeers the practices of the 
self and, on the basis of a phlosophical subject, inaugurates the constitution of 
objective, normative and subjective experience. If what “was missing in classical 
antiquity was the problematization of the constitution of the self as a subject ... , 
[bleginning with Christianity we have ... an appropriation of morality by the 
theory of the subject” 
Foucault argues that early Christianity’s pastoral-pouvoir exercises the relations 
of government between the social body and the self on the basis of a moral identity. 
It makes the self perpetually aware of, and alert to, his mental weaknesses and 
bodily temptations, and particularly his flesh, which is the subjectivity of the body. 
Early Christianity’s sexual morality of the confessions of the flesh ”interiorises 
sexuality within subjectivity through the self‘s submission of himself, which is the 
first effect of the introduction into roman society of pastora2-pouvoil/‘.120 
Cassian, whose texts represent early Christian literature in the graeco-roman 
society of the second and thrd century, exemphfies the scholastic techniques for 
the interpretation of desire. They help the monk to constitute hmself as a moral 
subject through the mortification of the flesh. For Foucault, Cassian’s practices of 
monastic asceticism are vital to the battle for chastity because, apart from the vices 
of greed, avarice, wrath, sloth, accidie, vainglory and pride, they see the spirit of 
fornication as the greatest threat. As it is rooted in the body and mind, h s  spirit 
has an ontological prominence and, for those voluntary confinees to the cloister, it 
is the sole vice which can and must be completely morhfied (in contrast to avarice, 
for example, as even the monk must eat).121 
*I6 Foucault, The Use ofPZeasure, p. 63. 
117 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, pp. 31-32. 
Foucault, The Use ofPleasure, p. 230. 
119 Foucault, ”The Return of Morality”, p. 253. 
I2O ”La chair, c’est la subjectivite‘ m h e  du c o p ,  la chair chre‘tienne, c’est la sexualite‘ prise a l’inte‘rieur de cettc 
subjectiviti, de cet assujettissernent de l‘individu a lui-mime qui est l‘effet premier de l’introduction dans la 
socie‘te‘ romaine du pouvoir pastoral”. Foucault, “Sexualite et pouvoir”, p. 566. 
lZ1 Foucault, “The Battle for Chastity”, pp. 228-229. 
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The spirit of-or desire for-fornication has three elements: carnal 
conjunction; autoeroticism; and carnal images (of the mind and thoughts). Cassian 
ignores the first and focuses on the besiegement of the monk’s will by an internal 
play of the last two, which fuel the spirit of fornication. The battle for chastity 
wages against the desire for autoeroticism and carnal images, what Cassian calls 
concupiscence, from whch the will must dissociate and disinvolve itself. Through 
the ascetic but hermeneutic practices of confession and self-examination, the monk 
withdraws h s  will from concupiscence to reveal its hidden depths.’= As a 
consequence of his triumphant battle against nocturnal pollution and erotic 
dreams, whch become alien to the chastised soul, the monk who lives in his body 
but is released from the flesh attains hs telos, or that form of citizenshp that is 
otherwise reserved for saints? 
The techniques of examination and confession, which are first articulated by 
Foucault in Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, find their earliest 
employment as producers of truth with Cassian and, later in the fourth and fifth 
century, with Gregory of Nyssa and Saint Augustine, t 0 0 . l ~ ~  In Gregory’s case, to 
accede to the care of the self is a question of the renunciation of marriage and an 
associated hermeneutic detachment of oneself from the flesh. Through the virglruty 
of the heart and body, the privileged man with social status, who h s  etluco-moral 
thought is aimed at, can lay claim to hs telos, immortahty, if he becomes a monk.125 
But whereas in grizco-roman antiquity the care of the self is a means to the end of 
the conversion to self, which the citizen attains ethically via practices of the self in 
order to then care for the city, with Gregory it implores a hermeneutic relation to 
self, in whch the monk renounces the world and discovers the soul that God 
illuminates.126 
Saint Augustine, whose account of sexual morality still informs the scienta 
sexualis and, by association, is the spur for Foucault’s original project in 1976,lz7 
similarly meditates on the monk’s attainment of truth as the passport for ascension 
to the parahse for saints and chaste, v i r p  sou1s.lz For Saint Augustine, the 
assertion of the autonomy of the will by man is tantamount to the renunciation of 
lz2 Foucault, “The Battle for Chastity”, pp. 233-239. 
Foucault, ”The Battle for Chastity”, pp. 230-231. 
124 Foucault, “The Battle for Chastity”, p. 240. 
lE Foucault, ”L’hermeneutique du sujet”, pp. 353-355. 
lz6 Foucault, “Les techniques de soi”, p. 787. 
lZ7 Foucault, The History ofSexuaZity, p. 9. 
Foucault, ”Les techniques de soi”, p. 793. 
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the grace of God, in virtue of whom the body is ontologically subordinate to the 
will. To regain his favour, the monk determines to care for himself, and the 
techniques of the self he turns to are designed to purge the monk of his carnal 
images. As for Cassian, they represent the principle of the movements of the sexual 
organs independently of the will129- the erection is the image of man’s revolt 
against - and for Saint Augustine the soul only encounters the truth, whence 
paradise, if the monk confronts and subdues these carnal image, whch as an 
integral part of the human will are responsible for his diremption from the divine. 
To attain a state of being autonomous in thought and action from the flesh, 
the cassian, gregorian or augustinian monk cares for the self with a hermeneutics of 
his desire.131 He practices the techruque of examination, in whch he interprets the 
desires he harbours, the thoughts he has and the state of his soul. It is an act of faith 
where the monk publicly reveals the truth about himself, whch he discovers in hs 
soul through self-examination. Albeit revealed as a sinner, the monk is also a 
penitent. He can divorce himself from h s  previous identity; for example, as that of 
an autoerotic sinner.132 Secondly, there is the techruque of confession, the verbal 
mobilisation of the soul, in whch the monk recognises hunself through the words 
of others via his obedience to the abbot and  IS contemplation of God. The monk 
relates his carnal images to the impurity of his soul, which requires a relation to 
other and the submission to the other’s morality of who the self should be.133 
Together, examination and confession invite the revelation of truth through a 
hermeneutics of desire. They promise salvation to the monk, who renounces 
himself in those cases where the truth he reveals fails to tally with the conizaissnizce 
of the abbot. There is, in the abbot’s government of the monk, a relation of power n 
pvopos of knowledge.134 Finally, Cassian, Gregory and Saint Augustine tame 
129 Foucault, ”Sexualite et solitude”, pp. 174-175. 
130 Foucault, “Sexualite et solitude”, p. 176. 
131 Foucault in no way claims to provide a definitive portrayal of the hermeneutics of the self that are 
at the heart of early Christianity’s techniques of examination and confession, because Christianity is 
more interested in its beliefs than the practice of them; there is no actual Christian doctrine on the 
hermeneutics of the self; a Christian hermeneutics of the self is frequently criss-crossed by its 
theologies of the soul (concupiscence, sin and the loss of grace); and the subsequent diffusion of the 
Christian hermeneutics of the self into broader culture makes it difficult to isolate and distinguish from 
a non-Christian hermeneutics of the self. Foucault, “Les t e c h q u e s  de soi”, p. 784. 
132 Foucault, ”Les techruques de soi”, pp. 805-808. 
133 Foucault, ”Les techniques de soi”, pp. 809-811. 
w The practice of confession involves the monk’s submission to dogmatic and canonical truths, in 
which he must both believe and demonstrate that he believes. In addition, Christianity uses confession 
to produce the truth from within the monk, who must know who he is and constantly decipher and 
speak about everything that happens inside hm. The monk’s knowledge of &elf is the 
precondition for the punfication of the soul- revelation in return for salvation- hence Saint 
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thought’s irrational nature. If the experience of chastity is to be real, its enemy of 
concupiscence, which is harboured by thought, demands a hermeneutic technique 
for the examination and confession of the various masks which thought assumes.135 
In this chas tity-oriented asceticism, Foucault claims, 
one can see a process of ‘subjectivization’ ... linked with a process of self- 
knowledge which makes the obligation to seek and state the truth about oneself 
an indispensable and permanent condition of this asceticism; and if there is 
subjectivization, it also involves an indeterminate objectivization of the self by 
the self-indeterminate in the sense that one must be forever extending as far as 
possible the range of one’s thoughts, however insigruficant and innocent they 
may appear to be. Moreover, this subjectivization, in its quest for the truth 
about oneself, functions through complex relations with others, ... . One has to 
rid oneself of the power of the Other, ... and eternal warfare has to be waged 
against this Other, ... . Finally, confession to others, submission to their advice 
and permanent obedience to one’s superiors is essential in this battle.136 
In spite of the archzological continuity in ehco-moral thought of the care of 
oneself between grzco-roman antiquity and early Christianity, genealogy reveals 
how the practices of the self through whch it is realised are substantially 
reformulated. Truth-telling, for instance, which involves the citizen’s confession to 
his interlocutor of the truth about himself and what he believes to be true about the 
world,137 is in early Christianity a techruque for the monk’s self-interpretation and 
discovery of concupiscent tendencies.’% Graxo-roman antiquity’s ethic to care for 
oneself, whch requires a knowledge of the self,139 is marginahed by verbal 
techruques of confession, which on the principle of know thyself operate through a 
hermeneutics of desire.140 Antiquity’s aesthetics of existence, in whch the citizen’s 
practices of the self constitute his ethcal subjectivity, is replaced in early 
Christianity by the renunciation of the self and the decipherment of truth, whch 
results in a moral identity.I4* From early Christianity, truth is that which the monk 
mints, banks and dispenses in hs relation to self that is mediated by the abbot, who 
withdraws and spends the currency of truth at the monk’s expense. ”Unconditional 
obehence, continuous examination and exhaustive confession”, Foucault 
Augustine’s motto, quisfacit veritatern, construct the truth in oneself to access the light (faire la wri te en 
soi, avoir acces a la lurnitre). Foucault, ”Les techniques de soi”, pp. 804-805. 
135 Foucault, “The Battle for Chastity”, p. 239. 
136 Foucault, ”The Battle for Chastity”, p. 240. 
137 Flynn, “Foucault as Parrhesiast”, pp. 103-105. 
’% Foucault, ”Interview de Michel Foucault”, pp. 658-659. 
139 Foucault, “Les techruques de soi”, pp. 788-789. 
I4O Foucault, ”Les techniques de soi”, p. 813. 
141 Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Etlucs”, p. 366. 
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concludes, 
comprise an apparatus in which each element is inextricable from the others. 
The verbalisation of truth from the depths of the self is indispensable to the 
government of one man by another ... . But it must be emphasised that the 
purpose of the marufestation of truth is not the self’s sovereign mastery of 
himself. Instead, the expected aim is humility and mortification, or the 
detachment of the self from himself and the constitution of a disciplined 
relation to self, which tends to destroy the form of the self.142 
6.v. The Use of Pleasure and Ethico-Political Subjectivity 
Foucault proposes a threefold justification of his critical history of subjectivity: 
historically, ”the idea of a morality as obedience to a code of rules is now 
di~appearing”;~~~ morally, the ”search for a form of morality acceptable to 
everybody in the sense that everyone should submit to it, strrkes me as 
catastrophic”;144 and ethically, as ”a moral experience essentially centered on the 
subject no longer seems satisfactory to me today’’ .145 For these reasons, Foucault’s 
conception of maturity that is apposite to the finitude articulated by his three 
critiques cannot draw on the autonomous subject’s self-actualised recogrution, 
which defines the philosophcal subject whose moral identity is constituted by a 
hermeneutic relation to self in early and medizval Christianity’s sexual moralities 
of the confessions of the flesh and the sacrament of penance. On behalf of a post- 
humanist, enlightenment paradigm for freedom, critical hstorical critique 
investigates the constitution of ethical subjectivity as a practice of the self in 
antiquity. 
Of course, Foucault is neither philosophically nor politically naive enough to 
want to re-instate antiquity’s sexual ethics, for ”you can’t find the solution of a 
problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other 
people” .146 Moreover, 
142 ”L’obkissance inconditionnee, l’examen ininterrompu et l’aueu cxhaustif forment donc un ensemble dont 
chaque e‘le‘nzent implique les deux autres; la manffestation uerbale de la vc‘ritc‘ qui se cache au fond ak soi-niZme 
apparait conznze une p ike  indispensable au gouucrnement des hommes les uns par les autres . . . . Mais il faut 
souligner que cette nzanifestation n’a pas pourfin d’c‘tablir la maitrise souzieraine de soi sur soi; ce qu’on en 
attend, au contraire, c‘est l‘humilitc‘ et la mortification, le dktachcment a l‘c‘gard de soi et la constitution d’un 
rapport U soi qui tend la destruction de la forme du soi”. Foucault, ”Du gouvernement des vivants”, p. 129. 
143 Foucault, ”An Aesthetics of Existence”, p. 49. 
144 Foucault, “The Return of Morality”, p. 254. 
145 Foucault, “The Return of Morality”, p. 253. 
146 Foucault, ”On the Genealogy of Etlucs”, p. 343. 
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[tlhe Greek ethics of pleasure is linked to a virile society, to dissymmetry, 
exclusion of the other, an obsession with penetration, and a kind of threat of 
being dispossessed of your own energy, and so on. All that is quite 
disgusting!147 
Instead of its sexual e h c s ,  a critical history of antiquity finds its vindication in the 
constitution of ethical subjectivity as “practices of liberation, of liberty”.148 Through 
his lectures at the CoZZege de France for 1980-1981, Subjectivite et Veriti, Foucault 
lauds how the self establishes, maintains and transforms his subjectivity in 
accordance with numerous goals, and via a relation of mastery of the self over, and 
a knowledge of the self by, the self. In the interests of an agonistic freedom 
applicable to the present, Foucault situates a hermeneutic self-interrogation about 
truth and: 
the imperative ‘to know thyself’ ... within a broader interrogation . .. : how does 
the self ’govern himself’ by exercising actions in which he is the object of those 
actions, the domain in which they are applied, the instrument to which they 
have recourse and the self who reacts?149 
My aim in this section and the next is to specify the self-government of 
oneself with respect to antiquity’s problematisation of sex in terms of a sexual ethc, 
which is self-actualised by practices of the ethico-political and ehco-social self. As 
an example of the agonistic relation to self, I look in this section at the art of life of 
economics, and to articulate the birth of a theory of the subject, in whch sex is 
posited as integral to the truth of the subject’s being in greek antiquity (a theme that 
subsequently finds support in Saint Augustine and humanism), I also examine the 
art of life of erotics. Then, to highhght the graceful, symmetrical relation to other in 
grzco-roman antiquity, I concentrate in the following section on the art of the self 
of economics. 
Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle problematise the aphrodisia, the uncensored, 
loosely defined pleasures whch include those that effect delight and are associated 
with art and music, as well as the self-indulgent pleasures (akolasia aphrodisia) that 
are lrnked to food, drink and sex and are experienced at great cost to the body.150 In 
particular, self-indulgent pleasures are earmarked as the citizen’s ethical substance, 
147 Foucault, ”On the Genealogy of Ethics”, p. 346. 
148 Foucault, ”An Aesthetics of Existence”, p. 50. 
149 “[qZ s’agit de replacer I’impe‘ratifdu ’se connaitre soi-mime’, . . . dans I’interrogation plus uaste: comment ’se 
gouvemer’ en exercant des actions ou on est soi-mime Z’objectifde ces actions, le domaine ou elles s’appliquent, 
l’instrurnent auquel elles ont recours et le sujet qui apt”? Foucault, ”Subjectivite et verite”, p. 213. 
150 Foucault, 7 7 ~  Use OfPleasure, pp. 32-40. 
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as the base necessities of food, drink and procreation induce an essential appetite 
that gives rise to an intense desire for them. Pleasure in greek antiquity is conceived 
to originate in a force that threatens to extend the citizen’s needs beyond nature’s 
prescriptions and to reverse the hierarchy of the soul over the body, which is a core 
prerequisite for the citizen’s government of the poZis. For doctors and philosophers, 
Foucault writes, the moral problematization of food, drmk and sexual relations 
with women and boys constitutes the same ethical material. 
[Tlhey brought forces into play that were natural, but that always tended to be 
excessive; and they all raised the same question: how could he, how must he 
’make use’ (christaz) of this dynamics of pleasure, desires, and acts? A question 
of right use.151 
The ethical substance of pleasure gives rise to a mode of subjection in whch 
the citizen focuses on its use. He moderates and regulates his practice of sex 
through a stylisation of h i s  conduct according to need, timeliness and status, and in 
regard to principles of prudence and practical reason. In place of laws of desire or 
norms, which regulate the juridical subject, the citizen’s ethical conduct 
individualises hs action, which is the qualification for acknowledgement by his 
peers in the p o l i ~ . ~ ~ ~  To ths  end, the mode of subjection invites daily ethical work, in 
which the citizen gwes shape to a certain attitude to himself, whilst a teZos of 
moderation orients him. Where the ethcal work is concerned, practices of the self 
elaborated in respect of h i s  repmen, household and courtshp develop the citizen’s 
ethical virtue of the mastery of himself (enkrafeia), which is simultaneously a means 
to the end of the political virtues of wisdom, courage, justice and, most relevant to 
Foucault’s investigation, the moderation (sdyhrosyne] that the citizen exercises in h s  
government of others. To develop his self-mastery, the citizen practices a combative 
attitude against his pleasures, which involves an incessant battle for control of the 
agonistic relation that is Inherent between the pull of the pleasures and the demand 
to use them moderately. In addition, the citizen develops a polemical attitude that 
concerns an agonistic relation with and between himself. Here, the battle is not 
between the opposing forces of pleasure and its ethical use, nor of the soul against 
the body, but against an adversary - himself- who is not ontologically alien to the 
citizen. 
These agonistic games of ethcal conflict result in victory if, as Aristotle 
advises, the citizen controls his pleasure and desire through moderation, or if it is 
151 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, pp. 51-52. 
152 Foucault, The Use ofPleasure, pp. 55-62. 
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evident that he has estabhshed a solid and stable rule of himself by himself.153 
Virtue in greek antiquity’s sexual ethics is manifest as the citizen’s mastery-docility 
relationship to pleasure and as domination-submission in his relationship to 
himself. Together, Foucault calls them the heautocratic structure of the self. It is the 
citizen’s literal self-government of himself, his care of himself, and it contrasts with 
early Christianity’s government of the monk by the other on the basis of his 
relationship of elucidation-renunciation of the flesh, and decipherment-purification 
of desire and concupiscence. 
To sustain hs heautocratic structure, the citizen undertakes daily ethical 
practices of the self, whch mirror the form of the political practices of the self. Yet, 
even if they produce the different virtues of self-mastery and moderation, they are 
interconnected because the citizen’s ethical care of h e l f  is the condition for his 
political care of others, whether it be in respect of  IS wife and slaves in the 
household, or over those in the poZis.154 The virile character of self-mastery signals 
the citizen’s ethical attitude and manly conduct in the use of the pleasures, which is 
isomorphic with his political role where, in the exercise of power, the citizen 
displays the coterminous manly virtue of moderation in hs rule of others.155 This 
etluco-political freedom of individuals, Foucault says, 
understood as the mastery they were capable of exercising over themselves, 
was indispensable to the entire state. ... The individual’s attitude toward 
himself, the way in which he ensured his own freedom with regard to himself, 
and the form of supremacy he maintained over himself were a contributing 
element to the well-being and good order of the city.156 
Greek antiquity’s mode of subjectivation is inextricable from politics, and to 
constitute his etl-uco-political subjectivity the citizen defers to truth (Zogos). 
However, the self’s relation to truth ”is not an epistemological condition enabling 
the individual to recogruze humelf in hs singularity as a desiring subject”, but the 
structural, instrumental and ontolopcal condition for the self‘s practice of liberty, in 
which the citizen seeks an ethical qua moderate use of plea~ure.15~ Firstly, truth aids 
the practice of self-mastery necessary to structure pleasure and desire; secondly, 
truth supports the heautocratic structure of the self and, as the instrument that 
guarantees the citizen’s dominance of hs pleasures, it releases him for the more 
153 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, pp. 63-71. 
Foucault, The Use ofPIeasure, pp. 71-76. 
lS5 Foucault, 17ze Use ofPZeasure, pp. 82-86. 
ls6 Foucault, The Use of PZeasure, p. 79. 
ls7 Foucault, The Use ofPZeasure, p. 89. 
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temporal duties of citizenship; and, thirdly, truth produces the citizen’s ontological 
recognition of a relationship to himself-he constitutes himself as a subject of a 
Socratic knowledge of himself.’% For the ethico-political self, truth enables status, 
status is a man who is ethical, the ethical man is accepted and recognised as a 
citizen, and only the citizen exercises power. In this unique relation of 
independence between truth and power, which are connected by the citizen’s 
subjectivity, freedom is politically exclusive, albeit an ethical practice. It is then the 
practice of liberty in Greek antiquity, and not its political practices, that Foucault 
retrieves as a model for maturity in the present. ”Putting it schematically”, he 
writes, 
classical antiquity’s moral reflection concerning the pleasures was not directed 
toward a codification of acts, nor toward a hermeneutics of the subject, but 
toward a stylization of attitudes and an aesthetics of existence. ... [Slexual 
moderation was an exercise of freedom that took form in self-mastery; and the 
latter was shown in the manner in which the subject behaved, in the self- 
restraint he displayed in his virile activity, in the way he related to himself in 
the relationship he had with others. . . . A moral value that was also an aesthetic 
value and a truth value ... by aiming at the satisfaction of real needs, by 
respecting the true hierarchy of the human being, and by never forgetting 
where one stood in regard to truth.159 
It is in the arts of llfe of economics and erotics that an ethxo-political 
isomorphism is most evident. In respect of the former, the husband’s endeavour to 
voluntarily reciprocate the wife’s enforced sexual fidelity, despite h s  licence to the 
contrary, constitutes one of the most elegant forms of the citizen’s moderation and 
”pertain[s] to an art of governing-governing in general, governing oneself, and 
governing a wife who must be kept under control and respected at the same 
time”.160 To be sure, economics does not promote what Foucault calls a double 
sexual monopoly. There is no emphasis on heterosexual sex and its localisation in 
marriage for both spouses. Instead of a personal commitment to h s  wife, the 
citizen’s h t a t i o n  of the use of his pleasures to marriage, which brings about an 
ethically ordered household a propos of a deliberate practice of the self-limitation of 
his power, is a political imperative of the polis, whilst his moderation is a sign of an 
ability to distribute justice in it. The effect of his virtue of moderation is the citizen’s 
renunciation of extramarital sex-& jure for his wife-yet what it represents in the 
art of life of economics is his etlucal stylisation of conduct, his self-mastery of 
Foucault, The Use ofPZeasure, pp. 82-89. 
159 Foucault, The Use ofPleusure, pp. 92-93. 
I6O Foucault, The Use ofPZeasure, pp. 164-165. 
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pleasure and moderate government of his wife.’61 
At its core, the art of life of erotics concerns the type of ethical stylisation to 
practice in the love of a boy, which differs to that practiced in the love of a woman 
w i h  the art of economics just discussed.162 In pre-Socratic erotics, it is ”a problem 
of knowing how one can make allowance for the other’s freedom in the mastery 
one exercises over oneself and in the true love one bears for h i d . 1 6 3  The 
problematisation is directed at the boy, whose courtship by a citizen is a training 
ground in etlucal conduct and virtue.164 At stake is the boy’s future reputation as a 
citizen, whch is gauged in terms of hs honour. As a minimum, the boy avoids a 
feeling of shame and the contempt of others that accompanies those who yield at 
random and indiscriminately; in parallel, the boy wins honour if, during his 
adolescence when he is most desirable, he exhibits a certain bodily demeanour or 
quality of acquaintance, and is discerning in the management of the suitors vying 
for his charms. Here, self-mastery is displayed by an ability to neither frustrate all 
their advances, nor to concede to every proposition, w l l s t  the boy’s moderation is 
evident in h i s  practice and timing of his use for pleasure by the citizen. Both 
moments demonstrate the boy’s attitude of an ethical relationshp with himself, 
which is a passport to ~itizenshp.~~5 
Nevertheless, the courtship of a boy by a citizen, in particular their nocturnal 
congress, presents an implacable problem. In an active-dominant and passive- 
dominated ethical schema, which is based on a sexual model of penetration, 
relations between the citizen and his wife are plulosophcally unproblematic. But 
when it comes to the question of the courtship of a boy, and the eventuahty that he 
would, as a virile citizen of tomorrow, be today’s passive, dominated subject of 
penetration, there arises what Foucault calls the antinomy of the boy,’66 for the 
relationship he “was expected to establish with himself in order to become a free 
man, master of himself and capable of prevailing over others, was at variance with 
a form of relationshp in which he would be an object of pleasure for an0ther”.’67 
The anti nomos of the boy, the flouting of customs which conform to nature,lbs 
ultimately sees the colonisation of pre-Socratic greek antiquity’s modes of 
161 Foucault, The Use ufPleasure, p. 184. 
162 Foucault, 7’he Use ofPZeasure, p. 190. 
163 Foucault, The Use ofPZeasure, p. 253. 
Foucault, The Use ofPZeasure, pp. 193-203. 
165 Foucault, The Use ofPZeasure, pp. 204-211. 
Foucault, 7?ze Use ofPZeasure, pp. 214-220. 
167 Foucault, The Use ofPZeusure, pp. 221. 
168 Foucault, The Use ofPZeasure, pp. 158. 
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subjectivation, in which ”‘courtship’ practice and recognition of the other’s 
freedom” are central to erotics, by ”an ascesis of the subject and the common access 
to truth” For Foucault, the coloniser is Plato’s post-Socratic discourse of 
philosophical erotics, which reformulates the practices central to the constitution of 
ethical subjectivity: amorous behaviour becomes an inquiry into the nature of true 
love; the boy’s honour becomes a question of the love of truth; in place of a 
dissymmetry between partners, there is a convergence of love qua road to truth; and 
virtue is transferred from the loved boy to the citizen’s love, which offers a direct 
relation to In philosophcal erotics, the citizen masters his desire for 
pleasure with the boy, which he knows is ephemeral and a hindrance to the true 
love of wisdom. Through active self-mastery and an ability to practice moderation 
in his pleasures, the citizen’s existent relation to truth becomes the object of love for 
the boy. Plato makes love into an ontologcal question, and philosophcal erotics 
into a true discourse on the relationshp between love and truth and the ascetics 
necessary to attain wisdom.171 The concern is with the truth the citizen is capable of 
in the double sense of his soul’s (grammatically feminine) ”relation to her own 
desire questioned in its being, and a relation to the object of her desire [the boy] 
recognized as a true being”.172 With Plato, sex is first problematised on the basis of 
desire, whch entails a moral requirement to be a subject of the truth that lies 
behind the objects of desire in the world of ideas. h a way that may be surprising at 
first, Foucault reflects, 
one sees the formation, in Greek culture and in connection with the love of 
boys, of some of the major elements of a sexual ethics that will renounce that 
love by appealing to the above principle [of indefinite abstention]: the 
requirement of a symmetry and reciprocity in the love relationship; the 
necessity of a long and arduous struggle with oneself; the gradual purification 
of a love that is addressed only to being per se, in its truth; and man’s inquiry 
into himself as a subject of desire.173 
6.vi. The Care of the Self and Ethico-Social Subjectivity 
Antiquity, Foucault jests, is a profound error that founders on the contradiction 
between ”the relentless search for a certain style of existence ... and the effort to 
169 Foucault, The Use ofPleusure, p. 244. 
170 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, pp. 236-241. 
171 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, pp. 235-242. 
172 Foucault, The Use ofPZeasure, p. 244. 
173 Foucault, The Use ofPleasure, p. 245. 
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make it available to all”.174 For this to occur, a religious framework is required 
which is akin to that estabhshed after graeco-roman antiquity by early christianity’s 
pastoral-po~voir,~~~ when Saint Augustine’s doctrinal unification of the elements 
dispersed across the arts of life allows pastoral-pouvoir to adjudicate the game of 
death and immortality, the institution of marriage, and the conditions of access to 
truth. The nascent pastoral-pouvoir between the monk and the abbot recentres 
antiquity’s practices of the self around the decipherment of the self, purification 
procedures and struggles against concupiscence. Instead of ”pleasure and the 
aesthetics of its use, ... [there is] desire and its purifying hermeneutics’?6 In h s  
sense, Plato’s phdosophcal erotics is a sign ”for a future inquiry into desiring 
man”, as well as an omen for a sexual ethics of the right use of pleasure that cannot 
readily accommodate an ascetics, in which total abstention is the preferred 
standard and privilege is accorded to the question of desire? 
From the point of view of maturity that extends beyond the ethico-morality of 
the athenian citizen’s exercise of his freedom, his virile power and h s  access to 
truth,l78 Foucault does not lament the decline in the sexual ethic of the use of 
pleasure, so much as the etluco-political subjectivity of an zsthetics of existence, or 
”the purposeful art of a freedom perceived as a power game’?79 In critical history, 
there is no nostalgia for an origmal, pre-Christian system of thought, as for Hegel 
and Nietzsche, only a return to an ethico-morality in which we recogruse ourselves 
today.Is0 Of course, at the level of subjectivity Foucault re-iterates the distinction 
between pre- and post-Socratic (greek) antiquity that is made by Nietzsche, who 
articulates the death of tragedy due to the interventions of Socrates’ theoretical 
man,’Sl and Heidegger, who describes the platonic birth of onto-theology or 
metaphysics.18* Yet Foucault’s focus on problematisations, both the discursive and 
174 Foucault, ”The Return of Morality”, p. 244. 
175 Foucault, ”The Return of Morality”, p. 246. 
176 Foucault, Tlze Use ofPleasure, p. 254. 
Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p. 244 and p. 246. 
178 Foucault, ”On the Genealogy of Etlucs”, p. 344. 
179 Foucault, The Use ofPZeasure, p. 253. 
180 Foucault, ”The Return of Morality”, pp. 248-249. 
appollonian restraint and control with dionysian passion and irrationality. It is dealt a deathblow by 
the interventions of theoretical man, whose progenitor, Socrates, believes that knowledge and reason 
not only lead to the depths of being but modify it, too. For Nietzsche, the optimism at the heart of all 
those Socratic cultures which are unable to free themselves from the Greeks and the truth they covert 
is the delusion of limitless power. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 55 15-18, pp. 51-67. 
182 Heidegger alludes to Plato’s inauguration of freedom as an education towards a metaphysical 
truth. It is indicated by the allegory of the cave, where the apprehension of a tlung is antecedent to 
According to Nietzsche, the greatness of pre-Socratic tragedy resides in its amalgamation of 
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non-discursive, salvages some, and abandons other, aspects of ancient experience.183 
In his focus on graxo-roman antiquity of the first and second century, therefore, 
Foucault highlights the continuation of an ethics-oriented morality that is based on 
a sexual ethic of the care of oneself. He distinguishes the transformation of dietetics, 
economics and erotics from arts of life in greek antiquity into arts of the self. In 
graeco-roman antiquity an aesthetics of existence is finessed into a universal mode 
of social being, whch entails practices that are constitutive of ethico-social 
subjectivity. 
Foucault commences with an analysis of Artemidorus’ treatise on 
oneirocriticism, the aptly entitled 77ze Interpretation of Dreams, which encapsulates 
the aesthetics of existence operative in graeco-roman antiquity. Artemidorus 
proposes the interpretation of dreams as an acceptable technique of the self for the 
citizen with a family, a few slaves and a small piece of With allegorical 
event dreams established as the amateur hermeneutist’s object of oneirocriticism, 
Artemidorus’ guidelines for the citizen’s practice of true interpretations 
distinguishes sex that conforms to the law, is contrary to the law, or contrary to 
nature.185 In tandem, Artemidorus advises the citizen that although the dreamer is 
always present in his dream as a witness of his use of pleasure, it does not represent 
reality. Rather, dreams are predictive of the citizen’s destiny in society. The 
interpreter looks for the h k  between himself qua subject of the dream and the 
subject of sex in the dream, and whether he is penetrater or penetrated, active or 
passive, or the subject or object of pleasure.’86 For Foucault, Artemidorus’ technique 
of interpretation elucidates the isomorphsm between the citizen’s sexual e h c s  and 
social conduct. 
The guiding thread of Artemidorus’ interpretation ... implies the breaking 
down and ordering of . . . [sexual] dreams . . . that are, by nature, social elements, 
and ... it indicates a certain way of quahfying sexual acts in terms of the 
manner in which the dreaming subject maintains, as the subject of the dreamed- 
of act, his position as a social subject. ... The sexual dream uses the little drama 
of penetration and passivity, pleasure and expenditure, to tell the subject’s 
experience, and referred to the Idea qua that which shines and brings a tlung into presence. A p r o p  of 
Plato, Heidegger says, truth is beyond the h g s  of experience and in a correctness of view about their 
thing-ness, or the extent to which a h n g  conforms to the Idea about it. Heidegger, ”Plato’s Doctrine 
ls3 Foucault, “The Return of Morality”, p. 249. 
184 Foucault, The Care offhe Self, pp. 49. 
ls5 Foucault, The Care of the Self, pp. 17-25. 
186 Foucault, The Care ofthe Se& pp. 27-32. 
of Truth”, pp. 167-174. 
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mode of being, as destiny has arranged it.Is7 
Artemidorus, Foucault suggests, testifies to the perenniality of peek 
antiquity’s zsthetic experience of the pleasures.1m Nonetheless, even if the ethical 
subjectivation of the athenian is mirrored in Rome, there is not a superimposition of 
the sexual ethic of the use of pleasure upon its citizens. Firstly, peek antiquity’s 
telos of moderation is re-articulated as a conversion to self (epistrophe’ eis 
heauton/conversio ad se).1s9 Secondly, if in Athens the means to moderation is self- 
mastery, which is dissymmetrical and non-reciprocal vis-a-uis the others who the 
citizen governs, in Rome self-mastery is a qualdication for a rational being who is 
related to other s d a r l y  rational beings.’% Roman self-mastery fashions the 
cultivation of the self (cura sui), and each day the citizen has to set aside time for 
introspection and reading, for the care of h s  body and meditation, or for speaking 
and writing with a confidant. Thirdly, the cultivation of the self is a consequence of 
a mode of subjection in which medico-philosophical reflection views the body as 
prone to passiveness and illness. Its vulnerability means it is no longer a question of 
the use of pleasure, but of the legitimate location and practice of pleasure (akolnsin 
dikaia).191 The cultivation of the self is a social practice with institutional structures, 
and the citizen’s family and friends are tied into obligations of exchange and 
reciprocity in pursuit of it. Fourthly, there are three main practices of self- 
knowledge for a cultivation of the self: self-testing procedures ascertain how far the 
citizen has progressed and still has to travel before the conversion to self; self- 
examination, in whch the self is both judge and defendant in his examination for 
the rationality bekund ethical conduct; and, finally, the citizen attains a stoical self- 
knowledge by examining, monitoring and screening representations, which foster 
the citizen’s relation to himself that is based on rational th0~ght. I~~ 
. 
Because it depends on these and other practices rather than a hermeneutics of 
the self, Foucault calls the conversion to self the culmination of a golden age of the 
ethcal stylisation of subjectivity.193 A roman citizen stresses the relation of hmself 
Foucault, The Care of the S e 4  p. 33. 
Foucault, The Care ofthe Serf. pp. 34-36 and p. 3. 
ls9 For Epictetus, the citizen is destined to care for hmself because of h potential to make free use of 
the reason at the core of his being, whilst for Seneca the citizen’s being demands a permanent exercise 
in self-transformation through plulosophical education. Foucault, The Care of the Se& pp. 39-50. 
Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Eth~cs”, pp. 357-358. 
191 Foucault, The Care of the Serf. pp. 51-57. 
192 Foucault, The Care ofthe Serf. pp. 58-65. 
193 Foucault, The Care of the Se& p. 45. 
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to himself less in terms of an agonistic self-mastery than a juridical model of 
possession, whereby the self retreats from preoccupations with the external world 
to rationally focus on-rather than, via the abbot’s mediation, to renounce- 
himself. Between greek and graeco-roman antiquity, there is a transformation in 
sexual ethics from the use of pleasure to the care of the self. Unlike Hegel, whose 
philosophy of hstory suggests SittZichkeit has no room to breathe under the empire 
of the ceasars, in whch Geisf ’ s  manifestation as right ignores the extra-juridical life 
of the citizen, Foucault’s critical history provides evidence to the contrary of a link 
between political activity and ehco-social subjectivity. With Marcus Aurelius, 
Foucault writes, ”one finds the clearest formulation of an experience of political 
power that . . . takes the form of an occupation separate from status . . . [but whch] 
requires the careful practice of personal virtues”.’” The transformation in ethical 
life-the intensification of the citizen’s relation to humelf through the rational 
cultivation of hurtself in order to convert to hunself-testifies to a crisis in 
subj ec tivation, 
that is, ... [to] a difficulty in the manner in which the individual could form 
himself as the ethical subject of his actions, and efforts to find in devotion to self 
that which could enable him to submit to rules and give a purpose to his 
existence.195 
Rather than a consequence of the transformations in graeco-roman antiquity’s 
e h c s  of married and political Me, the crisis in subjectivation is an original response 
to them.196 The re-articulated relation to self is a solution to the more widespread 
social practice, morally re-organised and public institution of marriage,197 while 
political changes redefine the citizen’s duties, obligations and In grzco- 
Foucault, The Cure o f fh e  Se& p. 89. 
195 Foucault, The Care offhe Se& p. 95. 
Foucault, The Care offhe Se& pp. 68-71. 
197 Foucault, The Care offhe Se& pp. 72-80. 
roman imperialism, Foucault claims that the cultivation of a rational relation to self is a phlosophical 
reply to a political landscape that is flexible and requires alliances and local municipalities to be 
effective. As a result, a complex administration is needed, which is drawn from a service aristo- 
bureaucracy who require a personal ethics, as it is difficult to define the relations between what one is, 
what one can do, and what one is expected to accomplish. An ehco-social subjectivity is thus a 
response to the politics of imperialism and it is necessary for political office, which this new dualism 
in subjectivity reflects. Firstly, there is the relativisation of the exercise of power. Politics is no longer 
an aristocratic pastime, but a life and practice that requires judgement and reason. Secondly, virtue is 
an insufficient qualification for political office, and it must be supplemented with reason, which is 
demonstrated by the cultivation of the self. Thirdly, the precariousness offortuna in politics demands a 
limitation of the empire on external events, whch resembles the etkucal conversion to self, where the 
stoical citizen finds delight in lumself and the non-dependent relation of hmself with himself. For 
Less a sign of individualism due to the decline of aristocratic rule, or the anonymity of grzco- 
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roman antiquity, the practice of the ethical conduct required for the conversion to 
self takes place as arts of the self in respect of the body, wife and boys. But unlike 
peek antiquity, where it is a question of the moderate use of pleasure through self- 
mastery, the accentuated sexual ethic of the care of oneself is effected by the 
citizen’s cultivation of his relation to himself, whch involves the legitimate use of 
pleasure. Hence, 
[tlhe individual who has finally succeeded in gaining access to himself is, for 
himself, an object of pleasure ... [which] is defined by the fact of not being 
caused by anything that is independent of ourselves and therefore escapes our 
control. It arises out of ourselves and within ourselves. ... [I]t knows neither 
degree nor change ... and once given no external event can rend it. ... [Alccess 
to self is capable of providing a form of pleasure that comes, in serenity and 
without fail, of the experience of oneself.’% 
Insofar as the conversion to self through the art of economics is concerned, 
Foucault detects three changes in the ethico-social life of matrimony. For the stoics 
in grzco-roman antiquity, marriage is ”a relation that is dual in its form, universal in 
its value, and specific in its intensity and strength”.200 Its primary function is social, 
which reflects the rational principle that h k s  sex between a husband and wife with 
communal union, common progeny and social companionship.20’ Secondly, duties 
of reciprocity prevail over the husband’s command of his wife.202 The citizen’s 
conversion to self is demonstrated by his ability to practice obligations to, and 
respect for, h s  wife. An art of dialogue effects the recognition of one another’s 
activities, whilst an art of collaboration realises marriage as an ethical unity of two 
spouses, each with divergent aptitudes, but who are equally capable of virtue.203 
Thirdly, marriage is a symmetrical relationshp that encroaches beyond the man’s 
use of pleasure into issues of love, affection and mutual sympathy. 
Marriage in grzco-roman antiquity mirrors the rationality of the natural 
world - heterosexuality - while the ethical reciprocity between spouses leads to the 
conjugalisation of sex by marriage.2” There is an intra-conjugal austerity that 
reconciles Ems’  physical but non-reciprocal pleasure, which is traditionally 
Foucault, there is an underlying principle of human reason manifest from the citizen’s ehco-social 
subjectivity to the governmentality of the empire. Foucault, The Care ofthe Serf, pp. 81-94. 
*% Foucault, The Cure of the Serf, p. 66. 
2oo Foucault, The Care offhe Serf, p. 150. 
201 Foucault, The Care of the Serf, pp. 151-156. 
202 Foucault, The Cure ofthe Se& p. 163. 
*03 Foucault, The Care offhe Serf, pp. 157-162. 
204 Foucault, The Care ofthe Serf, pp. 165-173. 
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reserved for pzderasty, with Aphrodife’s amorous reciprocity of passion. As 
procreation rather than pleasure is the goal of marital sex, Aphrodite‘ not only 
conjoins the husband and wife in intercourse, but she also enhances their 
friendship, f e e h g  of longmg, association and intimacy.2o5 Essentially, marital sex 
fosters the spouses’ symmetrical ethical relation and reciprocal affective relation. In 
parallel, the citizen honours kumself as a rational being to the extent that he 
conforms to his objective of the legitimate use of h s  pleasure with his wife. For 
Foucault, marriage and its associated stylisation of ethico-social subjectivity is 
indicative of a lawless universality of an aesthetics of existence.206 
The double sexual monopoly of marriage in graeco-roman antiquity has a 
direct bearing on the citizen’s art of erotic courtshp of boys. Heterosexual marital 
fidelity leads to a philosophical disinvestment from, instead of a disqualification of, 
pzderasty, which is criticised for its ”radical inadequacy, for its inability to 
accommodate relations of pleasure[,] . . . a style of living, an aesthetics of behaviour, 
and a whole modality of relation to oneself, to others, and to truth”.207 In addition, 
pzderasty is deproblematised due to new parental rights and laws that oversee the 
boy, and the institutionalisation of pedagogy that negates the citizen’s role as 
mentor. Ultimately, though, the courtship of boys, which is the pre-eminent 
athenian art for the constitution of ethico-political subjectivity, loses out to the 
roman valorisation of marriage as the primary art in the constitution of ethico- 
social subjectivity. For tlus to happen, the non-reciprocity of Eros, which is at the 
centre of the ethical asymmetry of pzderasty, has not only to be accommodated 
w i t h  the conjugal tie of ethical symmetry, but so too must Aplzrodife’s incitement 
of an amorous, reciprocal passion between husband and wife. 
In this respect, Foucault refers to the dialogues of Plutarch and Pseudo- 
Lucian, who illuminate h s  paradox of pleasure which permits the legitimacy of 
pzderasty to continue simultaneous to its d e c h e  as a stylistics of existence. They 
reconceive Eros in order to include, within the art of erotics, both the pleasure of 
boys and of the opposite sex, before they allude to the inability of the former to 
sustain symmetry and reciprocity.208 For Plutarch, true love that is a harmonious 
mix of Eros and Aphrodite is absent in the practice of pzderasty. The crucial ethical 
relation, which links the pleasure of Eros with the multiple effects of value of 
Aplzrodite, is missing, by which Plutarch means the citizen’s graciousness (clmris) to 
205 Foucault, The Cure ofthe Se& pp. 177-181. 
206 Foucault, The Cure ofthe Se& p. 185. 
207 Foucault, The Cure offhe Se& p. 192. 
208 Foucault, The Cure ofthe Se$ pp. 193-213. 
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his wife. It produces the bond of friendship, such that the woman acquiesces as the 
passive object in pleasure because a reciprocal love enables her to want to.209 
Similarly, Pseudo-Lucian recommends marriage on the basis of the ethical virtue of 
a gracious reciprocity, which simulates the paederastic virtue of friendship but 
without compromising the natural desire for pleasure.21o Pseudo-Lucian 
superimposes the e h c a l  privilege of paederasty onto a universal form of marriage, 
which is a demiurgic duty for all except the phdosopher.2*1 Ultimately, Foucault 
says, 
this erotics ... excludes the love of boys, for it lacks charis. ... [A] new stylistics 
of love.. . [is] formed.. . [that] is monistic in that it excludes the aphrodisia, but it 
makes this inclusion a criterion allowing it to keep only conjugal love and to 
exclude relations with boys because of the deficiency that characterizes them. 
There can ,no longer be a place for them in this great unitary and integrative 
chain in which love is revitalized by the reciprocity of pleasure.212 
vii. Synopsis 
In b s  penultmate chapter, I have shown that Foucault’s genealogcal critique of 
the nature of pouvoir, whxh he articulates as a relation of government, also 
accounts for the political rationality that exercises governmentality. Configured 
from pastoral-pouvoir, political rationality combines with somato- and bio-pouaoir into 
the juridico-administrative-governmental state and effects the submission of 
humanism’s subjectivity. In response to this experience, I have argued that Foucault 
turns to a critical hstory of subjectivity in his search for new conceptions of 
maturity, central to which is the distinction between the modes of subjectivation, or 
ethics, and a morality’s codes and behaviours. As a result, he excavates the 
restructuration in the techruques of the self from a practice to a hermeneutics of the 
self, which takes place between antiquity and Christianity. 
On the one hand, Foucault claims that in greek antiquity a relation to self is 
engulfed by a relation to other, which is intimated by Plato’s redirection of erotics, 
with its practice of love between the citizen and citizen-in-waiting, into a 
philosophical erotics and the citizen’s leadership of the boy to truth and the 
fulfilment of his being in respect of a theorisation of the subject. Later, in graeco- 
209 Foucault, The Cure of the Se$ pp. 202-207. 
*Io Foucault, 77ze Cure ofthe Se$ pp. 214-218. 
211 Foucault, The Care offhe Se$ pp. 219-227. 
212 Foucault, The Care ofthe Serf. p. 207 and pp. 209-210. 
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roman antiquity, philosophical erotics is superimposed upon economics, which 
requires a symmetrical relation to the other and an increased austerity that 
culminates in heterosexual marriage and the virginal integrity of at least one of its 
par hers 
On the other hand, critical historical critique brings an ethico-political 
subjectivity into view, where the self practices an agonistic freedom within a 
domain of pleasure, sex and desire that is defined by force, excess and combat. 
Divorced from its asymmetrical relation to other in terms of the ethico-social 
subjectivity of graeco-roman antiquity, greek antiquity's relation to self promises an 
ascetic practice with an aesthetic style of existence, in which an agonistic freedom 
resists the forces w i h  pouvoirlsavoir whch objectify, subject and submit maturity 
in the On this basis, I demonstrate in the last chapter how Foucault's 
critical history of humanism's failure to reahse enlightenment is matched by his 
post-humanist maturity, which flows from his three critiques of savoir, pouvoir and, 
in particular, of ethico-morality that I have discussed here. 
213 Foucault, The Cure ofthe Se$ pp. 228-231. 
* 1 4  Because, in antiquity's system of thought, "sexual behaviour was constituted as a domain of etlucal 
practice in the form of the aphrodisia, of pleasurable acts situated in an agonistic field of forces difficult 
to control[,] . . . a conduct that was rationally and morally admissible, . . . aimed at an exact self-mastery 
. . . whereby the subject would be 'stronger than lumself' even in the power that he exercised over 




Foucauh ’s CriticaCOntoLiogy 
In order to defend Foucault from the accusations of anormative critique and amoral 
freedom, I deployed hs critical hstory to attack the humanist critical thought that I 
articulated in chapters 2 and 3. To recall, humanism claims to be the sole path to 
enlightenment in virtue of its faith in a subject of knowledge, its theory of power 
and its conception of man whose autonomy requires recogmtion. By way of 
contrast, I demonstrated in chapters 4, 5 and 6 that Foucault practices critical 
thought along an alternative, nietzschean path. Here, critical history is a critique of 
the finitude grounded in humanism and of that omitted by-but pivotal to-its 
possibihty, whdst as I argue below with critical ontology freedom is conceived of in 
terms of a mode of being that is pertinent to who we are. Writing as early as 1963 
about the need to combine critique and ontology into a form of critical thought 
relevant to the present, Foucault reflects that: 
a philosophy which questions itself upon the existence of the h u t  is evidently 
one of the countless signs that our path is circular and that, with each day, we 
are becoming more Greek. Yet, ... [i]n reintroducing the experience of the 
divine at the center of thought, philosophy has been well aware since Nietzsche 
... that it questions an origin without positivity and an opening indifferent to 
the patience of the negative. No form of dialectical movement, no analysis of 
constitutions and of their transcendental ground can serve as support for 
thinking about such an experience or even as access to this experience. In our 
day, would not the instantaneous play of the h i t  and of transgression be the 
essential test for a thought ... which would be, absolutely and in the same 
motion, a Critique and an Ontology, an understanding that comprehends both 
finitude and being?’ 
Clearly, and notwithstanding that he never sought to take humanism‘s path 
to enlightenment, Foucault’s consistent practice of critique in the interests of critical 
Foucault, “A Preface to Transgression”, pp. 37-38. 
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ontology refutes any habermasian suggestion that he rejoins it in the 1980s.2 
Moreover, contrary to the claims of his detractors, who confuse his critical history 
that rejects humanism with a repudiation of enlightenment, Foucault does not 
adhere to normative relativism and moral nihihsm. Instead, because humanism is 
indicative of who we are, Foucault uses archzology, genealogy and critical hstory 
to investigate its objective, normative and subjective axes of experience. Essentially, 
Foucault draws up a balance-sheet of our finitude in the present. Critical history 
accounts for the domination of the debit side by the pouvoirlsavoir that is produced 
by humanism, whilst through his three critiques Foucault enters on the credit side 
his reconceptualisation of savoir, pouvoir and ehco-morality. 
At the same time as I questioned the suitabihty of humanist critique as a basis 
for maturity-the state of being autonomous in thought and action-I also 
suggested that, in tandem with Foucault’s retrieval of a kantian notion of critique 
from its submergence beneath humanism, he adopts a nietzschean ontology of 
freedom as the vis-a-vis of pouvoir. His kantianism translates into an endorsement of 
critique as an analytic of the regimes of truth whch make us conversant with 
finitude; and Foucault’s nietzscheanism leads to a conception of maturity that is 
tantamount to the constitution of ethical subjectivity through an agonistic practice 
of freedom, which is an ongoing process of becoming in respect of our experiential 
limits of pouvoirl savoir. After Nietzsche, therefore, who concludes A Genedogy o j  
Morals with the suggestion that ”[olne cannot possibly hide from one’s self what is 
ultimately expressed ... a will fo flw noflzZng”,3 my intention in this concluding 
chapter to the dissertation is not only to cast doubt on humanism’s path to 
enlightenment, but also to reject its protagonists’ criticisms of Foucault and to 
advocate his critical ontology as a viable method for critical thought. 
To begin with, I give an account of humanism in terms of the intellectual 
praxis of the phlosopher, who from Bauman’s analysis in section 1.i. is either a 
legislator at dawn for the day ahead, as for Kant and Rawls, or an interpreter at 
dusk of the day gone by, hke Hegel and Tay10r.~ Apart from a recapitulation of 
their critique and maturity, Kant’s and Rawls’ lepslative, as well as Hegel’s and 
Taylor’s interpretive, intellectual praxis hinders the comprehension of different 
Dews says that “[ilf one were to . . . idenhfy . . . the distinctiveness of the French phdosophical scene 
in the 1980s, compared with the entire preceding period since the Second World War, then the 
obvious choice would be the upsurge of interest in Kant”. Dews, Logzcs ofDisintegration, p. xiii. 
Nietzsche, A Genealogy ofMoraZs, p. 222. 
Needless to say, to demarcate roles of the phlosopher is to traffick in ideal types-on t h ~ ~  
inevitability and how to mitigate it, see Schlesinger, ”In search of the intellectuals”; Ludz, 
“Methodological Problems”. 
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paths to enlightenment, and I focus on the criticisms of Foucault which stem from 
this incomprehension. He is, as many contemporary critical thinkers claim, 
responsible both for the death of the philosopher and for a breakdown in the 
advancement of how to thmk and act freely, or of critique that furthers maturity. 
In reply, I stress the political connotations of three weaknesses in the 
intellectual praxis of the legdative and interpretive methods of humanism. Firstly, 
an archaology of objectivity uncovers savoir as the condition of possibility for 
connaissance, and not Kant’s and Hegel’s man; secondly, a genealogy of normativity 
reveals somato- and bio-pouvoir to be the extra-juridical conditions of existence for 
justice, rather than Rawls’ and Taylor’s subject who authorises right and legitimates 
the juridical state’s exercise of power; and, thirdly, if the reason behind 
epistemologico-political critique is the truth of the subject’s autonomy that is 
realised through recogrution, then humanism fails as a critique of the pouvoir/savoir 
that is installed as the submission of subjectivity. Or, as humanism leaves man 
mired in immaturity, it falters as critical thought. In contrast, I elucidate Foucault’s 
intellectual praxis of critical ontology, in whch hs professional and personal 
engagement is characterised by a kantian modern attitude and a nietzschean ascetic 
aesthetic mode of being. Critical history’s critique of who we are, plus an ontology 
that is appropriate to maturity, ensure that Foucault epitomises enlightenment 
critical thought. 
7.i. The Intellectual Praxis of the Legislator and Interpreter 
There are, Nietzsche remarks, two kmds of phdosopher. One ascertains facts for 
moral evaluations, whch requires the mastery of the present and past by 
concentrating events in signs. The aim is ”to make previous events ... 
comprehensible . . . [and to] assist the task of man to employ all past things for the 
benefit of hs future? A second kind of phlosopher is the legislator of these 
evaluations, who determines what is useful to man. He convinces himself that the 
good he desires is not  IS own but the good in itself, which he stumbles upon and is 
obliged to instruct to others.6 The philosopher who ascertains evaluations is an 
interpreter, and h i s  colleague who applies them is a legslator. They utilise truth to 
inform the critique that promotes freedom, and in describing the legslator’s and 
interpreter’s application of critical thought it is useful to bear in mind that, along its 
path to enlightenment, humanism juxtaposes reason with prejudice and maturity 
Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 5 972, pp. 509-510. 
Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 5 972, p. 510. 
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with the tutelage of tradition. In Kant and Rawls, or Hegel and Taylor, critique 
lends existential re-assurance to modernity through heightening its consciousness 
of itself as the age that is en route to, or in fact is the age of, maturity, which is a 
question of the autonomous subject’s self-actualisation through recognition of his 
authentic being. I turn then to look at their intellectual praxis of humanism. 
The philosophds will to surpass the late seventeenth century English 
enlightenment, fit only for the classical liberal man,7 depends on the ability of 
reason to logrcally order the world and things.8 As the agent of the critique that is 
deployed against the prejudices upheld by Christian the philosophe’s sense 
of man’s impending maturity motivates what Ernst Cassirer designates as the 
enlightenment’s epistemological reconstruction, where reason supplants 
convention and traditional authority.10 In this respect, Gadamer writes that: 
the real radicality of the ... enlightenment [is its desire] ... to understand 
tradition correctly, i. e. reasonably and without prejudice. ... It is the general 
tendency of the enlightenment not to accept any authority and to decide 
everytkung before the judgement seat of reason.ll 
On h s  basis, the legislator’s critique is directed at the ingredients of prejudice- 
custom and habit, for example12-because in the realms of thought and action they 
amount to over generahsed beliefs and arbitrary  motivation^.^^ Insofar as to be a 
subject of prejudice is to think and act immaturely, the role of the legislator is to 
juridicahse it. He disinvests prejudice from knowledge and power in order to re- 
invest them with the reasoned right of the volonte‘ gknerale, Moralitat or procedural 
justice .I4 
The English enlightenment ”stood primarily for the cult of commercial prosperity, the prestige of 
middle-class standards, the spread of polite manners and culture among the nouveaux riches, and, 
above all, the natural right to make money”. Randall, The Career of Philosophy Volume IZ, p. 51. 
d’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse, pp. 63-84; Im Hof, The Enlightenment, pp. 4-8; Hampson, Tlze 
Enlightenment, pp. 4-11. 
On the ascendancy of human reason in mid-eighteenth century Europe and France, see Cassirer, Tlte 
Philosophy of the Enlightenment, pp. 14ff.; Gay, The Enlightenment, Volume 2, pp. 167-180; Charle, 
Naissance des ‘intellectuels’ 1880-1 900, pp. 20-23; Roche, Les Ripublicains des lettres, pp. 209-225. 
I0 Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenmenf, pp. 228-234. 
l1 Gadamer, ”The Historicity of Understanding”, p. 257. 
Oakeshott, “Rationalism in Politics”, pp. 7-14. 
l3 Allport, The Nature ofPrejudice, pp. 9-15; Keith, 7 7 ~  Place ofPrejudice in Modern Cizdizath ,  pp. 39ff.; 
Rose, The Roots of Prejudice, pp. 11-17. 
l4 For the etymology of ib)tis and dicere, which evolve into the concept juridical and the verb to say or 
declare the law -that is, for instance,to juridicalise prejudice a props  of man’s reason-see Barnhart, 
ThE Bamhart Dictionary of Etymology, p. 560; Onions, The Oxford Dictiona ry of English Etymology, p. 500; 
Partridge, Origins, p. 325; Skeat, An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, p. 319. 
198 
A Conclusion in /EoucauCt’s CriticalOntolbgy 
Rousseau’s importance, to re-iterate from sections 2.i. and 2.ii., is his 
paradigmatic sketch of humanism’s epistemological and political critique. They 
promise maturity due to man’s representation of the world via a universal language 
and his common determination of the socio-political structures in which he lives. 
Nevertheless, motivated by his wish to free man’s mind from prejudice, the 
rousseauian legslator promotes the unhindered use of human reason as an 
lnfallible guide for critique and moral condu~t.’~ His zeal fuels the jacobin 
juridicalisation of 1789-1794, which Edmund Burke famously argues ”eradicate[s] 
prejudice out of the minds of men, for the purpose of putting all power ... into the 
hands of the persons capable of occasionally enlightening the minds of the 
people’? Accordingly, even Kant, who is no friend of the Christian ontology of the 
Prussian pietists and their conservative brethren in England,l7 believes that the 
revolutionary overthrow of prejudice not only fails to reform critical thought, but 
that its ’hew prejudices, hke the ones they replaced, will serve as a leash to control 
the great unthinking mass”? 
Consequently, as I pointed out in section 2.iii., Rousseau’s legislative critique 
in the interests of a reason whch knows no bounds is tempered by the systematic 
critical philosophy of Kant. He defers to the transcendental subject’s faculty of 
understanding to discipline reason and steer the age of enhghtenment towards an 
enlightened age. Armed, as I described in sections 2.iv and 2.v.’ with the principles 
of a knowledge of tl-ungs-for-themselves and man’s capacity for self-legslation, the 
kantian legislator detects the prejudices whch block the exit to maturity. Thanks to 
his abstract principles of truth,’g the kantian legislator belongs to the class of 
phlosophers ”whose activity essentially is not the pursuit of practical aims, . . . [but] 
metaphysical speculation” about the prejudices ripe for juridicalisation.20 Kant 
carves out a niche for hunself as the king’s legislative adviser on the precept of the 
autonomous subject,z’ or he counsels the state on the maxims of warfare and peace- 
making. In fact, the kantian legislator is obliged to offer his services in virtue of his 
attachment to the only true universal, human reason, whch for Kant is the ultimate 
moral legislator. Nonetheless, the philosopher is not prioritised over the jurist, who 
l5 Oakeshott, “Rationalism in Politics”, pp. 3-5; Oakeshott, “Rational Conduct”, pp. 83-85. 
I6 Burke, ”Letter to William Smith, 1795”, in The Philosophy of Edmund Burke, p. 231. 
l7 See, for instance, Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, pp. 171-200. 
Is Kant, “An Answer to the Question: ’What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 55. 
l9 Benda, The Treason of the Intellectuals, pp. 44-52. 
2o Benda, The Treason ofthe Intellectuals, p. 43. 
21 Kant, ”Perpetual Peace: A Plulosophical Sketch, p. 103. 
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represents the juridical state, and nor does Kant expect kings to do philosophy or 
philosophers to be kings. Instead, he suggests that the possession of power 
inevitably corrupts the free use of reason, whereas philosophers who are 
independent of power are incapable of being swayed from the truth.u All in all, the 
kantian legslator is the harbinger of man’s authentic being of autonomy. The 
maxim of maturity is a necessary thorn in the side of the monarch, who under the 
guidance of the legslator’s critique fades into the h e l i g h t  generated by the demos’ 
juridical state. ”Popular enlightenment”, Kant says, 
is the public instruction of the people upon their duties and rights towards the 
state to which they belong. ... [The] obvious exponents and interpreters among 
the people will not be officials appointed by the state, but free teachers of right, 
i. e. the philosophers. The latter, on account of the very freedom which they 
allow themselves, are a stumbling-block to the state, whose only wish is to rule; 
they are accordingly given the appelation of ’enlighteners’, and decried as a 
menace to the state.23 
Rawls differs from Kant by way of h s  rejection of the cartesian phdosophcal 
hierarchy of epi~temology.~~ For the rawlsian legislator, whose philosophy-as- 
defence is both an apologia of the dominant moral doctrine of the day and a 
contribution to a new one,25 the demos ground the truth that underpins critique. If 
moral philosophy is the study of moral concepts and objective moral truths, then its 
sub-branch of moral theory that is practiced by Rawls reveals, as I detailed in 
sections 3.ii and 3.iii., the moral doctrines whch structure justice in a society. Via 
the universal agreement about a particular one amongst rational persons who have 
achieved reflective equilibrium, a moral doctrine attains the status of objective 
truth.26 Due to the rawlsian legislator’s ability to uncover an underlying basis of 
agreement, the moral theorist deploys hs democratic moral epistemology in his 
moonlighting role as a political philo~opher,2~ who in an effort to uphold the 
conditions of possibility for political liberty of a secure and stable society engages 
in its politically divisive questions? Because Rawls’ philosophy assumes that the 
world is an ”ongoing system of co-operation over time”,29 it readily translates into a 
Kant, ”Perpetual Peace: A Phdosophcal Sketch”, pp. 114-115. 
23 Kant, ”The Contest of Faculties”, p. 186. 
24 Rawls, ”The Independence of Moral Theory”, pp. 287-291. 
* Rawls, Lectures on the History ofMoraZ Philosophy, pp. 106-107. 
26 Rawls, ”The Independence of Moral Theory”, p. 301. 
27 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, p. 391. 
28 Rawls, ”Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”, p. 330. 
29 Rawls, ”The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus”, p. 448. 
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political philosophy that focuses solely on institutional questions. In this role, the 
rawlsian legislator undertakes a kantian defence of reasonable faith, which in ”our 
case becomes the defense of reasonable faith in the real possibility of a just 
constitutional regune’? The public culture of a democratic society receives its 
legslative critique from the political philosopher, whose prior legitimation as a 
moral theorist of a society’s moral doctrine of procedural justice defines the 
rawlsian legislator’s goal, political liberty, and his role, which is: 
1 
to articulate and to make explicit those shared notions and principles thought to 
be already latent in common sense; or, as is often the case if common sense is 
hesitant and uncertain, and doesn’t know what to think, to propose to it certain 
conceptions and principles congenial to its most essential convictions and 
historical traditi~ns.~’ 
From the interpreter’s point of view, whch I first analysed in section 2.vi., the 
legislator’s abstract, theoretical knowledge that juridicalises prejudice brings his 
intellectual praxis into disrepute.32 Walzer, for example, speaks of the path of 
discovery that is travelled by the kantian legislator, who oblivious to a 
community’s experiences imitates the wisdom of an eagle at daybreak and foists an 
abstract Moralifii’f upon people.33 Similarly, the rawlsian legislator, who travels 
along the path of invention, fares no better. He constructs a theoretical ideal of 
procedural justice from one rather than another of the moral doctrines in a society? 
In contrast, the legslator’s critics demand the rehabhtation of prejudice 
precisely because it harbours the reality of the subject’s maturity.35 The interpreter, 
who believes ’’[olur historical consciousness is always fdled with a variety of voices 
in which the echo of the past is heard”,36 argues that reason is discoverable within 
prejudice. In fact, the interpreter’s rejection of the legislator’s desire to transcend 
tradition in the interests of maturity goes hand in hand with an articulation of 
prejudices, which as they ”barbarize or define us, . . . like that of the air we breathe 
in”,37 constitute the conditions of possibdity for recogmtion. However, the 
interpreter is concerned neither with the romantic’s conception of reason as the 
30 Rawls, “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus”, p. 448. 
31 Rawls, ”Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”, p. 306. 
32 Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters, pp. 120-126. 
33 Walzer, lnferpretation and Social Criticism, pp. 4-8. 
34 Walzer, lnterpretation and Social Criticism, pp. 10-17. 
35 Gadamer, “The Historicity of Understanding”, p. 258 and p. 265. 
36 Gadamer, ”The Historicity of Understanding”, p. 267. 
37 Burke, “First Letter on a Regcide Peace, 1796”, in The Philosophy of Edmund Burke, p. 237. 
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antithesis of prejudm,38 which Hegel believes destroys love and right among 
private persons and the laws of the state?9 nor with the abstract and theoretical 
reason of the legislator, who is bifurcated from the world. Instead, the interpreter 
seeks the reason latent in prejudice in order to validate communities of meaning via 
knowledge that is endogenous to them;O or he lends intra-communal legitimacy 
through an interpretive critique of existence that begins from principles internal to 
it.41 
In the hands of the interpreter, humanism comprehends Geist’s concept of 
reason in prejudice as well as its actuality therein.42 The role of the hegelian 
interpreter is to reflect upon thought. Because it is not contingent but located in 
what has being-in and -for-itself, Geisf, the activity of reflection amounts to a purer 
form of freedom than that actually enjoyed by the laity.43 Yet the interpreter 
advances nothrng new, and what he brings forth, Hegel says, ”is already the 
immediate prejudice of everyone” .@ For the hegelian interpreter, 
what matters is to recognise in the semblance of the temporal and the transient 
the substance which is immanent and the eternal which is present. For since the 
rational, which is synonymous with the Idea, becomes actual by entering into 
external existence . . . , it emerges in an infinite wealth of . . . appearances . . . and 
surrounds its core with a brightly coloured covering in which consciousness at 
first resides, but which only the concept can penetrate in order to find the inner 
pulse, and detect its continued beat even within the external 
Nonetheless, the hegelian interpreter, who paints the grey of life that has 
grown old, whch cannot be rejuvenated but only recogrused in phdosophy’s own 
grey, resists involvement in the wealth of prejudices where G i s t  is at 
Instead, to discern the recogrution necessary for self-actualisation, he fiddles as 
Rome burns.47 As I illustrated in sections 2.vii. and 2.viii., the hegelian interpreter 
comprehends the actual in thought, for what is in the post-Aujkl&uzg world-a 
38 Gadamer, ”The Historicity of Understanding”, p. 264. 
39 Hegel, Elements o f fh e  Philosophy ofRighf, Preface, p. 18. 
40 Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters, pp. 137-148 and pp. 197ff.. 
41 Walzer, Znterpretation and Social Criticism, pp. 19-30. 
42 Hegel, Elements ofthe Philosophy of Right, $5 1-2, pp. 25-26. 
43 Hegel, Elements o f fh e  Philosophy ofRzght, Preface, p. 22. 
44 Hegel, Encyclopadia ofthe Philosophical Sciences, quoted in Inwood, Hegel, p. 111. 
45 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Preface, pp. 20-21. 
46 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Preface, p. 23. 
47 Inwood, Hegel, pp. 107-110. 
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mode of reason that promises maturity-is what ought to be? It is thus important 
to distinguish between what Rawls calls Hegel’s philosophy of reconciliation vis-a- 
vis existent grey life, and resignation in the face of it.49 Scientific philosophy 
delivers, from out of life that has grown old, the rational to the actual through the 
medium of secular revelation, history? Via critique based on the faculty of reason’s 
knowledge of the world as it actually is, the hegelian interpreter legitimates 
tomorrow’s dawn of G i s t  at the dusk of the old order of Aufklarung. Maturity is not 
only a question of the autonomous subject’s transcendence of prejudice as a means 
to fulfil his authentic being, but of its self-actualisation under the auspices of a 
dialectic of reason that realises man’s desire for recogrution out of prejudice. 
Just as Rawls jettisons Kant’s metaphysics in favour of the demos’ consensus 
about a moral doctrine, so Hegel’s scion, Taylor, strives less after the G i s t  lnherent 
in prejudice than agreement about a language community’s background ontological 
picture.51 The taylorian interpreter, who I portrayed in sections 3.iv. and 3.v., 
articulates the hyper-goods which constitute moral ontology. These range from 
notions of the good and understandings of the human agent, to the kinds of 
narrative in whch recogrution is reciprocated between pe0ple.5~ Still, to distinguish 
the language of meaning as a possession of the community, the hermeneutic circle 
is circumscribed by an ultimate appeal to the common rather than subjective 
understandings of an expression.53 For Taylor, the subject is not necessarily the best 
authority in the endeavour to articulate moral ontology. Often, for example, h s  
moral actions are based on views that are largely implicit, or at other times the 
subject resists articulation because of the divergence between what he believes and 
the phlosophical basis of hs moral judgements that he ought to acknowledge.54 
The language community’s moral ontology may be constituted by its citizens and 
their assertions, but the subject depends for experiential meaning on the 
expressions of others and ultimately on the interpreter, whose role is to articulate 
those whch are central to political liberation.55 As with Rawls’ leplative advice 
about a society’s moral conceptions and his advocacy of the moral doctrine of 
48 Hegel, Elements oftlze Philosophy ofXight, Preface, p. 21. 
49 Rawls, Lectures on fhe History ofMoruZ PhiZosophy, p. 331. 
Westphal, History and Truth, pp. 43-52. 
51 Taylor, Sources ofthe Se& p. 8. 
52 Taylor, Sources ofthe Se& pp. 25-52. 
53 Taylor, “Interpretation and the sciences of man”, pp. 16-17. 
54 Taylor, Sources offhe Se& pp. 9-10. 
ss Taylor, “Interpretation and the sciences of man”, pp. 26-28. 
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political liberalism, when all is said and done it is the meaning of the interpreter’s 
legitimative word that counts about hyper-goods, which in addition to their 
substantiation of procedural justice are integral to the politics of recognition? 
Taylor argues, for instance, that because hyper-goods empower, 
[t]o come closer to them, to have a clearer view of them, to come to grasp what 
they involve, is for those who recognize them to be moved to love or respect 
them. And articulation can bring them closer. ... And of course not just any 
articulation will do. ... [Tlhe most powerful case is where the speaker, the 
formulation, and the act of delivering the message all line up together to reveal 
the good, . . . . An effective articulation releases this force, and this is how words 
have power.57 
7.ii. The Legislator’s and Interpreter’s Criticisms of Foucault 
In the previous section, I have retrodden the main steps on the path to 
enhghtenment that is forged by humanism through the intellectual praxis of the 
legislator and interpreter. At its core, the truth of man’s maturity of autonomy and 
recognition allows the humanist to place the subject at the centre of things in an 
objective world that he knows as it appears or actually is. Alternatively, the truth 
about the subject of right is the reason behind the deployment of normative justice 
to regulate juridical power on behalf of political liberty, or it allows the state to be 
commandeered to process political liberation. In either moment, epistemological 
and political critique guarantees man’s safe passage through prejudice to a level of 
maturity that is either beyond (Kant and Rawls), or derived from (Hegel and 
Taylor), custom and habit. The champions of humanism pursue enlightenment 
through a will to know the truth about the objectivity of things and the normativity 
which justrfies juridical state power. As a consequence, it is the status of truth, 
which in Foucault’s critical thought is a product and property of pouvoir/savoir 
rather than an independent variable, that humanist philosophers concentrate upon 
in their criticisms of his alleged anormative critique and amoral freedom: for what, 
if not an epistemological or political truth, is Foucault’s ground of critique?; and 
what, if not the autonomous subject’s authentic being that requires recognition for 
self-actualisation, is his conceptual basis for freedom? 
Richard Rorty, for example, claims that the critical hstorian’s archzological 
methodology simply proves that French phdosophy forbids one to settle for 
56 Taylor, ”Language and Human Nature”, pp. 218-221. 
57 Taylor, Sources of h e  Se$ p. 96. 
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interesting new descriptions to replace boring ones? Foucault’s anti-objectivist 
archaeology, which rejects traditional epistemology without offering an alternative, 
lies midway between a bleak apocalypse and a dionysian urge.59 Like other 
irrationalists, who disparage epistemological concerns, Foucault is a transrational 
romantic.60 He is, Merquior continues, a misologist who seeks relations of meaning 
in madness or the episteme, which is at the expense of relations of cause and 
effect? In the end, and albeit in the Heidegger and Nietzsche mould, Foucault’s 
critical historical inquiries are inferior .62 Genealogy merely descends from 
representational language, which elucidates truth, into discourse qua will to power 
that produces the Rather than forge a path to enlightenment, Christopher 
Norris argues that genealogy ends up in a politico-moral cul-de-sac, where critique 
is a rhetorical strategy? The foucauldian thinker-as-rebel offers a myhca l  analysis 
of power that caters solely for radical tastes and ignores careful philosophical 
argument.65 Try as he may, Foucault’s prejudice against reason entails a dismissal of 
agency,66 whch is synonymous with a t h e d  down normative commitment to 
f reed0m.6~ 
Perhaps Habermas and Taylor drive the final nail into Foucault’s coffin in 
respect of his supposed anormative critique and amoral freedom. From Frankfurt, 
Foucault’s aversion to truth means that neither the archaeologist’s stoic gaze that 
freezes hlstory into an iceberg, nor the c p c a l  gaze of the genealogist who defrosts 
and remoulds it, move us beyond a subjectless will of power inherent to 
pouvoir/ savoir. Foucault’s genealogcal hstoriography, which assumes power has a 
structuralist, transcendental application that can serve as a critique of reason’s 
claim to objectivity, suffers from the same illusions Foucault detects in the human 
sciences.@ According to Habermas, genealogical critique is presentistic, in that 
every time it tries to undertake an objective analysis of the past it originates from a 
hermeneutic point of departure in the present; secondly, in its reduction of 
58 Rorty, ”Foucault and Epistemology”, pp. 42-43. 
59 Merquior, Foucault, p. 83. and p. 75. 
6o Merquior, From Prague to Paris, pp. 187-199 
61 Merquior, From Prague to Paris, p. 208. 
62 Gauchet and Westerwelle, ”Fur eine hstorisch wahre Geschichte des Subjects”, pp. 673-674. 
63 Palmer, Descent into Discourse, pp. 25-28. 
6.1 Norris, ”’What is Enlightenment’”, pp. 30-35. 
65 Merquior, From Prague fo Paris, pp. 238-239. 
66 Merquior, Foucault, p. 107. 
67 Norris, “’What is Enlightenment”’, p. 47. 
Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity, pp. 242-256. 
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normativity to the effects of power, Foucault’s critique is relativistic; and, thirdly, 
genealogy mirrors the cryptonormative critique of the human sciences.69 ”The 
aporias of the theory of power”, Habermas argues, 
leave their traces behind in the selective readings of genealogical 
historiography . . . . To the objectivism of the self-mastery of the human sciences 
there corresponds a subjectivism of self-forgetfulness on Foucault’s part. 
Presentism, relativism, and cryptonormativism are the consequences of his 
attempt to preserve the transcendental moment proper to generative 
performances in the basic concept of power while driving from it every trace of 
subjectivity. This concept of power does not free the genealopt from 
contradictory ~elf-thematizations.~~ 
Ultimately, Habermas says, Foucault is silent when it comes to a normative 
critique of the all-pervasive power circulating in the bloodstream of the modern 
social body.71 His subject-phobia reduces all social processes to patterns of 
domination? If Foucault is to convince Habermas that he is more than a young 
conservative whose total critique of modernity does not turn in on itseF3-if he is 
to do more than aestheticise politics and morality into a transfiguring play of 
freedom with reality74- Foucault must assuage Habermas’ skepticism with 
critiq~e.~5 Why, Habermas asks, ought we to oppose and fight regunes of 
pouvoir/ s~zvoir?~~ 
There is a not d i s s d a r  perspective from Montreal, where concern is raised 
about Foucault’s amoral freedom. It is once again sparked by h s  location of truth in 
pouvoirl savoir. In h e  with Habermas, Taylor alludes to Foucault’s monolihc 
relativism, or his position of neutrality toward h t o r y  and h unwilhgness to 
make evaluative distinctions between forms of power.7 And, apart from the basic 
one-sidedness of Foucault’s analysis that Taylor and others highl~ght,~s critical 
history amounts to a senseless strateges without projects hi~toriography.~~ But 
69 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, pp. 276-282. 
70 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, pp. 294-295. 
71 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 283. 
72 Merquior, Foucault, pp. 111-115. 
73 Habermas, ”Modernity: An incomplete project”, pp. 13-14. 
74 Norris, “’What is Enlightenment’”, p. 62. 
75 Habermas, “Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present”, p. 107. 
76 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 284. 
Taylor, ”Foucault on Freedom and Truth”, pp. 156-163 and p. 182. 
7s Taylor, “Foucault on Freedom and Truth”, pp. 164-166. McNay, Foucault, ch. 1,  and Merquior, 
Foucuult, ch. 2, share Taylor’s view here. 
79 Taylor, ”Foucault on Freedom and Truth”, pp. 169-170. 
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what really concerns Taylor is Foucault’s ”rplower’ without ’freedom’ or ’truth’: 
can there really be an analysis which uses the notion of power, and which leaves no 
place for freedom, or  truth"?^ 
Rather than articulate a community’s moral ontology and its importance to 
the constitution of identity a la Taylor, especially the underlying image of the self 
who enjoys freedom and the power to will?’ Foucault denies the need for 
articulation.82 His neo-nietzschean arbitrariness of interpretation, and interpretation 
as an imposition of domination, means that Foucault skews moral philosophy in 
the direction of subjectivism.83 For Taylor, Foucault’s construction of the self as a 
work of art is difficult to accept in the face of his rejection of those strands in 
modem thought whch are central to h s  conception-”[blut what is striking again 
is the ... utterly self-related freedom that this ideal entails‘l.84 In answer to his 
question about Foucault’s conceptualisation of power without associated notions of 
freedom or truth, Taylor laments that: 
the final basis of Foucault’s refusal of ’truth’ and ’liberation’ seems to be a 
Nietzschean one ... . [Tlhere is no order of human life; or what we are, or 
human nature, ... only different orders imposed by men on primal chaos, 
following their will to power. Foucault espouses both the relativistic thesis from 
this view, that one cannot judge between forms of life/thought/valuation, and 
also the notion that these different forms involve the imposition of power. . . . To 
speak of power, and to want to deny a place to ’liberation’ and ’truth’, as well 
as the link between them, is to [sic] to speak ~ o h e r e n t l y . ~ ~  
Finally, where Foucault’s role as a critical ontologst is concerned, for 
representatives of humanism’s path to enhghtenment his anormative critique and 
amoral freedom betray an empty intellectual praxis. Among the English 
intelligentsia, for instance, Foucault’s abdication of critique personifies the post- 
1968 treason of the intellectualYE6 which is imitated in America as a rococo marxism 
that is infatuated with theory and indifferent to objectivity and n0rmativity.8~ In 
reply to the decline of marxism’s universal interpretations,@ Foucault not only aids 
Taylor, “Foucault on Freedom and Truth”, p. 174. 
Taylor, ”Introduction”, p. 5. 
g2 Taylor, Sources of the Se& pp. 99-100. 
83 Taylor, Sources ofthe Se& p. 487 and p. 102. 
85 Taylor, ”Foucault on Freedom and Truth”, p. 177. Presumably, this should read ”is not to speak 
coherently” or ”is to speak incoherently”? 
86 A. S. Byatt, “Belief in the jungle of ideas”, in ThE Guardian, 29 August 1998. 
87 T. Wolfe, “The tyranny of theory”, in ThE Guardian, 8 July 2000. 
Taylor, Sources offhe Se& p. 489. 
Ory and Sirinelli, Les lntellecfuels en France, p. 236. 
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the dethronement of economics from critical thought, but he retreats into a spiritual 
discourse on subjectivity that is devoid of any ~ritique.8~ As a postvanguardist 
intellectual who employs philosophische ArchuoZogie as farce,% his obscurantism 
exemplifies the hermetic critic-in-small in the university. Indeed, what the critical 
ontologst thinks is a mystery for Walzer, which is exacerbated by the absence of 
any criteria to judge Foucault’s critique? 
Perhaps Bernard-Henri Levy brings these perspectives on Foucault together 
when he suggests that critical history is amoral in its refusal to privilege truth? 
Because archaeology forecloses any alternative theoretical space in which to 
conceive non-hegemonic forms of subjectivity, and genealogy posits an 
interdependence between the subject and power that precludes a notion of active 
agency,93 Foucault is the cause of the philosopher’s post-1968 apocalyptic vision of 
unefin du monk. He is, Levy concludes, culpable for the death of the intellectual, 
whose existence since the Dreyfus Affair in 1898 finally comes to an end when he 
”dies in Paris at the end of the twentieth century due to his inability to survive 
beyond the d e c h e  of the universal claims of phdosophy”.” 
7.iii. Foucault’s Anti-Humanism 
A precondition for the above criticisms of Foucault is the incomprehension of h s  
nietzschean path to enhghtenment. As I first mentioned in section li, although h_ls 
three critiques self-consciously avoid - rather than court95- a descent into 
irrationality,% their depiction of the ambivalence of reason in modernity, 
specifically how it translates into objective and normative experience via 
humanism, is mistaken for a dismissal of enlightenment. S d a r l y ,  as I showed 
with a critical hstory of subjectivity and etl-uco-morality in chapter 6, Foucault’s 
desire to insert a practice of the self at the centre of maturity entalls a concomitant 
renunciation of the hermeneutic relation to self that underwrites autonomy and 
recogrution. His conceptualisation of ethics, which is unacceptable ”because all too 
89 Reader, Intellectuals and the Lejt in France since 1968, pp. 13-22. 
9o Bell, “Michel Foucault: A Phdosopher for all seasons?”, p. 344. 
91 Walzer, The Company of Critics, pp. 227-229 and pp. 206-209. 
92 Levy, Eloge des Intellectuels, pp. 17-45. 
93 McNay, Foucault, pp. 102-112. 
94 ”lntellectuel, . . . catkgorie sociale et culturelle nie a Paris au moment de l’affaire Dreyfis, morte a Paris a la 
fin du XXe sitkle; n’a apparernent pas sun~kcu au de’clin & I’Universel”. Levy, €Ioge des Intellectuels, p. 48. 
95 Habermas, “Conservatism and Capitalist Crisis”, p. 74. 
% Foucault, “Critical Theory/Intellectual I-fistory”, p. 35. 
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many ... have only that [hermeneutic] relation as an imagined last barrier to 
nihilism”,g explains the unwillingness of legislators and interpreters to 
acknowledge either his critique qua critical history, or his critical ontology that 
conceives of freedom. At worst, advocates of humanism disclose an attitude to 
Foucault in which the final objective is ”not to come as close as possible to a 
difficult truth, but to bring about the triumph of their intellectual praxis.% SO, 
before I demonstrate that Foucault embodies critical thought, I outhe in this 
section how humanism’s path to enlightenment falls short of its own goal, which is 
to secure the universal conditions necessary for freedom. Does objective 
epistemologcal critique that is based on the autonomous subject’s authentic being 
and his self-actualisation, and normative political critique that grounds man’s 
political liberty and demands his political liberation, actually nurture a state of 
being autonomous in thought and action? 
From chapters 4,5 and 6, in which I discussed Foucault’s three critiques of the 
objective, normative and subjective experience of humanism, it is clear that the 
latter fails to pave the way to free thought and action. In order to realise freedom, 
epistemologcal critique takes as its point of departure the kantian subject’s 
transcendental unity of apperception, whch helps man to shoulder the connaissance 
necessary for an analysis of h i s  finitude. However, to know these limits of who we 
are requires connaissance of man as an object. This ushers in the hegelian subject’s 
phenomenological journey toward the transcendental dialectic, where he idealises 
the world before he returns with an empirical analysis of man within it. But an 
archzological critique of man’s objective experience reveals him to be the condition 
for his own possibility. As an empirico-transcendental doublet, man invites an 
anthropologcal dialectical lustory of modernity’s h d e r e d  progress toward 
edghtenment, whch is a history that is necessarily representative of man only. 
Where he operates as the subject of objective experience, namely, within the 
domains of language, life and labour, which are represented by the human sciences 
of literature, psychology and sociology, critique establishes the criteria whch 
encourage a lustory of reason that is limited solely to sameness. As a result, Kant 
legislates in the interests of the authentic being of the normal autonomous subject, 
whilst Hegel interprets the structures of recogrution which sustain an exclusive 
process of self-actualisation. 
Foucault, who tests the h t s  of our experience of truth in order to wander in 
97 Bernauer, “Michel Foucault’s Ecstatic Thinking”, p. 48. 
98 Foucault, “Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations”, p. 382. 
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error beyond it,% therefore establishes the philosophical platform on which others 
stand politically. Feminists, multi-culturalists, anti-colonialists, environmentalists 
and other contemporary advocates of the cultural value of difference, the political 
and linguistic rights of minorities and the economic costs of modernisation allude 
to the perspective of sameness that is required for the objective experience 
necessary for autonomy and recoption. As Foucault and these critical thinkers 
hghlight, epistemologcal critique grounded in anthropocentric dialectical hstory 
lends existential re-assurance to a modernity in which some and not others have a 
heightened consciousness of themselves as living in an age of Aufklurung, or an 
already enlightened age of Geist. This is why, in respect of humanism’s objective 
experience of finitude that is supposedly universal in scope and concrete in effect, 
Foucault’s archEologica1 critique excavates within the human sciences the 
tranquillised sleep of Kant’s transcendental subject, who in turn spurs on the 
anthropologcal sleep of Hegel’s phenomenological subject. 
The political price of humanism’s epistemological critique of objectivity 
becomes more apparent with Foucault’s genealogy of its normative experience. In 
contemporary critical thought normativity often relies on Rawls’ revelation of 
procedural justice in virtue of the subject’s capacity for reason, and h s  legislation of 
political liberty on behalf of man’s rational capacity for a sense of the good. 
Otherwise, normativity depends on Taylor’s articulation of the hyper-goods which 
are fundamental to the political liberation of the subject, who as a self-interpreting 
language user seeks to dialogcally express hs deep sense of self. In addition, as I 
suggested in section 3.vi., Rawls’ and Taylor’s political critique informs the 
intellectual praxis of Kymlicka, MacCormick or Tamir, which is founded on 
embedded individuality. Nevertheless, in its focus on sameness, whch is 
symbolised by the subject of right, humanists are oblivious to the costs to maturity 
which are exacted by their normativity. 
On the one hand, Foucault’s genealogical critique of normative experience 
highlights its extra-juridical condition of possibility as the objectification of the 
mad, deviant and perverted, and their confinement and exclusion in the asylum, 
penitentiary and reformatory. Discursive practices such as psychiatry, criminology 
and psychoanalysis, whch can only produce a normative analysis of finitude on 
behalf of the citizen who is the same, invariably have effects of power beyond 
man’s world. A propos of their normative assumption for critique of the subject of 
right, these discursive practices find their non-discursive employment as subjection 
99 Sheridan, ”Michel Foucault: The Death of the Author”, p. 20. 
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in the society which denies political liberation to, withdraws political liberty from, 
and imposes certain identities like homosexual or malthusian couple upon, those 
who are different. To be sure, because Foucault’s genealogical critique has its 
empirical basis in France, it is unfeasible to implicate Rawls and Taylor in specific 
manifestations of pouvoirlsavoir, or to hold them accountable for forms of politics 
which are based on hstorical narratives that describe how reason emerges 
unscathed, and descends unfettered, from an o r i p .  Nonetheless, because their 
hypothesis for the normativity that informs political liberalism and a politics of 
recognition is a reasonable moral psychology and desire to be normal, or a 
consciousness of an ethic of authenticity and its historical conhtions of possibility, 
whch include the commercial bourgeoisie and the institution of marriage, Rawls 
and Taylor are in effect indifferent to the experience that is neglected by, yet vital to 
the functioning’of, their political critique. 
In this respect, a failure to see the confined madman, the imprisoned deviant 
or the sexually excluded behind the veneer of political liberty and political 
liberation, above all in places hke Britain, America and Quebec, respectively, is a 
major oversight of the extra-juridical capdlary pouvoir that underpins humanist 
finitude. Rawls’ philosoplucal assumption of the world as an ongoing system of co- 
operation over time, for example, is an extremely naive account of intersubjective 
harmony, above all in a country where a veil of ignorance continues to shroud the 
elimination of (savage) natives by the (civilised) European, which as for many 
countries-Canada, South Africa, Australla-is the o r i p a l  victory in the relation 
of force that underpins the domination inherent to the social contract of the 
founding fathers. Alternatively, in his focus on a society’s background moral 
ontology to discern the hyper-goods relevant to the normal citizen’s self- 
actualisation, Taylor overlooks the asymmetrical relations which hstorically distort 
recogrution between men and women, catholic and heathen, gentleman and boer, 
family and tribe, or the wlute’s property by right and the aborigine’s confinement 
by might. In short, the absence in humanist critique of a conception of the extra- 
juridical conditions of possibhty for normativity merely affirms the perspectivism 
of their critique for the maturity of some that is to the detriment of others, which is 
why a critical hstory that shares the same ideal of maturity but follows a different 
path to its realisation is imperative and long overdue. 
On the other hand, and concomitant with the confined exclusion necessary 
for normativity, there is the objectification and subjection by pouvoirlsavoir of those 
citizens at large in the social body, whch Foucault reveals via a genealogy of 
humanism’s normative experience that mediates who we are as social beings. 
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Whether in their origins in the factory, hospital, rnilitary barracks and school, or 
their broader application amongst juridical subjects whose normality sustains the 
contract that legtimates the juridical state, or through the apparatus of sexuality 
and health which inform intersubjective reiations of capillary pouvoir, mechanisms 
of somato- and bio-pouvoir and their techniques of examination and confession 
disciphe the citizen's body and regulate him as a subject of the population. Like 
objective connaissance, which details humanism's analysis of finitude in term of 
epistemological critique that is founded on the same, normative experience that is 
engendered by political critique turns on the confined exclusion of the abnormal 
from the normahed society of man. 
Lastly, there is the issue of the subjective experience that is fostered by 
humanism, where it is first proposed how to be-a philosophy of the subject- 
subsequent to which, with a view to ordering finitude to meet autonomy, 
recognition, political liberty and political liberation, Kant and Rawls legislate, 
whilst Hegel and Taylor interpret. Yet, despite this epistemologico-political critique 
in the name of maturity, the humanist subject suffers the submission of subjectivity. 
As I claimed in section 6.ii., because of the modern juridico-administrative- 
governmental state, in whch political rationality modelled on pastoral-pouvoir links 
the individuahing power of disciphe to the totalising power of regulation, 
humanist freedom fails to materialise. The kantian or rawlsian legislator, whose 
truth is divorced from power, and the hegelian or taylorian interpreter, who uses 
truth to mform juridical state power, is powerless in the face of pouvoir/savoir 
because he assumes that, by virtue of a pure truth that is untouched by power, it is 
possible to uphold the autonomous individual's undistorted intersubjective 
relations of mutual recogrution. 
Relatedly, it is possible to discern an unwitting fear of the madestation of 
maturity by the champions of epistemologco-political critique, whch they disguise 
in a will to know about the objectivity of thmgs and the normativity that justdies 
juridical state power. At the outset, exponents of humanism advocate the moral 
ideal of freedom rather than its reality,lM and th is  eighteenth century ambivalence 
toward maturity leads them to support enlightened despotism.101 Humanist 
philosophers, past and present, seemingly fear the genie released by the death of 
God, whom they re-incarnate in the guise of humanity to effect a theologisation of 
man.102 His will to know becomes the touchstone of truth and the legislative and 
loo Grimsley, "Introduction", pp. 20-22. 
lol Cranston, Phi2osophers and Pamphleteers, pp. 2-7 
lo2 Foucault, "Foucault repond a Sartre", p. 664. 
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interpretive ground of objective and normative experience. As the problem rather 
than the solution to maturity, the will to know conceals Kant’s fear of the great 
unthinking masses, Rawls’ readiness to propose what to think to common sense, 
Hegel’s wish to deliver the rational to the actual, and Taylor’s willingness to release 
articulations which empower subjectivity. To hide their awkwardness with 
freedom, humanists dhgently toil away in the interests of the subject whose wlll to 
know fuels the desire for objective and normative truth. Kant, for example, not only 
proposes a pietist morality as the limit to action, as is places ”all good conduct in 
man% subordination and subjection of his wdl to the discipline and training of a 
duty laid before his mental vision”, but he suggests that, whilst this limit prevents 
man ”from fanatically disorienting h e l f  among imagined moral excellences”, it 
also ”assign[s] limits of humility (it!., of ~elf-knowledge)”,~~3 which is the desire 
pivotal to the will to know. 
I further underlmed humanism’s ambivalence toward freedom in sections 
6.iii. and 6.iv.. Here, I portrayed how Foucault distinpshes an aesthetics of 
existence, whch is based on an ascetic ehcal relation to self, from a codified moral 
of existence under the tutelage of others, whether the abbot, pastor or psychiatrist, 
who mediate the hermeneutic relation to self and subordinate ethics to moral 
conduct.104 For example, without a prior critical hstorical critique which, in spite of 
the continuity of moral austerity, demonstrates that in the problematisation of sex 
from the point of view of erotics there is a discontinuity in the ethical constitution 
of subjectivity between pre-platonic, platonic, stoic and augustinian erotics, 
interpretive critique is unable to conceive of the practical relation to self that 
predates early Christianity’s hermeneutic relation. In fact, because Taylor 
understands occidental subjectivity to origlnate with ”the Christian understanding 
of the will”, he is forced into an irrelevant rhetorical criticism of Foucault - “Can we 
toss aside the whole tradition of Augustinian inwardness [as Foucault wants us 
to]”?105-by the fact that Taylor’s articulation of moral ontology settles for early 
Christian thought in the fourth and fifth century as the origin of ethico-morality. 
Consequently, because he refuses to acknowledge Foucault’s elucidation of 
subjectivity’s dispersed beginnings in the ethical practices of the pre-christian 
subject, Taylor and other humanists remain enthralled by a philosophy of the 
subject instead of a philosophy that is concerned with the practice of freedom. 
lo3 Kant, ”Inquiry into the A Priori Operations of the Will”, pp. 126-127. 
104 For instance, Kant touches on the practices of the self insofar as a stoical regime of mental health 
fosters homo noumenon‘s mastery over homo phznomenon. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 266-272. 
Io5 Taylor, ”Foucault on Freedom and Truth”, p. 183. Cf. Foucault, The Use ofPleusure, pp. 253-254. 
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7.iv. The Intellectual Praxis of the Critical Ontologist 
Through a critical history of the thought on humanism’s path to enlightenment, 
archzology highlights how epistemological critique produces less an objective 
experience of who we are than man’s perspective of the same on it, whlst 
genealogy points out that political critique reflects the might of this perspectivism 
in terms of the normative experience of confined exclusion for the different and the 
objectification and subjection of man into a normalised citizen. Humanism’s 
implicit fear of freedom, which masquerades as various philosophies of the subject 
and implores a will to know objectivity and normativity, exacerbates the 
submission of subjectivity. My aim in this penultimate section is thus to illustrate 
the intellectual praxis of the critical ontologist, which as I argue below encapsulates 
Foucault’s modern attitude and ascetic aesthetics of existence that leads to ethical 
subjectivity; that is, in contrast to humanism’s inability to foster freedom, critical 
ontology affirms enlightenment. 
To respond to the earlier criticisms of Foucault’s alleged anormative critique 
and amoral freedom, which translates into an incoherent intellectual praxis that 
frustrates critical thought, it is fruitful to underscore the humanist and nietzschean 
paths to enlightenment. In view of the realist assumption that words represent 
things, the legislator’s and interpreter’s hstory of reason, which is above or latent 
within the world, promises a theoretical refinement of objective and normative 
experience to the extent that, on humanism’s path to enhghtenment, reason re- 
assures modernity of its evolution toward the self-realisation of autonomous man% 
authentic being in recogrution. However, for a nominalist like Foucault, to know 
who we are it is, as I emphasised in section 4.ii., vital to recount the hstory of the 
words which represent things, as ”the hstory of various forms of rationality is 
sometimes more effective in unsetthg our certitudes and dogmatism than is 
abstract criticism” .Io6 
Because modernity creates as it undercuts the conditions which make 
maturity possible, critique confronts the ambivalence of modernity’s rationality in 
order to make the will to know conscious of itself as a problem. Through a critical 
history of confined exclusion, discipline, regulation and political rationality, which 
I detailed in sections 5.i., 5.v., 5.vi. and 6.ii., respectively, Foucault’s self-confessed 
nietzscheanism realises Nietzsche’s premonition of what a viable path to 
enlightenment nece~sitates:~O~ ”[Wlhat sense would our entire existence have, if not 
Foucault, ”Politics and Reason”, p. 83. 
Io7 Foucault, “The Return of Morality”, p. 251. 
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this that in ourselves this will to truth has become conscious of itself as a 
problem”?108 Foucault gives the will to know a consciousness of itself as a problem 
in terms of finitude as pouvoirlsavoir, which answers the central question in 
modern critical thought: “How is it possible to exist as rational beings, who are 
fortunately destined to practice a rationality that is unfortunately shot through with 
intrinsic dangers”?1Dg 
Evidently, Foucault is no more the cause of the death of the philosopher than 
merit is the measure of success. Rather, because of h s  nietzschean path to 
enhghtenment, Foucault’s critique of finitude and hs notion of freedom that is apt 
to the present fall on deaf ears. Nevertheless, he willingly pleads guilty to the 
murder in Paris of humanism’s emissary of truth, the universal intellectual,110 who 
in a like-minded manner to the legislator and interpreter displays an aristocratic 
demeanour of distance from power, as well as a lack of empirical verlfication in 
hs intellectual praxis.112 Sartre’s engagement in the 1960s as an existential sociali~t,~~3 
who as the agent of the progress of man’s freedom that grounds epistemologco- 
political critique ”interferes in idmt does not concern him”,114 is Foucault’s main 
example of the universal intellectual.115 
Critical hstory that locates truth within pouvoirlsavoir means that Foucault 
declines the role of the kantian judge, the hegelian universal witness, or the 
rawlsian or taylorian referee who arbitrates moral doctrines and ontologles.116 His 
refusal to legslate or legtimate to others, or what Franqois Ewald calls Foucault’s 
thought without confession,117 arises because, as I argued in sections 4.iii. and 4.iv., 
lo8 Nietzsche, A Genealogy ofMorals, p. 220. 
lo9 “Cornnzen t pouuons-nous exister en tant qu’itres rationnels, heureusement vouks U pratiquer une rationalitc‘ 
qui est rnalheureusenzenf trauersee par des dangers intrinseques”? Foucault, ”Espace, savoir et pouvoir”, p. 
279. 
110 Foucault, ”La fonction politique de l’intellectuel”, pp. 110-111. 
Jennings, “Introduction: Mandarins and Samurais”, p. 22. 
112 T h  can be contrasted with what Pierre Bourdieu calls Foucault’s desire to know lumself 
generically in the unthought, whch entads the retrieval of the empirical conditions of possibility 
behmd objective and normative experience. Bourdieu, ”A Free Thinker: ’Do not ask me who I am”’, 
pp. 81-82; Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophxum”, pp. 188-192. 
113 On Sartre’s fusion of existential freedom with marxist structures, see Barnes, ”Sartre’s Ontology”; 
McBride, ”Sartre and Marxism”; Meszaros, The Work of Sartre, pp. 78-87. 
114 Sartre, “ A  Plea for Intellectuals”, p. 244 and p. 264. 
115 In his re-affirmation of critical thought after the Vichy repme, Sartre personifies 1960s humanism 
that operates on the assumption of anthropological dialectical history. See, for example, Camus, 
”Discours de Suede”; Nizan, The Watchdogs, pp. 9-14; Sartre, ”Presentation”, pp. 2-8; Sartre, What is 
Literature?, pp. 127-171. 
116  Foucault, ”Confinement, Psychatry, Prison”, pp. 196-197. 
117 Ewald, “Foucault, une pens& sans aveu”, p. 46. 
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although an archzology of objectivity’s transcendental condition of existence of 
savoir is an advance over humanism’s formal a priori, man, Foucault’s attempt to 
push beyond him with the materiality of language founders as an explanation of 
the cause that effects transformation in discursive practices. After May 1968, 
Foucault defers connaissnnce to the non-discursive practices of pouzioir. As I 
suggested in sections 4.v. and 5.ii., the archzolopst is also concerned with a 
genealogy of pouvoir. Much to the consternation of the powers that be at the CoZZ2ge 
de France,lls Foucault extricates himself from an ideolopcal basis of dissidence and 
assumes the role of a specific intellectual.119 
Foucault says that if ”I do the analyses I do it is ... because I have been 
involved in certain conf l~c ts” .~~~ The critical ontologist, who transforms himself 
through critical hstory and invests his research in critique that gives shape to 
maturity,121 works in the ”constraints of the present time ... [and] locates and marks 
the weak points”.12 Located in the intersubjective capdlary pouvoir that is 
elucidated and reconceived by Foucault,123 whch I articulated in sections 5.iii., 5.iv. 
and 6.i., the critical ontologst recopses  that he, too, is an object and an instrument 
of regimes of truth.124 His critique of extra-juridical pouvoirlsavoir has no more than 
a specific, local sigmficance,125 which is why speaking for others on the basis of a 
phdosophcal subject would be an indignity.126 Or rather, he does not speak for the 
oppressed so much as enable them to speak: La parole aux &tenus!, as he encourages 
in h s  support of prison ref0rm.12~ In so doing, he opens up new spaces of possibllity 
and thought, whch allows those who are directly affected to correct what is 
wrong.128 
Bourdieu terms h s  the critical ontologist’s bidimensional nature.129 He is an 
academic phdosopher who works within systems of thought-critique is his 
118 On Foucault’s engagement, see Eribon, Michel Foucault, pp. 327-336; Macey, The Lives ofMichel 
Foucault, ch. 12; Miller, La Passion Foucault, pp. 215-225. 
119 Foucault, ”Confinement, Psychatry, Prison”, pp. 193-195. 
Foucault, ”Questions on Geography”, p. 65. 
Bourdieu, ”’Fieldwork in phdosophy”’, p. 29. 
Foucault, “Power and Sex”, p. 124. 
123 Foucault, ”Truth and Power”, p. 116. 
124 Foucault, “Les intellectuels et le pouvoir”, p. 308. 
Foucault, ”La fonction politique de l’intellectuel”, p. 109. 
126 Foucault, “Intellectuals and Power”, p. 209. 
lz7 Foucault, “Le grand enfermement”, pp. 301-304. 
lzs Nietzsche, The Will to Puwer, 5 977, p. 512. 
129 Bourdieu, ”Fourth Lecture, Universal Corporatism”, pp. 656-658. 
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prax iP-  as well as a specific intellectual who engages in politics by manipulating 
the knowledge and methods of academic analysis.131 The specific intellectual 
perceives the intolerable. In virtue of his privileged status within the university,132 
he brings subjugated knowledge to prominence.133 Theory is a toolkit with which to 
analyse, step by reflective step, ”the specificity of mechanisms of power, . . . [and to] 
build little by little a strategic knowledge”.134 Critique, Foucault claims, liberates the 
thought particular to a struggle and makes ”transformations urgent enough for 
people to want to carry them out and difficult enough to carry them out for them to 
be profoundly rooted in reality1?35 
The critical ontologist, who is a philosophy professor and a citizen keen to see 
critique manifest freedom, represents Foucault’s endeavour to make sense of the 
ethco-moral question that is posed by 1968.136 Maurice Blanchot sums up the 
critical ontolopt’s bidimensional nature well when he compares hun to the 
politically engaged citizen who lacks the theoretical tools for critique. The specific 
intellectual, Blanchot suggests, ”is like a sentry: he is always alert and keeps watch 
over politics, while his vi@ expresses a care for others rather than kus own 
concerns” .137 
A critical ontologist is a philosopher devoted to Ze souci lie soi, the care of 
himself through critical thought. He is also a citizen who is unafraid to use h i s  
understanding without the guidance of another, which translates into a concern for 
le souci des autres, the care for - but not of - others. At a minimum, he cares that the 
constitutional rights of others are legally enforced,’% whether they be those of 
students who demand the non-interference of politicians in their Vincennes 
curriculum,139 or rights which pertain to the miscarriages of justice by a 
conservative judiciary against youth,140 refugee~,’4~ or the living conditions of 
I3O Foucault, ”Intellectuals and Power”, p. 208. 
13’ Foucault, “The Concern for Truth”, pp. 263-264. 
132 Bourdieu, ”The uses of the ’people”’, p. 151. 
133 Foucault, “L’intellectuel sert a rassembler les idees”, p. 421; Foucault, Je perqois I’intolerable”, pp. 
204-205. 
134 Foucault, ”Powers and Strategies”, p. 145. 
135 Foucault, “Practicing Criticism”, p. 155. 
136 Gordon, ”Afterword”, p. 233. 
137 ”[L’intellectuel est] . . . comme un guetteur qui n’est la [dans la politique] que pour veiller, se nzaintenir en 
iveil, attendre par une attention active ou s’exprime rnoins le sou& de soi-mime que le souci des autres”. 
Blanchot, Les intellectuels en question, p. 13. 
138 Foucault, ”Verite, pouvoir et soi”, p. 782. 
139 Foucault, “Le piege de Vincennes”. 
140 Foucault, “Meeting VeritkJustice. 1500 Grenoblois accusent” 
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prisoners due to society’s over imprisonment of the population.142 For Foucault, the 
critical ontologist directs critique at the truth effected by pouvoirlsavoir, though not 
out of a desire ”to know if it is possible to construct a new politics of truth . . . [or] to 
change a person’s ’consciousness’’’, but because from the perspective of Nietzsche’s 
path to enlightenment critique targets ”the political, economic and institutional 
regime that produces the truth” and defines finitude.143 
7.v. A Modern Attitude of Critique and Ascetic IEsthetic Maturity 
Because Foucault is clear about who we are as subjects of humanist critical thought, 
in which maturity is constituted by the political rationality of the modern state and 
its mechanisms of disciplme and regulation, he leaves the question about what we 
are open.144 Foucault’s originality lies in ”h is  refusal to convert our finitude into the 
basis for new certainties”.145 Instead, through his diagnosis of f i n i t ~ d e , ’ ~ ~  the critical 
ontologist oversees the revolving door of modernity’s ambivalent rationality that 
harbours maturity.147 He is an aptator of the experience of who we are, with the 
express intent of making facile gestures diffi~ult.1~8 The critical ontologist, Veyne 
suggests, 
[is] a warrior in the trenches . . . who has enough energy to fight without having 
to jus* himself in order to reassure himself. ... The course of history ... only 
offers valorizations that differ from one culture to another and even from one 
individual to another, valorizations that, as Foucault was fond of saying, are 
neither true nor false: they are, that’s all.*49 
Due to his bidimensional nature, which translates into the care for himself 
and others such that he acts and is not a fatalist in hs agtation from the trenches, 
the critical ontologst displays a modem attitude of critique in respect of finitude 
and a concomitant ontology for maturity of an ascetic aesthetics of existence, and in 
t h s  concluding section I bring together Foucault’s thought and action to 
14’ Foucault, ”Le probleme des rehgies”. 
14* Foucault, ”Enquete sur les prisons”, pp. 179-181; Foucault, “(Manifeste du G. I. I?.)”, p. 174. 
143 "[Die savoir s‘il est possible de constituer une nouvelle politique de la veritC. Le probleme n’est pas de 
clzanger la ’conscience’ des gens ou ce qu’ils ont dans la tcte; mais le rigime pozitique, Cconomique, institutionncl 
de production de la verity. Foucault, “La fonction politique de l’intellectuel”, p. 114. 
144 Gordon, ”Foucault in Britain”, p. 268. 
145 Veyne, ”The Final Foucault and His E h c s ” ,  p. 5. 
146 Foucault, ”Foucault repond a Sartre”, p. 665. 
147 Foucault, “Espace, savoir et pouvoir”, p. 279. 
148 Foucault, ”Practicing Criticism”, p. 155. 
149 Veyne, ”The Final Foucault and His E h c s ” ,  pp. 2-3. 
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demonstrate how, through Nietzsche and Kant, he exemplifies enlightenment 
critical thought. 
As a follower of Nietzsche’s path to enlightenment, Foucault approaches 
maturity with a preceding analysis of finitude, subsequent to which he suggests 
how to be within it. Critical history is a hyppoliteanfinitude plzilosophique of man’s 
limit of pouvoirl savoir, whilst critical ontology reflects the freedom appropriate to 
it.’% At first, archzology discerns the savoir behind the discursive practices that 
articulate what we tl-unk and how we act, wlulst a genealogy of pouuoir higwghts 
the possibility for the transformation of the thought and action which informs 
experience.I5l If what Heidegger describes as Kant’s critical ontology requires that 
one knows the h u t s  of knowledge in order not to transgress them,15* and one 
searches for the transcendental structures of consciousness which have universal 
value, then Foucault’s critique of finitude employs genealogy to reveal the 
contingent and arbitrary within the universal and obligatory, which initially is 
excavated by arch~ology.’53 When critical history is amalgamated with a limit- 
attitude, the outcome is a critical ontology of who we are in the present.’% As a 
historico-practical test of b t s  and an exposure of the virtual fractures or spaces of 
freedom, critical ontology pursues maturity as a transformative practice vis-a-vis 
finit~de.15~ 
With regard to Nietzsche, Foucault mirrors his e h c  as a philosopher. In 
imitation of the etlucal subject in antiquity and early Christianity, which I analysed 
in sections 6.iv., 6.v. and 6.vi., the philosopher displays the ascetic care of humself, 
or the ”exercise of self upon self by which one tries to . . . transform one’s self and to 
attain a certain mode of being”.’56 In these personal moments of what I alluded to in 
section 1.iii. as a politics of critique, the critical ontologist’s thoughts arise with the 
same necessity that a tree bears fruit, though “[wlhether they are pleasant to your 
taste, these fruits of ours?-But what matters that to the trees! What matters that to 
us, the philosophers!”.157 Yet, in contrast to Nietzsche, Foucault’s critique that cares 
for others involves an identrfication with the weak and vanquished, and as such 
I5O Foucault, “Jean Hyppolite. 1907-1968”’ p. 781. 
15’ Foucault, ”’What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 46. 
15* Heidegger, ”Kant’s Thesis about Being”, pp. 349-350. 
153 Foucault, ”’What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 45. 
Foucault, ‘”What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 47. 
155 Foucault, “Critical Theory/Intellectual History”, pp. 36-37. 
Foucault, ”The ethic of the care for the self”, p. 2. 
157 Nietzsche, A Genealogy of MoruZs, p. 3. 
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critical ontology surpasses Nietzsche. Foucault does not settle for the stoical amor 
fati of the iibermensclz-namely, ”that one wants nothing to be different, not 
forward, not backward, ... [nlot merely bear what is necessary, ... but love it”1a- 
and critical hstory does not hasten his a~riva1.l~~ After the death of God and his 
reincarnation as man, Foucault shies away from the prescription of certainties or 
substitutes such as the Ubermensclz. In their place, he suggests an aesthetics of 
existence, which places “at the center of both thought and action the imaginative 
creativity which has been exiled to the exclusive practice of art”? 
Similarly, to the extent that one ”is not likely to arrive at Nietzsche . . . without 
having first travelled via Kant”,161 Foucault’s debt to Kant incorporates, as with his 
sluft beyond Nietzsche, a reformulation of enlightenment critical thought. It is most 
obvious in respect of critique that precedes and gives rise to, rather than proceeds 
from, ontology.‘ Because ”modern philosophy is the phdosophy that is attempting 
to answer ... Was  ist Aufklarung?”,162 Foucault understands Aufklarung as an 
ongoing process and obligation to exit from the immature use of reason in thought 
and action. Escape is both institutional and spiritual, or political and ethical.’63 
Kant’s reflection on the present as difference in history, which specifies 
phdosophy’s task of critique, implores what Foucault terms an attitude of 
modernity. It implies neither a sequel to, nor a rupture with, Aufkliirung.lU An 
attitude of modernity is: 
a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain 
people; in the end, a way of thlnking or feehg; a way, too, of acting and 
behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and 
presents itself as a task.165 
Further, insofar as what it is to be modern moves away from a longtudinal 
relation to the past to a cfirect, sapttal relation to the present,166 modernity is ”the 
transient, the fleeting, the contingent; it is one half of art, the other being the eternal 
lS8 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, quoted in Nancy, The Birth fo Presence, p. 397, f. 3. 
lS9 Bove, ”Mendacious Innocents”, pp. 381-383. 
Bernauer, ”Michel Foucault’s Ecstatic Thinking”, p. 71. 
161 Gordon, “Foucault in Britain”, p. 258. 
Foucault, ”’What is Enhghtenment?”’, p. 32. 
163 Foucault, “‘What is Enlightenment?”’, pp. 33-35. 
Foucault, ”’What is Enlightenment?’”, pp. 38-39. 
Foucault, ”‘What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 39. 
166 Foucault, “Kant on Enlightenment and revolution”, p. 12. 
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and the immovable”.167 Foucault’s modern attitude, which he borrows from Charles 
Baudelaire, bypasses the JZneur’s sensitivity to the contingent with an ironic ”will 
to ’heroize‘ the present”,’@ for to be modern is ”to extract from fashion the poetry 
that resides in its historical en~elope”.~6~ A modern attitude and a concern for 
maturity necessitate: 
the difficult interplay between the truth of what is real and the exercise of 
freedom ... . [The] high value of the present is indissociable from a desperate 
eagerness to imagine it ... otherwise than it is ... . Baudelarian modernity is an 
exercise in which extreme attention to what is real is confronted with the 
practice of liberty that simultaneously respects this reality and violates it.I70 
To his modern baudelarian attitude to the present, Foucault adds a 
relationship with oneself that is constituted by an indispensable asceticism. As I 
hghlighted in sections 6.v. and 6.vi., he retrieves the model for it from antiquity, 
where a practical relation to self that is defined by the agonistic mastery of oneself 
enables the ethico-political self’s moderation of humself and his government of 
others. Foucault, who discards the asymmetrical relations to others that is 
concomitant with greek antiquity’s practical relation to self, preserves the agonistic 
element. He combines it with the ethico-social self‘s rational care of oneself in 
grzco-roman antiquity, which leads to the continuous conversion to himself. Llke 
the dandy, who neither accepts humelf as the same in the flux of the contingent, nor 
discovers hmself in the face of it, Foucault’s ascetic agonism replaces being, or a 
hermeneutics of the autonomous self’s authentic being that is affirmed in 
recogrution, with the ongoing process of becoming.171 It is an ethos of dandysnw, 
whch requires the ascetic production of oneself and an aesthetic invention of forms 
of maturity.172 
If, for Kant, Aufklamng “simultaneously problematizes man’s relation to the 
present, man’s historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an 
autonomous subject’’,ln with Foucault there is a permanent re-activation of a 
modern attitude of critique and an ascetic zsthetic maturity. He asks how we are 
constituted as subjects of our own knowledge, as subjects who exercise or submit to 
167 Baudelaire, ”The Painter of Modem Life”, p. 403. 
Foucault, “‘What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 40. 
169 Baudelaire, “The Painter of Modem Life”, p. 402. 
Foucault, “’What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 41. 
171 Foucault, “Michel Foucault, une interview”, p. 736. 
Foucault, ”’What is Enlightenment?”’, pp. 41-42. 
Foucault, “’What is Enhghtenment?”’, p. 42. 
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power relations, and as moral subjects of our own actions.174 With a critical history 
of thought, Foucault historicises Kant’s philosophical questions: how have my 
questions been produced and the path of my knowing determined? (versus what 
can I know?); how have I been situated to experience the real and how does 
exclusion operate in delineating the realm of obligation for me? (versus what ought 
I to do?); and what are the struggles in which I am engaged and how have the 
parameters for my aspirations been defined? (versus what may I hope for?)? 
These questions define the terrain of foucauldian critique. In contrast to the 
legislative and interpretive critique on the humanist path to enlightenment, 
foucauldian critique does not take its orientation from a philosophy of the subject’s 
autonomy, recognition, political liberty or political liberation. Instead, because man 
who shoulders epistemologxo-political truth is the subject of games ”of rules for 
the production of truth” within the lirnits of pou~oir/snvoir,’~~ Foucault’s critique is 
prior to an ontology. The inquiries critical history demands: 
have their methodologxal coherence in the at once archaeological and 
genealogical study of practices envisaged simultaneously as a technological 
type of rationality and as strategic games of liberties; they have their theoretical 
coherence in the definition of the historically unique forms in which the 
generalities of our relations to things, to others, to ourselves, have been 
problematized. They have their practical coherence in the care brought to the 
process of putting historico-critical reflection to the test of concrete practices.1n 
Foucault’s maturity that comes to light on the back of a modern attitude of 
critique is fundamentally a practice of freedom. The teZos is an aesthetic style of 
existence, whch does not mean a distinct image or status but, as Veyne argues, 
the word [style] is to be taken in the sense of the Greeks, for whom an artist was 
first of all an artisan and a work of art was first of all a work. ... [Tlhe self, 
taking itself as a work to be accomphshed, could sustain an ethics that is no 
longer supported by either tradition or reason; as an artist of itself, the self 
would enjoy that autonomy that modernity can no longer do w i t h 0 ~ t . l ~ ~  
Foucault’s state of being autonomous in thought and action is an ascetic 
ethical practice with political overtures: ascetic and ethical because subjectivity is 
stylised by practices of the self, ”for what is morality, if not the practice of 
174 Foucault, “‘What is Enhghtenment?”’, pp. 42-49. 
175 Bernauer, ”Michel Foucault’s Ecstatic Thking”,  pp. 46-47. 
176 Foucault, ”The e h c  of the care for the self”, p. 16. 
In Foucault, “’What is Enlightenment?”’, p. 50. 
178 Veyne, ”The Final Foucault and His Etlucs”, p. 7. 
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liberty?";179 and political because, vis-a-vis the pouvoirl savoir that tends to states of 
domination, ethical subjectivity is necessarily an agonistic practice that is 
constituted over against finitude through transitory coalitions of individuals,180 who 
once they acheve liberation effect new relations of governmentality, which in turn 
calls for the aesthetic (re)stylisation of existence?' 
Along Nietzsche's path to enhghtenment, politics is an ethics.182 At the very 
least, there is an acknowledgement of the political in e h c s .  In place of humanism's 
philosophical subject, who is the foundation for moral being, the maturity that 
leads one to enlightenment entails an ethical subjectivity in which one is always 
becoming. Whence the priority for Foucault of a kantian notion of critique which, 
although not defined by a faithfulness to the doctrinal elements of AujkZiirung, 
"requires work on our hmits, that is, a patient labor gwing form to our impatience 
for liberty"? ' 
After all, man is an animal whose will to know, because it is inextricable from 
relations of power, places  IS maturity in political question. And insofar as the 
philosophcal answer to it is provided by critical thought that heralds 
enlightenment, then as I have argued in this dissertation Foucault personifies it 
with a histoire critique de la pens&, in whch critique on our hnits gives form to an 
ontology. 
179 Foucault, "The ethic of the care for the self", p. 4. 
Foucault, "The Confession of the Flesh", p. 208. 
181 Foucault, "The etluc of the care for the self", pp. 3-4. 
Foucault, "Politics and Ehcs" ,  p. 375. 
m3 Foucault, "'What is Enlightenment?"', p. 50. 
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